A separate, identifiable barrier manual should be agreed upon and used by licensees, rig operators, and cementing contractors. These manuals should set out best industry practice in relation to achieving and maintaining well integrity.

Barriers should not be installed or removed off‐line. The derrick should be located over a well at the time of removal and installation of any barrier. This will enable more decisive action to be taken in the event a problem arises.

Licensees, rig operators and relevant third party contractors should develop well control competency standards for key personnel in other entities involved in well control operations.

Procedures and accountabilities should be established to ensure, in the event of a future incident, that:
a. there is adequate monitoring of the volume of oil spilt and the spread of the oil (both surface and sub‐surface dispersed oil); and

DEWHA should participate in training programs and exercises relevant to an oil spill in the marine environment.

In the meantime, the Minister should:

Licensees and rig operators (and third party contractors involved in well control operations) should specifically assess, and document, the nature and extent of knowledge/skills of relevant personnel in relation to well control (including familiarity of personnel with agency‐specific requirements

Well construction and management plans, and drilling programs, should include provision for testing and verifying the integrity of all barriers as soon as practicable after installation.

Memoranda of Agreement should be entered into between operators in relation to provision of emergency assistance in the event of blowouts.

Secondary barriers (including PCCCs) should only be installed, tested, and removed with a BOP in place unless a documented risk assessment indicates that well control can be maintained at all times.

The Inquiry supports the objective (rather than prescriptive) approach to regulation now followed in Australia. However, the pendulum has swung too far away from prescriptive standards. In some areas relating to well integrity there needs to be minimum standards.

The regulatory framework should provide that in respect of all activities in Commonwealth waters:

In the future, and in the interests of ensuring that all possible well control options are comprehensively pursued to exhaustion, decisions as to well control response options should be the result of collaboration between the regulator and the operator rather than leaving one party to make unilat

In order that the ACT public can be reassured about the project management and financial planning in relation to the Fairbairn site as a proposed centralised accommodation facility for emergency services, the Auditor-General undertake a review of the project from a financial probity and project m

Wellbore gas bubbling should be regarded as a trigger for independent review of well integrity. Industry and regulators should identify and document other triggers.

Licensees should be subject to an express obligation to inform regulators of the proposed removal of a barrier, even if they consider that well integrity is not thereby compromised.

PCCCs should be installed in a timely manner (for example, to prevent corrosion in the MLS apparatus). Non‐installation in order to park a BOP is not acceptable.

To better ensure that ‘risks’ are identified and managed in accordance with sound engineering principles and good oilfield practice, it is recommended that regulation 25(1)(a)(i) and (2)(a)(i) of the Management of Well Operations Regulations, be reworded as follows: ‘A titleholder must not commen

Environment plans and OSCPs should be made publicly available as a condition of approval of proposals under the OPGGS Act, and should clearly set out Scientific Monitoring requirements in the event of an oil spill.

Licensees should be subject to an express obligation to inform regulators of problems which arise in the course of installing barriers, even if they consider that well integrity is not thereby compromised.

In any future similar blowout or offshore emergency situation, the Minister appoint (through either a NOPR or the relevant Department) a senior public servant to establish and oversight a central coordinating body that will facilitate interaction between regulators, industry, AMSA and the owner/o

If a risk assessment or compliance review is triggered by the happening of a predetermined event, specific consideration should be given to whether a ‘hold point’ should be introduced such that work must cease until the problem is resolved (and the subject of appropriate certification).

Use of single strings of intermediate casing to penetrate hydrocarbon bearing zones should be carefully risk assessed. Multiple strings of intermediate casing have the advantage of isolating lost circulation zones and sealing off anomalous pressure zones.

Wells should be re‐entered with a BOP in place unless a documented risk assessment indicates that well control can be maintained at all times.

The definition of ‘good oilfield practice’ in the OPGGS Act is unduly narrow. The current definition is incapable of application except where things ‘are generally accepted as good and safe’. The definition should be amended such that ‘good oilfield practice includes…’.

Arrangements should be developed to minimise duplication between the EPBC Act and the OPGSS Act Environment Regulation.

The funding arrangements that support the National Plan should be reviewed to ensure that the costs associated with both preparedness and response capability are equitably shared between the shipping and offshore petroleum industries.

The successful installation of every barrier should be the subject of written verification within and between licensees and rig operators; and should be the subject of explicit reporting to the relevant regulator(s).

The body established to undertake a central coordination and facilitation role in the event of any future blowout in Commonwealth waters should undertake to make all relevant information publically available from one, authoritative and easy to access source.

The Commonwealth organise the co-operation of state land management and fire agencies to provide the practical training aspect of the curriculum as part of a national bushfire accreditation course.

The committee recommends that the Commonwealth co-ordinate a national approach to the pooling of ground fire fighting resources across agencies and jurisdictions to maximise the efficiency of their use.

The Commonwealth seek agreement from the states and territories that would enable it to evaluate the adequacy of fuel reduction programs applied by public land management agencies in high bushfire risk areas, and audit their implementation against the program's stated objectives.

Further Commonwealth funding for bushfire suppression be made conditional on state fire agencies agreeing to the Commonwealth evaluating and auditing their fuel reduction programs.

At the conclusion of the current Bushfire CRC funding agreement the Commonwealth establish a new permanent bushfire research institute.

The Productivity Commission be tasked to assess the economic effects of recent major bushfires on the Australian economy to determine the cost effectiveness of prescribed burning as a mitigation strategy.

The Commonwealth Government work with the states and their agencies to ensure consistent terminology is used when communicating with the public.

The Commonwealth encourages further research into prescribed burning and its effectiveness and into alternative bushfire mitigation approaches through improved bushfire risk understanding at the asset level.

The Commonwealth Government examine potential new arrangements for Commonwealth involvement in the development and implementation of a national policy for bushfire management.

The Commonwealth consult with local, state and territory government planning authorities on the development and dissemination of a house loss risk index for households in Australia's highest risk bushfire areas.

The Commonwealth co-ordinate a standing national arson forum between fire and law enforcement agencies to be held every two years.

The Productivity Commission undertake an examination of bushfire risk from ageing power infrastructure, including an assessment of replacement costs and likely suppression costs from bushfires caused by defective infrastructure.

The Commonwealth publish all fuel reduction plans and related audit findings on a national database.

Subject to the findings of the Productivity Commission, the Commonwealth examine options for the funding of replacement of power infrastructure that presents an unacceptable bushfire risk.

The Commonwealth assist the states with bushfire training for land managers and volunteers by co-ordinating curriculum development and delivery of a national bushfire accreditation course, to be delivered by the relevant state agencies.

To improve Centrelink’s preparedness for responding to future disasters, the ANAO recommends that Centrelink include disasters that impact on multiple Areas in its emergency and business continuity test exercise program.

The ANAO recommends that Centrelink assess the reliability of emergency recovery payment data and reports generated from its system(s), and update the approach, standards and procedures for the collection, storage and use of the data. 

To improve customer awareness of the availability of disaster recovery assistance, the ANAO recommends that Centrelink:

To provide adequate assurance on the validity of claims paid for disaster recovery assistance, the ANAO recommends that Centrelink:

That the Department of the Attorney General, in consultation with FESA and Western Australia Police (WAPOL), consider options for legislative amendments to extend criminal liability to all damage, injury or death directly caused by arson.

The prioritisation, by the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC), of bushfire preparedness activities including updating WESTPLAN - BUSHFIRE and coordinating bushfire exercises prior to the 2009/10 bushfire season.

The prioritising of the critical amendments to the Bush Fires Act 1954 recommended by the Community Development and Justice Standing Committee that relate to fire management, ie: a. Fire and Emergency Services Authority (FESA)‘s ability to assume control of a fire in specific circumstances b.

That further amendments be made to the Bush Fires Act 1954 be drafted to provide fire response agencies with the necessary authorisation and statutory protection to respond to a fire on private property, or land that Local Government, Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) or FESA is re

That FESA assess the cost and other implications of proposed changes to bushfire prone zone declarations which would allow the whole State to be declared bushfire prone.

That the Minister for Emergency Services consider the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer, Department of Environment and Conservation as a member of the State Emergency Management Committee.

A standard for signage at fire incidents be developed and caches of this equipment be established at DEC and Local Govt facilitates to enable its rapid and effective deployment by Ground Support Unit at fires.

Wherever possible the ISU should be co-located with Operations and Logistics Sections to ensure effective communications and the ICC in which they operate should be located in the affected community.

Main Roads Western Australia, Police and LGA’s be encouraged via State emergency arrangements to establish a distributed cache of “hard” road barriers for deployment to major incidents

ABC Radio should be a participant in IMG and/or OAMG. LEMC and DEMC should plan for this involvement in Local and District Emergency Management Plans.

A formal IMG meeting should be convened as early as possible at initiating incidents with potential. At the very least early advice to potential IMG members should be made that a meeting is likely to be convened.

The declaration of a potential Level 3 incident should be notified to FESA who can facilitate an early warning to CFCO’s in the Shire and surrounding LGA’s.

In preparing traffic management plans consideration should be given to which VCP’s are critical and need to be resourced with uniformed Police Officers and which VCP’s can be manned with civilian contractors.

The role of ‘BFB Task Force Liaison’ be defined and appropriately trained personnel be provided by the HMA (possibly from support brigades) to facilitate brigade movements on and off the fire ground.

The information templates used by the ISU in developing public information boards need to be standardised and posted on the DEC Fire Management Services webpage to allow access and use by the ISU.

Potential IMG membership should be identified in local hazard management plans. The information needs to be kept current. The contact details for each member should be recorded.

The Interagency Guidelines for Road closure needs to be reviewed to incorporate a mechanism to identify bone-fide local landholders to facilitate their movement in and out of cordoned areas in sympathy with the Stay and Defend requirements.

Transport plans for BFB resources should be prepared by the Ground Support Unit in close liaison with FESA who will liaise with the home jurisdictions of the brigades.

Prior to the bushfire season, potential IMG members, many of whom are members of the Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC) should be made aware of, and possibly exercise, their role as an IMG member.

Full briefings of traffic management personnel should be provided prior to dispatch to work areas – why road closed, what their authority level is, level of current risk etc

The ISU should be provided with a person with local knowledge at Level 3 incidents.

A formal OAMG meeting should be convened as early as possible for incidents with the potential to be Level 3 incidents.

Information packs to be provided to road traffic personnel to assist with enquiries by public or provision to members of public and landholders who are defending homes/stock etc

The Emergency Management Regulations 2006 be urgently amended to determine a HMA(s) for bushfire.

Potential OAMG membership should be identified in DEMC protocols and local hazard management plans. The information needs to be kept current. The contact details for each member should be recorded.

Dedicated information packages should be made available to personnel operating Vehicle Control Points at the shift briefing.

The Emergency Management Act 2005 is amended to provide a mechanism for one HMA to transfer responsibility to another HMA and ensure that both HMA’s are provided the powers and protection necessary under that Act.

When an OAMG is established, a formal declaration of its establishment needs to be transmitted to all organisation/agencies involved. The declaration should clearly establish the reporting arrangements for Incident Controllers to the OAM as described in Westplan Bushfire.

All incidents where the HMA delegates the authority to manage suppression operations to another agency on its behalf, should be achieved via a written delegation setting out the scope, limitations and duration of the delegation.

The responsibilities and obligations for an OAM and OAMG (when established) needs to clarified and codified in Westplan Bushfire with regard to • Provision of information to participating organisations about the progress and potential of an incident; • Dealing with information disseminated to the

The Interagency Guidelines need to be amended to reflect what is operationally possible with regard to risk management rather than what is required to achieve an absence of risk.

A centralised, regional, multi-agency resource coordination and tracking system/facility be established to accommodate and coordinate the movement of resources from all agencies within and between regions.

At Level 3 incidents the Information Services Unit should be adequately resourced with information technology and at least 6 persons, all of whom are very experienced and capable in dealing with the information demands of a Level 3 incident.

Pre-season multi- agency refresher training for Ground Controllers should be undertaken each year.

Unassigned resources arriving at incidents should be encouraged to make themselves known and to undertake alternate duties.

Suppression resources should be ordered and mobilised as 2 truck Strike Teams with a STL and consistently deployed to the fire ground as a unit.

Portable, reliable mobile repeaters are required to provide radio communications into areas not covered by existing repeater networks. These repeaters need the capacity to be linked.

Pre-season refresher training to include an emphasis on check in/out procedures

At large incidents a communications bus should be provided for the use by Air Ops and a designated work space should be provided for the Air Ops management group.

There needs to be a system that allows laptop computers brought to an incident to be configured at the start of the season and allow them to be easily activated to the correct configuration when they arrive at the incident.

Media liaison personnel are needed to ‘ride’ shotgun’ on media personnel to facilitate them getting their stories without imposing on the effectiveness of operations.

Add an ‘Aviation’ map to the standard set of incident maps. The standard for this map will need to be developed by subject matter experts from the Air Ops group.

Ensure the S61 helicopter has all appropriate channels for water bombing operations throughout the State by including this requirement on a pre-deployment checklist.

Provide a photocopier in the Mobile Communications Facility or the mobile equipment cache that is capable of large volume production of collated documents.

Provision of timely, accurate and regular information to the community via electronic media (radio and internet) is a recognised function of the Information Unit in liaison with the Traffic Operations Officer.

There is an established need to develop mobile accommodation and accommodation facility support solutions that allows an acceptable standard of accommodation to be provided to fire fighters in close proximity to the incident.

Pre-season arrangements to provide high quality food should be encouraged in all emergency management plans

A review of community messages, their construction and component parts, the process to activate them and the technology required to deliver the messages by digital and non-digital media should be undertaken.

A strategically located Staging Area serviced with check in/out personnel should be considered as early as possible at incidents involving an extended attack.

Food storage should be a design consideration in all fire ground appliances

Public meetings are to be encouraged for all Level 3 incidents that affect, or have the potential to affect communities.

Perishable food should be ‘stamped’ with an expiry date.