Inquiry Search
Rec-ID | Code | Recommendation |
---|---|---|
REC324-4303 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | Risk-based approach to calculating flood planning: That, to take account of greater knowledge of climate change, Government reinforce its adoption of a risk-based approach to calculating the flood planning level for planning purposes and, through the NSWRA, immediately start a process of revising all flood planning level calculations in the state’s high-risk catchments. Flood planning level re-determinations for all high-risk catchments should be completed within 3 years. These revised flood planning levels will need to be factored into all development applications (in-progress and new) in those high-risk catchments. The risk profile of high-risk catchments should be revisited at appropriate time intervals to check that levels are current. A review should take place if there has been a significant trigger event (i.e. changed rainfall, development) or at least every 5 years. As well as reviewing the flood planning level, this 5-yearly review should include reviewing any floodplain lease conditions and adjusting them as necessary in the light of better knowledge of climate change impacts. In working out a tolerable, risk-based flood planning level, consideration should be given to the PMF, 1% AEP, 0.02% AEP, existing development, approved but not yet constructed developments, and existing and approved but not yet constructed evacuation routes. |
REC324-4305 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | Cost benefit framework:That, to enable a more systematic prioritisation of investment options in risk mitigation before, during and immediately following a natural disaster event, Government adopt and utilise a Disaster Cost Benefit Framework. This Framework will enable Government to estimate the investment required for any given disaster, starting with flood events, and will enable the fast allocation of funding based on detailed and rapid analysis of flood and property modification, mitigation, preparation, response and finance related options including: |
Rec-ID | Code | Recommendation |
---|---|---|
REC323-4258 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | That the NSW Government significantly increase its investment in flood mitigation and preparation, including its support of local governments to do the same, by: • increasing ongoing, long term funding and access to technical guidance and assistance for local councils • ensuring that land-use planning and development takes a risk-based approach. |
Rec-ID | Code | Recommendation |
---|---|---|
REC311-2497 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | To increase shared understanding of risks, ensure the coordination of plans and manage risks, dam failure for Paradise Dam be included as a separate risk within the Bundaberg District Disaster Management Plan (DDMP). |
REC311-2492 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | To increase understanding of hazards and manage risks, dam failure for Paradise Dam be included as a separate risk within the North Burnett Local Disaster Management Plan (LDMP). |
REC311-2496 | 10 - Infrastructure | To enhance shared capacity and collaboratively manage risk, the Chair of the Bundaberg LDMG use the Queensland Emergency Risk Management Framework (QERMF) process to determine if dam failure for Paradise Dam should be reported as a residual risk to the Bundaberg DDMG in this instance due to known changes in the risk profile. |
REC311-2490 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | To enable entities to have a shared understanding of forecast information for dam failure events during a flood, including flood wave travel time, speed and height, Emergency Action Plans contain protocols and responsibilities of relevant stakeholders for these aspects. |
REC311-2495 | 10 - Infrastructure | To increase understanding of hazards and manage risks, dam failure for Paradise Dam be included as a separate risk within the Bundaberg LDMP. |
REC311-2499 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | To ensure enhanced capability integration and enable timely community messaging Bundaberg LDMG in consultation with Sunwater develop additional Emergency Alerts and associated polygons for a Paradise Dam failure and load these on to the disaster management portal. |
REC311-2491 | 10 - Infrastructure | To enable a shared understanding of the risk, changes in the risk profile of referable dams be clearly communicated by entities that own dams to stakeholders and the community likely to be affected. The communication process starts immediately after the change is identified, is tailored to its audience, makes clear the scale of the change, and is documented so that stakeholders and the community can make informed decisions for managing risks. |
REC311-2498 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | To enhance shared capacity and collaboratively manage risk, the Chair of the Bundaberg DDMG use the QERMF process to determine if dam failure for Paradise Dam should be reported as a residual risk in this instance due to known changes in the risk profile to: |
Rec-ID | Code | Recommendation |
---|---|---|
REC217-1826 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | A revised Victoria Flood Management Strategy should identify and assign roles and responsibilities for the management and ongoing maintenance of Victoria’s waterways, for the purposes of flood protection and flood mitigation: |
Rec-ID | Code | Recommendation |
---|---|---|
REC210-0758 | 10 - Infrastructure | CS Energy should put in place contingency measures to ensure email and telephone communications at Wivenhoe Power Station are not entirely dependent on a network located off-site. |
REC210-0693 | 10 - Infrastructure | Electricity distributors should consider installing connection points for generators to provide electricity supply to non-flooded areas that have had their supply cut during floods. |
REC210-0692 | 10 - Infrastructure | The Queensland Government should consider measures to ensure that requirements are included in the designation of land for community infrastructure under the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 to ensure that critical infrastructure for operating works under the Electricity Act is built to remain operational during and immediately after a flood of a particular magnitude. That magnitude should be determined by an appropriate risk assessment. |
REC210-0761 | 2 - Emergency powers | The Queensland Government should consider whether to empower Seqwater, through the flood operations centre, to direct CS Energy to stop or delay releases from Splityard Creek Dam where a flood event is declared under the Manual of Operational Procedures for Flood Mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam. |
REC210-0754 | 2 - Emergency powers | As part of the longer term review of the Manual of Operational Procedures for Flood Mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam the Queensland Government should consider whether the dam operators should be able to extend the drawdown of the lake beyond seven days in order to reduce downstream bank slumping |
REC210-0727 | 2 - Emergency powers | The Disaster Management Act 2003 should be amended to give the chief executive of the department administering the Act (or his or her delegate) the authority to appoint an officer of Emergency Management Queensland to direct SES operations in extraordinary circumstances |
REC210-0695 | 10 - Infrastructure | The Queensland Government should consider implementing mandatory requirements to ensure that all conduits for the purpose of providing electrical supply below the applicable defined flood level are sealed to prevent floodwaters from entering them or flowing into them. |
Rec-ID | Code | Recommendation |
---|---|---|
REC199-0444 | 2 - Emergency powers | the state, as a matter of urgency, develop a multi-agency Incident Control Team capability to be readily available for statewide deployment to establish incident control or to relieve functioning control structures. |
Rec-ID | Code | Recommendation |
---|---|---|
REC177-3288 | 29 - Operational Health and Safety | As soon as a risk of barrier failure arises, no other activities should take place in the well other than those directed to removal of the risk. |
REC177-3291 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | Removal of a barrier must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to removal. A proper risk assessment should be carried out and agreed upon, and documented in writing before removal. Joint written certification as to the appropriateness of removal should take place before removal. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process. |
REC177-3303 | 29 - Operational Health and Safety | Tracking and analysis of cementing problems/failures should occur to assess industry trends, principal causes, remedial techniques and so on. |
REC177-3345 | 2 - Emergency powers | NOPSA’s prohibition powers should be extended such that a prohibition notice can be issued where a NOPSA Occupational Health and Safety Inspector believes, on reasonable grounds, that an activity is occurring or may occur at a facility involving an immediate threat to the health or safety of a person. |
REC177-3282 | 29 - Operational Health and Safety | If a risk assessment or compliance review is triggered by the happening of a predetermined event, specific consideration should be given to whether a ‘hold point’ should be introduced such that work must cease until the problem is resolved (and the subject of appropriate certification). |
REC177-3289 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | The use/type of barriers (including any change requests relating thereto) must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to installation. A proper risk assessment should be carried out, agreed upon, and documented in writing before installation. Joint written certification as to the appropriateness of the use of particular barriers should take place before installation. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process. |
REC177-3299 | 29 - Operational Health and Safety | Regulatory approval to rely on only one barrier should not be given unless (i) a proper risk assessment is carried out; (ii) exceptional circumstances exist; and (iii) risks involved are reduced to ‘as low as reasonably practicable’. The default position must be that well integrity must be assured. |
REC177-3281 | 29 - Operational Health and Safety | Wellbore gas bubbling should be regarded as a trigger for independent review of well integrity. Industry and regulators should identify and document other triggers. |
REC177-3286 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | Problems which arise in the course of installing barriers must be the subject of consultation between licensees, rig operators, and contractors (if used). A proper risk assessment should then be carried out and remedial steps (including further testing/verification) should be agreed upon, and documented in writing before the performance of remedial work whenever practicable. Joint written certification as to resolution of the problem should take place before resumption of drilling operations. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process. |
REC177-3295 | 29 - Operational Health and Safety | Wells drilled into hydrocarbon zones should be treated as live wells, with the potential to blowout unless a documented risk assessment establishes otherwise. |
REC177-3279 | 29 - Operational Health and Safety | Well construction and management plans, and drilling programs, should include provision for testing and verifying the integrity of all barriers as soon as practicable after installation. |
REC177-3285 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | Pre‐drilling assessments should include a risk assessment of the worst‐case blowout scenario. |
REC177-3294 | 29 - Operational Health and Safety | Perceived time and cost savings relating to any matters impacting upon well control should be subjected to rigorous safety assessment. |
REC177-3356 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | The regulator should pre‐assess and review in a generic sense, and in conjunction with the offshore petroleum industry, available options for well control in the event of a blowout. Being ‘match fit’ in this sense will enable a quicker and more effective response in terms of safety assessment, and will ensure that expectations of both operator and regulator are more readily aligned. |
REC177-3278 | 29 - Operational Health and Safety | Well construction and management plans should include provision(s) for reviewing the integrity of barriers at safety‐critical times or milestones, such as (i) prior to suspension involving departure of the rig from the platform; (ii) prior to re‐entry of a well after suspension; (iii) prior to removal of any barrier. |
REC177-3293 | 29 - Operational Health and Safety | If a dispute arises between a licensee and a rig operator in relation to a well control issue, and is not resolved between them, the matter must be raised with the relevant regulator before discretionary operations proceed. |
REC177-3330 | 39 - Disaster Risk Management | Decision‐making about well control issues should be professionalised. Industry participants must recognise that decision‐makers owe independent duties to the public, not just their employer or principal, in relation to well control. Risk management in the context of well control needs to be understood as an ethical/professional duty. Self‐regulation contemplates self‐regulation by the industry, not just by individual licensees and operators. |
REC177-3321 | 29 - Operational Health and Safety | Careful consideration must be given to equipment compatibility as part of well construction design. |