Perishable food should be ‘stamped’ with an expiry date.

A centralised emergency services website should be established that the public can access for reliable and up to date information on any incident. The website must be capable of reliably servicing a very high traffic load and be easily updated by HMA’s.

That if the Bushfires Amendment Bill 2009 is to be enacted, procedures be put in place which would ensure that in the event of an escalating fire, FESA would receive sufficient information to make an informed judgment as to whether or not to take control of all operations.

That a review be conducted of DEC’s ability to manage major fires and consideration be given to increased direct involvement by FESA in fire management role in the case of major fires on reserves or on unallocated Crown lands.

That arrangements be put in place for signage to be retained at Norseman and available at short notice to enable motorists to be warned of potential problems existing on the Great Eastern Highway west of Coolgardie.

That to the extent it has not already done so, DEC take action to ensure that in future cases relevant weather forecast information, particularly information as to significant wind changes, is promptly transmitted through the Incident Management Team and made available to persons with field opera

That in any consideration being given to the allocation of responsibility for control of operations in respect of major fires, consideration be given to the availability of technology and other resources, particularly when particular skills are required to make best use of such technology or reso

Agencies should: ensure their internal emergency management arrangements are up-to-date and regularly reviewed

SEMC and EM WA should: ensure that all agencies can access other agencies’ operations centres when needed and that the procedures to do so are documented

SEMC and EM WA should: ensure all agencies use the same approach to managing incidents.

SEMC and EM WA should: formally and regularly assess which hazards the state should prepare for

SEMC and EM WA should: assess the state’s level of preparedness at least annually, identifying gaps and significant risks

SEMC and EM WA should: review procedures for plan preparation and approval so that agencies can prepare their plans in a more timely way

Agencies should: annually assess their capability to respond to emergencies and take measures to address any shortfalls

SEMC and EM WA should: ensure agencies fulfil their obligations under the Act

SEMC and EM WA should: work with local government to ensure up-to-date, comprehensive local arrangements are in place

Agencies should: train their staff who will be involved in emergencies in incident management.

SEMC and EM WA should: submit outstanding legislative changes to Parliament as a matter of priority

SEMC and EM WA should: monitor and take action to ensure local plans are in place and cover areas where the hazard could occur

SEMC and EM WA should: ensure that agencies have a common or compatible crisis information management system in place

SEMC and EM WA should: define key roles within the emergency management framework

Agencies should: update out-of-date Westplans and support plans as a matter of urgency

Agencies should: identify overlaps between Westplans and develop written procedures for these circumstances

Agencies should: ensure their Westplans and support plans have supporting local arrangements in place

The Department of Premier and Cabinet should clarify the roles and responsibilities of departments and agencies under Part 6 of the Act and CIP framework to reduce confusion and gaps.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet should provide definitive guidance on identifying essential services for declaration to better inform relevant departments in discharging their responsibilities under Part 6 of the Act.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet should identify risks arising from the joined-up nature of the approach to protecting essential services and critical infrastructure, and to assist departments and agencies to develop associated risk management arrangements at the whole-of-government level.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet should clarify the requirements in relation to establishing Security and Continuity Networks in designated sectors, so that there is a shared understanding of those requirements.

Representatives of lead departments should obtain necessary security clearances so appropriate officers can access information relevant to their sectors.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet, in consultation with Victoria Police, should develop clear guidance to distinguish between declared essential services and critical infrastructure to assist departments, Victoria Police and industry in implementing Part 6 of the Act and the CIP framework mor

The Department of Premier and Cabinet should establish clear oversight and coordination of the arrangements for both Part 6 of the Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 and the CIP framework by an appropriate body, such as the Government Security and Continuity Network Coordination Group with

The Department of Premier and Cabinet should provide clear guidance on terms such as ‘audit’, ‘auditor’ and ‘adequacy of the exercise’ to assist departments, Victoria Police and industry to implement requirements more reliably.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet should lead the development of a performance management framework for measuring, monitoring and reporting on the implementation of Part 6 of the Act and the CIP framework.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet and Victoria Police, in consultation with departments, should standardise reporting on training exercises conducted under Part 6 of the Act and the CIP framework to promote greater consistency and to enable better identification of lessons learned and continu

Reports on the training exercises should be retained in an appropriately secured central repository so that consolidated results of the exercises can be drawn together effectively. 

That Tasmania Fire Service implement Recommendation 5 above; and that Aurora continue to co-operate with that Service.

That the recommendations contained in the Police Operational Debrief Report of 22 October 2007 to 7 November 2007, submitted to the Coroner, be further considered by the Tasmania Police for adoption where considered appropriate by Tasmania Police.

That the Tasmania Fire Service provide further training in respect to sprinkler systems, namely:
(a) That fire fighters of Tasmania Fire Service receive further training in the operation of sprinkler systems.

That the Tasmania Fire Service consider improvements in radio units installed in breathing apparatus:

That the Tasmania Fire Service provide additional training in the use of thermal camera imaging:

That Aurora ensure that regular audits are conducted of all electrical systems of all commercial buildings to confirm that they comply with modern standards.

That any building fitted with heat-activated closing devices or fire and smoke doors be assessed to establish if it constitutes a fire hazard under section 165 of the Building Act 2000 and that, where appropriate, such doors be replaced with smoke activated doors.

That the Tasmania Fire Service provide additional training in power disconnection and improvements in communication between Tasmania Fire Service and Aurora:
(a) That fire fighters receive training as to the available methods for power disconnection.

That the Tasmania Fire Service establish clear systems and protocols for dealing with fires.

That the Coroner prepare a discussion paper and draft guidelines for the clarification of investigative roles of the Tasmania Police Service, the Tasmania Fire Service, and the Coroners Office for adoption in relation to future fires where a Coroner’s Inquest is established.

That the Tasmania Fire Service conduct an audit of all shopping centres to ensure that there exists within those centres adequate fire protection and evacuation systems.

The Act be amended to make it clear that Disaster Controllers/Coordinators at all levels are to be authorised public officials with the necessary training and authority to properly discharge the role and provide an effective direct line of support, coordination and control of disaster events.

The suggested summary of legislative changes guide the legislative response to the report incorporating consultation with key stakeholders at State, District and Local levels.

District and State levels utilise the current Act to make pre-emptive declarations of a disaster event (likely disasters) so as to be proactive in leading and controlling disaster events.

Planning and consultation be undertaken by EMQ with all levels of the Disaster Management system to ensure that necessary risk-based disaster evacuation plans are prepared at Local, District and State levels, supported by necessary community education and preparedness programs.

Suggested escalation trigger points be discussed with District Disaster Coordinators and Local Disaster Coordinators, and if considered practical and useful, be incorporated in Local, District and State Disaster Management Plans.

The Department of Community Safety and Councils develop MOUs to reflect the genuine partnership that exists in present arrangements including an emphasis on the use of the agreed State disaster arrangements to task and deploy SES units following State/Local consultation.

Current procedures to activate disaster recovery funding arrangements be retained and processes be reinforced.

The SDMG commission the Department of Community Safety and seek the necessary funding to develop and enhance the Statewide Disaster Management information and communications system building on alternatives already in place and in consultation with all levels of Government.

The SDMG lead an initiative to deal at all levels with offers of assistance and donations from the general public in the event of disasters.

The basic tenet of a local community response as the foundation of Queensland's Disaster Management framework, with a clear description of the relationships between the levels and description of the phases of Disaster Management, needs to be more strongly emphasised in the "objects&quot

Revised governance arrangements be implemented involving Disaster Management Groups at the three levels supported by EMQ as outlined in this report to achieve continuous improvement in the Disaster Management arrangements in the State.

The Act be amended (Sections 45, 46, 47) to enable verbal directions in times of disaster responses from a State Controller to DDC to Local Controller, which must be committed to writing promptly to formalise the record.

The SDMG take into account key improvement initiatives and change processes suggested when deciding on an effective implementation strategy for agreed recommendations.

The State Disaster Management Plan incorporate linkages with all Lead Agencies and officers in control of National Plan or Agreement response.

The Chairperson of SDMG (where leadership is not already defined in relevant National Plans) nominate a senior officer to assume overall responsibility for control and coordination of each disaster event to ensure a decisive and effective response.

The Commissioner of Police, through a dedicated Assistant Commissioner (supported by a cohort of Assistant Commissioners to ensure adequate coverage), be assigned responsibility for overall control of each natural Disaster Management event in Queensland as the preferred arrangement.

The State Disaster Management Group focus on Disaster Management strategy and policy with sub-committees or appropriate levels in the Disaster Management system assigned detailed disaster planning or risk management assessment roles.

The State Disaster Management Act be strengthened by a description of the phases of Disaster Management with emphasis on the key elements within each phase including the recovery phase; ƒ Lead Agencies and nominated leaders in each area of Queensland for each of the four key elements of recovery

The SDMG lead an initiative to integrate and/or inter-connect all of the control centres involved at all levels of the Disaster Management system in Queensland as part of the project to integrate State communications.

EMQ resources be directed to continually improving, monitoring and regularly evaluating the State's Disaster Management system with a priority focus on providing support to Local Government levels including interlinking exercises involving District and State arrangements.

Executive Officers to DDCs be serving Police Officers. ƒ Regional and Area officers of EMQ be members of Local and District Disaster Management Groups to enable them to fulfil their Statewide support and governance roles.

The Department of Community Safety (through EMQ) be assigned in the Act with the responsibility to develop, maintain, monitor and continuously improve the State's Disaster Management arrangements and systems.

SERCon consider a review of existing community-based educational programs, with a view to informing the community
on flood recovery.

SERCon consider the establishment of a body, such as a State Recovery Committee, with responsibility for the
oversight and management of emergency recovery operations in general, and in specific instances.

SERCon consider that the proposed State Recovery Committee review the recommended considerations arising from
this report and those of the Mayor’s Communiqué (2009) (Appendix 9 in Volume 2) and the Far North

SERCon consider meeting with the State Emergency Management Committee, Directors General and agency heads to
discuss the role, function and responsibility of individual agencies in recovery arrangements.

SERCon consider the continued development of a State Recovery Sub-Plan (including complementary local and district
sub-plans).

SERCon consider that the proposed State Recovery Committee provide an interim report to government on these and
related recommendations within 12 months of being so tasked.

SERCon consider development of an education program for other government and non-government agencies (with
particular reference to those within the emergency services portfolio) on flood recovery arrangements,
assistance, duties and responsibilities.

That the Rural Fires Act 1997 be amended to provide to designated Fire Investigation Officers of the Rural Fire Service the power to enter any land upon which a bushfire has occurred for the purposes of investigation for a period of up to 24 hours after a fire has been declared out.

The prescribed penalty notice penalty amount for section 100(2) of the Rural Fires Act 1997 be increased to $1,100.

The prescribed penalty notice penalty amount for section 99(6) of the Rural Fires Act 1997 be increased to $1,100.

The prescribed penalty notice penalty amount for section 66(7) of the Rural Fires Act 1997 be increased to $1,100.

That the Attorney General’s Department’s Crime Prevention Division consider the causes of, and any solution to, the high number of juveniles involved in causing bushfires.

That appropriate officers of the Rural Fire Service be granted the same powers as granted to officers of NSW Fire Brigades under section 19 of the Fire Brigades Act 1989.

That legislation be prepared by the Criminal Law Review Division of the Attorney General’s Department allowing designated officers of the Rural Fire Service to apply for a warrant in certain circumstances.

A working group be established to consider methods of preventing criminal firestarting.

ESWG notes that existing and future contracts and the impending introduction of the Short Term Trading Market will be the primary mechanisms for addressing future gas supply shortfalls.

ESWG recommends consideration of how to ensure good communication and flow of information between the liquid fuels and other energy sectors. One approach that may be considered is that:

ESWG recommends investigation of options to fund NGERAC’s on-going activities including through AEMO’s funding model.

Energy Security Working Group (ESWG) recommends consideration be given to government and industry working together to understand that investment opportunities in the energy sector are realised in a timely fashion to better manage potential longer term supply shortfalls.

ESWG recommends consideration be given to expanding the role of AEMO in providing market information on gas by: 

ESWG recommends reviewing AEMO’s Gas Bulletin Board (GBB) to ensure it is effectively communicating all publicly available information to market participants to assist in monitoring daily gas supplies, and any changes to the GBB rules required to improve information and awareness of any potential

ESWG recommends consideration be given to consolidating gas and electricity network status and emergency information on one webpage for central communication.

ESWG recommends consideration be given to leveraging AEMO’s expanded responsibilities in gas markets by undertaking the role of the National Gas Emergency Response Advisory Committee (NGERAC) Secretariat while the Commonwealth continue as Chair, with the Chair’s position to be reviewed once the s

ESWG recommends National Gas Emergency Response Advisory Committee maintain its industry, jurisdiction and consumer representation noting the importance of input from each of these groups in developing its advice.

ESWG notes NGERAC already informally advises ministers on the possible effects of gas emergencies on electricity supplies. ESWG recommends formalising this role by acknowledging it in NGERAC’s MOU. ESWG also recommends an editorial review of NGERAC’s MOU to ensure accuracy and consistency.

ESWG recommends consideration of a review of communication protocols with the aim of achieving high level policy consistency of communication across jurisdictions to the maximum extent possible.

ESWG recommends consideration be given to the spokesperson role AEMO can undertake during an electricity and/or gas supply shortfall in its covered markets and relevant jurisdictional emergencies, noting that AEMO has clear responsibility for the bulk supply of electricity as outlined in the Powe

ESWG recommends that as far as reasonably practical, arrangements for load shedding be as transparent as possible to give consumers confidence in the process.

That the Commonwealth undertake legislative change that will ensure that when any floating facility reverts to a ‘navigable form’, the relevant provisions of the Navigation Act and the OHSMI Act will apply regardless of any voyage criteria.

That National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority review the risk assessment of pipelines.

That the Commonwealth Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Regulations be amended to ensure that the safety case for a floating facility specifically identifies when command structure changes occur (which may be well before departing the site

That Australian Maritime Safety Authority should have a role in assuring continuing marine standards that are not inconsistent with Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 provisions and that Australian Maritime Safety Authority needs defined powers to assist National Offshore Petr