TFS should engage in discussions with government about the construction of purpose-built State Control Centre facilities for emergency management in Tasmania.

Where safety-lamps are necessary - gas being present for (say) one month after being found in dangerous quantity - they should be securely locked by a man duly appointed, and tampering with them must be punishable by a simple and inexpensive process of law. 

Infringement of the regulations by either party should be followed by a summary form of justice, instituted before two Magistrates.

That, to provide greater clarity for building development, design and approval within tolerable risk levels, the Tasmanian Planning Scheme, including a relevant Riverine Flood Hazard Code, is finalised and approved as soon as practicable.

That the organisations responsible for construction, maintenance and ownership of bridges review their design guidelines and, if necessary, update them to specifically include consideration of debris and flood impacts on bridge design. A review of existing bridges by the responsible organisations could also be undertaken to highlight any potential issues.

That the State Fire Management Committee considers developing a structured, systemic and proactive bushfire hazard reduction program with municipal councils and Tasmania Fire Service; and advises the Government on any legislative or other changes required to implement such a program.

That the Government makes land use planning and building construction to prevent and mitigate bushfire risk a high priority and establishes a means to progress improvements in this area, such as a designated body or group, as soon as possible.

That the Government considers whether a peak body should be established, with authority to effectively implement a bushfire mitigation plan.

That Tasmania Fire Service conducts a review of the fire permit system in the Fire Service Act 1979, and implements change to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the system by: • considering whether it is appropriate to authorise persons or organisations to conduct fuel reduction burning during a permit period • providing a better match between the period, area and fire risk • maintaining a timely and efficient process for issuing permits • naming the period in a way that draws attention to bushfire risk • establishing a reporting and accountability process.

That a specific risk prevention and mitigation advisory body be established for the State Emergency Management Committee.

That Tasmania Fire Service or another suitable agency provides information to the community which shows, in simple form, the legislation applicable to approvals for lighting fires on private property and the various relationships between that legislation.

That the Department of Infrastructure Energy and Resources consult Aurora Energy on the use of wooden poles for overhead infrastructure with a view to mitigating the risk in bushfires.

That the legislation and enforcement arrangements are reviewed to ensure there are suitable offences and penalties, investigation and enforcement capabilities, and a rigorous approach is taken to breaches of the law.

That the State Emergency Management Committee includes in its planning, the development of contingency emergency management plans for areas of high risk due to local conditions.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service hold discussions with the Department of Planning and Infrastructure and Local Government NSW on ways to improve compliance with development consents under section 76A of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979.

There should be interoperability of communications equipment between all trains operating on the New South Wales rail network.

The RMC should be equipped by RailCorp with a transcriber system, or mimic board, or such other system as is necessary to enable identification of the precise location at any time of any train on the RailCorp network.

There must be compatibility of communications systems throughout the rail network. It is essential that all train drivers, train controllers, signallers, train guards and supervisors of trackside work gangs in New South Wales be able to communicate using the same technology.

A dedicated telephone line should be established by RailCorp between the RMC and any Emergency Services Control Centre for use during any emergency.

The ITSRR should conduct its own risk assessment in relation to the risk of any such high consequence, low probability accident and, if necessary, direct RailCorp to conduct a further risk assessment to reduce the level of residual risk to a level ITSRR regards as acceptable.

The risk of abuse of internal passenger emergency door releases should be further reduced by introducing significant penalties for any improper use of such an emergency facility. It should be a criminal offence for anyone to use or tamper improperly with an emergency escape facility in a train.

RailCorp should undertake risk assessments of each of its activities as follows:
(a) identify the features of the system, subsystem or activities that are to be risk assessed and managed, to determine what makes the system work in terms of equipment, infrastructure and human factors;
(b) identify all hazards that may exist within the particular system, subsystem or activity, whether it is a driver safety system, passenger safety system, engineering design system, train maintenance system or involves human factors or performance;
(c) identify what controls are in place to eliminate or minimise the risks associated with any identified hazard;
(d) test the validity of the controls to ensure that the risk is eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level and, if not, institute additional or further control measures;
(e) specify, in safety documentation, the level of any residual risk;
(f) in the case of low probability, high consequence risks retain the services of an independent verifier of the risk assessments and controls to certify that all risks of such potentially catastrophic accidents have either been eliminated, or controlled to the extent identified by the independent expert;
(g) the Board of RailCorp certify that it regards any residual risk of a high consequence, low probability accident as acceptable, notwithstanding the severity of the consequences, by reason of the cost of further measures to control the risk; and
(h) provide to ITSRR records of the processes of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk control, independent verification and certification, and any Board certification relating to any high consequence, low probability accident.

The ITSRR should have permanent access to the RailCorp intranet.

Regular field training exercises should be conducted by RailCorp with the emergency services to ensure that the incident command system and rail displan are able to be fully implemented as quickly as possible and are reviewed and improved.

Maintenance plans on all trains should be revised annually.

All signal telephones must be maintained by RailCorp in proper working order.

To burn, where necessary, at least 33 feet where there is a risk of fire, on the outside of the railway fence, in conjunction with the railway employees.

To link up fallow paddocks and natural fire breaks by ploughing or burning breaks through private or public property, roads, &c.

To prohibit persons throwing lighted cigarettes, cigars and tobacco among any straw, stubble, grass or herbage during the months of September to March in any Bush Fire area, under a penalty not exceeding $10.

To prohibit persons taking into a harvest field or through any grass or bush lands any motor, tractor, harvester, &c., which is not supplied with an approved fire extinguisher or without the exhaust being properly fitted and protected, under a penalty not exceeding $50.

Where possible to build stone or brick fireplaces for the use of travellers, teamsters, and drovers on the camping areas that are mostly used and where there is a risk of fire.

To burn camping areas at suitable water and camping reserves.