RailCorp should progressively implement, within a reasonable time, level 2 automatic train protection with the features identified in chapter 8 of this report.

The operation of the train doors should have an override facility whereby the train driver or the guard can override an internal passenger emergency door release system if the door release is interfered with when there is no emergency.

Communications procedures must be standardised throughout the rail network, so that all railway employees describe the same subject matter in an identical way.

The ITSRR should publish guidelines to be followed by accredited organisations.

The data and information management system should be compatible with any data and information management system established by the ATSB for the designated interstate rail network, provided that the establishment of a compatible system does not reduce the amount or quality of the information obtai

The Minister for Transport Services should retain, independently of ITSRR, safety auditors to provide a report to the Minister confirming or qualifying the contents of each such ITSRR quarterly report.

The OTSI should continue to conduct rail accident investigations on behalf of ITSRR and report directly to the Chief Executive of ITSRR.

The incident command system should clearly identify the roles of the rail commander, site controller, police commander and commanders of the other emergency services, and the way in which each is to work together during the recovery phase of any rail accident.

All emergency response personnel should be specifically trained in the features of railways which are relevant to their work, such as the location and means of operation of all emergency door releases on trains, the location and use of signal telephones, the methods by which electrical power can

All new rolling stock should be designed to be compatible with at least level 2 automatic train protection discussed in chapter 7 of this report.

All passenger trains operating in New South Wales must have the external emergency door release clearly marked with the words “Emergency Door Release”.

All communications protocols must be strictly enforced by all accredited rail organisations.

The ITSRR should continue to participate in the development of a national system for rail safety regulation, provided that any ultimate agreement between the States and Territories and the Australian Government does not produce a safety outcome for New South Wales that is less than would be achie

The RailCorp Board should establish independent external safety auditing processes to regularly audit and report to the Board on the implementation of an integrated safety management system by RailCorp and on safety performance generally.

All railway owners and operators should have a quality assurance program for the design and construction of rolling stock and regular review of construction to ensure that the rolling stock satisfies the original functional performance specifications.

The role of the rail commander should be to provide support and assistance to the site controller and emergency services personnel until the rescue phase of the emergency response to any rail accident is completed.

All rail employees should be trained by their employer to commence any emergency communication with the words “Emergency, emergency, emergency”, thereafter to identify themselves, the train, its location, what has occurred, the approximate passenger load and whether death or injuries have occurre

Random alcohol testing should be continued.

All trains should have windows available through which passengers can escape.

Communications protocols and procedures should be standardised and mandated by regulations making them a condition of accreditation.

A safety management system regulation should be promulgated, specifying the requirements of safety management systems in all accredited organisations, using Annexure I to this report as a guide

RailCorp should undertake risk assessments of each of its activities as follows:
(a) identify the features of the system, subsystem or activities that are to be risk assessed and managed, to determine what makes the system work in terms of equipment, infrastructure and human factors;

RailCorp should conduct internal and external safety audits to evaluate the adequacy of its safety management system and to ensure that any risk control measures are effective.

The rail commander should have complete authority to direct and control any rail employees attending the site of a rail accident, in accordance with directions given or arrangements put in place by the site controller, until the rescue phase of the emergency response to the rail accident has been

Alcohol and drug testing should be mandatory for any train driver or guard involved in any accident or incident.

A training centre for emergency services personnel should be established by RailCorp. The emergency services personnel should be required to undertake training at such a centre, which should be equipped with features replicating railway infrastructure and rolling stock.

RailCorp should establish a comprehensive safety document management system.

All new rail cars must have appropriate signage and lighting identifying escape routes in the case of emergency.

Defects reporting, recording and rectification should be integrated with the RailCorp regimes for train maintenance.

RailCorp should establish an integrated safety management system which includes the following:
(a) a formal performance management system, incorporating measurable safety accountabilities and responsibilities for each managerial position;

The ITSRR should conduct its own risk assessment in relation to the risk of any such high consequence, low probability accident and, if necessary, direct RailCorp to conduct a further risk assessment to reduce the level of residual risk to a level ITSRR regards as acceptable.

Following completion of any external audit, a corrective action plan to remedy any identified safety deficiencies should be developed by RailCorp, implemented and followed up within the business groups affected, to ensure appropriate and timely completion of the action plan, by a formal examinati

It is recommended that providers supply data to the Board:
- for each rescue attended, the location and type of incident, turnout time, response time and time when available for re- tasking (page 30)
- on the cost of rescue (page 25).

It is recommended that the Board: 
- require the Chief Executive of each rescue provider to certify on an annual basis that all rescue units comply with the Board’s accreditation standards (page 31)

It is recommended that the Board:
- collect data on rescue performance and cost over the next 12 months to inform the planning process (page 19)

It is recommended that the Board develop response time standards for metropolitan and rural rescue services to guide committees in determining the number, type and location of rescue units (page 25).

It is recommended that the Board:
- include time standards for responding to an incident in accreditation standards (page 29)
􏰀- revisit the need for specific accreditation criteria for various rescue activities (page 29).

Consolidate the Australian Government decision to establish an Australian Tsunami Warning System through a long-term government commitment to ensure a sustainable and effective national tsunami warning system beyond the current four-year initiative.

That the Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council requests that the Australian Government, through the Australian Emergency Management Committee, develops an effective pathway to incorporate hazard science into emergency management policy.

Establish a Regional Centre of Excellence for Tsunamis to focus Australian and international science/research and collaboration on the challenge of understanding tsunamis and mitigating their consequences.

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee:

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, strengthens the reporting on the National Capability Development Exercise Programme through:

The ANAO recommends that, to provide better information to contribute to strategic assessments, decisions and reporting, the Attorney-General’s Department, with input and guidance from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet:

The ANAO recommends that, to ensure the outcomes of evaluations are effectively used to enhance the national counter-terrorism arrangements, the Attorney-General’s Department and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet take appropriate measures to ensure:

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department better monitor and account for the expenditure of individual exercise costs under the National Capability Development Exercise Programme, through:

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter- Terrorism Committee, pursue the adoption of a more strategic approach to determining the National Capability Development Exercise Programme s

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in conjunction with the National Counter-Terrorism Committee’s exercise management advisers, explore options for the incorporation of more contemporary and varied testing and training aids in the National Capability Development Exercise

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, seek to create systematic mechanisms for better targeting and evaluating inter- agency coordination within the National C

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, pursue a more strategic and systematic approach to the measurement of performance via the National Capability Development

The Working Group recommends that State/Territory emergency management plans should explicitly take the need for rapid assessment of damaged physical infrastructure into account.

The Working Group recommends that agreed national protocols be developed to manage the integration of overseas workers and international aid into an affected jurisdiction. 

The Working Group recommends the Australian Emergency Management Committee note that: 
• The Catastrophic Disasters Emergency Management Capability Review should be seen as the first phase of a multi-faceted work program

The Working Group recommends that the Australian Government investigate, in consultation with the finance and banking sector, the development of arrangements to ensure that essential transactions can continue in the event of a catastrophic failure of the banking system that includes access to cas

The whole of government disaster plan should also be written in such a way as to manage continuity of national government, ensure delivery of key services for which the Australian Government has responsibility and establish (or document existing) command and control mechanisms. 

The Working Group recommends that jurisdictions plan for the logistics of supply and delivery of meals to large numbers of homebound persons in an attempt to identify possible ways of resolving existing shortcomings. 

The Working Group recommends that jurisdictions review their emergency management arrangements (plans, legislation, etc) to ensure that they are able to mitigate, respond to and recover from disasters, and maximise the duration of self reliance that can be achieved.

The Working Group recommends that potential shortfalls in the capacity to deal with large numbers of unprotected children and other special needs groups in a catastrophic event be referred to the Disaster Recovery Sub Committee of Community Services Ministers’ Advisory Council (CSMAC) for conside

The Working Group recommends that in addition to existing disease control and pandemic management plans, States/Territories should consider developing a pandemic emergency management plan that considers the impact of pandemic disease broadly, encompasses all government and private sector agencies

The Working Group recommends that the National Recovery Coordinators Group considers the issue of emergency relief centres in the context of catastrophic disaster with a view to assisting jurisdictions to plan for the need to accommodate thousands of people following a disaster. 

The working group recommends that a similar project to the Review of Australia's Ability to Respond to and Recover from Catastrophic Disasters be established to consider the longer term consequences of catastrophic disasters and their resulting recovery implications.

The Working Group recommends that States/Territories consider their ability to house large numbers of domestic pets, and where necessary, develop plans and arrangements that facilitate this need. 

The Working Group recommends that the Australian Government and the States/Territories use the survey templates compiled in each of their jurisdictions during the capability review workshops, and the scenarios to consider their current and future capabilities, to respond to and recover from large

The Working Group recommends that the National Recovery Coordinators Group approach the Investment and Financial Services Association Limited, with a view to identifying the most appropriate way of engaging the life insurance industry in the recovery process.

The Working Group recommends that appropriate building/surveyor peak bodies be identified, and that discussions be held between the emergency management sector and those peak bodies at State/Territory and national level with a view to:

The Working Group recommends that EMA convene a national forum to explore community information and warning needs in catastrophic disasters, to review existing information and warning systems, and to identify possible technologies and techniques that might be used to enhance community needs in di

The Working Group recommends that Emergency Management Australia (EMA) facilitate national discussions into the capability of States/Territories to ensure thorough collaborative systems and plans for inter-jurisdictional resource interoperability exist, and where this has not already occurred at

The Working Group recommends that the national forum mentioned in recommendation 13 consider the ongoing need for dissemination of information on a national basis both during and following a catastrophic disaster and also identify strategies to ensure the ability of this to be facilitated.

Related to recommendation 16, the Working Group recommends that the likelihood and consequences be systematically assessed by appropriate agencies that would include Geoscience Australia, the Bureau of Meteorology, CSIRO and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry among others.

The Working Group recommends that the adequacy of existing national mortuary capability to meet the likely demands of a catastrophic disaster be assessed by State/Territory Coroners.

The Working Group recommends that the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department hold discussions with the Commonwealth Department of Communications, Information, Technology and the Arts regarding the Integrated Public Telephone Network Database (IPND) being made accessible for use in times of em

The Working Group recommends support for ongoing research into natural hazard risks and an improved understanding of emergency management capability.
The research program should include:

The Working Group recommends that the results of the scenario modeling be presented to the Australian Emergency Management Committee (AEMC) upon completion, and that AEMC form Sub Working Groups of State/Territory emergency management representatives as appropriate to be tasked with considering r

The Working Group recommends that all States/Territories and the Australian Government should regularly (annually) test their continuity of executive government plans and contingencies. 

The Working Group recommends that Emergency Management Australia and the jurisdictions through the AEMC develop a three year rolling national exercise strategy aimed at testing the response and recovery aspects of large scale disasters. 

The Working Group recommends that participants in the exercises designed to test continuity of executive government plans and procedures should be the office holders themselves. 

The Working Group recommends that State/Territory Recovery Committees review their membership to ensure that it is reflective of community needs, including representation from the Insurance Disaster Response Organisation. 

The Working Group recommends that the Australian Government consider developing an overarching whole of government disaster plan that clearly articulates authority, roles and responsibilities of agencies, inter-departmental committees and key officials, to link the range of existing Australian Go

The Working Group recommends that each jurisdiction; 
• Examine the interdependency of essential services provided by the private sector, utilising where possible other existing programs such as the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Initiative

The Working Group recommends that a review of the operation of the Commonwealth Mutual Recognition Act 1992 be conducted and that agreed national protocols be developed to manage the integration of

The Working group recommends that the Australian Government take a leadership role with regard to addressing the national capability issues identified within this review.

The Working Group recommends that jurisdictions identify appropriate commercial organisations/bodies able to ensure maintenance of supply of food items and packaged water to commercial outlets in times of disaster. 

Government should: establish a State-wide command structure across volunteer Bush Fire Brigades for fighting major bushfires, to more effectively manage the coordination of personnel and resources

Government should: establish emergency management legislation which clarifies State and local government responsibilities, and which rectifies the deficiencies in the State’s bushfire Emergency Management Plan, Westplan Wildfire.

FESA should: in addition to its current initiatives, develop and implement structured programs (with clearly identified objectives, target groups and time lines for achievement) aimed at:
- increasing the level of adoption of AIIMS by local governments and volunteer Bush Fire Brigades

Firefighting organisations should: resolve existing telecommunication problems and work with other emergency service organisations to establish compatible telecommunications systems.

Firefighting organisations should: address their key training and development issues

That PSB and PIRVIC review their service agreement to ensure that PIRVIC is compensated for its costs in providing PSB with the specified level of service.

That DPI improves monitoring and surveillance of high priority threats and improves the quality of information provided to the Commonwealth.

That DPI reviews the work of entry level graduates to ensure career paths are clear and encourage the retention of staff.

That DPI establishes a system to ensure the security of all samples at all times, but particularly during their handling and transport.

That DPI negotiates access, as and when required, to an AQIS PC4- accredited laboratory.

That DPI provides plant incursion-specific AIIMS training for anyone who might be involved in, or providing resources for, an incursion response. This includes senior management, field and research staff, contractors and industry participants.

That DPI upgrades the Crop Health Services diagnostic database so that it alerts PSB and PIRVIC to the receipt of samples from nearby areas with similar symptoms and can be linked to other PIRVIC diagnostic databases.

That DPI works with industry to develop a training module on the certification and verification system for inclusion in industry quality assurance programs.

That DPI ensures that AIIMS training includes information to ensure that everyone understands their role, and how information will be managed internally and externally, in the event of an incursion.

That DPI effectively communicates to all sectors of the industry their responsibilities to report new threats, and how to report them.

That DPI develops a department-wide enforcement policy and specific guidelines for Plant Standards Branch (PSB).

That DPI develops a comprehensive strategy for communicating to industry their rights and responsibilities in relation to threats, incursions, outbreaks and post-outbreak; and also for communicating internally.

That the Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals (Control of Use) Act 1992, Plant Health and Plant Products Act 1995 and Livestock Disease Control Act 1994 be registered with the Department of Justice’s PERIN system.

That DPI develops diagnostic protocols for high-priority threats, in conjunction with other jurisdictions and industry, as soon as practicable.