TFS should engage in discussions with government about the construction of purpose-built State Control Centre facilities for emergency management in Tasmania.

Complete sets of daily-report books should be provided, and kept in the mine or office, to be overlooked by the Inspector during his periodical visits.

That, to provide greater clarity for building development, design and approval within tolerable risk levels, the Tasmanian Planning Scheme, including a relevant Riverine Flood Hazard Code, is finalised and approved as soon as practicable.

That the organisations responsible for construction, maintenance and ownership of bridges review their design guidelines and, if necessary, update them to specifically include consideration of debris and flood impacts on bridge design. A review of existing bridges by the responsible organisations could also be undertaken to highlight any potential issues.

That the State Emergency Management Committee includes in its planning, the development of contingency emergency management plans for areas of high risk due to local conditions.

That the State Fire Management Committee considers developing a structured, systemic and proactive bushfire hazard reduction program with municipal councils and Tasmania Fire Service; and advises the Government on any legislative or other changes required to implement such a program.

That the Government considers whether a peak body should be established, with authority to effectively implement a bushfire mitigation plan.

That the Government makes land use planning and building construction to prevent and mitigate bushfire risk a high priority and establishes a means to progress improvements in this area, such as a designated body or group, as soon as possible.

That a specific risk prevention and mitigation advisory body be established for the State Emergency Management Committee.

That Tasmania Fire Service conducts a review of the fire permit system in the Fire Service Act 1979, and implements change to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the system by: • considering whether it is appropriate to authorise persons or organisations to conduct fuel reduction burning during a permit period • providing a better match between the period, area and fire risk • maintaining a timely and efficient process for issuing permits • naming the period in a way that draws attention to bushfire risk • establishing a reporting and accountability process.

That the Department of Infrastructure Energy and Resources consult Aurora Energy on the use of wooden poles for overhead infrastructure with a view to mitigating the risk in bushfires.

That Tasmania Fire Service or another suitable agency provides information to the community which shows, in simple form, the legislation applicable to approvals for lighting fires on private property and the various relationships between that legislation.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service hold discussions with the Department of Planning and Infrastructure and Local Government NSW on ways to improve compliance with development consents under section 76A of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979.

Formation of a subcommittee of the DHHS Tasmanian Medical Retrieval Services Committee to identify risk exposures, system problems and potential solutions. The subcommittee should review data, problem cases, system issues and generate a risk register. Meetings should occur at least quarterly.

Regular field training exercises should be conducted by RailCorp with the emergency services to ensure that the incident command system and rail displan are able to be fully implemented as quickly as possible and are reviewed and improved.

All train drivers’ defects reports should be entered by RailCorp into a computerised record and tracked to finalisation.

All ATSB accident investigation reports should be made public.

All signal telephones must be maintained by RailCorp in proper working order.

There should be interoperability of communications equipment between all trains operating on the New South Wales rail network.

The ATSB should deliver any report of any such rail accident which it investigates to the Board of any rail organisation involved in the accident, ITSRR and the Minister for Transport Services.

The RMC should be equipped by RailCorp with a transcriber system, or mimic board, or such other system as is necessary to enable identification of the precise location at any time of any train on the RailCorp network.

The Minister for Transport Services should retain, independently of ITSRR, safety auditors to provide a report to the Minister confirming or qualifying the contents of each such ITSRR quarterly report.

There must be compatibility of communications systems throughout the rail network. It is essential that all train drivers, train controllers, signallers, train guards and supervisors of trackside work gangs in New South Wales be able to communicate using the same technology.

RailCorp and ITSRR should co-operate with national programs for the collection, collation, trend analysis and dissemination of safety critical information.

A dedicated telephone line should be established by RailCorp between the RMC and any Emergency Services Control Centre for use during any emergency.

The Minister for Transport Services must table in Parliament, each such quarterly report by ITSRR.

The ITSRR should conduct its own risk assessment in relation to the risk of any such high consequence, low probability accident and, if necessary, direct RailCorp to conduct a further risk assessment to reduce the level of residual risk to a level ITSRR regards as acceptable.

The ITSRR should have permanent access to the RailCorp intranet.

The ITSRR must provide a quarterly report to the Minister for Transport Services on the progress made by RailCorp in implementing these recommendations, including:
(a) a statement as to whether or not the recommendation has been implemented and, if so, is working effectively; and
(b) if the recommendation has not been implemented, the me

RailCorp should undertake risk assessments of each of its activities as follows:
(a) identify the features of the system, subsystem or activities that are to be risk assessed and managed, to determine what makes the system work in terms of equipment, infrastructure and human factors;
(b) identify all hazards that may exist within the particular system, subsystem or activity, whether it is a driver safety system, passenger safety system, engineering design system, train maintenance system or involves human factors or performance;
(c) identify what controls are in place to eliminate or minimise the risks associated with any identified hazard;
(d) test the validity of the controls to ensure that the risk is eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level and, if not, institute additional or further control measures;
(e) specify, in safety documentation, the level of any residual risk;
(f) in the case of low probability, high consequence risks retain the services of an independent verifier of the risk assessments and controls to certify that all risks of such potentially catastrophic accidents have either been eliminated, or controlled to the extent identified by the independent expert;
(g) the Board of RailCorp certify that it regards any residual risk of a high consequence, low probability accident as acceptable, notwithstanding the severity of the consequences, by reason of the cost of further measures to control the risk; and
(h) provide to ITSRR records of the processes of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk control, independent verification and certification, and any Board certification relating to any high consequence, low probability accident.

Maintenance plans on all trains should be revised annually.

All reports of the Chief Investigator of OTSI should be delivered, upon completion and without being reviewed, to ITSRR and the Minister for Transport Services.

To burn, where necessary, at least 33 feet where there is a risk of fire, on the outside of the railway fence, in conjunction with the railway employees.

To link up fallow paddocks and natural fire breaks by ploughing or burning breaks through private or public property, roads, &c.

Where possible to build stone or brick fireplaces for the use of travellers, teamsters, and drovers on the camping areas that are mostly used and where there is a risk of fire.

To burn camping areas at suitable water and camping reserves.