The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that Emergency Management Victoria – in collaboration with the emergency management sector and as part of the emergency management planning reforms:
a) review, update and confirm arrangements for all tiers of control, including the flexible application of areas of operations, with a particular focus on the triggers for activation, integration with other tiers of control and clearly defined roles and responsibilities
b) exercise these arrangements to ensure they are appropriate and familiar during emergencies. 

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that the State review (and where necessary amend) legislation including but not limited to the Country Fire Authority Act 1958, Forest Act 1958 and Local Government Act 2020 to:
a) clarify accountability for fuel management across land and fire agencies, public authorities, councils, private organisations and individuals
b) define shared responsibility for fuel management across land and fire agencies, stakeholders and community
c) enable organisations with a legislated responsibility for fuel management to conduct fuel management on behalf of other organisations on land outside of their legislated land tenure, where invited to do so
d) provide consistent protections to all personnel, including volunteers, when carrying out fuel management functions on behalf of their legislated organisation. 

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that Victoria Police – in collaboration with the community and the emergency management sector – reflect on events of the 2019–20 fire season to review and enhance evacuation plans and processes with consideration of:
a) high risk areas (including remote locations)
b) early evacuation triggers
c) the potential for isolated communities
d) the presence of tourists and non-residents
e) individual decisions to not evacuate
f) the inability to evacuate
g) consequence management and compounding events such as the loss of essential services or health impacts. 

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that Emergency Management Victoria works with the emergency management sector and relevant emergency management entities in New South Wales and South Australia to identify and address key cross border operational and resource management issues. This engagement should aim to enhance interoperability and maximise the capability and capacity of agencies to work together during emergencies along Victoria’s borders. 

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that Emergency Management Victoria – in accepting that emergency management is a ‘shared responsibility’ - collaborate with the emergency management sector and community to:
a) establish clear guidance that clarifies the roles and responsibilities of individuals, communities, the private sector, responder agencies and government before, during and after emergencies
b) develop, implement and evaluate an ongoing communications strategy that ensures these roles and responsibilities are well-understood and reiterated throughout the year. 

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that Emergency Management Victoria collaborate with the emergency management sector to develop a capacity model that considers current and future:
a) career and volunteer emergency management personnel requirements
b) identified and trained personnel for surge requirements
c) emergency risks and climate scenarios. 

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that the Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning (or the single entity referenced in Recommendation 4) – in collaboration with the Country Fire Authority and local government – undertake a review of the current residual risk target to ensure that it remains contemporary in terms of its designated percentage value. The review should:
a) involve engagement with land and fire management agencies; public authorities; private organisations; individuals and any other stakeholders with a role in fuel management
b) define a pathway to expanding the residual risk target to apply to all methods of fuel management, with the expansion of the target to apply across all organisations with a legislated responsibility for fuel management
c) become part of a program of review of the State’s land and fuel management policy occurring on a regular basis and not exceeding a five-year cycle. 

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that in conjunction with Inquiry Recommendation 2, the State establish or assign responsibility to a single body or entity to lead and coordinate the implementation of evidence-based fuel management policy, practice and assurance and reporting on activities on both public and private land in Victoria. 

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that Emergency Management Victoria – in partnership with agencies engaged in state, regional and incident control centres:
a) review and update shift roster and handover processes to ensure they are procedurally consistent and support the achievement of objectives at all stages of a protracted event
b) provide training and guidance to ensure shift roster and handover processes are consistently applied in state, regional and incident control centres. 

State and territory governments should ensure those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review those plans, and update where appropriate, to provide for coordination between states and territories in cross border areas and to provide cross-border access to evacuation centres. 

The Australian Government should make provision, in legislation, for a declaration of a state of national emergency. The declaration should include the following components:
(1) the ability for the Australian Government to make a public declaration to communicate the seriousness of a natural disaster
(2) processes to mobilise and activate Australian Government agencies quickly to support states and territories to respond to and recover from a natural disaster, and
(3) the power to take action without a state or territory request for assistance in clearly defined and limited circumstances. 

State and territory governments should ensure that those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review those plans, and update them where appropriate, including in relation to:
(1) roles and responsibilities of state and territory governments, local governments and local communities
(2) education and signage about evacuations and evacuation routes, including education of seasonal populations
(3) the adequacy of evacuation routes; including contingencies if evacuation routes or centres are assessed as not being able to cope, and
(4) the potential inability to evacuate, either by reason of circumstances or personal characteristics. 

State and territory governments should ensure those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review these plans, and update them where appropriate, to account for the existence and standard of any evacuation centres and safer places (however described) in the community, including:
(1) the capacity of a centre to handle seasonal population variation
(2) the suitability of facilities to cater for diverse groups, including vulnerable people, and those evacuating with animals, and
(3) the existence of communications facilities and alternate power sources.

Australian, state and territory governments should work together to develop consistent data standards to measure disaster impact. 

Australian, state and territory governments should continue to explore the feasibility of a national, all-hazard emergency warning app. 

State and territory governments should provide information to the public on the closure and opening of roads. Information should be provided in real-time, or in advance based on predictions, where possible. 

State and territory governments should provide further community education on the function and limitations of different sheltering facilities, including evacuation centres, Neighbourhood Safer Places, places of last resort and natural disaster shelters. This education should be nationally consistent. 

The Australian Government should facilitate state and territory governments working together to develop minimum national standards of information to be included in bushfire warnings apps. 

State and territory governments should include road closure and opening information on all roads within their borders on public apps. 

State and territory governments should, as a priority, adopt nationally consistent terminology and functions for the different sheltering facilities, including evacuation centres, Neighbourhood Safer Places, places of last resort and natural disaster shelters. 

The Australian Government should revise the COMDISPLAN thresholds to provide that a request for Australian Government assistance, including Defence assistance, is able to be made by a state or territory government when:
(1) it has exhausted, or is ‘likely to exhaust’, all government, community and commercial resources
(2) it cannot mobilise its own resources (or community and commercial resources) in time, or
(3) the Australian Government has a capability that the state or territory does not have. 

State and territory governments should urgently deliver and implement thevall-hazard Australian Warning System. 

The Australian Government should review the content of the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community manual to ensure consistency of language and application with a revised COMDISPLAN. 

State and territory governments should expedite the development and implementation of the Australian Fire Danger Rating System. It should ensure that there is national consistency in the visual display of the AFDRS and action to be taken in response to each rating. 

The Australian Government should consider whether employment protections under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) are sufficient to ensure that fire and emergency services volunteers will not be discriminated against, disadvantaged or dismissed for reasons associated with their volunteer service during natural disasters. 

Australian, state and territory governments should review Australian Medical Assistance Team capabilities and procedures and develop necessary training, exercising and other arrangements to build capacity for domestic deployments. 

State and territory governments should ensure that those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review those plans, and update them where appropriate, including in relation to:
(1) key risks that essential service outages have on communities during a severe or catastrophic natural disaster (particularly communications an
power)
(2) availability of essential supplies, including food and water, and
(3) consequence management and compounding events such as the loss of essential services or health impacts. 

That Justice and Community Safety Directorate (JACS) lead a working group from across relevant organisations to undertake the five year review of the Emergencies Act in conjunction with a wholistic review of the Emergency Plan and relevant sub-plans; and recommendations from this review, to the extent they are accepted by Government. Bringing together a small Taskforce of staff from across government for a set period would assist the working group in delivering the work needed to address these and other recommendations.

The Emergencies Act 2004 be amended so that the powers, including delegations, available to an EC be granted on their appointment and remain in place under the same section of the Act for the duration of their appointment rather than being drawn from different sections of the Act that are dependent on the existing alert state for the specified event.

The Government consider amendments to the Emergencies Act to include provision for a Deputy ESA Commissioner.

The CCIP be reviewed in conjunction with the review of the Emergency Plan and the two synchronised. A workable approach to delivering operational emergency communications and strategic WhoG communications is developed with simple and clear reporting arrangements.

The Emergencies Act 2004 be amended to allow for the provision for a Deputy Emergency Controller to be appointed, independent of the initial appointment of an EC. The powers and functions of this appointment to be contingent on the absence of the EC.

The Emergency Plan be amended to better reflect the intent of the Emergencies Act in the establishment of a Management Executive, separate to SEMSOG, on the appointment of an EC. It should describe the role of SEMSOG and the Management Executive as distinct in the emergency management architecture.

Review, refine and implement the joint ESA/EPSDD Arrangement for Fire Management in the ACT with the previous recommendation in mind.

The Emergencies Act 2004 be amended to allow for the appointment of the EC to be made for a discretionary time period of up to 28 days with the requirement for a legislated review of the appointment to be removed. Alternatively, a period of review should fall within the Chief Ministers discretion for up to seven (7) days following appointment.

In collaboration with other jurisdictions the ACT share the learnings for this bushfire event and work to officially embedded values officers and RRATs as key elements of bushfire response.

Efforts be increased to build trust, confidence and a common operating picture across PCS and RFS and seek mechanisms that identifies RFS and PCS as equitable partners in delivery of fire management across the territory.

A Relocation and Evacuation working group be established from stakeholder organisations to consider and develop an Evacuation and Relocations Sub- Plan. The Sub-Plan should consider the lessons learned this year and address principles, lead agency, WHoG coordination, trigger points etc. This could be the same working group formed for reviewing the Emergencies Act, Plan and sub-plans.

The five year review of the Emergencies Act examine amendments to better define the rationale for a State of Alert / State of Emergency whilst ensuring that the relevant Minister / Chief Minister still has sufficient discretion to make a declaration based on advice from relevant Government officials and committees.

The BFC Terms of Reference be reviewed to ensure they are contemporary and reflect learnings from this and recent bushfire seasons.

NDIA be engaged in regard to information sharing in emergencies as part of the above actions.

The working group (Rec 1) should include relevant stakeholders deciding collectively what the declaration might mean for such things as sub and supporting plans and the relevant community messages and calls to action.

The ACT Emergencies Act 2004 be amended to clarify that the powers of the EC encompass the power to direct agencies and directorates to share personal information for the preservation of life and protection of Canberrans.
For example: Direct a person to give information, answer questions or produce documents or anything else, reasonably needed. To remove any doubt, a direction to provide information that is given to a person includes information that person has access to on behalf of an organisation or entity that holds relevant information.

The Emergency Plan and ECC Ops Plan be amended to better articulate the delivery of emergency management vs the delivery of the emergency plan. The Plan should facilitate principles for emergency management and clear role delineations whilst allowing flexibility in how the mechanisms are structured.

ACT Government undertake a detailed legislative review to ensure that information regarding vulnerable community members can be appropriately accessed, provided and used during an emergency event.

That the NSW RFS identifies remote bush fire prone areas that do not already have an indoor Neighbourhood Safer Place (NSP) and upgrades the relevant NSW RFS Stations to meet NSP guidelines. These stations would require adequate Asset Protection Zones and active/passive protection systems to provide short-term protection.

That, in order to ensure evacuation arrangements can be scaled up when needed, Resilience NSW:
a) ensure staff who are willing to be deployed to evacuation centres are trained as soon as possible to bolster evacuation centre staff surge capacity
b) train council and NSW government regional staff in evacuation centre establishment and management, supported by a one-page ‘start up sheet’ for opening an evacuation centre
c) enable interested community members to be trained to assist in evacuation centre establishment and management and provide an avenue for skilled volunteers to register their interest
d) develop an exercise for the management of multiple evacuation centres dealing with large numbers of people for a protracted period over a widespread area.

That, in order to improve support for people evacuating with animals, the Department of Primary Industries:
a) work with Resilience NSW to develop evacuation protocols and procedures to ensure appropriate supports are provided for both people and animals (informed by the findings from Project Ohana), including a process for animal registration at evacuation centres and mutually agreed naming conventions, and provide this information to Local Emergency Management Committees (LEMCs)
b) work with LEMCs to identify overflow sites that can be used for evacuated animals when preferred sites are full
c) further develop the domestic pets evacuation protocol.

That the NSW RFS Commissioner consult with the Fire and Rescue NSW Commissioner and other emergency services to develop a protocol in the event that simultaneous emergency events necessitate the re-allocation of resources while a Section 44 declaration is in place.

That, in order to improve cross-agency communication and coordination during bush fires, the NSW RFS review Fire Control Centres (FCCs) in areas that were heavily affected by fire. The results should be combined with the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Facilities Review to identify areas that would benefit from a purpose-built FCC, enabling co-location with the EOC.

That Government commit to:
a) evaluating existing bush fire preparedness programs to determine the most effective and efficient approach given increased frequency of extreme fire seasons, and develop outcomes-based measures to monitor programs’ impact over time
b) post-evaluation roll out the most effective bush fire preparedness programs to all communities and at-risk cohorts in bush fire prone areas across NSW.

That the NSW RFS include the following priorities in the Fires Near Me improvements roadmap:
a) text enlargement functionality
b) a clear statement about the app’s limitations and the importance of heeding public warnings and relying on personal observations
c) fire spread prediction maps on extreme/catastrophic days d) update fire map information as technology improves.

That, in order to enhance fire fighting strategies in severe conditions, the NSW RFS implements the following in respect to backburning:
a) establish protocols for each category (tactical and strategic) within their operational and training doctrine. These protocols should include lessons learnt from the 2019-20 season
b) modify ‘ICON’ to implement the capability to record all backburns, including whether or not they break containment lines
c) when fire conditions are approaching Severe or above, an independent review must be undertaken at State Operations Level before strategic backburns are implemented
d) where there is significant concern within a community regarding a backburn, the NSW RFS should undertake a community engagement session with affected residents to discuss the backburn, including any investigation and relevant findings.

That, in order to ensure equitable access to evacuation centres and associated support services for people in border communities, Resilience NSW ensure cross-border access arrangements are reflected in evacuation centre management guidelines.

That, in order to ensure all agencies have a clear understanding of cross-border communication channels during bush fires, all MoUs between state or territory agencies include an agreed protocol about how agencies will communicate across borders and that these are reflected in Incident Action Plans.

That in order to provide greater consistency in public information and warnings, especially in border areas:
a) the finalisation of the Australian Warning System be prioritised to provide greater consistency in public information and warnings
b) the NSW State Emergency Management Committee, including the Public Information and Warnings Sub-Committee, prioritise the implementation of the Australian Warning System and data standards for relevant hazards within NSW.

That, in order to provide real-time information on evacuation doorknocking during emergency events, Government explore a shared data gateway for NSW agencies based on the NSW State Emergency Service Collector app and a common mapping and analytics platform.

That, in order to ensure the safety of local landholders on firegrounds, the NSW RFS emphasises the importance of local landholders using protective clothing while fire fighting as part of the RFS’ ‘Farm Fire Unit Integration’ priority for 2020-21.

That, in order to ensure the safety and wellbeing of vulnerable people during an evacuation, Resilience NSW:
a) identify aged care facilities in fire and flood prone areas, and ensure that emergency plans are in place and comply with the Evacuation Decision Guidelines for Private Health and Residential Care Facilities
b) develop/refresh evacuation centre protocols to specifically address the needs of vulnerable people.

That, in order to ensure emergency response agencies can communicate across state and territory borders, the Commonwealth Government allocate 10 + 10 MHz as a dedicated spectrum for Public Safety Mobile Broadband (PSMB) at no cost to states and territories.

That, in order to ensure recommendations accepted by the Government are implemented in a timely and transparent manner, Government establish a central accountability mechanism to track implementation of recommendations from bush fire-related reviews and inquiries and consider expanding this to other policy areas.

That, in order to improve information flows and increase public awareness of ABC emergency broadcasts, Government:
a) include an ABC Manager in the Public Information Functional Area Coordinator (PIFAC) team within the State Operations Centre
b) strategically place roadside signage with local/regional ABC station frequency band throughout the State.

That, in order to improve the provision of evidence-based public health messaging about air quality during bush fire events, Government develop a public education campaign and supporting systems before the next bush fire season. This should include:
- a public education campaign (like sun exposure), to help people make their own decisions about exposure to bush fire smoke
- tailored messaging to target:
* smoke-vulnerable cohorts of the community
* general practitioners, particularly in rural and regional areas, so they can advise patients with relevant, susceptible comorbidities
* employers, to support development of appropriate workplace health and safety guidance for outdoor workers
* an improved air quality alert system such as an enhanced Air Rater app.

That, in order to ensure the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC) can maintain communications during emergencies, the Government provide the SEOC with independent Public Safety Network functionality.

That the NSW RFS work with AFAC to analyse the impact of changing fire seasons on inter- jurisdictional resource sharing agreements, both domestic and international, and determine any flow-on effects for NSW fire fighting personnel capacity.

That, in order to ensure the guiding principles and approval processes are contemporary, streamlined and more flexible, the NSW and Commonwealth Governments review the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) arrangements. This review should include the circumstances in which the State can request Commonwealth assistance, and the level of information provided by the ADF to the State on available resources and capabilities.

That Government amend the Rural Fires Act 1997 so that all public land management agencies be required to forward complaints received about bush fire hazards to the Commissioner of the NSW RFS. As an interim measure, heads of agencies should commence this practice immediately.

That, in order to ensure evacuation centres are fit-for-purpose, Resilience NSW work with Local Emergency Management Committees (LEMCs) to:                                                                                                                                       a) update the guidelines for LEMCs identifying evacuation centres to require a risk assessment of potential locations, which should include identifying alternate sources of power for use by evacuation centres and recording these appropriately
b) review existing evacuation centre locations to assess compliance with updated LEMC guidelines and report to the State Emergency Management Committee on their suitability.

That, in order to improve fireground communications between NSW agencies and interstate personnel:                                      a) Government ensure all NSW fire authority personnel and vehicles can access and utilise the Public Safety Network (PSN). This should include access to NSW RFS Private Mobile Radio networks where PSN coverage is not yet available.
b) the NSW Telco Authority review cross-border communications availability and planning and advise NSW fire authorities on next steps to enable multi-state interoperability for wide area communications.

That Resilience NSW review existing functional area arrangements to ensure they are closely aligned to agencies responsible for direct service delivery.

That, to strengthen cross-agency accountability and deliver improved bush fire risk management outcomes:
a) Bush Fire Coordinating Committee (BFCC) members from NSW government agencies are at the level of Coordinator General/Deputy Secretary/Agency Head/Deputy Commissioner (or equivalent)
b) the BFCC ensures all Bush Fire Risk Management Plans, Operation Coordination Plans and Fire Access and Fire Trail (FAFT) Plans are compliant with the timeframes outlined in section 52 of the Rural Fires Act as soon as practicable
c) the BFCC develops a risk-based performance auditing cycle to ensure Bush Fire Risk Management Plans, Operation Coordination Plans and FAFT Plans are fit-for-purpose and any opportunities for improvement are identified and actioned
d) the NSW RFS considers the best way of enhancing the transparency of BFCC decision-making, for example by publishing BFCC membership and minutes on its website
e) the BFCC endorses the annual statement to Parliament on the likely fire risk and the effectiveness of planning and preparation
f) relevant agencies review Bush Fire Management Committee (BFMC) membership and confirm to the NSW RFS that members have sufficient discretion and authority to agree and implement risk mitigation activities at the local level
g) the NSW RFS Commissioner amends the BFMC Policy to require BFMCs to refer unresolved issues to the BFCC for resolution.

That, in order to ensure State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC) interoperability during all natural disasters, Resilience NSW review the current SEOC arrangements and location including responsibilities for ongoing resourcing and maintenance.

Align risk assessment tools and processes to Risk Management Standard ISO 31000 and the National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines (NERAG) and communicate these on public-facing platforms. Make Bushfire Management Area Plans (BMAP) accountable for managing and reporting on region-specific risk and identifying critical infrastructure such as mobile phone towers as key risks.

Better coordinate public information and warnings including evacuation plans and provide a single source of information about, the location and direction of fires, how and when to use Safer Places, Places of Last Resort, relief and recovery centres and directed evacuations.

Implement previous review recommendations for bushfire management including those relating to the 2009 amendments to the Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005, State Bushfire Coordination Committee operation, State Bushfire Management Plan, as well as urgent completion of Codes of Practice for fuel hazard reduction on all land tenures, and redevelopment of Bushfire Management Area Plans accompanied by effective community engagement to build an understanding of risk.

Develop and practice procedures for the CFS, DEW and local governments to access and deploy heavy plant and machinery for fuel reduction operations both before and during bushfires.

Engage with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) once or twice a year to understand the capabilities that could potentially be deployed. Educate IMTs about how to deploy ADF assistance effectively and develop a streamlined ‘call out’ procedure.

Prepare to ‘scale up’ capability during major bushfire events with senior representatives (including BoM staff) in the SEC 24/7, ensure adequate facilities for IMTs, base camps (e.g. Humanihuts) and recovery centres. Consider the resource implications of providing firefighters to interstate operations.

Regularly reviewing these plans to ensure that they reflect the current operating environment.

This report be returned to the InspectorGeneral Emergency Management to monitor, evaluate and report on progress and implementation of the recommendation(s) that are accepted in whole or in part by government. 

To enable entities in the sector to proactively work to achieve better results for the community, the recommendations and lessons of this review should be evaluated through the lessons management processes of entities involved in dam safety for their value and relevance. 

The progress of recovery for this event be reviewed incrementally over the next 2 to 3 years, with a formal, independent report provided on the effectiveness of the recovery after 3 years.

Energy Queensland and local groups consider establishing formal arrangements that embed measures that assist evacuation plans to increase levels of safety. 

Greater emphasis be placed on pre-planned and pre-determined arrangements between the Australian Defence Force and State and local agencies.

Evacuation centre plans be revised to better manage vulnerable persons, including the safe storage of medications and providing alternate arrangements for evacuees with additional needs. (e.g. evacuation centre for aged persons). 

Local groups should plan for and establish clear arrangements to effectively manage offers of assistance including the management of goods, services and volunteers. 

Queensland should implement and maintain a system-wide lesson management program.

The Queensland Chief Health Officer should work with the Office of the Inspector-General Emergency Management to raise, with the Commonwealth, the need for all aged care providers to plan and exercise for evacuation to a similar safe establishment.

Significant effort should be invested to provide disaster decision-makers at every level with a shared understanding of risks, the situation, and capability, so that they can agree on the best decisions for the communities they serve. 

Efforts are made to improve the timeliness, accuracy and targeting of Emergency Alert messaging by:
 • educating the sector about how Emergency Alert works in detail, and involving them in its testing.
 • ensuring the preparation and authorisation of Emergency Alert campaigns consider those to be warned, and are not limited by disaster management boundaries.
 • allowing the operation of Emergency Alert and the authorisation of its campaigns by disaster management practitioners at a district and local level.

The Queensland Offers of Assistance Policy, particularly for corporate donations, should be updated and exercised prior to the next season. 

Business continuity planning should feature permanently in disaster management doctrine.

Relevant authorities should work with the tourism sector to clarify future arrangements for evacuation. In particular they should look closely at differentiating voluntary and directed evacuations in their messaging,
ensure the differences are explained to the community in pre-season campaigns, and that necessary information is passed on to tourists. 

The national messages for catastrophic fire danger ratings should be integrated with all existing and new community bushfire safety information. 

Coordinated arrangements for liaison officer deployment should be considered and documented by disaster management groups across the full spectrum of risk identified for their area of responsibility, and not rely on a singular inflexible approach.

Given an increasing risk of intense fires, the framework of legislation relating to vegetation management, bushfire mitigation and preparation priorities should be re-assessed. The re-assessment should aim to enable more appropriate and flexible means at the local level for the reduction of intense fires.

Planning for response to bushfire risk should identify all stakeholders to be engaged in the response phase and their roles and responsibilities should be clearly documented.

Legislation at state and local level requiring landholders to reduce fire risk on their property should be actively applied

Hazard-specific plans and guidelines should be published on external websites for access by relevant stakeholders.

Wherever possible, the antecedents that will lead to catastrophic fire weather conditions existing for a particular area should be identified and documented within fire management plan relevant to the area.  

Hazard-specific and disaster management guidelines and plans should explain the circumstances and process for hazard-specific activation of the disaster management arrangements in support of an incident. They should be relevant to local authorities and local and district groups, and used during events. 

Queensland's plans and arrangements for heatwave should be reviewed to provide for an intergrated multi-agency approach to their management. A single agency should lead and oversee this process.

Communications protocols about hazard-specific events should be developed to clarify responsibilities and the principles for the release of information and warnings. They should be included in all related hazard-specific plans and published on relevant websites, and used during events.

Define formal bushfire management regimes for areas with different bushfire management requirements and define bushfire management responsibilities in those areas. One category will provide for areas that warrant provision of a wildfire response capacity, another will allow for the declaration of temporary fire management arrangements for the duration of identified high-risk circumstances. 

Include a detailed description of the role, responsibility and accountability of
- key stakeholders groups as described in this section;
- key host agency and Bushfires NT staff;
- Volunteer Bushfires Brigades; and
- key personnel within those organisations.

Formalise and clearly define the powers and duties of Bushfires NT personnel, including volunteers, thereby clarifying Bushfires NT’s role in bushfire management in the Northern Territory.

Enshrine the broader fire management principles, including coordination, strategic planning, mitigation, monitoring and control within the Act.

Introduce clear Terms of Reference for the Bushfires Council and Regional Bushfires Committees, and introduce a requirement for the Minister to consider advice and recommendations from the Council.

Further define the principle of landholder responsibility for fire management and strengthen its fundamental place in the Act. This should include a clear requirement for landholders to prevent fire on their land from spreading to neighbouring properties.

Amend the object to provide for ‘The mitigation, management, and suppression of bushfires’. Definitions of these terms should be included in the Act, and should include clarification that bushfire suppression can include emergency response activities in certain circumstances

Amend the Act title to ‘Bushfires Management Act’. 

Remove those policies, guidelines, memoranda of understanding and committees that are made redundant as a result of adopting recommendation #2 while updating any remaining policies that are considered to still be relevant

Take immediate steps to eliminate fire boundaries for call and dispatch purposes to create an agnostic approach to the threat of fires from both a departmental and organisational perspective

In recognising the success of the work of both the volunteer based Rural Fire Service and the full time Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW) members in joint operations – both agencies should be represented at major briefings or press conferences to reinforce successful integrated collaborative efforts rather than individual agency achievements

Review the effectiveness of emergency public information arrangements, and give consideration to embedding an ABC Manager (not a journalist) into the RFS headquarters during emergencies to broadcast warnings to the community that can be pooled to commercial media outlets

Until a single call centre is developed, continue deployments of a senior RFS officer to Fire and Rescue NSW ComCen on a 24/7 day basis. This arrangement should determine the quickest most suitable resource and who is ‘in charge’ of an incident

The Commissioners of Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW) and the RFS issue an instruction to FRNSW ComCen that while AVL capability is being made available to the RFS vehicle fleet, no offers of assistance by one agency to the other in combatting a fire is rejected or delayed if what is being offered is appropriate

TFS, PWS and STT should work with government and each other to continue to pursue a whole-of-state fuel management and burning program that encompasses all land tenures, meets the range of outcomes required by the state (township protection, risk reduction and landscape-scale burns) and is inclusive of private landholders and local communities as well as all fire agencies.

TFS should initiate a policy review (seeking support from government as appropriate) to clearly identify what body or agency is responsible for planning, carrying out and enforcing fuel management on private property at a township level. If current arrangements are unclear or ineffective, TFS should request government to consider making this a statutory responsibility of TFS and provide any additional funding required to support this function.

Tasmanian Fire Service (TFS), Tasmanian Parks and Wildlife Service (PWS) and Sustainable Timber Tasmania (STT) initiate a discussion among their Australasian peers about good practice around managing new fire starts in remote terrain, to include issues around identification, predictive analysis, risk management and suppression activities. The outcome should be a document which allows for benchmarking to accepted good practice across Australasia, from which Tasmanian fire agencies can develop protocols against which the management of future events can be tested.

TFS, PWS and STT should establish a State Air Desk, to be staffed by specialist staff year-round, with responsibility for managing both preparatory and contractual issues out of season as well as aircraft management when fires or other emergency events are occurring.

TFS, PWS and STT agree an updated version of the Interagency Fire Management Protocol which maintains the principle that there will be one state-wide point of command for major unwanted fires burning in the State of Tasmania, explicitly recognises the right of each of TFS, PWS and STT to have their objectives prioritised in incident action planning and adequate resources applied to those objectives, and provides a mechanism for executive decision-makers from TFS, PWS and STT to come together and agree objectives and resourcing levels that will then be operationalised by whole-of-State control structures.

The Commission feel that the 4th clause in the present Act, relating to the spacing of cut-throughs, should be amended to admit of any convenient or safe system of mining being pursued. This is a matter of detail that would be better out of the Act. The Commission would advise that the word should not occur at all, and that, if bratticing be used, or the air by some other satisfactory device be conveyed to the face, scope would be given to Managers to introduce systems of mining adapted to the circumstance of each particular coal-seam, with advantage to all concerned.

That a review of the cross‑tenure approach be undertaken to determine its effectiveness and to address issues that arise in fire prevention on private and public land.

That the Government conduct a review of fire prevention
activities undertaken by local government, including the amounts and sources of funding for such activities and the support of departments and agencies to manage and mitigate risk. The review should include determining compliance with
s43 of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 and should consider the appropriate support required to enable Councils to meet their obligations under the Act.

That DPIPWE clarifies responsibility for river restoration and riparian management and, having done so, communicates this to councils, landowners and other owners of relevant infrastructure.

That the State Emergency Management Committee allocates resources to reviewing all findings and recommendations in the Productivity Commission Report No. 74 relevant to Tasmania and, for those identified as relevant, actions taken and, if none, why not.

That DPIPWE examines the Forest Practice Code 2015 for relevance of its concepts to farming and other business activities near rivers, streams and naturally occurring dams and makes recommendations to Government accordingly.

That emergency management authorities react with heightened awareness and action when BoM issues flood watches and related warnings.

That DPIPWE examines the WMAwater report along with its own, analyses the differences, consults with the Forest Practices Authority and Environment Protection Authority, and proposes an appropriate course of action to Government.

That Government supports the anticipated SES State Flood Warning proposals aimed at improving public warnings and communication, and that the proposed warning system is consistent with the National Frameworks.

That the Flood Warning Consultative Committee reviews flood classification levels in the Service Level Specifications with BoM specifically relating to flood level triggers on gauges.

That heightened awareness and action is needed by communities when BoM issues flood watches and related warnings. Councils and SES need to facilitate this.

That the Office for Digital Government, in close partnership with telecommunications companies (e.g. Telstra, Optus, Vodaphone), develop a Control Agency Plan for Information and Communication Technology including mobile communications. The plan should consider:
a) provision of back-up power to priority infrastructure
b) back-up equipment requirements e.g. satellite phones for government ministers (including training and other support)
c) potential impact on the National Broadband Network on emergency services when there is an extended power outage / black system event
d) arrangements with commercial mobile network carriers to ensure emergency and support services have priority access to available mobile networks; and
e) contingencies to ensure ongoing functionality of the Broadcast Australia network

That additional guidance be provided in the State Emergency Management Plan regarding the activation, structure and operation of Zone Emergency Support Teams. This should include: a) the reporting relationship between the Zone Emergency Support Teams, the State Emergency Centre and the State Coordinator b) briefing requirements between the State Coordinator (or their representative) and the Zone Emergency Support Teams when the State Emergency Centre is activated c) responsibilities for provision of local public information; and d) the appointment of public information officers in Zone Emergency Support Teams (where there is no incident management team (established) to provide information to local communities

Continue development of the Damage Assessment Support Plan to:
a) integrate data produced from Control Agency Stage One
Assessment into the Stage Two Assessment
b) develop a capability to undertake Stage Four Assessments which
includes assessment of impacts to infrastructure, agriculture,
businesses and the economy; and
c) consult with the Local Government Association regarding how/if
their Emergency Assessment Reporting System (EARS) data can be
utilised in the damage assessment process.

Review and update the role, function, workload and focus of the groups/committees that contribute to incident management and emergency management capabilities including the State Emergency Management Training Committee, Interagency Incident Management Sub-Committee and the Central Exercise Writing Team.

Establish an ‘Interstate Deployment Support Plan’ for incoming interstate resources. The plan should outline responsibilities and arrangements for this function. Consider including this plan into the State emergency management arrangements.

Update the Public Information Functional Support Group Plan to include: a) standards, outputs, systems and processes required to be used by control agencies and the Public Information Functional Support Group during emergencies b) guidance on the public information cycle through the prevention, preparedness, response and recovery phases which includes the responsibilities and information requirements during different phases, and effective transition between phases c) establishing a public information intelligence cell within the Public Information Functional Service Group; and d) identifying tools or resources to monitor social media

In order to increase resilience and public safety during emergencies, the State Emergency Management Committee should request the Australia and New Zealand Emergency Management Committee to place on the agenda, and consider establishing a national position, on redundancies for mobile communications (including phone tower back-up power) and the National Broadband Network.

That members of Emergency Management Council ensure they are prepared to undertake their roles and responsibilities during emergency events, including establishing: a) contingencies for communication e.g. satellite phone b) access to relevant documents such as the State Emergency Management Plan, supporting plans, ministerial guidelines, agency plans and contacts in hard copy and/or portable device c) formalised arrangements for briefings (up and down), and d) arrangements for suitable representation e.g. relevant Chief Executive(s) or their deputy, at all Emergency Management Council meetings .

That SA Police, emergency services, health facilities, utility providers and other key service providers, review their Business Continuity Plans giving consideration to factors such as: a) identification of: business critical needs; essential services power requirements; back-up power requirements for all facilities including State, regional and local facilities such as Police, SES, MFS and CFS stations; the need for any arrangements for back-up power to be included in contracts for design and or lease of Government premises b) contingencies for black system events and extended power outages c) regular back-up generator testing regime protocols, including testing under load and for long durations d) contingencies for communications when mobile, landline and/or radios are not operational e.g. satellite phones; and e) alternative State control centre facilities that are pre-identified, equipped and have procedures for moving to the alternative facility.

Review representation in the State Emergency Centre including: a) determining if there is a more suitable functional support group e.g. the Procurement Functional Support Group, to replace the Logistics Functional Support Group, and if so, Chief Procurement Officer, DPC, has responsibility for the management of this role within the State Emergency Centre. b) That when the State Crisis Centre is not operating from a physical location, a State Crisis Centre liaison officer is attached to the State Emergency Centre.

Engage an independent business analyst to review the current call, receipt and dispatch process for emergency services i.e. the Metropolitan Fire Service, Country Fire Service and State Emergency Service, from the initial call for assistance through to response of emergency service resources, including the allocation and coordination of multiple taskings.

Review and update Part 3, Annex C, of the SEMP ‘Public Information and Warnings’ to: a) clarify the role and responsibilities of the Public Information Functional Support Group and control agencies in relation to public information b) define requirements and processes for liaising with the community, including holding community meetings

That a State Plan be developed for managing the consequences of a black system event or other major power outage. The plan should include:
a) public information strategies including providing advice on: the extent of the outage; anticipated and worst-case time frames for power restoration; services impacted by the outage; and, information about contingencies and actions by local and State government to provide support
b) identification of key providers that will supply fuel to emergency services and other critical services (vehicles and generators)
c) identification of priorities for provision of fuel and restoration of power
d) arrangements for purchase of essentials, for government agencies and the public, when electronic payment systems fail; and
e) arrangements for obtaining and distributing food.

That, as with earthquake, SA Police be designated the Control Agency under the State Emergency Management Plan for black system events or other major power outages.

That the glossary of terms in the State Emergency Management Plan be reviewed to ensure all relevant language is included. All agencies need to ensure the use of clear communication and accurate use of terminology, including in describing the status of critical services e.g. Triple Zero (000), SA Government Radio Network, electrical and water supplies and infrastructure.

That a review of the role and effectiveness of the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) including: the legislative functions; membership including the chair; roles and responsibilities; and, SEMC Advisory Groups be undertaken.

That the SES in collaboration with MFS Communications Centre (Comcen) investigate and implement options to reduce the number of calls coming into the Comcen, (particularly on 132500). Options could include better utilisation of the available options on the Interactive Voice Recording and community education to increase community resilience.

Update the SEMP Part 3, Annex F ‘Debriefs’ to provide more guidance regarding the types of debriefs, when they are required to be undertaken and at what level and guidance for undertaking and recording debriefs, and implementing lessons identified.

That SA Police develop an evacuation plan for the Adelaide Central Business District (CBD) which includes:
a) a Traffic Management Plan to assist in the movement of persons and vehicles away from the CBD
b) protocols for the early placement of a SA Police liaison officer within the Traffic Management Centre.

That the annexure to the State Emergency Management Plan, ‘Traffic management during emergencies’, be updated to include: responsibilities and processes for road closures; and, Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure requirements in regards to provision of road closure information, notification of changes in road closure status and publishing of that information.

Develop a State Relief and Recovery Plan as a distinct part of the State Emergency Management Plan which should include: a) potential locations for suitable facilities for relief and recovery centres which: are in locations safe from hazards such as flooding and bushfire; and, have appropriate access and suitable ablutions. b) formalisation of roles and capabilities of non-government organisations such as Red Cross

Identify, document and communicate contingency arrangements and procedures for emergency services in the event SA Government Radio Network paging is turned off to conserve power, or other loss of paging capacity.

That an Emergency Management Assurance Framework be established as soon as possible to support the emergency management arrangements and the State Emergency Management Plan. Consider establishing an Inspector General Emergency Management department or position.

That resources be provided to support the implementation of recommendations in the South Australian Levee Bank Management Issues Paper (DEWNR, 2015) including: a) development of relevant policy; and b) identification of responsibilities in relation to levee management and flood mitigation

Establish a lessons management capability across the SA emergency management sector to collect, analyse and track lessons identified during debriefs and reviews following events and other sources such as interstate and oversees reviews and inquiries.

That the Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure review their Business Continuity Plan to:
a) minimise the loss of public transport services
b) ensure ongoing fuel supply
c) improve public information e.g. electronic signage on buses, about alternative transport arrangements when there is a significant disruption to operations.

That SA Police, as the control agency for search and rescue, and State Emergency Service who have the responsibility for providing search and rescue services under the State Emergency Management Plan, develop a swiftwater rescue capability plan that describes key swiftwater risk locations, roles and responsibilities of emergency services, State swiftwater resources and dispatch arrangements.

Develop a Disaster Waste Management Plan to form part of the State Emergency Management Plan which describe participating agencies and responsibilities for various aspects of waste management during and after emergencies.

Consider bringing other agencies onto the SA Government Radio Network, in particular, Department of Education and Child Development and local government, to support more effective coordination and provide a reliable communications contingency during emergencies.

That the State Emergency Management Plan be reviewed and updated including: a) a better description of the responsibilities of Hazard Leaders Page xx b) establish a mechanism for a hazard leader to identify systemic failures in coordination of their hazard, with a clear process to raise those issues with SEMC and seek a remedy c) establish resilience as a key heading in the plan, with clearly documented strategies and responsibilities; and d) consider the Schar/Mulroney submission and taking a ‘fresh eyes’ approach

That, giving consideration to the previous recommendation, the Flood
Reform Response Working Group identify and consider appropriate
agency involvement and protocols for response to and management
of dams which are in danger of losing their structural integrity or
spilling.

Establish a State-wide resourcing capability to support incident management teams, regional coordination centres, zone emergency centres, relief centres, recovery centres and State control centres. some of the features of such a capability should include: a) multi-agency, cross-government, State-wide pool of incident management and emergency management personnel building on the State incident management team concept currently facilitated by the Country Fire Service, and expanded to include all hazards, multiagency teams with a roster that provides year-round coverage b) a system that enables staff and volunteers from any agency to identify their availability for upcoming shifts c) a rostering system that enables one or more incident management teams, staging areas, regional coordination centres, State control centres and relief centres to develop, maintain and distribute rosters and structure charts in a more coordinated manner d) identifying areas of expertise for key incident and emergency management functions (e.g. public information, alerts and warning, media liaison, logistics and resource management) that would benefit from a coordinated and resource pooling approach and take steps to implement (consider the Mapping Functional Support Group model as a potential service delivery model).

That SA Health undertake a review of their emergency management arrangements. Health State Controllers should be consulted during this review and arrangements should be consistent throughout the department and across the State and compatible with State emergency management arrangements and information systems

That the State Emergency Service together with the Local Government Association and Country Fire Service establish a plan for coordinated provision of sandbags to the public, including options for what is provided, where and when, and the process for effective communication of availability to the public.

Task South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission with further developing the Emergency Alerts capability across government agencies including to: a) establish and maintain a centralised training program for emergency alert initial and refresher training. b) establish a pool of endorsed Emergency Alert personnel from across government agencies to enable control agencies to assist each other with the emergency alert function during emergencies. c) develop supporting processes to ensure that the capability supports: emergencies involving any hazard; consistent issuing of alerts and warnings; consistent messages; and effective communication and notification of alerts issued to relevant internal and external stakeholders

The chairpersons of disaster management groups within the Mackay Disaster District, supported by the Queensland Police Service and Queensland Fire and Emergency Services, implement the Mackay Disaster District capability improvement strategy.

I recommend that the Secretariat of the Australia–New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee prepare guidelines regarding the interpretation and scope of the restrictions contained Clause 92 of the National Counter Terrorism Plan 2012. The Secretariat should also update relevant Australia–New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee documents and the New South Wales Police Force should update State Protection Group documents to refer to the latest versions of the National Counter-Terrorism Plan

I recommend that the ADF Review, in consultation with the police forces of the states and territories, examine the guidance available to ADF officers and state and territory police regarding: the role of ADF liaison officers; the availability of ADF assistance in the absence of a call-out; and the procedures to apply in relation to requests for, and the provision of, equipment or advice by the ADF. 

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force review its policies to ensure that the usual arrangements for placing a sniper coordinator in the Police Forward Command Post are departed from only for sound operational reasons that are recorded.

I recommend that the Commissioner of Police issue guidelines to assist officers to determine when they should exercise their powers of arrest and take an accused into custody rather than proceeding by way of a court attendance notice.

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force develop a policy regarding the use of distraction devices and the training of officers in their use.

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force consider developing a pro forma debriefing sheet containing standard questions relevant to all or most high risk situations, which can be supplemented by the negotiation coordinator and the tactical commander to maximise the likelihood of all available relevant information being obtained during hostage debriefings. Such measures would also aid contemporaneous documentation of information derived from debriefs and assist in relaying all relevant information to command.

I recommend that the ADF Review give consideration to amending the Australia–New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee protocols to ensure that they provide sufficient guidance as to the respective roles of the ADF and state police tactical groups. Such guidance should accord with the legislative framework in Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth).

I recommend that the Minister for Police consider whether the provisions of the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act2002 should be amended to ensure that police officers have sufficient legal protection to respond to terrorist incidents in a manner most likely to minimise the risk to members of the public.

I recommend that the Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency liaise with the Australia–New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee to determine whether policies requiring the consideration of more proactive intervention should be developed for responding to terrorist sieges.

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force review the division of tasks among the various officers responsible for responding to major high-risk situations to enable Police Forward Commanders to focus exclusively on their primary goals and that officers engaged in matters not directly related to the resolution of the incident be required to report to an officer other than the Police Forward Commander

I recommend that the ADF Review confer with state and territory governments about the criteria governing applications for the ADF to be called out pursuant to the Defence Act 1903(Cth) with a view to determining: whether further guidance is required on the criteria to be used by states and territories in determining whether to apply for Commonwealth assistance; and if so, what criteria ought to be stipulated.

I recommend that the Commissioner of Police consider seeking an agreement with news media outlets whereby the New South Wales Police Force will establish a way for such outlets to rapidly and confidentially determine whether publishing specific material could compromise the response to an ongoing high-risk incident and the media in turn will agree not to publish such material without first alerting a nominated senior police officer of their intention to do so.

I recommend that the Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency and the Australia–New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee review the Australia New Zealand Guidelines for Deployment of Police to High Risk Situations and the Police Tactical Group Operations Manual to ensure that they adequately describe all aspects of the DA planning and approval pro-cess and present commanders with appropriate guidance on relevant considerations.

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force remedy the lack of detailed guidance on how State Protection Group officers should interact and communicate with the Police Forward Commander, and that such guidance be included in policy documents and reinforced with training.

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force review its policies, procedures and training to ensure the rapid identification of persons killed or injured in high-risk situations. Those policies should provide appropriate guidance on how and when death messages ought to be conveyed following such incidents. 

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force develop policies that require the recording of negotiation strategies and tactics, demands made by a hostage taker, and any progress towards resolution (or lack thereof ) in a form readily accessible by commanders and negotiators.

I recommend that the Minister for Police undertake a review of the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 with a view to enabling the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission to facilitate urgent debriefs and confidential internal reviews of critical incidents focused on improving current practice.

I recommend that the Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency and the Australia–New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee review the Australia–New Zealand Guidelines for Deployment of Police to High-Risk Situations and the Police Tactical Group Operations Manual to ensure that those documents give commanders guidance on how to assess imminent or immediate risk.

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force review the Management Operational Guidelines to resolve any inconsistency between them and relevant counter terrorism protocols.

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force develop a comprehensive policy and set of procedures in relation to family liaison capability for high-risk situations. Those policies and procedures should ensure that: The capability is scalable depending on the nature of the incident, An appropriately senior officer is responsible for overseeing the liaison process, He or she should have direct access to officers in the Police Forward Command Post for the purpose of conveying and receiving information in a timely manner, A dedicated family liaison officer (or officers) is assigned to the family of each victim and given responsibility for managing the needs of that family Officers are given guidance on communi-cating with families, including the appropriate frequency and content of briefings both during and after an incident, Officers are advised of the proper process for gathering and disseminating intelligence from family members.

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force develop a comprehensive policy that describes the role and function of a psychological adviser engaged to assist in responses to high-risk situations and that all those involved be made familiar with that policy.

I recommend that the Commonwealth Attorney-General, in consultation with states and territories, review existing arrangements for information sharing between federal, state and territory agencies during terrorist events to determine whether those arrangements (and the guidance provided to officers in respect of them) adequately facilitate the efficient identification and transfer of pertinent information between agencies.

I recommend that New South Wales Police Force policies be amended to require documentation of triggers for Emer-gency Actions. Consideration should be given to stipulating that “contingency triggers”—specific events that will require initiation of an EA or some other agreed response—should also be recorded.

I recommend that the Director of Public Prosecutions develop a policy for overseeing lawyers' exercise of the discretion not to oppose bail that takes into account the seriousness of the offences involved; the experience of the prosecutor appearing; and the views of the police officer in charge of the investigation, insofar as those views are based on facts relevant to bail determinations. 

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force undertake a formal assessment of alternatives to the TOU’s current soft-point ammunition to determine whether a more appropriate form of ammunition is reasonably available.

The State Emergency Management Committee to review the policy for traffic management at emergency incidents so it reflects national ‘best practice’. This includes the production and issuing of an aide-memoire to guide traffic management, emergency and incident management personnel.

The State Government to establish an arrangement to develop a ‘network’ of Western Australian State Government agency personnel who can be called upon for bushfire and emergency incident management capability within Western Australia. The arrangement will be led by the State Emergency Management Committee and modelled on systems used by the Department of Parks and Wildlife.

The Department of Fire and Emergency Services to issue a photo identification card to DFES members, members of Bush Fire Brigades, volunteer emergency services, Incident Management Teams, forestry industry brigade members and Networked Government Emergency Agency members. DFES also to consider temporary windscreen signage to identify vehicles carrying such personnel.

The State Emergency Management Committee to adopt, across all hazards, the doctrine of: · the primacy of life; · the ‘Strategic Control Priorities’ (as documented by the Department of Fire and Emergency Services); and · community warnings that are timely, tailored and relevant. Agencies will reinforce amongst emergency management personnel the importance of this doctrine through briefings and intent statements.

The Department of Fire and Emergency Services to work with the Department of Planning and Local Governments to adopt a policy which enables Local Governments to identify, register and communicate, ‘Places of Bushfire Last Resort’ in settlements and townsites where the life risk from bushfire is very high or greater.

The State Government to explore options for streamlining the functions and the independence of the State Emergency Management Committee Secretariat and the Office of Bushfire Risk Management with a view to including an inspectorate function, and appointing a person who is dedicated to that role. The purpose is to provide assurance and reporting, and to inquire into, monitor and report transparently on emergency management standards, preparedness, capability, service delivery and investment performance outcomes. Within two years of the establishment of this arrangement the State Government to review and assess whether it is meeting the desired outcomes.

The Department of Fire and Emergency Services to investigate and adopt a system that will allow the public to opt in, monitor and receive, through a ‘push mechanism’, bushfire and other emergency warnings, maps and information using a wide variety of devices including personal hand held smart devices.

The Department of the Premier and Cabinet to conduct an independent review of the current arrangement for the management and distribution of the Emergency Services Levy. The review will have the specific purpose of: · seeking input from key entities including the Departments of Treasury, Finance, Fire and Emergency Services, Lands, and Parks and Wildlife, WA Local Government Association, and the Office of Bushfire Risk Management. · ensuring the arrangement has the flexibility and agility to deal with emerging bushfire risk priorities. · establishing a budget process that enables a shift in investment towards prevention, mitigation and building community resilience and capability.

The Departments of Fire and Emergency Services and Parks and Wildlife to investigate and adopt an emergency services resource management system that will enable the registration, tasking, tracking, management and coordination of emergency management personnel, vehicles, plant and aircraft.

The State Government to create a Rural Fire Service to enhance the capability for rural fire management and bushfire risk management at a State, regional and local level. The proposed Rural Fire Service will: · be established as a separate entity from the Department of Fire and Emergency Services or, alternatively, be established as a sub-department of the Department of Fire and Emergency Services; · have an independent budget; · be able to employ staff; · have a leadership structure which, to the greatest degree possible, is regionally based and runs the entity; · be led by a Chief Officer who reports to the responsible Minister on policy and administrative matters; and to the Commissioner for Fire and Emergency Services during operational and emergency response; · have responsibilities and powers relating to bushfire prevention, preparedness and response; and · operate collaboratively with the Department of Fire and Emergency Services, the Department of Parks and Wildlife, Local Government and volunteer Bush Fire Brigades. In creating the Rural Fire Service, the State Government to consider whether back office and corporate support services could be effectively provided by an existing Department, such as the Department of Fire and Emergency Services or the Department of Parks and Wildlife. The State Government to review the creation of the Rural Fire Service two years after its establishment, to assess whether its structure and operations are achieving the intended outcome.

The Departments of Parks and Wildlife and Fire and Emergency Services to adopt the policy that all bushfire Level 3 Incident Management Teams in the Perth Hills and the South West will be integrated and pre-formed from the start of the 2016/17 fire season with substantial involvement of both the Departments of Parks and Wildlife and Fire and Emergency Services personnel on all teams.

Coordinated and targeted mitigation of fire risk

Cross-agency resource management system

Flexible pre‐formed multi‐ agency IMTs

Structures to incorporate local knowledge and situational awareness into the fire response

Review of institutional arrangements in the fire sector

Co‐designed arrangements that support a unified response to fire

IGEM recommends that Emergency Management Victoria continue to lead the development and application of a comprehensive sector wide preparedness model for integration within and across emergency management arrangements in Victoria.

The Committee finds that on the evidence presented, that the State Government should establish an independent Chair to govern the State Fire Commission and that this governance arrangement should be included in the reform of the governing legislation.

The Committee finds that on the evidence presented, that section 107 of the Fire Service Act should be amended to provide greater clarity in relation to discretionary spending by the Chief Officer or alternatively, the Act should be amended to include the authorisation for the State Fire Commission to directly fund the State Emergency Service.

The Committee finds that on the evidence presented, that a review and reform of the Fire Services Act 1979 is necessary. An investigation should be undertaken to assess how the legislation can be amended or replaced to best service the organisations subject to the Act and should be undertaken and completed within 12 months. The Fire Services Act 1979 must be reformed or replaced to allow for: (1) A centralised funding model for the State Emergency Services; (2) Streamlined approach to fire fighting between Tasmania Fire Service, Tasmania Parks and Wildlife Service, Forestry Tasmania and other relevant agencies; (3) Resources to be allocated according to the risk and not according to local government municipal boundaries; (4) The continuation of Tasmania having a singular fire service; (5) Clear reporting lines; (6) Improved governance structure; and, (7) Include the fire permit system and inter- agency protocols.

The Tasmanian fire agencies take steps at a national level to share learnings from the 2016 fires about the administration of interstate assistance and support the codifcation of the workings, structure and reporting lines of an Interstate and International Liaison Unit for future complex deployments within Australia and New Zealand.

The fire agencies consider how the Regional Fire Operations Centre (RFOC) as a concept adds value once a level 3 IMT is up and running in a region.

The Tasmanian fire agencies consider the development of fire operational guidelines to avoid long-term environmental impacts such as: • • • strategies and tactics that will minimise the impact of fire management activities conditions under which earthmoving equipment and fire chemicals may be used information on seasonal conditions and the times of year when various strategies and tactics should be applied, and fuel management strategies.

The Tasmanian fire agencies develop a joint multi-agency Fire Preparedness Matrix to guide decision-making in response to severe fire weather conditions or capacity issues.

The Tasmanian fire agencies commission a review into the efectiveness of aerial firefghting in the 2016 fires, in order to better understand and to document for future reference the cost-efectiveness of specifc fire suppression strategies and tactics in different vegetation types. The Review should include a comparative analysis of fire suppression options whether aerial or ground-based.

Integrate Storage Operating Rules with downstream flood response plans.

Create a stakeholder plan template to aid heatwave preparedness and response in facilities occupied by people vulnerable to heatwaves (e.g. nursing homes)

Build capacity to enable Incident Management Teams to manage the likely increased frequency and intensity of major fire events.

Test the Biosecurity Act 2015.

Review the allocation of responsibilities for earthquake risk management.

Review current all-hazards emergency management arrangements to evaluate if they adequately address Tsunami response and recovery requirements.

Review community information and warning systems to ensure they cater for heatwave messages

Review legislation relating to Fuel Stove only areas, Fire Permit System and Total Fire Bans to ensure appropriate incentives to modify individuals’ behaviour.

Review State Special Emergency Plan: Human Influenza Pandemic Emergencies.

Improve the coordination and delivery of the National seismic monitoring program.

Develop SOP for recovery package.

Integrate clean-up arrangements into emergency plans.

Develop arrangements to identify and communicate with people vulnerable to heat stress

Consider outcomes of national review of warnings and review resilience of warning systems’ infrastructure.

Develop a flexible plan for establishing flu-specific services.

Develop a strategic plan for the operation and management of the seismic monitoring network in Tasmania.

Formalise response triage arrangements.

Integrate existing capabilities into a Total Flood Warning System.

Identify facilities that can be used as cool spaces during heatwaves and establish linkages between operators and emergency management organisations

Increased regulation of landslide risk assessment.

Review seismic monitoring network alert systems to ensure emergency managers are on the contact lists.

Review interagency information sharing arrangements.

Develop flood evacuation plans for at risk communities.

Integrate non-government entities into emergency response and recovery arrangements.

Develop innovative response models of patient care to improve surge capacity.

Review coastal inundation evacuation and response plans.

Continue the enhancement of forecast and warning services.

The report recommends that Ambulance Tasmania regularly reviews its emergency and urgent determinants methodology to ensure that it continues to be best practice and in accordance with requirements of the National Academy of Emergency Medical Dispatch.

The report recommends that Ambulance Tasmania investigate whether the additional resources in the North and North West regions were effective in reducing average response times.

The report recommends that Ambulance Tasmania investigate why the level of multiple responses had increased.

Preventing Flood Related Fatalities: The NSW Government consider the recommendations from the Preventing Flood Related Fatalities Report when it is released.

That the NSW Government consider enabling the default position during catastrophic and extreme fire danger periods to be the same as for section 44 fires, so that fire control centres have the same systems and resources ready to deploy should a fire break out.

That the Ministry for Police and Emergency Services urgently review its policies for the provision of disaster welfare services to ensure that in the event of a bush fire emergency and the declaration of a fire under section 44 of the Rural Fires Act 1997, adequate funding and services, especially recovery centres and mental health services, are provided for an adequate length of time, with gradual transition to normal service delivery when those services are no longer required.

That the NSW Government, as a matter of urgency, amend the Rural Fires Act 1997 to codify the current interim arrangements for command and notification requirements for class 1 and class 2 fires, which clarify that the NSW Rural Fire Service or Fire and Rescue NSW:
-have ultimate responsibility for all bush fires regardless of tenure
-are responsible for the appointment of incident controllers
-are responsible for keeping the public informed.

That the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service adopt an interim fencing agreement in the immediate aftermath of a fire. This will enable emergency and interim works to commence, but features such as length, fencing components and site of the fence line are not binding. A final fencing agreement would be negotiated no earlier than six months following a major national park fire.

That the Minister for Police and Emergency Services review the communications technologies used by the NSW Rural Fire Service, Fire and Rescue NSW, the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service and Forestry NSW during fire fighting operations, to ensure that systems are standardised and effective. Within this context, the potential value of satellite phone technology should be investigated.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service reassess the protection of pastoral assets during bush fires to ensure that priority for protection is not simply afforded to the homestead, and that land holders are, within reason, able to request which of their own assets are protected.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service:
-commission an independent investigation into the allegations that brigade group captains and captains were not duly, or in a timely way, notified of the outbreak of the Wambelong fire
-improve procedures for the notification of group captains to ensure that they are notified of any fire outbreak in and/or adjoining their brigade areas.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service review its procedures, systems and infrastructure for notifying community members of bush fires, both when a fire has broken out and as it proceeds, to ensure the provision of timely and adequate information.

The committee recommends that the Australian and Tasmanian Governments: • develop options to increase co-operation to ensure that the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area is protected and conserved in line with Australia's obligations under the World Heritage Convention; and • work together to ensure strong provisions to protect the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area from bushfire risks are included in the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area Management Plan.

Develop an integrated inter-agency resource management system: Large and complex fire incidents require resources from multiple agencies. Developing an integrated inter-agency resource management system will have three main benefits: identifying potential resources will be more straightforward • the status and location of resource deployments can be tracked • planning of deployments can take into account all relevant information

Clarify the role of the ROC and SOC and their reporting relationships: The ROC and SOC have important coordination roles under the State Emergency Management Arrangements to support both the incident and the broader region and state. Clarifying the role of the ROC and SOC, their reporting relationships, and how the command structures of other agencies are integrated, will have three main benefits: the ROC and SOC can perform their functions effectively • no inconsistencies, gaps or duplication in the activities of the IMT, ROC and SOC • transparency of incident management

Establish multi-agency preformed IMTs: An effective IMT for large and complex fire incidents requires the capacity and expertise of multiple agencies. Establishing multi-agency preformed IMTs will have three main benefits: adequate IMT resources can be deployed with ease • strong working relationships will be built between IMT members • common approaches to incident management and fire response can be embedded.

IGEM recommends that fire agencies consider an earlier classification of Level 3 incident for fires that present significant complexity such as was evident in the Wye River – Jamieson Track event.

That Victoria Police assesses and where practical addresses limitations to available data and trials the use of response times for internal performance measurement.

That the Department of Health & Human Services uses Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority Computer Aided Dispatch data to report ambulance emergency response time performance. 

That the Department of Health & Human Services and the Department of Justice & Regulation, in consultation with their portfolio emergency service agencies that have response time measures, determine relevant targets for these.

That the Emergency Management Australia’s ‘Arrangements for Interstate Assistance (Fire and Emergency Services)’ be applied to all future requests for assistance by the SACFS, SAMFS and SASES.

Review the communication and request procedures within SACFS to ensure that the most effective chain of command and line of communications are established between the Incident Management Team, region and state.

That SACFS consider a review to develop an effective interagency messaging system and agency resource management system.

Incorporating ‘triggers’ within Chief Officers Standing Orders No. 17, which requires the escalation of the State Controller role to the rank of Assistant Chief Officer or greater, depending on the increased risk or activity.

That SACFS conduct a review of SIMT with a view to increasing the number of teams from four to six, aligning them with each of the six regions within SA.

That SACFS in consultation with SAMFS consider adopting common terminology and capability requirements for strike teams being ‘4-5 appliances and a group officer’ in line with other jurisdictions.

Incorporate in operational doctrine the ability for the State Controller to determine the operational readiness levels of the state or regions based on either the predicted and/or actual risk and/or activity to some or all of the regions.

That future declarations be undertaken to ensure that the areas affected by the declaration are clear and concise.

That SACFS consider the Traffic Management Procedures and guiding principles adopted in Tasmania as a model that could be implemented within SA.

That a complete review of current naming conventions of personnel and centres, in accordance with the outcomes of the Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission is undertaken, to ensure clarity around command, control and coordination within SA.

Review the current practise of issuing an ‘emergency alert’ telephone message or an emergency warning and/or watch and act alert to ensure that it is consistent, relevant and necessary. Prior to issuing an emergency alert message, consider state level involvement so that other agencies are made aware of message and intent.

Noting the implementation of Common Incident Command and Control System (CICCS) in SA that fire and emergency services together with police (including through AFAC and ANZPAA), continue to liaise regarding the development of a national incident management.

SACFS appoint the Regional Controller and/or Coordinator as the IC for any Level 3 incident occurring within their Region to provide better continuity and improved coordination. The position of the regional controller and/or coordinator could then be backfilled by a suitably qualified individual as required.

Review relevant Legislation associated Acts and Plans to establish a consistent approach to fire and emergency management to minimise duplication and risk of contradiction. That the Hazard and Functional area plans be amalgamated and establish a SA Bushfire Plan, under the SEMP, which clearly define role of SACFS.

That the following disaster management doctrine are reviewed and reissued to ensure consistency and improved guidance to local government:
- Queensland Evacuation Guidelines for Disaster Management Groups;
- Queensland Public Cyclone Shelter Operations Guidelines;
- Queensland Public Cyclone Shelters Maintenance Guidelines;
- Guideline. Mitigating the Adverse Impacts of Cyclones – Evacuation and Shelter; and
- Business Continuity Planning Resource for Aged Care Facilities.

An audit of all local government areas vulnerable to storm tide events is completed and opportunities identified to resolve gaps in evacuation zone planning to ensure consistency with the Queensland Evacuation Guidelines for Disaster Management Groups and neighbouring local government areas.

As part of the above, both the Banana Shire Council and SunWater ensure Emergency Alert messages are pre-formatted, consistent, polygons are identified according to risk, and that they are tested and practiced with the State Disaster Coordination Centre.

Prior to September 2015, SunWater and the Banana Shire Council jointly develop a multi-channel, common warning strategy, including common language and consistent messaging, for residents downstream of
SunWater assets within the Banana Shire Council, and clearly articulate procedures for dissemination.

Prior to September 2015, the Banana Shire Council develops a multi-channel warning strategy and associated public information campaign, including common language and consistent messaging, for the Banana Shire.

State Disaster Coordination Centre considers requesting a representative from critical infrastructure owners be present as a liaison officer in the State Disaster Coordination Centre during activations for events that may impact on their assets.

The evacuation sub-plan component of the Local Disaster Managment Plan should be reviewed, including any identified triggers for activation. Ideally, the plan should be tested in a live, multi-agency exercise prior to next summer.

Banana Shire Council completes business continuity planning as a matter of priority, including documentation and testing of the plan.

State agencies with disaster management roles and responsibilities assess their performance by including a disaster management performance measure in chief executive officers’ performance agreements. This measure should reinforce an obligation for agencies to participate in the arrangements at all levels.

Responsibilities of functional lead agencies and hazard-specific primary agencies are clearly articulated in state level doctrine, including the Queensland State Disaster Management Plan.

An integrated risk-based approach to disaster management planning for Queensland is developed that is consistent with the Standard for Disaster Management in Queensland and applicable at all levels of the arrangements.

The Local and District Disaster Management Guidelines are reviewed to align with the Standard for Disaster Management in Queensland.

That Queensland’s disaster management arrangements are reviewed to enhance integration. Specifically: · to address the disparity between functions and structure of local government and disaster groups · to integrate hazard specific agency planning at all levels of the arrangements (This may include legislative, policy and procedural considerations).

The Queensland State Disaster Management Plan is reviewed to:
- clarify core disaster management functions in relation to the issue of warnings, and provide guidance on state agency lead, co-lead and support roles and responsibilities
- include direction for primary agencies to ensure local groups are included in the development and issue of hazard-specific warnings and public information
- ensure the role of the Crisis Communications Network and the Public Safety Business Agency Public Information Cell is clearly articulated to enable effective public information and messaging at all levels of the arrangements, including local government.

A dynamic online list of positions and contact details is published for those able to authorise Emergency Alert, and made accessible to local government.

The Warning and Alert Systems training package is updated to align the content to the Standard for Disaster Management in Queensland and to include advice and scenarios from the Information Commissioner.

A qualitative assessment of public information and warnings arrangements is undertaken as part of the 2016 disaster management plan assessment process.

The Public Information and Warnings Sub-plan Guide is reviewed to include:
- good practice examples
- a broader range of considerations for barriers to effective communication
- guidance to ensure warnings and public information is linked with state agency arrangements, when the event is led by a hazard-specific primary agency.

Queensland Fire and Emergency Services should consider supporting local government in the annual development of at least one pre-formatted Emergency Alert message and polygon map based on a risk assessment and hazard modelling.

The Queensland Emergency Alert Guidelines is reviewed to reflect current practice and incorporate evidence-based improvements informed by lessons learned and research.

Queensland Fire and Emergency Services should consider new and emerging technologies for issuing warnings (including opportunities for Emergency Alert to be distributed in other languages or to people with vision or hearing impairment).

Farm Management Deposits
The Farm Management Deposit Scheme appears to be a well-structured framework for
building rural resilience, however its uptake is low. Recent Commonwealth Government
announcements regarding this scheme should be applauded, but more work appears to be
needed to understand why the scheme is not more widely used, and to promote its use as a
means of building enterprise resilience.

PES External Surge Program The success of the PES External Surge Program and the willingness of participants to deploy at short notice to support the recovery effort is commendable, as is the readiness of their supervisors to release them from their duties to enable deployment. The Program, supported by an appropriate training program, is one that should be sustained as part of the whole of Government recovery readiness effort.

The forthcoming review by SEMC of SEMP 4.4 Recovery Coordination and Westplan – Recovery Coordination and SEMP 4.1 Incident Management should include consideration of:
- the process for establishing a State Emergency Coordination Group (SECG) and the frequency of SECG meetings during an emergency;
- clarifying of the criteria for declaring an incident at Level 2 or 3
- Clarifying the criteria for handing over control of the incident from the Controlling Agency to local government and the transition from response to recovery
- the development of processes to ensure that ‘betterment’ is considered in recovery plans, including the identification of roles and responsibilities.

Future appointments to the role of Incident Controller should be limited to one for the entire duration of the incident, with nominated Deputy Incident Controllers to assist or ‘take charge’ in the Incident Controller’s absence. This measure will provide for a single point of responsibility and control for the incident and assist with any subsequent review or enquiry. If it is not possible to implement this proposal for liability reasons, the number of Incident Controllers should nevertheless be reduced to the minimum.

Consideration should be given to an automatic ‘Advice’ notice being issued as soon as a fire is reported in a pre- determined high risk area such as the Darling Scarp on days when adverse fire weather conditions are forecast.

Standard Operating Procedure 1 (Mobilisation Zone 2, Perth Hills area) should be reviewed to ensure that appropriate escalation triggers and levels of operational readiness are in place for future periods when severe fire weather conditions are forecast.

Procedures should be reviewed to address the risks associated with response aircraft all working from one forward operating base, including the need for a designated fire protection unit to be available in the event of an aircraftrelated fire or other emergency incident

In addition to regular meetings of the DFES/DPaW Interagency Bushfire Management Committee, the two organisations should use joint exercises to identify agreed firefighting approaches for common or likely scenarios.

The role of the Ground Controller should be reaffirmed in operational doctrine and reinforced in Incident Management Team training. During incidents involving aircraft the appointment of a Ground Controller should be confirmed by the Incident Controller

EMP 4.4 and Westplan – Recovery Coordination should be amended to: clarify the wording around handing over control of the incident from the Controlling Agency to local government and the transition from response to recovery; include principles and criteria that will assist the Controlling Agency and local government to determine the best time to effect a hand over of control of the incident; make explicit the roles and responsibilities of the parties involved in the handover of control of the incident; specify the information required in the needs and impact assessments provided to local government by the Controlling Agency so that local government is given sufficient information to take control of incidents; clarify the roles, responsibilities and the title of the State Recovery Controller and ensure that the appropriate wording is reflected in Westplans and State Emergency Management Policies; Hazard Management Agencies, combat and support agencies and local governments need to fully inform themselves of the role of the State Recovery Controller and implement a more effective approach to communicating
internally the changes or additions to Westplans, State Emergency Management policies or procedures adopted by the SEMC;

The Executive Teams of both DFES and DPaW should meet quarterly to review and agree joint improvements relating to issues of interoperability, complementarity and the alignment of firefighting doctrine. The establishment of a unified command in joint State Operations Centre, Regional Operations Centre and Incident Management Teams should be pursued as an overarching goal.

All agencies engaged in bushfire response should develop expeditious procedures for the mobilisation of resources in support of other agencies. See discussion in Section 7.1.

DFES, in consultation with bushfire volunteers should develop a procedure for the controlled entry and exit of volunteers to the fire ground

SEMC Secretariat Community Emergency Management Officers should work with the Shire to document the Shire of Mundaring’s learnings from the Parkerville Stoneville Mt Helena fire with a view to sharing this with other local authorities particularly those facing similar situations in order to extend the range of tools available to assist local governments to understand their roles and responsibilities in future emergencies.

Whenever a Bush Fires Act 1954 section 13 transfer of control is invoked, the Incident level of an event should also be reviewed and any changes documented.

A Restricted Access Permit system for the entry/ re-entry of residents, based on the one developed for the Parkerville Stoneville Mt Helena Bushfire should be finalised.

The State take the lead in advocating for a national compliance standard for PM

GDF Suez revise its Emergency Response Plan, to: • require an increased state of readiness on days of Total Fire Ban; • require pre-establishment of an Emergency Command Centre; • require pre-positioning of an accredited Incident Controller as Emergency Commander; and • require any persons nominated as Emergency Commander to have incident controller accreditation and profciency in the use of the Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System.

The State: • bring forward the commencement date of s.16 of the Mineral Resources (Sustainable Development) Amendment Act 2014 (Vic), to facilitate the requirement that approved work plans specifcally address fre prevention, mitigation and suppression; and • acquire the expertise necessary to monitor and enforce compliance with fre risk measures adopted by the Victorian coal mining industry under both the mine licensing and occupational health and safety regimes.

The State review and revise its communication strategy, to: • needed for effective and rapid public communications during an emergency; and ensure all emergency response agencies have, or have access to, the capability and resources • ensure, where appropriate, that private operators of essential infrastructure are included in the coordination of public communications during an emergency concerning that infrastructure.

GDF Suez improve its crisis management communication strategy for the Hazelwood mine in line with international best practice.

The State enact legislation, to: • require Integrated Fire Management Planning; and • authorise the Emergency Management Commissioner to develop and implement regional and municipal fire management plans.

The State develop and widely disseminate an integrated State Smoke Guide, to: • incorporate the proposed State Smoke Plan for the management of public health impacts from large scale, extended smoke events; • include updated Bushfre Smoke, carbon monoxide and PM protocols; and 2.5 • provide practical advice and support materials to employers, communities and individuals on how to minimise the harmful effects of smoke.

GDF Suez adopt and apply the firefghter carbon monoxide response protocol.

The State establish, for any future incident, integrated incident management teams with GDF Suez and other Victorian essential industry providers, to: • essential industry providers; and require that emergency services personnel work with GDF Suez and other appropriate • implement the Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System.

The State review and revise the Bushfre Smoke Protocol and the PM Health Protection Protocol, to: 2.5 • ensure both protocols are consistent with each other; and • ensure both protocols include assessment methods and trigger points for specifc responses.

GDF Suez: • practice and ensures that, by taking a risk management approach, it is suitable for fire prevention, mitigation and suppression in all parts of the Hazelwood mine; and review its ‘Mine Fire Service Policy and Code of Practice’ so that it refects industry best • work plan for the Hazelwood mine. incorporate the revised ‘Mine Fire Service Policy and Code of Practice’ into the approved

The State empower and require the Auditor-General or another appropriate agency, to: • oversee the implementation of these recommendations and the commitments made by the State and GDF Suez during this Inquiry; and • report publicly every year for the next three years on the progress made in implementing recommendations and commitments.

The State review and revise the community carbon monoxide response protocol and the firefghter carbon monoxide response protocol, to:
• ensure both protocols are consistent with each other;
• ensure both protocols include assessment methods and trigger points for specifc responses;
• ensure GDF Suez and other appropriate essential industry providers are required to adopt and apply the frefghter carbon monoxide protocol; and
• highlight the increased risks for those with health conditions and those who are pregnant. inform all firefghters about the dangers of carbon monoxide poisoning, and in particular

GDF Suez: • consequences of fire in the worked out areas of the Hazelwood mine, and an assessment of the most effective fre protection for the exposed coal surfaces; conduct, assisted by an independent consultant, a risk assessment of the likelihood and • controls are in place to eliminate or reduce the risk of fre; and prepare an implementation plan that ensures the most effective and reasonably practicable • implement the plan

CFA and VICSES should: explore further opportunities to collaborate with each other.

That the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority includes Victoria State Emergency Service vehicle capability details in the Computer Aided Dispatch database.

That the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority, assisted by Ambulance Victoria, reviews the business rules to be applied by the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority ambulance dispatchers in selecting appropriate resources for dispatching to events, taking account of meal-break procedures.

That Emergency Management Victoria be responsible for facilitating the interoperability of all organisations involved in emergency response, including the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority and Ambulance Victoria.

That the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority, assisted by the Inspector-General for Emergency Management and responder agencies, improves the process for changing call-taking and dispatch procedures by comprehensively appraising the costs, benefits and operational impacts of these changes and agreeing a plan for their implementation with all affected agencies.

That Emergency Management Victoria novates the head contract for the StateNet Mobile Radio network to the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority.

That Victoria Police implements the recommendations relating to protective services officers in the Service Demand and Dispatcher Capacity Analysis dated September 2013 and:
- works with the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority to implement revised Metropolitan Mobile Radio channel arrangements to reduce the impact of protective services officer usage on other police users 
- investigates the use of smart devices and applications for protective services officers to minimise their use of the Metropolitan Mobile Radio network for routine enquiries.

That Ambulance Victoria:
- reassesses the current structured call-taking script
- develops a single structured call-taking script for Triple Zero calls.

That Emergency Management Victoria expedites the expansion of the Rural Mobile Radio network to all emergency services organisations.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service, in order to ensure greater respect for volunteer fire fighters’ knowledge and experience in the management of fires:
- examine its plans of operations to provide for the use of local knowledge at every level of decision making down the chain of command
- require a local fire fighter to be stationed in every command vehicle, where possible 
- ensure that every out of area crew includes at least one local fire fighter
- require officers to engage more effectively and regularly with volunteers during the periods between fires
- consider any further strategies to address the entrenched conflict between officers and volunteers, including additional ways to empower volunteers and utilise them more effectively.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service review its procedures, systems and infrastructure for notifying community members of bush fires, both when a fire has broken out and as it proceeds, to ensure the provision of timely and adequate information.

That the NSW Government, as a matter of urgency, amend the Rural Fires Act 1997 to codify the current interim arrangements for command and notification requirements for class 1 and class 2 fires, which clarify that the NSW Rural Fire Service or Fire and Rescue NSW:
- have ultimate responsibility for all bush fires regardless of tenure
- are responsible for the appointment of incident controllers
- are responsible for keeping the public informed.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service:
- commission an independent investigation into the allegations that brigade group captains and captains were not duly, or in a timely way, notified of the outbreak of the Wambelong fire
- improve procedures for the notification of group captains to ensure that they are notified of any fire outbreak in and/or adjoining their brigade areas.

That the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service remove from its boundary fencing policy and standard contract the condition that requires adjoining land owners to maintain a fence that has been damaged by trees falling from national park land.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service investigate mechanisms to enhance the predictability of megafires and how this information is communicated easily to the public.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service reassess the protection of pastoral assets during bush fires to ensure that priority for protection is not simply afforded to the homestead, and that land holders are, within reason, able to request which of their own assets are protected.

That NPWS conduct a review of its hazard reduction policies to ensure all assets within and on the boundary of the Park are clearly identified and an adequate policy or management plan exists for the protection of all assets, including a procedure pursuant to which progress in meeting hazard reduction targets is regularly and comprehensively assessed.

That the Rural Fire Service consider extending pre-emptive section 44 to whole of Castlereagh RFS/Warrumbungle Shire area.

That the Rural Fire Service and National Parks and Wildlife Service review the procedures for requesting aerial support in ‘severe’ or worse fire conditions to ensure that delays in providing it are reduced to the minimum time possible.

That as part of the adoption of such a posture in ‘severe’ or worse fire conditions, the National Parks and Wildlife Service consider alerting, at an early stage, all relevant persons and organisations, such as shire councils, heavy plant operators, the local RFS captains, Fire & Rescue NSW and other emergency services, that it is doing so, and that their assistance may be required at short notice.

That in Class 3 fire-fighting operations, the Rural Fire Service consider including a fire behaviour analyst in the incident management team if feasible.

That the Rural Fire Service and National Parks and Wildlife Service consider amending their protocols for upgrading advices to higher levels to emphasise the significance and urgency of raising warning levels as soon as the potential dangers of fire to lives or property materially increase.

That during periods of ‘severe’ or worse fire conditions, that the National Parks and Wildlife Service consider adopting a posture of pre-emptive planning and deployment of incident management teams in national parks similar to the manner in which the Rural Fire Service does.

That the Rural Fire Service consider amending its fire prediction reports to include a checklist of significant factors that have not been able to be considered in the prediction model and a warning to be alert for them and seek intelligence on them from fire ground managers.

That NPWS and the RFS consider developing a land management policy that requires active engagement with property owners adjoining the Park to ensure that hazard reduction and asset protection is encouraged and undertaken before the bush fire season commences

That the National Parks and Wildlife Service review its procedures for monitoring Class 1 fires occurring in ‘severe’ or worse fire conditions that cannot be reconnoitred at ground level adequately due to terrain or dangerous conditions, and consider including aerial surveillance (if reasonably practicable) as a standard procedure in such circumstances.

That the Rural Fire Service consider redrafting the disclaimer in its fire predictions to make abundantly clear where the potential errors or omissions may affect the prediction and how to detect them if they are there (for example, by comparing them with linescans) and what other factors (such as VLS) may affect the predictions and in what way.

That the Rural Fire Service and National Parks and Wildlife Service consider adopting the approach to fire classification suggested by Mr Conway that “classification and resourcing of the fire ground response and incident management capability should reflect the potential of the fire rather than observed fire behaviour.

That the National Parks and Wildlife Service review its protocols for control of Class 1 fires under its control to ensure that incident controllers managing fires in ‘severe’ or worse fire conditions receive as much incident management planning support as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances.

That the Rural Fire Service together with other land managers develop a program whereby local stakeholders come together regularly (every 2 months during non-fire season and monthly during the fire season) to share intelligence and to consider hazard and incident management measures for implementation.

That the National Parks and Wildlife Service, in consultation with the relevant local Council(s), devise a policy that enables the John Renshaw Parkway to be closed at either end of the Warrumbungle National Park during a bush fire in such a way that its closure would not impede access by emergency services vehicles into the park.

That State and Local Government agencies maximise communication to the residents owning bushfire prone properties to be aware of their level of exposure by having access to the BAL relevant to their property.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority structures all regulations not yet made with the three-tier approach, and subsequently reviews all other Civil Aviation Safety Regulation Parts (in consultation with industry) to determine if they should be remade using the three-tier structure.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s Board exercises full governance control. The nonexecutive directors should possess a range of appropriate skills and backgrounds in aviation, safety, management, risk, regulation, governance and government.

The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development and Department of Defence (and appropriate agencies) establish an agreed policy position on safety oversight of civil operations into joint user and military airports.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes the current two-tier regulatory framework (act and regulations) to a three-tier structure (act, regulations and standards), with:
a. regulations drafted in a high-level, succinct style, containing provisions for enabling standards and necessary legislative provisions, including offences
b. the third-tier standards drafted in plain, easy to understand language.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority utilise the provision in their bilateral Memorandum of Understanding to accredit CASA observers to ATSB investigations.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority delegates responsibility for the day-to-day operational management of airspace to Airservices Australia, including the designation of air routes, short term designations of temporary Restricted Areas, and temporary changes to the classification of airspace for operational reasons.

Recreational Aviation Administration Organisations, in coordination with the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, develop mechanisms to ensure all aircraft to be regulated under CASR Part 149 are registered.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigates as many fatal accidents in the sport and recreational aviation sector as its resources will allow.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority amend the wording of their existing Memorandum of Understanding to make it more definitive about interaction, coordination, and cooperation.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority implements a system of using third-party commercial audits as a supplementary tool to its surveillance system.

The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development plays a stronger policy role in the State Safety Program.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority amends the current Terms of Reference of the Industry Complaints Commissioner so that:
a. the ICC reports directly to the CASA Board
b. no CASA staff are excluded from the ICC’s jurisdiction 
c. the ICC will receive complaints that relate to both the merits and the process of matters
d. on merits matters, including aviation medical matters, the ICC is empowered to convene an appropriately constituted review panel, chaired by a CASA non-executive director, to review the decision
e. while all ICC findings are non-binding recommendations, the original decision-maker is required to give reasons to the CASA Board if a recommendation is not followed.

Airservices Australia, in conjunction with the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, reconsiders the policy on ‘Assessment of Priorities’ that stipulates that air traffic controllers sequence arriving aircraft based on category of operation, rather than on the accepted international practice of ‘first come, first served’.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority assures consistency of audits across all regions, and delivers audit reports within an agreed timeframe.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s Director of Aviation Safety meet with industry sector leaders to jointly develop a plan for renewing a collaborative and effective Standards Consultative Committee.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority:
a. reinstates publication of Key Performance Indicators for service delivery functions
b. conducts a stakeholder survey every two years to measure the health of its relationship with industry
c. accepts regulatory authority applications online unless there is a valid technical reason against it
d. adopts the same Code of Conduct and Values that apply to the Australian Public Service under the Public Service Act 1999.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority provides full disclosure of audit findings at audit exit briefings in accordance with international best practice.

The Regional Director-Defence Support-Northern NSW, make contact with Deputy Commissioner ~~~~~ Director of Operational Services Rural Fire Service, to arrange a headquarters driven bipartite review of the events of 16 October 2013 with a review to mitigation of future fire events generally, and with specific reference to: 
a. hazard reduction programming and site works on Marrangaroo Training Area;
b. bushfire response within Marrangaroo Training Area, with specific reference to equipment to be kept on or present on site and operated by Defence personnel and the circumstances in which the Rural Fire Service will respond to a report of bushfire within Marrangaroo Training Area; and
c. the development and implementation of a Memorandum of Understanding between Defence and the Rural Fire Service in relation to these matters.

On matters relating directly to safety or risk, or when live-firing may occur, where there is ambiguity or apparent inconsistency, the most conservative or restrctive order should be followed until formal clarification has been provided.

Commanding Officer Defence Explosive Ordnance Training School amend relevant instructions, both generally and specifically, so as to ensure that explosive ordnance used in training serials is logged in real time, in accordance with extant doctrine. 

The Marrangaroo Training Area Regional Environmental Officer confer with the local Rural Fire Service at least annually and determine a hazard reduction regime capable of implementation. It is furter recommended all ranges be reviewed in relation to the same issue, that is, that personnel involved in the management of each range under Defence control be directed to confer with local firefighting authorities on at least an annual basis to assess hazard reduction responses to be pursued for that range in subsequent years. 

Authority be given to the regional Environmental Officer to close a range or impose live-firing restriction in addition to any set out in Range Standing Orders if circumstances so warrant. 

Commanding Officer Defence Explosive Ordnance Training School review and enforce Standard Operating Procedures to ensure that appropriate explosive ordnance accounting and handling practices, in accordance with Defence doctrine, are adhered to during all training activities. 

Defence undertake a review of its ability to respond to a fire within Marrangaroo Training Area, whether bushfire or structural. The underlying assumption should be that the only response available to fight a fire within Marrangaroo Training Area will be provided by Defence. Further, such response must occur while a fire is in its initial stages. A review must either acknowledge the risk of fire occurring in th future, or upgrade Defence's firefighting capability at Marrangaroo Training Area. 

The use of Internal and External ranges at MTA for patrolling activities be prohibited. 

Range Control Officer Marrangaroo Training Area liase with the local Rural Fire Service units to develop a map indicating the areas of the range likely to contain unexploded ordnance. 

Defence engage with both the Bureau of Meteorology and the Rural Fire Service to determine a more suitable index system. In the interim, Range Standing Orders be amended so that live-firing on the ranges on Marrangaroo Training Area not be permitted where the Forest Fire Danger Index for either the Central Ranges District or Greater Sydney Region is 12, it being the threshold for HIGH Fire Danger Rating or above. put another way, and in a practical sense, Range Standing Orders should, as an interim measure, require the Officer in Charge Practice and the Range Control Officer to consider the Forest Fire Danger Index for both Central Ranges District AND Greater Sydney Region on the day of any given serial. If either index is as 12 or above, live-firing should not be permitted. Any indication in Range Standing Orders or elsewhere that live-firing is permitted on Marrangaroo Training Area when the Fire Danger rating is HIGH should be rescinded.

The lines of responsibility be made clearer and some individual, perhaps the Regional Environmental Officer, or agency be given overarching responsibility to ensure recommended works related to bushfire mitigation on Defence Estate are carried out in accordance with the Bushfire Management Plan which the Manual for Fire Protection Engineering directs be prepared.

Range Standing Orders be amended to include a direction that no Defence vehicle is to leave the administration area of Marrangaroo Training Area during a bushfire, except to leave Marrangaroo Training Area itself through the main gate, unless it is a properly equipped bushfire fighitng vehicle havig at least four wheel drive capabiliy and self-protection equipment. 

Marrangaroo Training Area Range Standing Orders should be reviewed to impose a requirement that the Officer in Charge of any live-firing practice ascertain and consider current weather parameters, temperature, humidity, wind strength and direction, registered at Mt Boyce immediately prior to any demolition serial. The setting of those parameters and their limits should be decided in consulation with the Bureau of Meteorology and Rural Fire Service and inserted into Range Standing Orders. 

All documents be reviewed to remove ambiguity and perceived inconsistencies. Marrangaroo Training Area Range Standing Orders be subject to further examination, with particular consideration of the bushfire mitigation strategies referred to in the Bushfire Management Plan 2011-2014 before amendments to Chapter 10 are made. the basis upon which Range Standing Orders might fix a cut-off point for live-firing exercises should depend on continued bushfire strategies. Range Standing orders and Marrangaroo Training Area Bushfire Management Plan be reviewed annually. if hazard reduction has not occurred or the fire trails degraded, Range Standing Orders should take into account of heightened risk. 

Defence Security Authority conduct an investigation into the whereabouts of items of anaccounted explosive ordnance issued to Defence Explosive Ordnance Training School Exercise Marrangaroo.

The Australian Government should schedule an independent and public review of the progress of reforms to natural disaster funding arrangements five years after implementation has commenced. This review should examine the operation and efficacy of the arrangements, including the:
• use of assessed damages and benchmark prices for the reconstruction of essential public assets
• use of upfront grants for community recovery
• feasibility of moving away from a cumulative trigger for recovery funding and towards an event-based model
• quantum and impacts of mitigation funding, and the institutional arrangements used by states and territories to allocate the mitigation funding they receive
• accountability arrangements for each level of government, including those that relate to Australian Government budgeting for natural disasters, insurance of state and territory government assets, and use of asset management planning by state, territory and local governments
• progress implementing the Commissions’ recommendations in relation to land use planning, information provision and insurance.
In developing terms of reference for this review, the Australian Government should consult with state and territory governments.

The provisions in the Queensland Sustainable Planning Act 2009 for injurious affection should be repealed.

The Australian Government should:
• legislate the current eligibility criteria for the Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment (AGDRP) and remove Ministerial discretion
• review the amount provided under the AGDRP so that it is more reflective of immediate emergency relief needs, and against other comparable payments.

The Australian Government should establish a framework for the development of benchmark prices for the reconstruction of essential public assets. This should set out the broad parameters that state and territory governments should follow, without prescribing particular prices to be used.
The Australian Government should also develop a methodology for assessing damages to essential public assets from natural disasters, to enable the application of benchmark prices.
Both tasks should be completed as soon as possible and within one year.

The ANAO recommends that the Department of Defence review the minimum information necessary to be reported for each emergency DACC task to discharge accountability obligations, identify costs, undertake cost recovery where appropriate, maintain records for future use and learn from emergency DACC activities

Future coordination/support/control of integrated emergency management across all agencies in Albany needs to be merged and located in a single joint facility. This issue needs to be reviewed statewide.

DFES and Local Government Bushfire Brigades ensure that only those with the required AIIMS competence have the authority to manage Level 1 incidents, noting they may not be Fire Control Officers.

DFES or DEC (depending on land tenure) is mandated to take over control of emergency incidents from Local Government once they have been declared Level 2 incidents. WESTPLAN BUSHFIRE and legislation to be amended accordingly.

Critical operational procedures such as ‘Red Flag Warnings’, on a common fireground need to be consistent across DFES, DEC and Local Government. In particular, the operational procedure of Red Flag Warnings needs to be adopted by all WA fire agencies.

WA fire agencies adopt a common set of standing orders, operational procedures, training and competencies for rural firefighting that are produced in hard copy, leading to integrated multi-agency training, IMTs, Regional and State coordination/control centres.

WA adopts a culture of joint IMTs in future. At Regional and State levels, DFES and DEC maintain standing contributions.

Western Australia Health should carry out targeted clinical audits in volunteer country sub-centres until longer term solutions are in place

Western Australia Health should carry out targeted clinical audits in volunteer country sub-centres until longer term solutions are in place

Western Australia Health should consider publishing information on St John Ambulance’s complaints processes to assist Western Australia Health staff.

St John Ambulance should ensure the positive gains in clinical governance achieved since the Inquiry become embedded throughout the whole organisation.

The Department of Justice should review the current model for rapid impact assessment to improve the quality of the information collected.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet should lead: x the development of an evaluation framework, based on work undertaken to date by the Department of Human Services, to be used in assessing the impact of relief and recovery programs in the recent floods and in future disaster events x an evaluation of the impact of relief and recovery programs in the recent floods, using this framework.

The Department of Human Services should develop an improved model for communication for future disasters that provides a single point of information and contact for disaster affected communities

That Tasmania Fire Service considers measures to bring local knowledge into Incident Management Team operations.

That Tasmania Police reviews its Emergency Traffic Management Points policy; and develops a multi-agency policy in the emergency management plans for road closures and traffic management, including clarity in decision making, coordination and sufficient operational flexibility.

That the State Emergency Management Committee examine whether there are any legal issues associated with continuing recovery operations where the overarching emergency management arrangements have ceased.

That the State Emergency Management Committee considers structuring the Tasmania Emergency Management Plan in a way that provides more specific guidance, commitment to and accountability for action to be taken.

That Tasmania Fire Service considers adopting a primary tactic of an aggressive first attack on fires.

That Tasmania Police be identified as the lead agency on evacuations.

That the Tasmanian Emergency Management Plan includes a comprehensive all hazards communications policy and plan.

That Tasmania Police establishes a section within its structure with responsibility for developing and maintaining contemporary expertise in emergency management, progressing innovation, assisting organisational change initiatives and supporting its responsibilities in state emergency management arrangements.

That the Government reconsider the current position on emergency declarations in the Emergency Management Act 2006 and the Act is amended to provide: • a graduated scale of emergency declarations; • the ability to make a declaration when an emergency has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur; • the ability for the State Controller (or whatever the person in overall control of response and recovery operations is called) to make one or more declarations; • a declaration to enable access to all emergency powers.

That Tasmania Fire Service reviews its integration of rural local knowledge and volunteer brigades into fire operations, develops and maintains appropriate strategies, and aims to be a best-practice fire service in this regard.

That a public information plan be developed as a part of the State Special Emergency Plan–Recovery, for implementation in the immediate recovery phase.

That Tasmania Fire Service and Tasmania Police review their use of modern forms of communication with the community, including social media, and commit resources to fully use this capability where appropriate.

That an independent means of monitoring and reporting on the implementation of approved recommendations is established.

That Tasmania Fire Service and its partner agencies establish a means of monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of centralising the location of Incident Management Teams.

That Tasmania Police ensures planning for emergency operations includes a proactive approach wherever possible.

That emergency management plans recognise the need to provide priority access to areas of emergency operations for critical infrastructure providers.

That an accountability process be established for managing improvement in the emergency management arrangements, including annual State of Readiness Reports by relevant departments and agencies and on the overall emergency management arrangements.

That Tasmania Fire Service ensures that planning for active fires includes a proactive approach wherever possible.

That arrangements are made and appropriate pre-planning occurs to effectively implement the policy on evacuation.

That the State Fire Commission structures its Tasmania Bushfire Safety Policy so policy outcomes are identifiable and progress in achieving outcomes can be evaluated.

That Tasmania Police conducts a review to ensure emergency management is treated as a priority and a core function throughout the organisation, including the development of contemporary capabilities, and is supported by an appropriate culture.

That in multi-agency response and recovery operations, arrangements be made so it is unambiguous who is in charge of these operations.

That Tasmania Fire Service reviews operational practices to ensure there is continuity of fire operations when fire suppression action is required.

That appropriate plans are made to mobilise resources quickly to re-open roads affected by emergencies.

That the State Emergency Management Committee makes arrangements to actively manage the use of social media in the community during an emergency, to avoid negative consequences for emergency operations.

That resources are committed to developing and implementing approved reforms to the emergency management arrangements.

That Tasmania Fire Service examines options for developing and issuing fire management objectives and tactics from Incident Management Teams in a more timely way, including ‘quick’ plans.

That Tasmania Fire Service documents and publishes its operational policies and procedures so they are accessible to and suitable for operational personnel.

That the Government consider whether it should discuss options for greater mobile phone coverage and redundancy in areas of high risk in emergency situations where there are presently telecommunications limits.

That membership of the State Emergency Management Committee, and other processes to link in appropriate agencies and organisations to emergency management, be included in the recommended review of the emergency management arrangements.

That Tasmania Fire Service reviews the communication systems used for all emergency management operations, ensures operators are qualified, and ensures there is appropriate accountability.

That qualifying the evacuation authority in section 47 of the Fire Service Act 1979 be considered — by exempting those people with a pecuniary interest in a property from a directed evacuation where it is reasonable for them to remain.

That the State Fire Commission finalise its position on the Tasmania Bushfire Safety Policy without further delay.

That the Strategic Fuel Management Plan includes measurable targets and they are actively monitored and reported on to the community.

That the State Controller (or an alternate if they are not available) be expected to personally take an active role in controlling and coordinating response and recovery operations, depending on the nature and scale of the emergency, and until other identified arrangements for ongoing operations are established.

If it is considered more information is required on action to suppress the fires in Dunalley and why fire operations did not continue, the Department of Justice should conduct an independent examination of this matter.

That the State Special Emergency Plan–Recovery and the emergency management structure for recovery be reviewed.

That the State Emergency Management Committee makes timely decisions and resource commitments on the appropriate use of social media in emergency management.

That following any review, the Emergency Management Act 2006 be amended.

That police and other emergency services examine options for achieving radio interoperability between them in the absence of an integrated radio system.

That Tasmania Fire Service establishes sufficient resources and expertise to research, develop, implement and review its policies and operations.

That the role of Red Cross in emergency management plans and procedures for the activation of Red Cross be reviewed.

That a process be established for the timely implementation of approved recommendations from the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission.

That Tasmania Fire Service reviews its position on using local experienced officers on the fire ground in the command model in a structured and systemic way.

That a state-level policy on evacuations be developed in the emergency management plans, including specific requirements for vulnerable people and guidelines for its implementation.

That emergency management plans specifically include processes and resources for effectively engaging with and using local communities, including volunteers

That the Government actively support the timely development and implementation of an ongoing Strategic Fuel Management Plan.

That the role and expected duties of the State Controller be clearly defined in the Emergency Management Act 2006.

That Tasmania Fire Service considers what adjustments may be necessary to the promotion and use of the Six Operational Priorities to ensure plans are suitable for the circumstances of each fire.

That a standing plan is developed to manage the transition from immediate recovery to medium and long-term recovery, and arrangements are made to ensure this plan can be effectively implemented in a timely way.

That Tasmania Fire Service ensures that the priority on warning communities at risk of active bushfires is not confined to when bushfires are burning out of control.

That the Department of Justice conduct an independent review to develop a suitable model for integrated and interoperable emergency management arrangements in Tasmania.

That all agencies and the Government support moving to an integrated communications technology for police and the emergency services.

That Tasmania Fire Service reviews its approach to fire management operations at night, and develop and effectively implement unambiguous policy and operating procedures.

That evacuation centres and other centres have a standard operating procedure for communications.

That Tasmania Fire Service develops a research base from which to inform the design of communication campaigns for communities threatened by bushfire.

That Tasmania Fire Service reviews its position on fire ground management to determine whether a unified command model at the fire ground should be adopted.

That arrangements are made for and appropriate pre-planning occurs to effectively implement the policy on road closures and traffic management.

That the plans for social recovery be reviewed, and plans and procedures are established ready for implementation.

That the State Emergency Management Committee determine suitable risk management tools, such as the Bushfire Risk Assessment Model, and encourages their use in assessing bushfire risk in a consistent manner.

That Tasmania Fire Service critically reviews the operation of the Six Operational Priorities to determine whether they are appropriate and effective.

That decisions to open Community Fire Refuges and evacuation centres be coordinated with Tasmania Police.

That Tasmania Fire Service actively uses predictive modelling to design emergency communications for communities threatened by bushfire, unless there is a compelling reason for not doing so.

That Tasmania Police develops and implements a program for examining emergency management arrangements and facilities in Australia.

That the Tasmania Emergency Management Plan enable, and all organisations with a role in emergency management activate, emergency plans at lower threshold events to practice their arrangements and achieve a ‘hot start’ in escalating events.

That Tasmania Fire Service reviews its approach to blacking out and mopping up, including its policies, operating procedures and training.

That evacuation centres and other centres have plans and arrangements for electrical power redundancy.

That Tasmania Fire Service reviews its approach to communicating with communities threatened by bushfire and consider the matters referred to in this Report.

TFS finalise and sign off the State Fire Protection Plan (SFPP). All the documents named in the SFPP should be finalised and available to relevant stakeholders to support the SFPP.

TFS seek to address the following outstanding items from the recommendations of the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. § 45 out of 53 Community Bushfire Response Plans for “at risk” communities have been finalized. The remaining eight should be completed as a priority action. § That TFS progress the development of Community Bushfire Mitigation Plans for the 53 at risk communities, possibly as an action for reactivated Fire Management Area Committees. § TFS, together with other ESOs and local government, should develop a common comprehensive approach to the option of planned evacuation from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas to safer areas and eventual return. § TFS should include factors for consideration for evacuation during a bushfire into their training doctrine for Incident Controllers. § The IAP Template and its application be reinforced as an important operational requirement for IMT’s during the 2013-14 pre-season briefing program. 10 § That TFS review their use of IRMS to ascertain if either its full potential is not being realized through a lack of operator training or it is in fact not providing the required functionality and there is a need to research an improved resource management system which enhances interoperability. § The TFS Publication: Guidelines for Development in Bushfire Prone Areas of Tasmania http://www.fire.tas.gov.au/userfiles/stuartp/file/Publications/BushDeve… s2012.pdf requires an update to reflect the provisions of Planning Directive #5 Bushfire-Prone Areas Code.

All Tasmanian fire agencies seek to have the State Bushfire Policy finalised and signed-off at the required level of government.

TFS develop written guidelines for the use of IMTs about the use of evacuation in a bushfire context, and triggers for decision-making.

TFS develop MOUs with interstate fire agencies and land management authorities to formalise agency to agency resource sharing/mutual aid protocols that ensure the effective deployment of interstate resources for all roles from fire ground to state control, and management of those resources within pre-established criteria.

TFS review all areas in which the SFOC has a role and ensure that robust policy and protocols are finalised to ensure that corporate knowledge is widely accessible and is not held solely by individuals.

TFS review the Inter-Agency Fire Management Protocol and the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the Multi-Agency Coordination Group (MAC), to ensure that the Inter-Agency Fire Management Protocol accurately reflects the role and functions of the State Fire Operations Centre (SFOC) and clearly establishes and communicates the role and functions of the MAC Group.

That TFS and Ambulance Tasmania work together to resolve problems around congestion, particularly during the fire season.

That Tasmania Police, Tasmania Fire Service (TFS), Ambulance Tasmania and State Emergency Services (SES) investigate ways of providing secure and confidential radio communications.

Should the State Bushfire Coordination Committee continue to exist under the F&ES Act, then Section 71 of the Act be amended to provide for the appointment of an independent presiding member of the committee.

That the F&ES Act be amended to enable fire safety inspections in and outside fire districts.

That the proposed ‘Permit Information Management System’ (PIMS) be implemented as soon as possible and incorporated into the Call Receipt and Dispatch process. Following implementation, amend Regulation 33 (5) (d) and (10) (c) in line with the automated notification process.

Amend the F&ES Act to reflect the SES expanded responsibilities as Hazard Leader for ‘Extreme Weather’ including their community education role.

Amend Section 143 to strengthen the capacity of the ESOs to recover outstanding debts (e.g. penalty for late payment provisions).

That South Australia’s Hazard Leader Plan for Rural Fire, prepared in accordance with the State Emergency Management Plan, replace the F&ES Act requirement for a separate State Bushfire Management Plan.
Divisions 7 and 7a of the Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005 be amended or deleted accordingly. Bushfire Management Areas be replaced by Zone Emergency Management Committee regions, which are already aligned to South Australian Government Regions.

Amend Sections 28, 61 and 110 to provide the Chief Officers greater flexibility over organisational structure.

Consider whether Regulation 71 be amended to extend the range of offences for which expiation fees apply to include a breach of any permit condition imposed by an authorised officer.

Section 70 (5) be amended to preclude a person from being elected as a group officer, brigade captain or brigade lieutenant if he or she is an employee of the CFS.

Should the State Bushfire Coordination Committee continue to exist under the F&ES Act amend Section 94 (4) (c) to refer to the ‘State Bushfire Coordination Committee’.

Section 142 be amended to include the SES

Review employment conditions under the F&ES Act to align with those under the Public Sector Act unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary.

That an independent review of the operational and geographic boundaries of the ESOs be conducted recognising the limitations of the current governance structures to adequately address such issues. Such a review needs to be performed periodically, but not less than every 8 years.

Amend Regulation 41 to exempt the use of prescribed appliances when a Hot Work Permit compliant with AS1674.1 has been issued.

Sections 42 and 97 be amended to provide greater flexibility in the engagement of contractors by Senior MFS and CFS Officers. Consideration be given to providing similar powers in Section 118 to enable the SES to engage contractors.

Develop a code of practice which is referenced by the F&ES Act for burning off including the option to issue seasonal permits for relevant purposes throughout the State.

Review Section 134 to ensure that it is not a deterrent to a group of farm fire units operating at an incident.

When judging major incidents in the future, consideration be given to Eburn and Dover’s proposal to establish processes with a statutory basis that sufficiently balance the community’s interests in ensuring that true lessons, including lessons of error or neglect, are identified, whilst also protecting members of the emergency services. Processes need to be developed for emergency services such as those used in aviation and medicine, to facilitate open and honest disclosure of errors.

Amend the F&ES Act to provide for the operation of interstate fire and emergency service workers in South Australia. The issue of liability may need to be considered.

An external audit of shared services performed by SAFECOM and services now provided by the three ESOs which have the potential to be shared, be undertaken to determine the most efficient and cost effective way such services can be delivered to the sector. The three ESO Chiefs need to have input into this process.

Notification of a total fire ban should be broadcast to the public via any means reasonably available. Section 80, parts (2), (5) and (6) be amended so that broadcast fire ban warnings include, but not be limited to, radio stations, internet sites, social media outlets etc.

The F&ES Act be amended to clarify the meaning of ‘closure’ in Section 38 and that provisions relating to the extension and rescission of closure orders be reviewed.

Review the format and necessity for Schedules 9 and 10 of the Regulations

Clarify that Section 128 of the F&ES Act is not compromised by any other legislation. 

In consultation with stakeholders including CFA, develop a Forest Industry Brigade standard for inclusion in the Fire and Emergency Services Regulations.

The requirement to consult with members of the unit and the SESVA before an SES Unit is dissolved should remain but the need for public meetings be removed from the regulations.

That the MFS, CFS and SES be incorporated into a departmental structure under the direction of a Chief Executive based on interstate developments over the past two decades, which establishes this arrangement as the benchmark for the governance of Emergency Services in Australia. The MFS, CFS and SES would operate as separate units under the ultimate direction of the CEO.

Amend Regulation 33 (6) and (8) to include respectively ‘notice given’ and ‘permit application’ using the online medium.

The power of the Chief Officer to appoint officers from the staff of the SES as well as appoint volunteer officers of the SES be clarified. A command structure section (similar to Section 70) be incorporated into the Act and include the power to register, appoint, disqualify and terminate volunteer members.

Consider the amendment of Section 82 (2) to include the power to order the cessation of harvesting or any other actions (including the lighting of fires authorised under Section 81) that because of the weather conditions, may cause a fire, if ignited, to get out of control.

That noting the precedents for legislated charters in the Carers Recognition Act 2005 and the Health and Community Services Complaints Act 2004, that the Government support the Fire and Emergency Services (Volunteer Charters) Amendment Bill introduced by the Member for Morphett in November 2012 to enshrine the Country Fire Service and the State Emergency Service at law.

That the Government’s Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation (SAMFS Firefighters) Amendment Bill be amended to include Country Fire Service firefighters alongside Metropolitan Fire Service firefighters.

That the State Government give high priority to liaising with interstate and Federal processes, and offer to take a lead, on changing the climatic and fire rating arrangements to ensure these match the conditions that can create dangerous bushfire conditions at short notice.

That the Government consult broadly upon and review impediments to volunteering in the community and establish a taskforce to assist in removing barriers to volunteering, particularly with respect to:
i harmonising the regime for reimbursement to community safety and emergency services volunteers for their out-of-pocket expenses; and
ii reviewing the impact of work health and safety laws on the community safety and emergency service sector, particularly on the volunteer organisation.

That noting the precedents for legislated charters in the Carers Recognition Act 2005 and the Health and Community Services Complaints Act 2004, that the Government support the Fire and Emergency Services (Volunteer Charters) Amendment Bill introduced by the Member for Morphett in November 2012 to enshrine the Country Fire Service and the State Emergency Service at law.

That Government agencies work closely with the Bureau of Meteorology and radio stations that broadcast emergency service announcements, to ensure the earliest possible determination of, and communications about, dangerous bushfire conditions.

That the State Government recognises the legal status of rural fire brigades as per Crown Law advice and addressed by Recommendations from this Review.

That Rural Fire Brigades only be required to conduct an audit of finances if the Brigades income exceeds $5,000 for a financial year. RFSQ District offices should investigate options for savings on the costs of auditing Brigades in their district through either an in-house or external provider. Legal Status of Brigades

That Rural Fire Service Queensland undertake a risk management process for rural fire Brigade profiles across Queensland based on the principles in the Rural Fire Brigade Risk Management Guide, July 1999, and updated as necessary.

That the focus of Rural Fire Service Queensland will be the protection of life, property and the environment from the threat and impact of wildfire.

That a memorandum of understanding be developed between RFSQ and other organisations with fire fighting capacity at state level, to establish operational procedures when these organisations may be required for a joint response roles. Specifically, the intent will be: Vegetation Fire in a Rural Area: The Rural Fire Brigade in that area (boundary) is in charge and is the first Brigade called by Firecom. Structural Fire in a Rural Area: Firecom calls the Urban Brigade first and they control the incident. Local Rural Fire Brigade must also be notified by Firecom at the same time. Vegetation Fire in an Urban Levy Area: Firecom call the local Urban Brigade first and they control the incident. At their discretion they may call Rural Fire Brigades for assistance. Structural Fire in an Urban Levy Area: Firecom call the local Urban Brigade first and they control the incident.

That on all land where fuel load creates a fire risk, the owner shall be responsible for the construction and maintenance of effective firebreaks. Failure to provide effective and accessible firebreaks will result in the cost of firebreak construction to control a wildfire on this land being debited to the land owner

That the Queensland Police Service Disaster Management Unit be given responsibility for production of the State disaster management plan for the State Disaster Management Group’s approval.

That the proposed efficiency review of the Queensland Police Service examine whether:
- the Queensland Police Service is losing money from indirect costs associated with extraneous activities through sick leave or additional overtime shifts allocated to cover officers undertaking ‘special services’ activities
- there is a degree of transfer of risk to the Queensland Police Service when their services are ‘bought’ for commercial activities such as crowd control for private events.

That Queensland Corrective Service, the Queensland Police Service and Queensland Health should work together to develop a position that enables prisoners to have timely access to their prescribed medication despite travel between facilities and without the need for costly re-prescription.

That the current SES memoranda of agreement between the Department of Community Safety and local governments be revised to include a clear statement as to the command and control arrangements between State and respective local governments. These arrangements should also be reflected in the local disaster management plans.

That the Queensland Police Service:
- identify policing matters that only a sworn officer can manage, or
- identify matters that can be handled more efficiently through the use of emerging technologies such as biometrics and scanners.

That, where appropriate, the Commissioner of Police appoints appropriately trained and experienced public service officers to appropriate roles in the disaster management system to support District Disaster Coordinators in their vital roles.

That the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business leads an efficiency review of portfolio agencies beginning with the Queensland Police Service.

That the Disaster Management Act 2003 be amended to:
- specify the Commissioner of Police as Deputy Chair of the State Disaster Management Group
- identify that a Deputy Commissioner of Police would be the default choice for appointment as State Disaster Coordinator.

That the Fire and Rescue Act 1990 be amended so that Commissioner’s position is not limited to a “person with professional experience in fire prevention and fire fighting”.

That a system should be designed so that the prisoner and the prisoner’s prescribed drugs are treated as one and therefore travel together through the system for whatever purpose.

That the protocols developed by the Queensland Police Service and SES for operations define the respective roles and responsibilities as well as recognise the varying capabilities of SES units across the State.

That the Queensland Police Service considers adopting the broader use of ANPR in line with other Australian jurisdictions in consultation with the Privacy Commissioner.

That the Department of Fire and Emergency Services be created through the renaming and amendment to the existing Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 including:
- The creation of a new, ‘Fire and Emergency Services Act’ 2013.
- Transfer those sections of the Disaster Management Act 2003 pertinent to State Emergency Service and Emergency Service Units into the Fire and Emergency Services Act’ 2013.
- Removal of the specific requirement for the QFRS Commissioner to be an experienced ‘fire officer’.

That the Queensland Police Service executive team reassesses its preparedness to collaborate with other agencies to deliver a whole of Government approach to delivering community safety.

That Queensland enters into a similar arrangement with Bureau of Meteorology to have an experienced forecaster seconded to Kedron State Disaster Coordination Centre for at least the duration of fire and storm seasons.

That as part of its efficiency review, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service instigate an independent review of commercial operations in terms of statutory obligations and current ‘full cost pricing’ methodology to ensure:
a. compliance with all necessary obligations
b. that if current understanding of profitability is not valid, then Training and Emergency Management Unit operations should be wound up.

That the proposed efficiency review consider whether special service functions are core business, whether this practice is sustainable, and other options such as the use of casual employees.

That as the Queensland Police Service moves to a digital platform the strategy around effective targeting and alternative automated number plate recognition models should form part of the design architecture.

That any changed arrangements to the operations of Queensland Corrective Service ensure anti-corruption, prisoner management, and accountability processes are defined and established.

That the ‘Functions of Chief Executive’ under the Disaster Management Act 2003 are amended to remove those functions that will become the role of the proposed Inspector General of Emergency Management.

That the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business consider ‘big data’ problems and solutions in line with the outcome of the efficiency review into the Queensland Police Service and ensure alignment with whole of government solutions.

That the presence of police in State Disaster Coordination Centre response teams is mandated and formalised through documented standard operating procedures.

That the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service enters into discussion with the Queensland Police Service regarding the possibility for the Queensland Police Service to assist with prosecutions that may arise out of fire safety matters.

That the proposed efficiency review includes a focus on the rank structure of both the Queensland Police Service and the proposed Fire and Emergency Services.

That the Queensland Police Service and SES develop clear operational protocols to ensure that SES assistance is not exploited.

That the current provisions enabling there to be a Ministerial Direction be maintained and actioned as the Minister sees fit.

That the Queensland Police Service bring this practice to the attention of the Privacy Commissioner and discuss a new service wide policy on the retention of data to ensure that their officers are not acting in breach of the law.

That the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service community safety operations be joined in the efficiency review of the Queensland Police Service focussing on both the community safety outcomes achieved and the extent to which they support the Government’s economic priorities.

That the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business in consultation with the Police Commissioner and the Commissioner Fire & Emergency Services should provide the direction for future information and communication technology strategies and acquisitions.

That the Queensland Police Service Disaster Management Unit work with emergency management staff in the new portfolio to produce the State disaster management plan.

That the new Department of Fire and Emergency Services develop a common doctrine to protect people from fire and emergencies.

That the review of this Queensland Fire and Rescue Services business unit be done in conjunction with the efficiency review proposed for the Queensland Police Service.

That as part of reviewing its legislation, Queensland Corrective Service should ensure that amendments be made to ensure a stronger onus is placed upon a more efficient process to receive prisoners with a view to reducing the time spent in police watch houses.

That the Inspector General Emergency Management assess the effectiveness of plans and policy in relation to SES deployment and command and control.

That the roll-out of the Queensland Police Service digital technology should take into consideration adopting and facilitating new processes including the police response to domestic violence.

That the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business and Commissioners establish a high level working group with the ABC and commercial media to identify and implement an improved information flow to the community on disasters.

That the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service undertake a review of all standing orders, incident directives and guidelines regarding response protocols with a view to reducing risk to staff and other road users associated with urgent duty driving.

That systems development in the Queensland Police Service capitalises on the advances made by the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service in recent years.

Develop and implement a program of cost-effective road improvement works that can enhance flood evacuation capacity in the short-medium term.

Optimise the configuration of a raised Warragamba Dam for flood mitigation of the full range of flood events and water supply, with due consideration of upstream impacts.

Determine the appropriateness and the steps required to allow the reduction of full supply level by up to five metres and/or the implementation of alternative gate operation at Warragamba Dam for the mitigation of minor to moderate flood events in the short-term.

Ensure effective flood gauging arrangements in the Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley

Review the NSW state-wide governance arrangements for flood risk management so that broader issues identified by this Review can be most effectively addressed.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service hold discussions with the Commonwealth Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities about hazard reduction and roadside vegetation, including potential changes to the NSW Bush Fire Environmental Assessment Code.

That section 56 of the Rural Fires Act 1997 be amended to give the Commissioner of the NSW Rural Fire Service the power to direct a Bush Fire Management Committee to amend its Bush Fire Risk Management Plan if it is inadequate, in the opinion of the Commissioner.

That section 100I of the Rural Fires Act 1997 be amended to allow hazard reduction certificates to be issued for annual low impact works for a period of three years, where appropriate.

That section 9(4)(b) of the Rural Fires Act 1997, which sets out the functions of the NSW Rural Fire Service, be amended to include protecting infrastructure, environmental, economic, cultural, agricultural and social assets from damage.

That section 74 of the Rural Fires Act 1997 be amended to require public authorities to report monthly to the Commissioner of the NSW Rural Fire Service on activities undertaken to reduce bush fire hazards on managed land during the preceding month and the reasons why any planned activities did not take place.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service investigate use of appropriate modelling, such as PHOENIX RapidFire and the Bayesian Network analysis, to quantify the level of bush fire risk to critical values and assets.

That section 3(c) of the Rural Fires Act 1997, which sets out the objects of the Act, be extended to include protecting infrastructure, environmental, economic, cultural, agricultural and social assets from damage.

That section 74 of the Rural Fires Act 1997 be amended to require public authorities to report to the Commissioner of the NSW Rural Fire Service within one month of the end of the financial year on activities undertaken to reduce bush fire hazards on managed land during the preceding financial year.

That Bush Fire Management Committees be required to take into account fuel age and fire frequency thresholds when developing Bush Fire Risk Management Plans

That the definition of “bush fire hazard reduction work” in the Dictionary of the Rural Fires Act 1997 be amended to include the establishment or maintenance of fire trails.

The Panel notes and endorses the NSW bush fire management system based on a multi-agency, tenure blind approach using locally focused Bush Fire Management Committees, Bush Fire Management Plans and the Bush Fire Environmental Assessment Code as best practice.

That the Rural Fires Act 1997 be amended to allow the Commissioner of the NSW Rural Fire Service to carry out hazard reduction on land without the consent of the owner after reasonable attempts to contact the landowner have failed, without serving a notice under section 66 of the Rural Fires Act.

The committee recommends that where the consideration and implementation of an ATSB recommendation may be protracted, the requirement for regular updates (for example 6 monthly) should be included in the TSI Act.

The committee recommends that the minister, in issuing a new Statement of Expectations to the ATSB, valid from 1 July 2013, make it clear that safety in aviation operations involving passengers (fare paying or those with no control over the flight they are on, e.g. air ambulance) is to be accorded equal priority irrespective of flight classification.

The committee recommends that the Aeronautical Information Package (AIP) En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) is updated to reflect the need for caution with regard to Norfolk Island forecasts where the actual conditions can change rapidly and vary from forecasts.

The committee recommends that CASA processes in relation to matters highlighted by this investigation be reviewed. This could involve an evaluation benchmarked against a credible peer (such as FAA or CAA) of regulation and audits with respect to: non-RPT passenger carrying operations; approach to audits; and training and standardisation of FOI across regional offices.

The committee recommends that the ATSB review its process to track the implementation of recommendations or safety actions to ensure it is an effective closed loop system. This should be made public, and provided to the Senate Regional and Rural Affairs and Transport Committee prior to each Budget Estimates.

The committee recommends that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau retrieve VH-NGA flight data recorders without further delay.

The committee recommends that the relevant agencies investigate appropriate methods to ensure that information about the incidence of, and variable weather conditions at, Norfolk Island is available to assist flight crews and operators managing risk that may result from unforseen weather events.

The committee recommends that the investigation be re-opened by the ATSB with a focus on organisational, oversight and broader systemic issues.

The committee recommends that, where relevant, the ATSB include thorough human factors analysis and discussion in future investigation reports. Where human factors are not considered relevant, the ATSB should include a statement explaining why.

The committee recommends that the relevant agencies review whether any equipment or other changes can be made to improve the weather forecasting at Norfolk Island. The review would include whether the Unicom operator should be an approved meteorological observer.

The committee recommends that the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 be amended to require that the Chief Commissioner of the ATSB be able to demonstrate extensive aviation safety expertise and experience as a prerequisite for the selection process.

The committee recommends that the ATSB-CASA Memorandum of Understanding be re-drafted to remove any ambiguity in relation to information that should be shared between the agencies in relation to aviation accident investigations, to require CASA to:
• advise the ATSB of the initiation of any action, audit or review as a result of an accident which the ATSB is investigating.
• provide the ATSB with the relevant review report as soon as it is available.

The committee recommends that Airservices Australia discuss the safety case for providing a hazard alert service with Fijian and New Zealand ATC (and any other relevant jurisdictions) and encourage them to adopt this practice.

The committee recommends that the ATSB be required to document investigative avenues that were explored and then discarded, providing detailed explanations as to why.

The committee recommends that a short inquiry be conducted by the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport into the current status of aviation regulatory reform to assess the direction, progress and resources expended to date to ensure greater visibility of the processes.

The committee recommends that the government consider setting a time limit for agencies to implement or reject recommendations, beyond which ministerial oversight is required where the agencies concerned must report to the minister why the recommendation has not been implemented or that, with ministerial approval, it has been formally rejected.

The committee recommends that the ATSB move away from its current approach of forecasting the probability of future events and focus on the analysis of factors which allowed the accident under investigation to occur. This would enable the industry to identify, assess and implement lessons relevant to their own operations.

The committee recommends that CASA, in consultation with an Emergency Medical Services industry representative group (eg. Royal Flying Doctor Service, air ambulance operators, rotary wing rescue providers) consider the merit, form and standards of a new category of operations for Emergency Medical Services. The minister should require CASA to approve the industry plan unless there is a clear safety case not to. Scope for industry to assist as part of an audit team should also be investigated where standardisation is an issue. This should be completed within 12 months and the outcome reported publicly.

The Australian National Audit Office recommends that the Department of Regional Australia, Local Government, Arts and Sport improve the arrangements for conducting value for money reviews of Victorian reconstruction projects by pursuing amendments to the operating protocol with Victoria to require that, at regular intervals, the Taskforce is provided with information on all reconstruction projects being delivered within the scope of the National Partnership Agreement.

In order to maximise the envisaged benefits from the Inspectorate’s program of value for money reviews, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)  recommends that the National Disaster Recovery Taskforce improve the application of the sampling approach to make it more representative of the
population of projects within the Inspectorate’s remit.

Individuals without a mobile phone who are concerned about access to Triple Zero during a prolonged telecommunications outage could consider purchasing a low cost mobile phone with a charger to keep at home for use during such outages. Since mobile phones do not require SIM cards to make emergency calls (‘000’ and ‘112’), there will be no ongoing costs.

Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy will work with the Communications Sector Group within the Trusted Information Sharing Network to develop best practice guidance for owners of critical communications infrastructure regarding public messaging during a prolonged telecommunications outage covering:
- the provision of early and accurate advice to the community;
- the dissemination of information to business, government, community service providers and critical industry sectors such as banks;
- engagement with emergency service providers and the appointed local incident manager;
- public communications over radio, by personal contact etc. - avoiding a reliance on phone and internet;
- communications with other wholesale providers including on matters dealing with compensation;
- public notices, such as the use of prominent notices on websites, explaining the outage to customers and clients outside the affected area; and
- the use of recorded voice announcements to inform incoming callers of the outage.

Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy seek regular updates from Telstra on the implementation of the recommendations of its inquiry into the Warrnambool exchange fire.

Governments and other stakeholders consider reviewing their existing emergency management arrangements to ensure public communications are clear and the public is kept informed of the incident response.

Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE) to work with the Triple Zero Awareness Work Group through Australian Communications and Media Authority's (ACMA) Emergency Service Advisory Committee to review Triple Zero awareness messages with regard to telecommunications outages.

The Australian Department of Health and Ageing work with the states and territories to provide a uniform notifiable diseases list across Australia, with consistent reporting requirements across each state and territory and consistent public health information on infectious diseases disseminated to the public. This work should be a priority of Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council (AHMAC).

The Department of Health and Ageing review the existing evidence base to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of its policy to use heat scanners at ports of entry as a measure to mitigate the risk of infectious disease importation.

The relevant government agencies that have a significant role in managing the biosecurity threat develop a coordinated approach which addresses the health threats to Australians and recognises the impact on the economy.

The Australian Government, in consultation with state and territory governments, commission an independent review to assess the case for establishing a national centre for communicable disease control in Australia. The review should outline the role of a national centre and how it might be structured to build on and enhance existing systems. It should examine different models, considering a range of options for location, governance and staffing. The review should incorporate a cost-benefit analysis for each of the models presented.
The outcomes of the review should be made publically available.

The Australian Government, in consultation with state and territory governments, conduct a comprehensive national audit and mapping exercise to:
- identify all of the agencies (not limited to those within the health portfolio) and expert committees/working groups involved in managing infectious disease risks;
- clarify roles, responsibilities and map hierarchies and lines of communication;
- identify all relevant infectious disease policies and plans, explain how these operate in relation to one another;
- identify any duplication and present options for streamlining; and
- identify any policy or response gaps that need to be addressed.
The outcomes of the audit and mapping exercise should be made publically available.

The Australian Government, in consultation with consumers and other relevant federal, state and territory agencies, develop a national communication strategy for consumers to be used in the event of an infectious disease outbreak.

The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) recommends that the Department of Regional Australia, Local Government, Arts and Sport, in preparation for the forthcoming reviews of the National Partnership Agreements, identify the most effective means of obtaining the project level information on the respective reconstruction programs required by the Agreements to be reported on and, if appropriate, seek amendments to the Agreements.

The committee recommends that the Attorney-General's Department facilitate a public consultation process on a regulatory framework for overflow arrangements between public safety agencies and commercial carriers.

The committee recommends that disincentives to insurance, such as taxes and levies applied by the states and territories, should be removed as part of a national reform process.

The committee recommends that Australian governments specifically address issues of compatibility and capacity to facilitate the most effective interoperability of emergency service organisations and their key personnel, especially for fire services.

The committee recommends that Commonwealth, state and territory governments ensure that all facilities caring for vulnerable groups, in particular hospitals, schools, childcare and aged care facilities, have emergency management plans, relevant to their geographic settings, in place and regularly revised.

The Emergency Services Agency, in consultation with the Territory and Municipal Services Directorate, should review the Farm FireWise Program, including:
a) its purpose;
b) to whom it applies;
c) the relationship between this Program and Land Management Agreements; and
d) planning and implementation processes.

The Emergency Services Agency should review the operations of the Strategic Bushfire Management Plan Implementation Working Group to determine if it is the most appropriate mechanism for ‘monitoring the scope and effectiveness’ of the Strategic Bushfire Management Plan. If it is retained, ways to improve its effectiveness should be identified and implemented.

The Emergency Services Agency, in consultation with the ACT Bushfire Council, should conduct a review of the ACT Bushfire Council against its recently developed terms of reference (July 2013) within two years.

The Emergency Services Agency should develop and test administrative procedures for the communications systems used for the distribution of public warning and emergency alerts.

The Justice and Community Safety Directorate, in managing future amendments to the Emergencies Act 2004, should propose amendments which require the Emergency Services Agency to maintain information on privately-owned assets of public interest that are vulnerable to bushfire without the need to include this information in the Strategic Bushfire Management Plan.

The Emergency Services Agency should continue to work with National Land managers and develop a National Land bushfire management framework to address bushfire risks on National Land.

The Emergency Services Agency and the Territory and Municipal Services Directorate should develop and routinely review a strategic bushfire capability for the ACT. The contribution of ACT Fire and Rescue (including the Community Fire Units) and the ACT Rural Fire Service (including Parks Brigade) should be explicitly stated.

The Emergency Services Agency should comply with the Emergencies Act 2004 requirements for the Strategic Bushfire Management Plan by including in this Plan an explicit statement of all resources needed to meet the objectives of the Plan.

The Emergency Services Agency should develop a strategy for monitoring the development and implementation of all Government land managers’ operational plans.

The Emergency Services Agency and the Territory and Municipal Services Directorate should continue to improve working arrangements between the ACT Rural Fire Service Parks Brigade and the ACT Rural Fire Service headquarters, by:
a) documenting the responsibilities of the Parks and Conservation Service Branch in its land management role versus Parks Brigade role and conveying this to all brigades; and
b) updating or replacing the Emergency Services Agency and the Territory and Municipal Services Directorate 2007 Memorandum of Understanding to guide working arrangements for bushfire preparedness and suppression.

The Emergency Services Agency should specify preparation and approval requirements for bushfire operational plans, particularly those for lands in the Bushfire Abatement Zone.

The Emergency Services Agency should improve its management of the Community Fire Unit Program by:
a) developing governance and administrative documentation for the planning, management, administration and evaluation of the Program;
b) reviewing and consolidating standard operating procedures and operational guidance for participants in the Program; and
c) maintaining accurate records of activities, including training undertaken by Program participants and the issuing of stores and equipment to program participants.

The Emergency Services Agency should undertake audits to meet the requirements in the Strategic Bushfire Management Plan for the preparation, sharing and publication of annual progress reports. Annual progress reports should be made available to the ACT Bushfire Council.

I recommend that arrangements be put in place which would remove the requirements for Masters of Volunteer Marine Rescue vessels to hold a commercial certificate of competency. Operators could then be qualified through the FESA Volunteer Marine Rescue Training pathway as skippers and crew. This would increase the number of available skippers in the event of a search and rescue incident and would make appropriate training easier to arrange. 

I recommend that the AFP takes steps to ensure that there are on Christmas Island at all times appropriately trained AFP officers who have completed the National Police Search and Rescue Manager’s Course and that upskilling should be ongoing to establish a cadre of trained search and rescue personnel. 

I recommend that Border Protection Command implement a surveillance strategy, possibly with the assistance of other Commonwealth authorities and organisations on the island such as the AFP, which heightens its coverage at times when the weather and sea conditions are rough.

Inter-agency cooperation to manage fire precincts in a tenure-blind fashion is necessary for effective fire suppression.

IMTs need to establish early and effective liaison with Local Governments.

The process for initiating and releasing State Alert messages requires review.

The state should identify the number of fully trained, experienced and accredited Level 3 Incident Controllers required to be available at any time and establish a process for identification of suitable personnel, ongoing training and accreditation.

Clear direction to divisional and sector commanders and a common communications platform enables maximum return to be gained from the application of tactical resources and this rests on good incident action planning, and good command and control.

Suitably experienced local representatives should be engaged to provide advice to the IMT in all Level 2 and Level 3 incidents at the earliest opportunity.

The role of district and local emergency management committees should be reviewed to ensure they are appropriately engaged in the active management of emergencies across the PPR R continuum

Incident Controllers should be supported by a planning function that combines experienced weather forecasters, fire behaviour experts and local knowledge.

Timely alerts and updates to the community are essential.

For incidents of this complexity, effective control in the critical phase (first 24-36 hours of the fire) requires an appropriately resourced IMT.

Strategic direction seeks to identify and resource those areas of tactical action that offer the greatest advantage.

There would be value in progressively aligning the geographical boundaries of emergency management agencies and co-locating where possible within regions and districts.

Legislative change may be needed to enable FES A to better manage fire- fighting resources across the state.

Contingency planning is a critical function in the early stages of an escalating incident, and should provide the foundation of an IAP.

To be effective, multi-agency IMTs will need to be exercised regularly and supported by sound and comprehensive doctrine.

Communications planning for geographic regions with recognised black spots and specific communications challenges should be prepared in advance of an emergency in order to support the IMT Communications Planning Officer

Contingency planning before the fire may have supported the IMT in recognising and seizing strategic opportunities earlier.

Decisions on evacuations need to be made early enough for people to be fully informed, prepared and to move to a place of greater safety. Failure to conduct good planning can create situations where loss of life can occur

Predetermined locations for Level 3 IMTs should be reviewed and adequately resourced with necessary communications and IT capacity.

There would be benefit in progressively aligning the geographic boundaries of each of the agencies and seeking to co-locate their headquarters within those boundaries.

The expected scenario, with a view to the worst-case scenario should provide the basis for an IAP.

At Level 3, the available fire management expertise should be applied overwhelmingly to the fire management aspects of emergency management, possibly in incident control, and certainly in situations planning and operations roles.

As presently implemented, the AIIMS planning role is under-developed and provides insufficient support to the Incident Controller.

Logistics and resource officers in IMTs need to collaborate and establish full awareness and control over the available resources.

Radio bulletins need to be up to date and time stamped. Where social media is used the messages need to be up to date and accurate. Websites need to be up to date and accurate.

An intensive exercise/training program should be developed and maintained across agencies to identify and establish a pool of current Incident Controllers who are capable of managing a Level 3 incident.

A system of vehicle tracking should be fitted to all fire appliances and linked to the common operating picture. Good communications planning is essential for good command and control.

Procedures to relocate IMTs need to be established in doctrine and exercised to ensure continuity of control.

DEC’s fire management expertise should be augmented by multi-agency IMTs that incorporate the expertise of other agencies and in fast developing situations the appropriate decisions will need to be made early.

Greater investment in training on specific functions within the AIIMS structure will improve the support provided to the Incident Controller.

Section 13 arrangements need to be clarified across key agencies.

Expand the exploitation of social media, including graphical content for state alerts and warnings. Consider increasing the graphical content of web-based warnings.

Within the AIIMS IMT doctrine the roles of the Incident Controller and Deputy Incident Controllers should be defined and well-practiced.

In multi-agency responses the culture, training and equipment characteristics of each of the agencies should be considered in their employment.

Opportunities be sought to utilise local government representatives in other areas of the IMT particularly in public information or other community related functions.

Reporting and control should be through the incident chain of command and not through agency chains of command

DFES or DEC (depending on land tenure) is mandated to take over control of emergency incidents from Local Government once they have been declared Level 2 incidents. WESTPLAN BUSHFIRE and legislation to be amended accordingly.

: In due course, acts of bravery are considered and recommendations for awards are submitted, including commendations for the delivery of First Aid.

Once Recommendation 1 has been actioned, all agencies give greater priority to the promulgation of Red Flag warnings in order to enhance situational awareness on the fireground.

WA fire agencies adopt a common set of standing orders, operational procedures, training and competencies for rural firefighting that are produced in hard copy, leading to integrated multi-agency training, IMTs, Regional and State coordination/control centres.

Critical operational procedures such as ‘Red Flag Warnings’, on a common fireground need to be consistent across DFES, DEC and Local Government. In particular, the operational procedure of Red Flag Warnings needs to be adopted by all WA fire agencies.

WA adopts a culture of joint IMTs in future. At Regional and State levels, DFES and DEC maintain standing contributions.

Future coordination/support/control of integrated emergency management across all agencies in Albany needs to be merged and located in a single joint facility. This issue needs to be reviewed statewide.

DFES and Local Government Bushfire Brigades ensure that only those with the required AIIMS competence have the authority to manage Level 1 incidents, noting they may not be Fire Control Officers.

The response operation to the Margaret River bushfire in November 2011 be the subject of a review with independent oversight.

The Department of Environment and Conservation review its practices and procedures in the undertaking of prescribed burns so as to fully utilise the skills available to it in a seamless way including but not limited to: · volunteer bushfire brigades, especially in regard to use as a source of local advice; and · staff of the Fire and Emergency Services Authority of Western Australia.

The Department of Environment and Conservation review its implementation of the findings of the Ferguson Review conducted in 2010.

The Government consider enacting legislation to facilitate the review of all future major incidents, including but not limited to fire, earthquake, storm and marine inundation, and the emergency response to them.

The Ministers for Health, Police, and Emergency Services ensure that the Western Australia Police, the Fire and Emergency Services Authority and St John Ambulance establish a formal platform to share their knowledge and experience in delivering programs to their staff and volunteers to address issues of stress from disasters and critical incidents, as is done in other Australian jurisdictions.

The Ministers for Emergency Services, Environment and Police ensure their departments undertake a formal review by 30 June 2013 of the welfare services addressing stress and trauma provided to both their career and volunteer members.

The Ministers for Emergency Services, Environment and Police ensure their departments include provisions for regular external audits of invoices for payment in their next round of Employee Assistance Program contract negotiations.

The Chief Executive Officer of the Fire and Emergency Services Authority request the Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council to include a new module in the Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System to guide the provision of welfare services for emergency service workers during a disaster.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority should expand their use of social media to better inform the Western Australian community.

The Minister for Emergency Services request the State Emergency Management Committee to review by June 2013 the sharing of data between the State’s emergency response agencies using the WebEOC software and any further enhancements that can be made to this process.

The Department of Sustainability and Environment should develop guidelines for streamlining the permitting system for works on waterways for incorporation in the revised Victoria Flood Management Strategy. An exemption process will be introduced, with particular application to identified reaches of rivers and streams that require ongoing vegetation management and maintenance:
• that government will amend the Victorian Planning Provisions to create a new exemption for native vegetation removal under clause 52.17, for the purpose of ‘flood protection’; and
• Catchment management authorities will amend their respective ‘Works on Waterways’ bylaws to reflect these changes.

That statements of obligations, issued under the Water Industry Act 1994 for water authorities, be amended to include a provision whereby managing authorities must:
• make available to the public information designed to inform and educate local communities, particularly those communities living downstream of water storages ‐ this information will relate to dam operations, the rules governing those operations, and the capacity, or lack thereof, of storage infrastructure to provide protection in the event of major flooding; and
• ensure this information forms part of an ongoing program of interaction with local communities, to be conducted at a minimum of every two years, and providing community members with the opportunity to raise questions, discuss issues, and be informed on current dam operations.

The revised Victoria Flood Management Strategy should clearly articulate the policy guidelines for the management of vegetation and debris in Victorian waterways, for the purposes of flood protection and mitigation, taking into account the localised potential flooding effects of in‐stream vegetation in townships.
To that end:
• the Victoria Flood Management Strategy will provide flood risk criteria for identifying specific reaches of rivers and streams that require ongoing vegetation management and maintenance, and to be subject to a revised permitting system;
• in their Regional Flood Strategies, CMAs will identify specific reaches of rivers and streams in their catchments, that require ongoing vegetation management and maintenance, and to be subject to a revised permitting system;
• each CMA will develop an In‐stream Management Policy to clarify responsibilities for the management of all waterways, including vegetation management. This will clearly articulate the circumstances under which the CMA will approve the removal of vegetation. This policy to be reviewed every three years; and
• where appropriate CMAs will develop agreements with local regional councils.

The state government give consideration to enacting legislation to provide protection from legal liability for public authorities conducting works on priority levees in good faith, acting reasonably and responsibly in the public interest, and in accordance with standards agreed to under approved schemes. Public authorities should not be excluded from liability if they have acted negligently.

The Department of Sustainability and Environment will develop guidelines for the management of levees in emergencies, during and after a flood event, which can be incorporated into local flood response plans. The department will also provide, as part of these guidelines, a set of criteria for assessing the ongoing viability of ad hoc levees post‐flood. The Emergency Management Act 1986 will be amended to support the implementation of these guidelines. A more effective means for councils to remove illegal levees will also be examined by the Department of Sustainability and Environment.

The Department of Sustainability and Environment will develop clear policy for the coordinated management of rural drainage, clarifying the legal framework, and identifying authorities with responsibility for the management and ongoing maintenance of formal schemes, and their development:
• where appropriate, an expedited approvals process for works be applied in line with recommendation 5.4; and
• a central component of policy will be the principle of beneficiary pays.

Public authorities such as councils and CMAs should continue to seek local knowledge in relation to flood management issues. In particular, councils will collaborate with VICSES and other key stakeholders in reviewing the system of flood wardens. Roles and responsibilities of flood wardens, and the process for their recruitment, should be formalised and clearly articulated in relevant flood management plans.

Local knowledge on the management and ongoing maintenance of waterways, including vegetation clearing and debris removal, needs to be incorporated in the development of regional flood mitigation strategies and local flood plans. Specifically:
• the process of flood risk assessment must include community consultation, and these views will inform development of both floodplain management studies, and floodplain implementation plans;
• in the absence of a formal planning process, councils and authorities undertaking significant ad hoc works on waterways for flood mitigation and protection must involve the local community; and
• the revised Victoria Flood Management Strategy and Victorian River Health Strategy will clearly articulate this process.

The state government establish a well coordinated and formalised system for the reading of river gauges by local people, including flood wardens. Furthermore, the knowledge of local people in predicting flood heights and impacts should be considered by emergency management agencies when predicting floods.

The Department of Sustainability and Environment will develop a code of practice on the removal of vegetation around critical public assets, in consultation with councils, CMAs and asset managers. Regional Flood Strategies will support this code of practice as part of shared flood risk management planning.

The state government implement the Victorian Floods Review recommendation 8, to review the flood gauging network. As part of the review, consideration should also be given to the use of portable telemetered river gauges, and to the replacement of manual gauges with telemetered gauges over time and where appropriate.

Efficient and effective supporting tools and processes: streamlining the authorisation processes for urgent warnings.

Efficient and effective supporting tools and processes: developing tools and workflows to quickly and reliably transform technical data into intelligence that can be used to construct messages for community information that are timely, relevant, tailored and effective.

Agency incident management preparedness: a more comprehensive approach to planning, including the number of personnel, their training and better use of on-the-ground intelligence in the affected areas that enables immediate and strategic decision-making to be concurrent processes.

Agency incident management preparedness: refining IT tools to process the intelligence.

Agency incident management preparedness: provide clarity and certainty in specific roles and responsibilities for each agency.

Fire services can improve outcomes by implementing standard procedures that ensure the welfare and safety of crews and the public are not compromised

Fire services can improve outcomes by developing a checklist for use by incident controllers

Regulators can help to achieve improved outcomes by auditing compliance with the BPEM guidelines on a regular basis

Regulators can help to achieve improved outcomes by acknowledging that changes to legislation and the BPEM guidelines may be required to help address the identified issues

Fire services can improve outcomes by working with EPA as the regulator and licensing authority to achieve improved compliance with the required outcomes specified in the BPEM guidelines

Fire services can improve outcomes by implementing standard procedures that ensure the welfare and safety of crews and the public are not compromised

The Queensland Government should legislate to clarify the purposes for which a transitional environmental program can be granted. In particular, if the government considers the transitional environmental program the appropriate regulatory mechanism to deal with the discharge of water from mines during flood, section 330 of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 should be clarified to make it clear that it extends to that use.

CS Energy and Seqwater should agree upon and adhere to a formal communication protocol that requires CS Energy personnel to advise Seqwater, through the Flood Operations Centre, of water movements between Splityard Creek Dam and Wivenhoe Dam or Pryde Creek once a flood event is declared under the Manual of Operational Procedures for Flood Mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam. The protocol should ensure that a direct line of communication is established between CS Energy personnel physically located at the power station and the Flood Operations Centre.

Seqwater should consider commissioning an investigation into the extent of cracking below the level of the upper gallery of Somerset Dam and the impact of any such cracking on the dam’s stability and, in turn, its operation.

Councils should consider making available to business owners locality specific information that would assist them to develop evacuation plans for commercial premises, for example, any evacuation sub-plan created under Emergency Management Queensland’s disaster evacuation guidelines.

The Department of Environment and Resource Management should ensure that an independent and appropriately qualified person immediately starts the task of reviewing the March flood event report to ensure that the review is completed before the start of the 2012/2013 wet season.

As part of the longer term review of the Manual of Operational Procedures for Flood Mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam the Queensland Government should consider whether the dam operators should be able to extend the drawdown of the lake beyond seven days in order to reduce downstream bank slumping

The Queensland Government should consider whether to empower Seqwater, through the flood operations centre, to direct CS Energy to stop or delay releases from Splityard Creek Dam where a flood event is declared under the Manual of Operational Procedures for Flood Mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam.

If the Queensland Development Code is amended to include provisions requiring homeowners to install sewage reflux valves, the Queensland Government should develop and make available to homeowners appropriate guidance material to assist them in meeting their responsibilities to maintain reflux valves.

Councils should support and encourage business owners to develop private flood evacuation plans by providing the following to business owners in areas known to be affected by flood: • information about the benefits of evacuation plans • contact details of relevant council and emergency service personnel for inclusion in evacuation plans.

Seqwater should ensure that proper support and oversight mechanisms are put in place around both the substantive and procedural aspects of drafting flood event reports. Seqwater should consider engaging consultants with expertise in the production of reports following significant events to advise on these mechanisms. Measures to be considered should include: • ensuring appropriate systems are in place to ensure the recollections of flood engineers and other parties are recorded immediately after the event, perhaps by engaging an external party to interview the flood engineers and other parties • ensuring that a methodology for writing the report is set out clearly in advance, in writing, and that the final report includes a statement of that methodology • putting in place systems to ensure that members of senior management have sufficient understanding of both the methodology and process by which the report is prepared to allow themselves to be satisfied that these are appropriate.

The assessment of flood mitigation manuals should be completed by a person with appropriate expertise who has had no involvement in its development, at any stage, and who can be seen to be independent of all individuals who were so involved.

CS Energy should amend its business procedure to remove any ambiguity as to the establishment of communications with Seqwater and to acknowledge the formal communications protocol regarding releases.

The Queensland Government should amend the Environmental Protection Act 1994 so as to permit an emergency direction to be given orally where it is not practicable to provide the direction in writing, with provision for its subsequent confirmation in writing

The Department of Environment and Resource Management should prioritise dam safety audits according to risk. The risk assessment should be informed by criteria including: • structure and materials used in construction • age of the dam • time since last inspection • occurrence of a flood event since last audit and the size of that flood event • population at risk if the dam were to fail • experience and capability of dam owner • dam owner compliance history • time since last audit.

Emergency Management Queensland should pursue the execution of the ‘Local Arrangements’ with councils where a Memorandum of Agreement is in place. The contents of the arrangements should be reviewed and updated regularly

The Queensland Government should amend the Water Supply (Safety and Reliability) Act 2008 to designate the Minister as the person who must approve a flood mitigation manual.

CS Energy should review its emergency action plan and business procedures to ensure they are wholly consistent and give appropriate consideration to flooding as a possible emergency event.

The Queensland Government should consider amending the Environmental Protection Act 1994 to provide a definition of the term ‘emergency’ for the purposes of section 468 of that Act.

Prior to each wet season, the Department of Environment and Resource Management should audit the compliance of each owner of a referable dam with the obligation to have an emergency action plan approved by the Queensland Government.

The Disaster Management Act 2003 should be amended to give the chief executive of the department administering the Act (or his or her delegate) the authority to appoint an officer of Emergency Management Queensland to direct SES operations in extraordinary circumstances

Seqwater should, in creating the new Wivenhoe and North Pine flood mitigation manuals, comprehensively consider: • the amount of discretion that is able to be exercised by the flood engineers and the senior flood engineers, and the description of the circumstances in which such discretion may be exercised • the circumstances in which it might be appropriate to release water in advance of an impending flood on the basis of forecasts from the Bureau of Meteorology • if strategies of the form of strategy W2 and W3 in Revision 7 are included in the revised manual, or any strategy defined as a ‘transition strategy’, when and how those strategies should be implemented • if the concept of ‘urban inundation’ is relevant to the operation of the dam, how it should be defined, and if the definition involves diverse concepts, how those concepts can be related back to the strategies, so that flood engineers can reach a clear understanding of their objectives and primary considerations • if the concept of ‘natural peak flow’ is relevant, how it should be defined.

The Queensland Government should consider amending the Environmental Protection Act 1994 so that it allows for the relaxation of environmental authority conditions, by transitional environmental program or otherwise, as to discharge of water: • pre-emptively, in advance of rainfall or flooding events, or • for all mines in a catchment that is flooding.

The protocol should make provision for the use of telephone and/or radio where communication by email is not possible. Where necessary, CS Energy and Seqwater should make additional radio equipment available to relevant personnel.

The Queensland Government should legislate to oblige each owner of a referable dam to have an emergency action plan approved by the appropriate Queensland Government agency. Such plans should be reviewed periodically

The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service should require that each region records in writing the results of its risk assessment undertaken as part of its annual review of its special operations functional plan.

Seqwater should ensure that any future peer review process: • is co-ordinated by someone independent of those who wrote the report • entails the provision of all relevant information to the peer reviewers • permits sufficient time for the review • documents all contact between those whose actions are under review and the reviewers.

An evaluation be conducted into the integration of the appropriate elements of the South Australian Country Fire Service “Crimson” networking system into Bushfires NT ICT.

Regional Fire Management Plans be reviewed for all regions prior to the start of each fire season. 

Continue the use of Warnings and Alerts, in various languages, and through multiple broadcast media, including Indigenous language versions to engage with all people as to the risks of bushfire.

That the Bushfires Act and Regulations be reviewed and modernised after the implementation of the recommendations of this review.

Review the membership of the Bushfires Council, and the composition of Regional Committees to ensure that the Council and Committees have representational stakeholders.

That Bushfires NT, NTFRS, DLP, Weeds Branch, Parks and Wildlife, the Natural Resources Management Board, Biodiversity staff and representatives of the Volunteer Fire Brigades get together, at least annually, to coordinate planning efforts for peri-urban areas.

Spreading the message of enforcement of landholder’s obligations and responsibilities through active consultation and ultimately the issuing of infringement notices be adopted as a planned strategic intervention to promote the importance of compliance with the Bushfires Act.

Bushfires NT create a bushfire management strategy and emergency response procedures framework including the criteria that define the escalation and response requirements for all incidents up to and including the establishment of an EOC, applicable for all regions across the Territory.

Ensure that adequate administrative personnel are available within the incident control structure to provide administrative and knowledge management support for incident management.

Conduct an information sharing and planning exercise between Bushfires NT and NTFRS to explore the current boundaries and the overlaps in the peri-urban areas between the NTFRS ERA and the Bushfires NT areas of responsibility for all major centres in the NT.

That, as part of the Pollution Incident Management Response Plan to be developed for Orica’s Kooragang Island site, or by another appropriate mechanism, the Office of Environment and Heritage ensure that Orica’s incident-response procedures address the need to consider all relevant factors when assessing potential impacts, including the height and force of emissions as well as the location of any onsite fallout and whether there are off-site impacts following all serious incidents.

That OEH’s testing procedures for determining the impact of pollution incidents incorporate additional requirements for the checking and verification of results before those results are released.

That the Office of Environment and Heritage amend its operating procedures for the Environment Line to ensure that there are clear obligations to pass on information relevant to other agencies, to those agencies in a timely manner.

That the Premier issue clear and unambiguous guidelines to all Government Ministers specifying the timing of notifications to the public of any matters that may affect public health or safety.

That, if necessary, regulation be amended to require Health to approve any script used by any party concerned, for door knocking or other information dissemination, if Health is not the first source of information to affected residents.

That, when developing requirements concerning pollution incident response management plans pursuant to the recent legislative amendments, the Office of Environment and Hertiage include appropriate definitions as to the meaning of ‘immediately’, and when ‘material harm to the environment is caused or threatened’.

Focus leadership practices to re-orient culture away from customisation and experimentation and towards reliable, efficient and consistent documented processes

Start a project to introduce organisational process thinking with a view to standardising processes and product specifications.

Ensure the Bureau puts in place necessary planning and governance arrangements to develop its bid for capital funding to maintain its critical supercomputing capacity

Agree clear allocation of responsibilities to state and local government for flood management, with defined boundaries on the Bureau’s role and:
(a) As a minimum:
(i) Agree national standards for operation of flood monitoring networks and vest responsibility in fewer agencies
(ii) Clarify roles and responsibilities for issuing flash flood warnings
(b) And either:
(i) Focus the Bureau’s role on data management and divest responsibility for flood monitoring infrastructure from the Bureau; or
(ii) Expand and consolidate the Bureau’s role in flood management by:
(a) Re-organising operations (including a new Flood Operations Centre)
(b) Enhancing the Bureau’s flood monitoring network
(c) Strengthening the collection and provision of flood data by third parties
(d) Improving the information base for flood warnings, including access to flood risk maps

Formalise and standardise service levels provided to emergency services.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government amend the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) to make it obligatory that insurers offer to consumers the option of a general insurance policy that conforms to Standard Cover, as prescribed in the Insurance Contracts Regulations 1985 (Cth), from 1 July 2012, so that all insurers carry a product that provides full replacement in the event of total loss and cover for damages resulting from flood.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission amend Regulatory Guideline 165 to:
- require general insurers to provide clear and comprehensive information about both Internal Dispute Resolution and External Dispute Resolution to clients at time of claim lodgement;
- require general insurers to provide information to clients at the time of claim lodgement on the right to seek from Financial Ombudsman Service an independent external expert report (such as a hydrology report);
- prohibit general insurers from commenting to policyholders on the merits of a dispute;
- prescribe an Internal Dispute Resolution model which avoids multi-tiered components; and
- automatically escalate a claim that has not been settled within four months to an internal dispute should the General Insurance Code of Practice amendment to this end not be implemented.