All emergency services personnel should be trained in the location and operation of emergency door release mechanisms on all rail cars.

Risk assessments of occupational health and safety issues by RailCorp should include an analysis of broader public safety risks and not be confined to narrow occupational health and safety issues.

The RailCorp emergency response plan should include a requirement for the debriefing of all senior rail and emergency response personnel involved in any rail accident, so as to determine the way or ways in which emergency response arrangements for rail accidents can be continually improved, and t

The RailCorp passenger containment policy must be abandoned.

The ATSB should deliver any report of any such rail accident which it investigates to the Board of any rail organisation involved in the accident, ITSRR and the Minister for Transport Services.

The ITSRR should audit the RMC to ensure communications protocols are being followed. The sanction for non-compliance with communications protocols should be identical to that in the aviation industry and involve immediate removal from duty.

RailCorp should make it a condition of employment that all level 2 managers have or obtain a formal qualification in system safety management.

There must be a minimum of two independent methods of self-initiated emergency escape for passengers from all trains at all times.

Uniform verbal descriptions identifying that power has been isolated should be developed by RailCorp and utilised by all railway personnel, electrical service providers and all emergency response personnel.

ITSRR should initiate and/or participate in the development of a national standard for crashworthiness of all passenger trains.

All ATSB accident investigation reports should be made public.

ITSRR should ensure that, as a condition of accreditation, each of these recommendations is carried into effect and should audit against them to enforce compliance.

Staff at the Rail Management Centre (RMC) should receive training from RailCorp to enable them to quickly and accurately assess that an emergency has occurred and to provide precise and reliable information to emergency response personnel about the location of the emergency, the available access

RailCorp should ensure that where the safety competency of any manager is deficient such manager is required to undertake professional development courses to raise his or her safety competency level to an adequate standard.

All passenger trains must be fitted with an internal passenger emergency door release.

The rail safety regulator should set standards for the design, manufacture, testing and commissioning of rolling stock to ensure that the rolling stock is fit for its purpose.

The Advisory Board established under the Transport Legislation Amendment (Safety and Reliability) Act 2003 must be abolished.

All reports of the Chief Investigator of OTSI should be delivered, upon completion and without being reviewed, to ITSRR and the Minister for Transport Services.

The ITSRR should conduct random audits of accredited rail organisations for compliance with communications protocols.

All train guards should be trained by RailCorp in the use of the Metronet radio and instructed to use it in any emergency.

All passenger trains operating in New South Wales must be fitted with external emergency door releases which do not require any special key or other equipment to operate.

The ITSRR should impose a standard in relation to the collection and use of data from data loggers.

Legislative changes should be enacted to ensure the complete independence of ITSRR from the Minister for Transport Services.

The ITSRR must provide a quarterly report to the Minister for Transport Services on the progress made by RailCorp in implementing these recommendations, including:
(a) a statement as to whether or not the recommendation has been implemented and, if so, is working effectively; and

Recommendations one to seven of the final report of the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Glenbrook Rail Accident should be fully implemented, save that the random auditing referred to in recommendations five and seven should be carried out by ITSRR.

All operational rail staff should be trained by RailCorp in the action check list relevant to each.

All trains must be fitted with a minimum of two independent engineering defences to minimise the risk of derailment or collision in the event of train driver incapacitation.

The internal passenger emergency door release should be fitted with a facility which prevents it from operating unless the train is stationary.

The standard in relation to the collection and use of data from data loggers should provide that such information must be accessed in the circumstances of any accident or incident and can be accessed to monitor driver performance generally.

The Chief Executive of ITSRR should have sole accountability and responsibility for the regulation of rail safety in New South Wales.

The ITSRR should establish a data and information management system, containing all data and information that it requires, to continually monitor the safety of the New South Wales rail system.

The Minister for Transport Services must table in Parliament, each such quarterly report by ITSRR.

It is recommended that the Board:
- collect data on rescue performance and cost over the next 12 months to inform the planning process (page 19)

It is recommended that the Board develop response time standards for metropolitan and rural rescue services to guide committees in determining the number, type and location of rescue units (page 25).

It is recommended that the Board:
- include time standards for responding to an incident in accreditation standards (page 29)
􏰀- revisit the need for specific accreditation criteria for various rescue activities (page 29).

It is recommended that providers supply data to the Board:
- for each rescue attended, the location and type of incident, turnout time, response time and time when available for re- tasking (page 30)
- on the cost of rescue (page 25).

It is recommended that the Board: 
- require the Chief Executive of each rescue provider to certify on an annual basis that all rescue units comply with the Board’s accreditation standards (page 31)

That the Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council requests that the Australian Government, through the Australian Emergency Management Committee, develops an effective pathway to incorporate hazard science into emergency management policy.

Establish a Regional Centre of Excellence for Tsunamis to focus Australian and international science/research and collaboration on the challenge of understanding tsunamis and mitigating their consequences.

Consolidate the Australian Government decision to establish an Australian Tsunami Warning System through a long-term government commitment to ensure a sustainable and effective national tsunami warning system beyond the current four-year initiative.

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department better monitor and account for the expenditure of individual exercise costs under the National Capability Development Exercise Programme, through:

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter- Terrorism Committee, pursue the adoption of a more strategic approach to determining the National Capability Development Exercise Programme s

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in conjunction with the National Counter-Terrorism Committee’s exercise management advisers, explore options for the incorporation of more contemporary and varied testing and training aids in the National Capability Development Exercise

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, seek to create systematic mechanisms for better targeting and evaluating inter- agency coordination within the National C

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, pursue a more strategic and systematic approach to the measurement of performance via the National Capability Development

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee:

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, strengthens the reporting on the National Capability Development Exercise Programme through:

The ANAO recommends that, to provide better information to contribute to strategic assessments, decisions and reporting, the Attorney-General’s Department, with input and guidance from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet:

The ANAO recommends that, to ensure the outcomes of evaluations are effectively used to enhance the national counter-terrorism arrangements, the Attorney-General’s Department and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet take appropriate measures to ensure:

The Working Group recommends that Emergency Management Australia and the jurisdictions through the AEMC develop a three year rolling national exercise strategy aimed at testing the response and recovery aspects of large scale disasters. 

The Working Group recommends that participants in the exercises designed to test continuity of executive government plans and procedures should be the office holders themselves. 

The Working Group recommends that State/Territory Recovery Committees review their membership to ensure that it is reflective of community needs, including representation from the Insurance Disaster Response Organisation. 

The Working Group recommends that each jurisdiction; 
• Examine the interdependency of essential services provided by the private sector, utilising where possible other existing programs such as the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Initiative

The Working Group recommends that the Australian Government consider developing an overarching whole of government disaster plan that clearly articulates authority, roles and responsibilities of agencies, inter-departmental committees and key officials, to link the range of existing Australian Go

The Working Group recommends that jurisdictions identify appropriate commercial organisations/bodies able to ensure maintenance of supply of food items and packaged water to commercial outlets in times of disaster. 

The Working Group recommends that a review of the operation of the Commonwealth Mutual Recognition Act 1992 be conducted and that agreed national protocols be developed to manage the integration of

The Working group recommends that the Australian Government take a leadership role with regard to addressing the national capability issues identified within this review.

The Working Group recommends that the Australian Government investigate, in consultation with the finance and banking sector, the development of arrangements to ensure that essential transactions can continue in the event of a catastrophic failure of the banking system that includes access to cas

The Working Group recommends that State/Territory emergency management plans should explicitly take the need for rapid assessment of damaged physical infrastructure into account.

The Working Group recommends that agreed national protocols be developed to manage the integration of overseas workers and international aid into an affected jurisdiction. 

The Working Group recommends the Australian Emergency Management Committee note that: 
• The Catastrophic Disasters Emergency Management Capability Review should be seen as the first phase of a multi-faceted work program

The whole of government disaster plan should also be written in such a way as to manage continuity of national government, ensure delivery of key services for which the Australian Government has responsibility and establish (or document existing) command and control mechanisms. 

The Working Group recommends that jurisdictions plan for the logistics of supply and delivery of meals to large numbers of homebound persons in an attempt to identify possible ways of resolving existing shortcomings. 

The Working Group recommends that jurisdictions review their emergency management arrangements (plans, legislation, etc) to ensure that they are able to mitigate, respond to and recover from disasters, and maximise the duration of self reliance that can be achieved.

The Working Group recommends that potential shortfalls in the capacity to deal with large numbers of unprotected children and other special needs groups in a catastrophic event be referred to the Disaster Recovery Sub Committee of Community Services Ministers’ Advisory Council (CSMAC) for conside

The Working Group recommends that in addition to existing disease control and pandemic management plans, States/Territories should consider developing a pandemic emergency management plan that considers the impact of pandemic disease broadly, encompasses all government and private sector agencies

The Working Group recommends that the National Recovery Coordinators Group considers the issue of emergency relief centres in the context of catastrophic disaster with a view to assisting jurisdictions to plan for the need to accommodate thousands of people following a disaster. 

The working group recommends that a similar project to the Review of Australia's Ability to Respond to and Recover from Catastrophic Disasters be established to consider the longer term consequences of catastrophic disasters and their resulting recovery implications.

The Working Group recommends that States/Territories consider their ability to house large numbers of domestic pets, and where necessary, develop plans and arrangements that facilitate this need. 

The Working Group recommends that the Australian Government and the States/Territories use the survey templates compiled in each of their jurisdictions during the capability review workshops, and the scenarios to consider their current and future capabilities, to respond to and recover from large

The Working Group recommends that the National Recovery Coordinators Group approach the Investment and Financial Services Association Limited, with a view to identifying the most appropriate way of engaging the life insurance industry in the recovery process.

The Working Group recommends that appropriate building/surveyor peak bodies be identified, and that discussions be held between the emergency management sector and those peak bodies at State/Territory and national level with a view to:

The Working Group recommends that EMA convene a national forum to explore community information and warning needs in catastrophic disasters, to review existing information and warning systems, and to identify possible technologies and techniques that might be used to enhance community needs in di

The Working Group recommends that Emergency Management Australia (EMA) facilitate national discussions into the capability of States/Territories to ensure thorough collaborative systems and plans for inter-jurisdictional resource interoperability exist, and where this has not already occurred at

The Working Group recommends that the national forum mentioned in recommendation 13 consider the ongoing need for dissemination of information on a national basis both during and following a catastrophic disaster and also identify strategies to ensure the ability of this to be facilitated.

Related to recommendation 16, the Working Group recommends that the likelihood and consequences be systematically assessed by appropriate agencies that would include Geoscience Australia, the Bureau of Meteorology, CSIRO and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry among others.

The Working Group recommends that the adequacy of existing national mortuary capability to meet the likely demands of a catastrophic disaster be assessed by State/Territory Coroners.

The Working Group recommends that the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department hold discussions with the Commonwealth Department of Communications, Information, Technology and the Arts regarding the Integrated Public Telephone Network Database (IPND) being made accessible for use in times of em

The Working Group recommends support for ongoing research into natural hazard risks and an improved understanding of emergency management capability.
The research program should include:

The Working Group recommends that the results of the scenario modeling be presented to the Australian Emergency Management Committee (AEMC) upon completion, and that AEMC form Sub Working Groups of State/Territory emergency management representatives as appropriate to be tasked with considering r

The Working Group recommends that all States/Territories and the Australian Government should regularly (annually) test their continuity of executive government plans and contingencies. 

Firefighting organisations should: address their key training and development issues

Government should: establish a State-wide command structure across volunteer Bush Fire Brigades for fighting major bushfires, to more effectively manage the coordination of personnel and resources

Government should: establish emergency management legislation which clarifies State and local government responsibilities, and which rectifies the deficiencies in the State’s bushfire Emergency Management Plan, Westplan Wildfire.

FESA should: in addition to its current initiatives, develop and implement structured programs (with clearly identified objectives, target groups and time lines for achievement) aimed at:
- increasing the level of adoption of AIIMS by local governments and volunteer Bush Fire Brigades

Firefighting organisations should: resolve existing telecommunication problems and work with other emergency service organisations to establish compatible telecommunications systems.

That the model for state funding be reviewed to ensure that DPI can confidently build and maintain a core level of diagnostic expertise and research capability.

That DPI maintains ISO 9000 accreditation for at least one laboratory and seeks NATA accreditation for key diagnostic tests. This should be done in combination with Plant Health Australia’s laboratory accreditation project.

That PSB’s enforcement procedures are consistent with those of the rest of the department.

That DPI conducts and documents debriefs after all incursions, and adopts any improvements that are identified through debriefs.

That DPI develops a consistent approach to recording and enforcing breaches of the certification and verification system.

That the recommendations of the 2000 DPI report into the reference collection’s storage facility be implemented, to secure the collection in a purpose-built facility.

That DPI makes arrangements to use contract labour for fruit fly trap monitoring and surveillance before the predicted fruit fly outbreak season.

That DPI prepares guidelines, both internally and externally with Treasury, about funding arrangements for an outbreak.

That PSB and PIRVIC review their service agreement to ensure that PIRVIC is compensated for its costs in providing PSB with the specified level of service.

That DPI improves monitoring and surveillance of high priority threats and improves the quality of information provided to the Commonwealth.

That DPI reviews the work of entry level graduates to ensure career paths are clear and encourage the retention of staff.

That DPI establishes a system to ensure the security of all samples at all times, but particularly during their handling and transport.

That DPI works with industry to develop a training module on the certification and verification system for inclusion in industry quality assurance programs.

That DPI negotiates access, as and when required, to an AQIS PC4- accredited laboratory.