In carrying out a review of PTTEPAA’s permit and licence, the Minister should have regard to this Report, particularly (i) the adverse findings set out in this Chapter; and (ii) the extent to which PTTEPAA has implemented the Action Plan submitted to the Inquiry, or otherwise addressed the matter

Supervision/oversight of well control operations (within licensees, rig operators and by regulators) must occur without assuming adherence to good oilfield practice.

Wells drilled into hydrocarbon zones should be treated as live wells, with the potential to blowout unless a documented risk assessment establishes otherwise.

The industry standard of two barriers should be replaced with the concept of ‘two or more barriers’ as a minimum standard. A minimum standard when operations proceed normally should never be regarded as a sufficient standard in other circumstances.

Any pro‐formas used by licensees, rig operators and contractors for recording information about installation of barriers should explicitly provide for ‘exception reporting’, that is, the form should include provision for recording any unforseen or untoward events which occur in the course of inst

The regulatory regime should also impose an obligation on an operator to ascertain the availability, and provide details to the regulator, of any potential relief well rigs, prior to the commencement of drilling operations (including prior to each phase of a drilling operation where applicable).<

Decision‐making about well control issues should be professionalised. Industry participants must recognise that decision‐makers owe independent duties to the public, not just their employer or principal, in relation to well control.

Licensees and rig operators should be astute in ensuring that corporate systems and culture encourage rather than discourage raising of well control issues. For instance, do performance bonuses or rewards actually encourage or discourage reporting of issues?

Regulatory approval to rely on only one barrier should not be given unless (i) a proper risk assessment is carried out; (ii) exceptional circumstances exist; and (iii) risks involved are reduced to ‘as low as reasonably practicable’.

Industry, regulators, and training/research institutions should develop standards that address best practices for cementing operations (including liaising, as appropriate, with overseas regulators) with a view to overcoming problems which can effect the integrity of cemented casing shoes, annulus

Batched drilling operations should only be undertaken after careful assessment of the special risks which such operations give rise to; well control must be maintained during the course of batched drilling operations.

NOPSA develop a policy of engagement with operators so as to enable experts (including safety experts) to canvas all available options for well control in the event of a blowout.

Logistics management of well control equipment should be conducted in such a way as to operate as a check against deficient well control practices, for example, use of serial numbers to track availability, testing, and deployment of well control equipment.

It is recommended that industry, regulators, and training/research institutions liaise with one another with a view to developing better techniques for testing and verifying the integrity of cemented casing shoes as barriers (particularly in atypical situations such as where the casing shoe is lo

The regulator should pre‐assess and review in a generic sense, and in conjunction with the offshore petroleum industry, available options for well control in the event of a blowout.

Consideration should be given to ways to ensure that contractors who are involved in barrier installation (such as cementing companies) have a direct interest in the performance of works to a proper standard.

Tracking and analysis of cementing problems/failures should occur to assess industry trends, principal causes, remedial techniques and so on.

Cement integrity should be evaluated wherever practicable by way of cement evaluation tests, rather than relying on pre‐operational calculations of cement and displacement fluid volumes.

Where multiple wells are drilled, operations and occurrences at one well must be carefully assessed for any implications with respect to well control at other wells.

The Inquiry also supports Bills and Agostini’s recommendation: ‘…in relation to safety case development and compliance overall, that NOPSA revise its approach to interacting with operators prior to the safety case assessment process and subsequently direct more resources into its advisory functio

The National Plan should specify that the cost of responding to an oil spill, or other damage to the offshore marine environment, will be totally met by the owner/operator.

Careful consideration must be given to equipment compatibility as part of well construction design.

It should be standard industry practice to re‐test a cemented casing shoe (that is, after WOC) whenever the plugs do not bump or the float valves apparently fail. Standard industry practice should require consideration of other tests in addition to a repeat pressure test.

The mere fact that the rig is over the platform should not be regarded by licensees or regulators as sufficient justification for reliance on only one barrier.

The National Plan should be reviewed to clarify the arrangements to apply in Commonwealth waters regarding key roles and responsibilities, including in relation to the ESC, in the event of an oil spill. This should also address any necessary training required.

NOPSA’s prohibition powers should be extended such that a prohibition notice can be issued where a NOPSA Occupational Health and Safety Inspector believes, on reasonable grounds, that an activity is occurring or may occur at a facility involving an immediate threat to the health or safety of a pe

The obligation of companies involved in an incident to meet the full costs of monitoring and remediation should be made a condition of approval of proposals under the EPBC Act and OPGGS Act.

Any indication of a compromised cemented shoe which cannot be resolved with a high measure of confidence should result in the installation of additional well control barrier(s).

Relevant personnel from licensees and rig operators should meet face to face to agree on, and document, well control issues/arrangements prior to commencement of drilling operations.

The Commonwealth co-ordinate a standing national arson forum between fire and law enforcement agencies to be held every two years.

The Commonwealth consult with local, state and territory government planning authorities on the development and dissemination of a house loss risk index for households in Australia's highest risk bushfire areas.

The Commonwealth publish all fuel reduction plans and related audit findings on a national database.

The Productivity Commission undertake an examination of bushfire risk from ageing power infrastructure, including an assessment of replacement costs and likely suppression costs from bushfires caused by defective infrastructure.

Subject to the findings of the Productivity Commission, the Commonwealth examine options for the funding of replacement of power infrastructure that presents an unacceptable bushfire risk.

The Commonwealth assist the states with bushfire training for land managers and volunteers by co-ordinating curriculum development and delivery of a national bushfire accreditation course, to be delivered by the relevant state agencies.

The Commonwealth organise the co-operation of state land management and fire agencies to provide the practical training aspect of the curriculum as part of a national bushfire accreditation course.

The committee recommends that the Commonwealth co-ordinate a national approach to the pooling of ground fire fighting resources across agencies and jurisdictions to maximise the efficiency of their use.

Further Commonwealth funding for bushfire suppression be made conditional on state fire agencies agreeing to the Commonwealth evaluating and auditing their fuel reduction programs.

At the conclusion of the current Bushfire CRC funding agreement the Commonwealth establish a new permanent bushfire research institute.

The Commonwealth seek agreement from the states and territories that would enable it to evaluate the adequacy of fuel reduction programs applied by public land management agencies in high bushfire risk areas, and audit their implementation against the program's stated objectives.

The Productivity Commission be tasked to assess the economic effects of recent major bushfires on the Australian economy to determine the cost effectiveness of prescribed burning as a mitigation strategy.

The Commonwealth Government work with the states and their agencies to ensure consistent terminology is used when communicating with the public.

The Commonwealth Government examine potential new arrangements for Commonwealth involvement in the development and implementation of a national policy for bushfire management.

The Commonwealth encourages further research into prescribed burning and its effectiveness and into alternative bushfire mitigation approaches through improved bushfire risk understanding at the asset level.

To improve Centrelink’s preparedness for responding to future disasters, the ANAO recommends that Centrelink include disasters that impact on multiple Areas in its emergency and business continuity test exercise program.

The ANAO recommends that Centrelink assess the reliability of emergency recovery payment data and reports generated from its system(s), and update the approach, standards and procedures for the collection, storage and use of the data. 

To improve customer awareness of the availability of disaster recovery assistance, the ANAO recommends that Centrelink:

To provide adequate assurance on the validity of claims paid for disaster recovery assistance, the ANAO recommends that Centrelink:

That the Minister for Emergency Services consider the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer, Department of Environment and Conservation as a member of the State Emergency Management Committee.

That the Department of the Attorney General, in consultation with FESA and Western Australia Police (WAPOL), consider options for legislative amendments to extend criminal liability to all damage, injury or death directly caused by arson.

The prioritisation, by the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC), of bushfire preparedness activities including updating WESTPLAN - BUSHFIRE and coordinating bushfire exercises prior to the 2009/10 bushfire season.

The prioritising of the critical amendments to the Bush Fires Act 1954 recommended by the Community Development and Justice Standing Committee that relate to fire management, ie: a. Fire and Emergency Services Authority (FESA)‘s ability to assume control of a fire in specific circumstances b.

That further amendments be made to the Bush Fires Act 1954 be drafted to provide fire response agencies with the necessary authorisation and statutory protection to respond to a fire on private property, or land that Local Government, Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) or FESA is re

That FESA assess the cost and other implications of proposed changes to bushfire prone zone declarations which would allow the whole State to be declared bushfire prone.

Suppression resources should be ordered and mobilised as 2 truck Strike Teams with a STL and consistently deployed to the fire ground as a unit.

At Level 3 incidents the Information Services Unit should be adequately resourced with information technology and at least 6 persons, all of whom are very experienced and capable in dealing with the information demands of a Level 3 incident.

Pre-season multi- agency refresher training for Ground Controllers should be undertaken each year.

Unassigned resources arriving at incidents should be encouraged to make themselves known and to undertake alternate duties.

At large incidents a communications bus should be provided for the use by Air Ops and a designated work space should be provided for the Air Ops management group.

Portable, reliable mobile repeaters are required to provide radio communications into areas not covered by existing repeater networks. These repeaters need the capacity to be linked.

Pre-season refresher training to include an emphasis on check in/out procedures

Add an ‘Aviation’ map to the standard set of incident maps. The standard for this map will need to be developed by subject matter experts from the Air Ops group.

Ensure the S61 helicopter has all appropriate channels for water bombing operations throughout the State by including this requirement on a pre-deployment checklist.

There needs to be a system that allows laptop computers brought to an incident to be configured at the start of the season and allow them to be easily activated to the correct configuration when they arrive at the incident.

Media liaison personnel are needed to ‘ride’ shotgun’ on media personnel to facilitate them getting their stories without imposing on the effectiveness of operations.

Provide a photocopier in the Mobile Communications Facility or the mobile equipment cache that is capable of large volume production of collated documents.

There is an established need to develop mobile accommodation and accommodation facility support solutions that allows an acceptable standard of accommodation to be provided to fire fighters in close proximity to the incident.

Provision of timely, accurate and regular information to the community via electronic media (radio and internet) is a recognised function of the Information Unit in liaison with the Traffic Operations Officer.

Pre-season arrangements to provide high quality food should be encouraged in all emergency management plans

A review of community messages, their construction and component parts, the process to activate them and the technology required to deliver the messages by digital and non-digital media should be undertaken.

A strategically located Staging Area serviced with check in/out personnel should be considered as early as possible at incidents involving an extended attack.

Food storage should be a design consideration in all fire ground appliances

Public meetings are to be encouraged for all Level 3 incidents that affect, or have the potential to affect communities.

Perishable food should be ‘stamped’ with an expiry date.

A centralised emergency services website should be established that the public can access for reliable and up to date information on any incident. The website must be capable of reliably servicing a very high traffic load and be easily updated by HMA’s.

At Level 3 incidents the position of ‘Traffic Operations Officer’ –be established and filled by a WAPOL officer. A role description for this position is required and should be included in the “Guidelines for the Operations of Road Closures During Bushfires 2008”.

A standard for signage at fire incidents be developed and caches of this equipment be established at DEC and Local Govt facilitates to enable its rapid and effective deployment by Ground Support Unit at fires.

Wherever possible the ISU should be co-located with Operations and Logistics Sections to ensure effective communications and the ICC in which they operate should be located in the affected community.

Main Roads Western Australia, Police and LGA’s be encouraged via State emergency arrangements to establish a distributed cache of “hard” road barriers for deployment to major incidents

ABC Radio should be a participant in IMG and/or OAMG. LEMC and DEMC should plan for this involvement in Local and District Emergency Management Plans.

A formal IMG meeting should be convened as early as possible at initiating incidents with potential. At the very least early advice to potential IMG members should be made that a meeting is likely to be convened.

The declaration of a potential Level 3 incident should be notified to FESA who can facilitate an early warning to CFCO’s in the Shire and surrounding LGA’s.

In preparing traffic management plans consideration should be given to which VCP’s are critical and need to be resourced with uniformed Police Officers and which VCP’s can be manned with civilian contractors.

The role of ‘BFB Task Force Liaison’ be defined and appropriately trained personnel be provided by the HMA (possibly from support brigades) to facilitate brigade movements on and off the fire ground.

The information templates used by the ISU in developing public information boards need to be standardised and posted on the DEC Fire Management Services webpage to allow access and use by the ISU.

Potential IMG membership should be identified in local hazard management plans. The information needs to be kept current. The contact details for each member should be recorded.

The Interagency Guidelines for Road closure needs to be reviewed to incorporate a mechanism to identify bone-fide local landholders to facilitate their movement in and out of cordoned areas in sympathy with the Stay and Defend requirements.

Transport plans for BFB resources should be prepared by the Ground Support Unit in close liaison with FESA who will liaise with the home jurisdictions of the brigades.

Prior to the bushfire season, potential IMG members, many of whom are members of the Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC) should be made aware of, and possibly exercise, their role as an IMG member.

Full briefings of traffic management personnel should be provided prior to dispatch to work areas – why road closed, what their authority level is, level of current risk etc

The ISU should be provided with a person with local knowledge at Level 3 incidents.

A formal OAMG meeting should be convened as early as possible for incidents with the potential to be Level 3 incidents.

Information packs to be provided to road traffic personnel to assist with enquiries by public or provision to members of public and landholders who are defending homes/stock etc

The Emergency Management Regulations 2006 be urgently amended to determine a HMA(s) for bushfire.

Potential OAMG membership should be identified in DEMC protocols and local hazard management plans. The information needs to be kept current. The contact details for each member should be recorded.

Dedicated information packages should be made available to personnel operating Vehicle Control Points at the shift briefing.

The Emergency Management Act 2005 is amended to provide a mechanism for one HMA to transfer responsibility to another HMA and ensure that both HMA’s are provided the powers and protection necessary under that Act.

When an OAMG is established, a formal declaration of its establishment needs to be transmitted to all organisation/agencies involved. The declaration should clearly establish the reporting arrangements for Incident Controllers to the OAM as described in Westplan Bushfire.

All incidents where the HMA delegates the authority to manage suppression operations to another agency on its behalf, should be achieved via a written delegation setting out the scope, limitations and duration of the delegation.

A centralised, regional, multi-agency resource coordination and tracking system/facility be established to accommodate and coordinate the movement of resources from all agencies within and between regions.