All RMC communications related staff should be selected upon the basis of the ability to convey information clearly, accurately and concisely and to follow strict communications protocols.

RailCorp must establish a task analysis for particular categories of employees, to identify the specific skills and responsibility of those employees or groups of employees, and thereafter undertake a training needs analysis, to develop the skills required in particular areas.

If ITSRR accepts such a plan as an appropriate response to the existing weak safety culture, ITSRR should approve it and monitor the effectiveness of the plan.

The ITSRR should not grant accreditation to any rail organisation unless it has an integrated safety management system in accordance with any safety management system regulation and the guidelines published from time to time by ITSRR.

The rail displan should provide for the site controller to have complete control of the site, with other agencies co-ordinating with and supporting him or her, until the rescue phase of the emergency response has been completed.

The relevant legislation should be amended to provide expressly that OTSI and the Chief Investigator have the power to initiate a rail accident or incident investigation.

The risk of abuse of internal passenger emergency door releases should be further reduced by introducing significant penalties for any improper use of such an emergency facility.

All accredited rail organisations should be required to re-apply every three years to ITSRR for accreditation.

There must be compatibility of communications systems throughout the rail network. It is essential that all train drivers, train controllers, signallers, train guards and supervisors of trackside work gangs in New South Wales be able to communicate using the same technology.

The RailCorp defects unit should be combined with the passenger fleet maintenance division of RailCorp.

Training should be based upon a needs analysis, to determine what skills a particular person will require to carry out the tasks of any position safely and efficiently, and instruction and practice, to acquire and demonstrate those skills.

RailCorp’s approach to occupational health and safety should be proactive and involve the systematic analysis of all current hazards, risks and controls and an assessment of their adequacy to reduce the risk of injury to, or death of, employees to an acceptable level.

RailCorp should develop and implement an emergency response plan for management of all rail accidents. Such a plan should be subsumed by the rail displan in the case of serious accidents or incidents.

Any barriers to communication between OTSI and ITSRR should be removed, so as to ensure that any findings made by OTSI in relation to any investigation it conducts are reported immediately to ITSRR.

Satellite telephones should be provided by RailCorp to all rail commanders at any emergency.

All train drivers’ defects reports should be entered by RailCorp into a computerised record and tracked to finalisation.

There should be interoperability of communications equipment between all trains operating on the New South Wales rail network.

The location of the command post for site control at the scene of any rail accident should be identified by NSW Police by a distinctive flashing light.

RailCorp should employ a Chief Safety Information Officer to manage the collection, collation, and dissemination of safety information within RailCorp.

The position of team leader should be created by RailCorp to be responsible for a group of approximately 30 train drivers, with responsibility to ensure that each train driver’s training needs are being met and that any safety concerns of train drivers are being properly addressed.

RailCorp should integrate its management of occupational health and safety into its overall safety management.

The RailCorp emergency response plan should include action checklists of the steps that each employee is required to take, and the order for specific employees to follow in case of emergency.

Legislation should be enacted and any necessary arrangements made, to enable the ATSB to review any reports of any investigation by a rail organisation or the OTSI into any serious incident or accident in New South Wales.

RailCorp and ITSRR should co-operate with national programs for the collection, collation, trend analysis and dissemination of safety critical information.

RailCorp should establish clear safety accountability statements and reporting lines for all management positions.

All RailCorp operational personnel should be trained in the location and operation of external emergency door release mechanisms.

Risk assessments of occupational health and safety issues by RailCorp should include an analysis of broader public safety risks and not be confined to narrow occupational health and safety issues.

The RailCorp emergency response plan should include a requirement for the debriefing of all senior rail and emergency response personnel involved in any rail accident, so as to determine the way or ways in which emergency response arrangements for rail accidents can be continually improved, and t

The RailCorp passenger containment policy must be abandoned.

The ATSB should deliver any report of any such rail accident which it investigates to the Board of any rail organisation involved in the accident, ITSRR and the Minister for Transport Services.

Staffing arrangements for ITSRR should be reviewed by it to ensure that adequate staff are employed in field positions, actively monitoring the safety of rail operations and compliance with conditions of accreditation.

All emergency services personnel should be trained in the location and operation of emergency door release mechanisms on all rail cars.

It is recommended that the Board:
- collect data on rescue performance and cost over the next 12 months to inform the planning process (page 19)

It is recommended that the Board develop response time standards for metropolitan and rural rescue services to guide committees in determining the number, type and location of rescue units (page 25).

It is recommended that the Board:
- include time standards for responding to an incident in accreditation standards (page 29)
􏰀- revisit the need for specific accreditation criteria for various rescue activities (page 29).

It is recommended that providers supply data to the Board:
- for each rescue attended, the location and type of incident, turnout time, response time and time when available for re- tasking (page 30)
- on the cost of rescue (page 25).

It is recommended that the Board: 
- require the Chief Executive of each rescue provider to certify on an annual basis that all rescue units comply with the Board’s accreditation standards (page 31)

Consolidate the Australian Government decision to establish an Australian Tsunami Warning System through a long-term government commitment to ensure a sustainable and effective national tsunami warning system beyond the current four-year initiative.

That the Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council requests that the Australian Government, through the Australian Emergency Management Committee, develops an effective pathway to incorporate hazard science into emergency management policy.

Establish a Regional Centre of Excellence for Tsunamis to focus Australian and international science/research and collaboration on the challenge of understanding tsunamis and mitigating their consequences.

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department better monitor and account for the expenditure of individual exercise costs under the National Capability Development Exercise Programme, through:

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter- Terrorism Committee, pursue the adoption of a more strategic approach to determining the National Capability Development Exercise Programme s

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in conjunction with the National Counter-Terrorism Committee’s exercise management advisers, explore options for the incorporation of more contemporary and varied testing and training aids in the National Capability Development Exercise

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, pursue a more strategic and systematic approach to the measurement of performance via the National Capability Development

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, seek to create systematic mechanisms for better targeting and evaluating inter- agency coordination within the National C

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee:

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, strengthens the reporting on the National Capability Development Exercise Programme through:

The ANAO recommends that, to provide better information to contribute to strategic assessments, decisions and reporting, the Attorney-General’s Department, with input and guidance from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet:

The ANAO recommends that, to ensure the outcomes of evaluations are effectively used to enhance the national counter-terrorism arrangements, the Attorney-General’s Department and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet take appropriate measures to ensure:

The Working Group recommends that EMA convene a national forum to explore community information and warning needs in catastrophic disasters, to review existing information and warning systems, and to identify possible technologies and techniques that might be used to enhance community needs in di

The Working Group recommends that the national forum mentioned in recommendation 13 consider the ongoing need for dissemination of information on a national basis both during and following a catastrophic disaster and also identify strategies to ensure the ability of this to be facilitated.

Related to recommendation 16, the Working Group recommends that the likelihood and consequences be systematically assessed by appropriate agencies that would include Geoscience Australia, the Bureau of Meteorology, CSIRO and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry among others.

The Working Group recommends that the adequacy of existing national mortuary capability to meet the likely demands of a catastrophic disaster be assessed by State/Territory Coroners.

The Working Group recommends that Emergency Management Australia (EMA) facilitate national discussions into the capability of States/Territories to ensure thorough collaborative systems and plans for inter-jurisdictional resource interoperability exist, and where this has not already occurred at

The Working Group recommends support for ongoing research into natural hazard risks and an improved understanding of emergency management capability.
The research program should include:

The Working Group recommends that the results of the scenario modeling be presented to the Australian Emergency Management Committee (AEMC) upon completion, and that AEMC form Sub Working Groups of State/Territory emergency management representatives as appropriate to be tasked with considering r

The Working Group recommends that all States/Territories and the Australian Government should regularly (annually) test their continuity of executive government plans and contingencies. 

The Working Group recommends that the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department hold discussions with the Commonwealth Department of Communications, Information, Technology and the Arts regarding the Integrated Public Telephone Network Database (IPND) being made accessible for use in times of em

The Working Group recommends that Emergency Management Australia and the jurisdictions through the AEMC develop a three year rolling national exercise strategy aimed at testing the response and recovery aspects of large scale disasters. 

The Working Group recommends that participants in the exercises designed to test continuity of executive government plans and procedures should be the office holders themselves. 

The Working Group recommends that State/Territory Recovery Committees review their membership to ensure that it is reflective of community needs, including representation from the Insurance Disaster Response Organisation. 

The Working Group recommends that the Australian Government consider developing an overarching whole of government disaster plan that clearly articulates authority, roles and responsibilities of agencies, inter-departmental committees and key officials, to link the range of existing Australian Go

The Working Group recommends that each jurisdiction; 
• Examine the interdependency of essential services provided by the private sector, utilising where possible other existing programs such as the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Initiative

The Working Group recommends that a review of the operation of the Commonwealth Mutual Recognition Act 1992 be conducted and that agreed national protocols be developed to manage the integration of

The Working group recommends that the Australian Government take a leadership role with regard to addressing the national capability issues identified within this review.

The Working Group recommends that jurisdictions identify appropriate commercial organisations/bodies able to ensure maintenance of supply of food items and packaged water to commercial outlets in times of disaster. 

The Working Group recommends that agreed national protocols be developed to manage the integration of overseas workers and international aid into an affected jurisdiction. 

The Working Group recommends the Australian Emergency Management Committee note that: 
• The Catastrophic Disasters Emergency Management Capability Review should be seen as the first phase of a multi-faceted work program

The Working Group recommends that the Australian Government investigate, in consultation with the finance and banking sector, the development of arrangements to ensure that essential transactions can continue in the event of a catastrophic failure of the banking system that includes access to cas

The Working Group recommends that State/Territory emergency management plans should explicitly take the need for rapid assessment of damaged physical infrastructure into account.

The whole of government disaster plan should also be written in such a way as to manage continuity of national government, ensure delivery of key services for which the Australian Government has responsibility and establish (or document existing) command and control mechanisms. 

The Working Group recommends that jurisdictions review their emergency management arrangements (plans, legislation, etc) to ensure that they are able to mitigate, respond to and recover from disasters, and maximise the duration of self reliance that can be achieved.

The Working Group recommends that jurisdictions plan for the logistics of supply and delivery of meals to large numbers of homebound persons in an attempt to identify possible ways of resolving existing shortcomings. 

The Working Group recommends that in addition to existing disease control and pandemic management plans, States/Territories should consider developing a pandemic emergency management plan that considers the impact of pandemic disease broadly, encompasses all government and private sector agencies

The Working Group recommends that potential shortfalls in the capacity to deal with large numbers of unprotected children and other special needs groups in a catastrophic event be referred to the Disaster Recovery Sub Committee of Community Services Ministers’ Advisory Council (CSMAC) for conside

The working group recommends that a similar project to the Review of Australia's Ability to Respond to and Recover from Catastrophic Disasters be established to consider the longer term consequences of catastrophic disasters and their resulting recovery implications.

The Working Group recommends that the National Recovery Coordinators Group considers the issue of emergency relief centres in the context of catastrophic disaster with a view to assisting jurisdictions to plan for the need to accommodate thousands of people following a disaster. 

The Working Group recommends that the Australian Government and the States/Territories use the survey templates compiled in each of their jurisdictions during the capability review workshops, and the scenarios to consider their current and future capabilities, to respond to and recover from large

The Working Group recommends that States/Territories consider their ability to house large numbers of domestic pets, and where necessary, develop plans and arrangements that facilitate this need. 

The Working Group recommends that the National Recovery Coordinators Group approach the Investment and Financial Services Association Limited, with a view to identifying the most appropriate way of engaging the life insurance industry in the recovery process.

The Working Group recommends that appropriate building/surveyor peak bodies be identified, and that discussions be held between the emergency management sector and those peak bodies at State/Territory and national level with a view to:

Firefighting organisations should: resolve existing telecommunication problems and work with other emergency service organisations to establish compatible telecommunications systems.

Firefighting organisations should: address their key training and development issues

Government should: establish a State-wide command structure across volunteer Bush Fire Brigades for fighting major bushfires, to more effectively manage the coordination of personnel and resources

Government should: establish emergency management legislation which clarifies State and local government responsibilities, and which rectifies the deficiencies in the State’s bushfire Emergency Management Plan, Westplan Wildfire.

FESA should: in addition to its current initiatives, develop and implement structured programs (with clearly identified objectives, target groups and time lines for achievement) aimed at:
- increasing the level of adoption of AIIMS by local governments and volunteer Bush Fire Brigades

That DPI formalises agreements within the Regional Services and Agriculture Division to ensure that plant health information is included in extension programs.

That better use be made of Primary Industries Research Victoria's (PIRVIC) facilities by strengthening links with relevant groups of expertise, such as the Forest Science Centre.

That DPI formalises agreements between divisions and groups that allow staff to be involved in incursion responses and reflects this requirement in individual duty statements.

That Department of Primary Industries (DPI), in partnership with the Department of Sustainability and Environment, reviews all legislation relating to plant biosecurity with a view to streamlining the legislative framework.

That DPI, as part of the development of the Victorian plant biosecurity strategy, undertake a strategic review of its plant health planning framework so that: • corporate and business unit plans at all levels of the department align to each other and to government policy so that staff have a cohe

That the model for state funding be reviewed to ensure that DPI can confidently build and maintain a core level of diagnostic expertise and research capability.

That DPI maintains ISO 9000 accreditation for at least one laboratory and seeks NATA accreditation for key diagnostic tests. This should be done in combination with Plant Health Australia’s laboratory accreditation project.

That PSB’s enforcement procedures are consistent with those of the rest of the department.

That the recommendations of the 2000 DPI report into the reference collection’s storage facility be implemented, to secure the collection in a purpose-built facility.

That DPI conducts and documents debriefs after all incursions, and adopts any improvements that are identified through debriefs.

That DPI develops a consistent approach to recording and enforcing breaches of the certification and verification system.

That DPI prepares guidelines, both internally and externally with Treasury, about funding arrangements for an outbreak.

That DPI makes arrangements to use contract labour for fruit fly trap monitoring and surveillance before the predicted fruit fly outbreak season.

That DPI establishes a system to ensure the security of all samples at all times, but particularly during their handling and transport.