To ensure enhanced capability integration and enable timely community messaging Bundaberg LDMG in consultation with Sunwater develop additional Emergency Alerts and associated polygons for a Paradise Dam failure and load these on to the disaster management portal. 

To enhance shared capacity and collaboratively manage risk, the Chair of the Bundaberg DDMG use the QERMF process to determine if dam failure for Paradise Dam should be reported as a residual risk in this instance due to known changes in the risk profile to:
- the State Disaster Coordination Group (SDCG) in accordance with their responsibilities under the State Plan
- QFES for ensuring the development of the state-wide risk assessment. 

To increase shared understanding of risks, ensure the coordination of plans and manage risks, dam failure for Paradise Dam be included as a separate risk within the Bundaberg District Disaster Management Plan (DDMP). 

To increase understanding of hazards and manage risks, dam failure for Paradise Dam be included as a separate risk within the North Burnett Local Disaster Management Plan (LDMP). 

To enable entities to have a shared understanding of forecast information for dam failure events during a flood, including flood wave travel time, speed and height, Emergency Action Plans contain protocols and responsibilities of relevant stakeholders for these aspects. 

We recommend that, in the absence of stand-alone catchment management authorities, the Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning as a matter of priority, establish what funding is reasonably required and complete all elements of the Brisbane River Catchment Flood Studies.

The committee recommends that the government develop a process by which the ATSB can request access to supplementary funding via the minister.

In order to further build on the value for money review work being undertaken by the National Disaster Recovery Taskforce (on behalf of the Australian Government Reconstruction Inspectorate), the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)  recommends that the Taskforce:
(a) apply greater scrutiny to project cost data, particularly in circumstances where the data provided for review includes lump sums; and
(b) develop the capacity to independently benchmark actual cost data for Queensland reconstruction projects.

The state government should provide core, ongoing funding to the responsible authority for the FloodSafe community education program. Funding should be provided for education about prevention, response and recovery phases and include information on rates notices about the height of particular floods.

The state government review the current funding approach used for the operation, maintenance and upgrade of river gauges, with a view to improving the river gauge network.

The funding model for works on levees and their ongoing maintenance be revised, to be primarily based on the beneficiary pays principle. The state government should give consideration to wholly funding, or contributing to, the initial upgrade of high priority levees to an agreed standard. The construction of any new public levees will be the subject of a cost‐benefit analysis to be undertaken by DSE and the public authority, and be supported by a floodplain management study. Levees deemed low priority will be wholly the responsibility of the beneficiaries.

A revised Victoria Flood Management Strategy should identify and assign roles and responsibilities for the management and ongoing maintenance of Victoria’s waterways, for the purposes of flood protection and flood mitigation:
• CMAs are confirmed as the responsible authority for the management and ongoing maintenance of waterways, including vegetation management, for the purposes of flood protection; and
• CMAs will negotiate with landholders, councils and other authorities, and conduct agreed flood mitigation works on the basis of beneficiary pays.

Emergency Management Queensland should develop and implement a new formula for the distribution of its recurrent SES subsidy, which takes into account relevant factors including the size of a local SES contingent and the population, area and natural hazard risk profile of the local government area concerned.

Removal of a barrier must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to removal. A proper risk assessment should be carried out and agreed upon, and documented in writing before removal. Joint written certification as to the appropriateness of removal should take place before removal. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

The use/type of barriers (including any change requests relating thereto) must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to installation. A proper risk assessment should be carried out, agreed upon, and documented in writing before installation. Joint written certification as to the appropriateness of the use of particular barriers should take place before installation. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

Problems which arise in the course of installing barriers must be the subject of consultation between licensees, rig operators, and contractors (if used). A proper risk assessment should then be carried out and remedial steps (including further testing/verification) should be agreed upon, and documented in writing before the performance of remedial work whenever practicable. Joint written certification as to resolution of the problem should take place before resumption of drilling operations. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

Pre‐drilling assessments should include a risk assessment of the worst‐case blowout scenario.

The regulator should pre‐assess and review in a generic sense, and in conjunction with the offshore petroleum industry, available options for well control in the event of a blowout. Being ‘match fit’ in this sense will enable a quicker and more effective response in terms of safety assessment, and will ensure that expectations of both operator and regulator are more readily aligned.

The funding arrangements that support the National Plan should be reviewed to ensure that the costs associated with both preparedness and response capability are equitably shared between the shipping and offshore petroleum industries.

Decision‐making about well control issues should be professionalised. Industry participants must recognise that decision‐makers owe independent duties to the public, not just their employer or principal, in relation to well control. Risk management in the context of well control needs to be understood as an ethical/professional duty. Self‐regulation contemplates self‐regulation by the industry, not just by individual licensees and operators.

That port/channel managers should be able, within the general context of the pricing/cost recovery arrangements established under the Port Services Act 1995 and pricing determinations made by the Essential Services Commission, to recover the reasonable costs of meeting their statutory obligations (as per recommendation 26) through charges for prescribed service applied to port users. 

That emergency services are responsible for funding the development of the emergency services marine emergency response capacity/capability to meet their statutory obligations. 

That port/channel managers are responsible for funding the preparation of marine emergency risk assessments and marine emergency response arrangements and ensuring the availability of identified marine resources in support of response to a marine emergency, to meet their statutory obligations. 

The industry should develop in conjunction with the Regulator a process for addressing the need to maintain the risk profile of a facility moving into extended life operation at the same risk profile as when it was within design life.

Maintenance plans on all trains should be revised annually.

The ITSRR should conduct its own risk assessment in relation to the risk of any such high consequence, low probability accident and, if necessary, direct RailCorp to conduct a further risk assessment to reduce the level of residual risk to a level ITSRR regards as acceptable.

RailCorp should undertake risk assessments of each of its activities as follows:
(a) identify the features of the system, subsystem or activities that are to be risk assessed and managed, to determine what makes the system work in terms of equipment, infrastructure and human factors;
(b) identify all hazards that may exist within the particular system, subsystem or activity, whether it is a driver safety system, passenger safety system, engineering design system, train maintenance system or involves human factors or performance;
(c) identify what controls are in place to eliminate or minimise the risks associated with any identified hazard;
(d) test the validity of the controls to ensure that the risk is eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level and, if not, institute additional or further control measures;
(e) specify, in safety documentation, the level of any residual risk;
(f) in the case of low probability, high consequence risks retain the services of an independent verifier of the risk assessments and controls to certify that all risks of such potentially catastrophic accidents have either been eliminated, or controlled to the extent identified by the independent expert;
(g) the Board of RailCorp certify that it regards any residual risk of a high consequence, low probability accident as acceptable, notwithstanding the severity of the consequences, by reason of the cost of further measures to control the risk; and
(h) provide to ITSRR records of the processes of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk control, independent verification and certification, and any Board certification relating to any high consequence, low probability accident.

The ITSRR should have permanent access to the RailCorp intranet.