Memoranda of Agreement should be entered into between operators in relation to provision of emergency assistance in the event of blowouts.

Secondary barriers (including PCCCs) should only be installed, tested, and removed with a BOP in place unless a documented risk assessment indicates that well control can be maintained at all times.

The Inquiry supports the objective (rather than prescriptive) approach to regulation now followed in Australia. However, the pendulum has swung too far away from prescriptive standards. In some areas relating to well integrity there needs to be minimum standards.

The regulatory framework should provide that in respect of all activities in Commonwealth waters:

A single, independent regulatory body should be created, looking after safety as a primary objective, well integrity and environmental approvals. Industry policy and resource development and promotion activities should reside in government departments and not with the regulatory agency.

The use/type of barriers (including any change requests relating thereto) must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to installation. A proper risk assessment should be carried out, agreed upon, and documented in writing before installation.

In view of the numerous well integrity problems in all of the Montara Oilfield wells, the Minister should commission a detailed audit of all the other offshore wells operated by PTTEPAA to determine whether they too may suffer from well integrity problems.
 

If a risk assessment or compliance review is triggered by the happening of a predetermined event, specific consideration should be given to whether a ‘hold point’ should be introduced such that work must cease until the problem is resolved (and the subject of appropriate certification).

Licensees should be subject to an express obligation to inform regulators of the proposed removal of a barrier, even if they consider that well integrity is not thereby compromised.

PCCCs should be installed in a timely manner (for example, to prevent corrosion in the MLS apparatus). Non‐installation in order to park a BOP is not acceptable.

To better ensure that ‘risks’ are identified and managed in accordance with sound engineering principles and good oilfield practice, it is recommended that regulation 25(1)(a)(i) and (2)(a)(i) of the Management of Well Operations Regulations, be reworded as follows: ‘A titleholder must not commen

Environment plans and OSCPs should be made publicly available as a condition of approval of proposals under the OPGGS Act, and should clearly set out Scientific Monitoring requirements in the event of an oil spill.

The proposal of the Productivity Commission’s Research Report (Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector, April 2009) to establish a NOPR should be pursued at a minimum.

Licensees should be subject to an express obligation to inform regulators of problems which arise in the course of installing barriers, even if they consider that well integrity is not thereby compromised.

Removal of a barrier must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to removal. A proper risk assessment should be carried out and agreed upon, and documented in writing before removal.

As soon as a risk of barrier failure arises, no other activities should take place in the well other than those directed to removal of the risk.

Use of single strings of intermediate casing to penetrate hydrocarbon bearing zones should be carefully risk assessed. Multiple strings of intermediate casing have the advantage of isolating lost circulation zones and sealing off anomalous pressure zones.

Wells should be re‐entered with a BOP in place unless a documented risk assessment indicates that well control can be maintained at all times.

The definition of ‘good oilfield practice’ in the OPGGS Act is unduly narrow. The current definition is incapable of application except where things ‘are generally accepted as good and safe’. The definition should be amended such that ‘good oilfield practice includes…’.

Arrangements should be developed to minimise duplication between the EPBC Act and the OPGSS Act Environment Regulation.

Responsibility for well integrity should be moved to NOPSA (as also proposed by the Productivity Commission).

The successful installation of every barrier should be the subject of written verification within and between licensees and rig operators; and should be the subject of explicit reporting to the relevant regulator(s).

Decision‐making about well control issues should be professionalised. Industry participants must recognise that decision‐makers owe independent duties to the public, not just their employer or principal, in relation to well control.

In order that the ACT public can be reassured about the project management and financial planning in relation to the Fairbairn site as a proposed centralised accommodation facility for emergency services, the Auditor-General undertake a review of the project from a financial probity and project m

If a dispute arises between a licensee and a rig operator in relation to a well control issue, and is not resolved between them, the matter must be raised with the relevant regulator before discretionary operations proceed.

A minimum of two barriers should be in place at all times (including during batched operations) whenever it is reasonably practicable to do so.

Any equipment (including PCCCs) used as, or to install, a barrier should be manufactured for that purpose and be generally recognised as fit for purpose.

Written (rather than verbal) approval from the DA (or new regulator) should be obtained before the commencement of well activities that lead to a physical change of a wellbore, other than in a true emergency situation (requiring amendment to regulation 17 of the Management of Well Operations Regu

The Minister consider legislative amendments to the OPGGS Act which make clear that

In the meantime, the Minister should:

The regulator should pre‐assess and review in a generic sense, and in conjunction with the offshore petroleum industry, available options for well control in the event of a blowout.

Consideration should be given to ways to ensure that contractors who are involved in barrier installation (such as cementing companies) have a direct interest in the performance of works to a proper standard.

Existing well control training programs should be reviewed by the industry, regulators and training providers, with a focus on well control accidents that have occurred (in Australia and overseas).

Perceived time and cost savings relating to any matters impacting upon well control should be subjected to rigorous safety assessment.

Reliance upon one barrier against a blowout must not take place except with the prior written approval of the relevant regulator and then only in a true emergency situation (see below).

Manufacturers should be consulted about how to address non‐routine operational problems affecting their well control equipment.

The OPGGS Act should be amended to allow for a power to suspend a petroleum production licence (in addition to the current power to cancel a licence or suspend its conditions).

In the future, and in the interests of ensuring that all possible well control options are comprehensively pursued to exhaustion, decisions as to well control response options should be the result of collaboration between the regulator and the operator rather than leaving one party to make unilat

The National Plan should specify that the cost of responding to an oil spill, or other damage to the offshore marine environment, will be totally met by the owner/operator.

A specific focus on well control training should be mandatory for key personnel involved in well control operations (including both on‐rig personnel and onshore personnel in supervisory capacities).

Wells drilled into hydrocarbon zones should be treated as live wells, with the potential to blowout unless a documented risk assessment establishes otherwise.

Licensees and rig operators should install an additional barrier whenever (i) there is any real doubt as to the integrity of any barrier; (ii) whenever the risk of flow from a reservoir increases materially in the course of operations; and (iii) where the consequences of a blowout are grave (for

Drilling programs dealing with barrier installation should incorporate relevant aspects of manufacturer’s instructions.

The recommendations of the Inquiry in relation to suitable ways of achieving well integrity contained in Chapter 3 be included in a guidance manual that is issued for the assistance of industry and regulators.

In any future similar blowout or offshore emergency situation, the Minister appoint (through either a NOPR or the relevant Department) a senior public servant to establish and oversight a central coordinating body that will facilitate interaction between regulators, industry, AMSA and the owner/o

The obligation of companies involved in an incident to meet the full costs of monitoring and remediation should be made a condition of approval of proposals under the EPBC Act and OPGGS Act.

Licensees and rig operators (and third party contractors involved in well control operations) should specifically assess, and document, the nature and extent of knowledge/skills of relevant personnel in relation to well control (including familiarity of personnel with agency‐specific requirements

Regulatory approval to rely on only one barrier should not be given unless (i) a proper risk assessment is carried out; (ii) exceptional circumstances exist; and (iii) risks involved are reduced to ‘as low as reasonably practicable’.

The industry standard of two barriers should be replaced with the concept of ‘two or more barriers’ as a minimum standard. A minimum standard when operations proceed normally should never be regarded as a sufficient standard in other circumstances.

Any pro‐formas used by licensees, rig operators and contractors for recording information about installation of barriers should explicitly provide for ‘exception reporting’, that is, the form should include provision for recording any unforseen or untoward events which occur in the course of inst

The regulator, rather than the responsible Minister, should be given the power to direct an operator to use a particular rig for the purpose of well control operations, if appropriate in the circumstances, and the power should be used in the future if that rig is the best option available.

The body established to undertake a central coordination and facilitation role in the event of any future blowout in Commonwealth waters should undertake to make all relevant information publically available from one, authoritative and easy to access source.

It is recommended that industry, regulators, and training/research institutions liaise with one another with a view to developing better techniques for testing and verifying the integrity of cemented casing shoes as barriers (particularly in atypical situations such as where the casing shoe is lo

The Commonwealth encourages further research into prescribed burning and its effectiveness and into alternative bushfire mitigation approaches through improved bushfire risk understanding at the asset level.

The Commonwealth assist the states with bushfire training for land managers and volunteers by co-ordinating curriculum development and delivery of a national bushfire accreditation course, to be delivered by the relevant state agencies.

The committee recommends that the Commonwealth co-ordinate a national approach to the pooling of ground fire fighting resources across agencies and jurisdictions to maximise the efficiency of their use.

The Commonwealth Government work with the states and their agencies to ensure consistent terminology is used when communicating with the public.

The Commonwealth organise the co-operation of state land management and fire agencies to provide the practical training aspect of the curriculum as part of a national bushfire accreditation course.

Further Commonwealth funding for bushfire suppression be made conditional on state fire agencies agreeing to the Commonwealth evaluating and auditing their fuel reduction programs.

The Productivity Commission undertake an examination of bushfire risk from ageing power infrastructure, including an assessment of replacement costs and likely suppression costs from bushfires caused by defective infrastructure.

Subject to the findings of the Productivity Commission, the Commonwealth examine options for the funding of replacement of power infrastructure that presents an unacceptable bushfire risk.

The Commonwealth seek agreement from the states and territories that would enable it to evaluate the adequacy of fuel reduction programs applied by public land management agencies in high bushfire risk areas, and audit their implementation against the program's stated objectives.

The Commonwealth Government examine potential new arrangements for Commonwealth involvement in the development and implementation of a national policy for bushfire management.

The Commonwealth co-ordinate a standing national arson forum between fire and law enforcement agencies to be held every two years.

The Commonwealth publish all fuel reduction plans and related audit findings on a national database.

At the conclusion of the current Bushfire CRC funding agreement the Commonwealth establish a new permanent bushfire research institute.

The Commonwealth consult with local, state and territory government planning authorities on the development and dissemination of a house loss risk index for households in Australia's highest risk bushfire areas.

The Productivity Commission be tasked to assess the economic effects of recent major bushfires on the Australian economy to determine the cost effectiveness of prescribed burning as a mitigation strategy.

To improve Centrelink’s preparedness for responding to future disasters, the ANAO recommends that Centrelink include disasters that impact on multiple Areas in its emergency and business continuity test exercise program.

The ANAO recommends that Centrelink assess the reliability of emergency recovery payment data and reports generated from its system(s), and update the approach, standards and procedures for the collection, storage and use of the data. 

To provide adequate assurance on the validity of claims paid for disaster recovery assistance, the ANAO recommends that Centrelink:

To improve customer awareness of the availability of disaster recovery assistance, the ANAO recommends that Centrelink:

That the Department of the Attorney General, in consultation with FESA and Western Australia Police (WAPOL), consider options for legislative amendments to extend criminal liability to all damage, injury or death directly caused by arson.

The prioritisation, by the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC), of bushfire preparedness activities including updating WESTPLAN - BUSHFIRE and coordinating bushfire exercises prior to the 2009/10 bushfire season.

That FESA assess the cost and other implications of proposed changes to bushfire prone zone declarations which would allow the whole State to be declared bushfire prone.

That the Minister for Emergency Services consider the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer, Department of Environment and Conservation as a member of the State Emergency Management Committee.

The prioritising of the critical amendments to the Bush Fires Act 1954 recommended by the Community Development and Justice Standing Committee that relate to fire management, ie: a. Fire and Emergency Services Authority (FESA)‘s ability to assume control of a fire in specific circumstances b.

That further amendments be made to the Bush Fires Act 1954 be drafted to provide fire response agencies with the necessary authorisation and statutory protection to respond to a fire on private property, or land that Local Government, Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) or FESA is re

At Level 3 incidents the Information Services Unit should be adequately resourced with information technology and at least 6 persons, all of whom are very experienced and capable in dealing with the information demands of a Level 3 incident.

The Emergency Management Regulations 2006 be urgently amended to determine a HMA(s) for bushfire.

Add an ‘Aviation’ map to the standard set of incident maps. The standard for this map will need to be developed by subject matter experts from the Air Ops group.

The role of ‘BFB Task Force Liaison’ be defined and appropriately trained personnel be provided by the HMA (possibly from support brigades) to facilitate brigade movements on and off the fire ground.

The Emergency Management Act 2005 is amended to provide a mechanism for one HMA to transfer responsibility to another HMA and ensure that both HMA’s are provided the powers and protection necessary under that Act.

Pre-season arrangements to provide high quality food should be encouraged in all emergency management plans

Transport plans for BFB resources should be prepared by the Ground Support Unit in close liaison with FESA who will liaise with the home jurisdictions of the brigades.

All incidents where the HMA delegates the authority to manage suppression operations to another agency on its behalf, should be achieved via a written delegation setting out the scope, limitations and duration of the delegation.

Food storage should be a design consideration in all fire ground appliances

The Interagency Guidelines need to be amended to reflect what is operationally possible with regard to risk management rather than what is required to achieve an absence of risk.

Perishable food should be ‘stamped’ with an expiry date.

Unassigned resources arriving at incidents should be encouraged to make themselves known and to undertake alternate duties.

A standard for signage at fire incidents be developed and caches of this equipment be established at DEC and Local Govt facilitates to enable its rapid and effective deployment by Ground Support Unit at fires.

At Level 3 incidents the position of ‘Traffic Operations Officer’ –be established and filled by a WAPOL officer. A role description for this position is required and should be included in the “Guidelines for the Operations of Road Closures During Bushfires 2008”.

Main Roads Western Australia, Police and LGA’s be encouraged via State emergency arrangements to establish a distributed cache of “hard” road barriers for deployment to major incidents

A centralised, regional, multi-agency resource coordination and tracking system/facility be established to accommodate and coordinate the movement of resources from all agencies within and between regions.

In preparing traffic management plans consideration should be given to which VCP’s are critical and need to be resourced with uniformed Police Officers and which VCP’s can be manned with civilian contractors.

A strategically located Staging Area serviced with check in/out personnel should be considered as early as possible at incidents involving an extended attack.

Suppression resources should be ordered and mobilised as 2 truck Strike Teams with a STL and consistently deployed to the fire ground as a unit.

Provision of timely, accurate and regular information to the community via electronic media (radio and internet) is a recognised function of the Information Unit in liaison with the Traffic Operations Officer.

A formal IMG meeting should be convened as early as possible at initiating incidents with potential. At the very least early advice to potential IMG members should be made that a meeting is likely to be convened.

The Interagency Guidelines for Road closure needs to be reviewed to incorporate a mechanism to identify bone-fide local landholders to facilitate their movement in and out of cordoned areas in sympathy with the Stay and Defend requirements.