INQ226

When communities are grieving there is a need to provide special forms of support to affected residents.

The state should progressively align on a shared platform, such as WebEOC, to establish a COP [Common Operating Picture or Platform?].

Increased acceptance of mutual obligations will be fundamental to the management of fire risk across the state

The role of district and local emergency management committees should be reviewed to ensure they are appropriately engaged in the active management of emergencies across the PPR R continuum

Legislative change may be needed to enable FES A to better manage fire- fighting resources across the state.

There would be benefit in progressively aligning the geographic boundaries of each of the agencies and seeking to co-locate their headquarters within those boundaries.

A system of vehicle tracking should be fitted to all fire appliances and linked to the common operating picture. Good communications planning is essential for good command and control.

Better maps are required for urban/rural interface fires

In multi-agency responses the culture, training and equipment characteristics of each of the agencies should be considered in their employment.

Clear direction to divisional and sector commanders and a common communications platform enables maximum return to be gained from the application of tactical resources and this rests on good incident action planning, and good command and control.

Strategic direction seeks to identify and resource those areas of tactical action that offer the greatest advantage.

Contingency planning before the fire may have supported the IMT in recognising and seizing strategic opportunities earlier.

A review of the manner in which resourcing is conducted across all agencies needs to occur with a review identifying the best manner to ensure all agencies adapt to the same process.

The state should converge on a single communications platform for all emergency management and support agencies.

Reporting and control should be through the incident chain of command and not through agency chains of command

DEC’s fire management expertise should be augmented by multi-agency IMTs that incorporate the expertise of other agencies and in fast developing situations the appropriate decisions will need to be made early.

Given the prominent role played by the Shire in the management of welfare aspects in this emergency, there may be a need for state sponsored training for shire staff who are involved in implementing state emergency management policies and plans including how to deal with traumatised individuals.<

An early decision on relief funding enables timely responses. D CP should review their communication of relief arrangements to ensure that they are clear.

Shire experiences in managing these traumatic events should be captured and passed into emergency management procedures.

Procedures to resolve issues surrounding financial assistance need to be reviewed to ensure they are as smooth, fast and transparent as possible possible. Review and streamline current financial relief procedures.

Good Local Government planning and management facilitates community resilience.

Decisions on evacuations need to be made early enough for people to be fully informed, prepared and to move to a place of greater safety. Failure to conduct good planning can create situations where loss of life can occur

Radio bulletins need to be up to date and time stamped. Where social media is used the messages need to be up to date and accurate. Websites need to be up to date and accurate.

Expand the exploitation of social media, including graphical content for state alerts and warnings. Consider increasing the graphical content of web-based warnings.

The process for initiating and releasing State Alert messages requires review.

Timely alerts and updates to the community are essential.

To be effective, multi-agency IMTs will need to be exercised regularly and supported by sound and comprehensive doctrine.

At Level 3, the available fire management expertise should be applied overwhelmingly to the fire management aspects of emergency management, possibly in incident control, and certainly in situations planning and operations roles.

Logistics and resource officers in IMTs need to collaborate and establish full awareness and control over the available resources.

Section 13 arrangements need to be clarified across key agencies.

Rolling risk assessment conducted during ignition of prescribed burns should identify whether an escape is likely to develop into a Level 3 incident. As soon as possible after it has been identified that the escape cannot be contained, the incident should be declared a Level 3.

Communications planning for geographic regions with recognised black spots and specific communications challenges should be prepared in advance of an emergency in order to support the IMT Communications Planning Officer

As presently implemented, the AIIMS planning role is under-developed and provides insufficient support to the Incident Controller.

Greater investment in training on specific functions within the AIIMS structure will improve the support provided to the Incident Controller.

All forms of fuel modification should be available to fire managers.

Inter-agency cooperation to manage fire precincts in a tenure-blind fashion is necessary for effective fire suppression.

Fuel loads on private property need to be identified and included in understanding fire behaviour in determine the contribution they make to the burn risk assessment.

Maps prepared for prescribed burns should address the fuel type and burn history of the burn area as well as surrounding areas. Predicted rates of spread under prescribed and other conditions should recognise the complexity of coastal heathlands.

Improved understanding of fire behaviour in coastal heathlands would support sound risk management through the southwest of W

Prescribed burns which meet the ‘red flag’ criteria should have mandated risk Establish risk management criteria for management criteria imposed.

There should be clearly established criteria for burns which are specially challenging, and these criteria need to extend beyond the intended boundaries of the prescribed burn.

A risk management approach is needed which considers risks both inside the prescribed burn and the risks that will need to be managed if the fire escapes. This risk assessment should be dynamic in line with the four day and seven day weather forecast.

For incidents of this complexity, effective control in the critical phase (first 24-36 hours of the fire) requires an appropriately resourced IMT.

The state should identify the number of fully trained, experienced and accredited Level 3 Incident Controllers required to be available at any time and establish a process for identification of suitable personnel, ongoing training and accreditation.

Within the AIIMS IMT doctrine the roles of the Incident Controller and Deputy Incident Controllers should be defined and well-practiced.

State-wide all agency reporting should be established to facilitate the interactions of emergency management agencies, support agencies and governments.

IMTs need to establish early and effective liaison with Local Governments.

Incident Controllers should be supported by a planning function that combines experienced weather forecasters, fire behaviour experts and local knowledge.

Contingency planning is a critical function in the early stages of an escalating incident, and should provide the foundation of an IAP.

The expected scenario, with a view to the worst-case scenario should provide the basis for an IAP.