The State amend the Victoria Planning Provisions relating to bushfire to ensure that the provisions give priority to the protection of human life, adopt a clear objective of substantially restricting development in the areas of highest bushfire risk—giving due consideration to biodiversity conser

The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment standardise their operating systems and information and communications technologies with the aim of achieving greater efficiency and interoperability between agencies.

The State consider amending the Emergency Management Act 1986 to introduce a graded scale of emergency declarations short of a state of disaster.

The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment improve mapping support in the following ways: ■ DSE providing mapping data free of charge to emergency response agencies; ■ greatly increasing the CFA’s ‘write’ access to FireMap for incident management team staff; ■

The State appoint an independent monitor or the Victorian Auditor-General to assess progress with implementing the Commission’s recommendations and report to the Parliament and the people of Victoria by 31 July 2012.

The Country Fire Authority amend its guidelines for assessing permit applications for dwellings, nondwellings and subdivisions in the Bushfire-prone Overlay in order to accommodate the amendments to the Wildfire Management Overlay that are implemented as a result of recommendation 39 and make the

The State amend the Regulations under Victoria’s Electricity Safety Act 1998 and otherwise take such steps as may be required to give effect to the following: ■ the progressive replacement of all SWER (single-wire earth return) power lines in Victoria with aerial bundled cable, underground cablin

Councils should strengthen governance arrangements for business continuity by:

Councils should improve assessments of business continuity risks by:
• strengthening risk management practices to assure they identify and consider the full range of specific business continuity risks

Councils should improve the structure, format and content of their business continuity plans to provide greater clarity on roles and responsibilities for emergencies, more specificity on continuity and recovery responses, and better integration with other council disaster recovery and emergency p

Councils should strengthen their continuous improvement frameworks by:
• systematically reviewing the effectiveness of their business continuity activities
• regularly testing business continuity plans to assure they are up-to-date and effective

Local Government Victoria should, further to its work on strengthening the oversight role of audit committees, assist councils to develop good practice approaches to implementing, overseeing and continuously improving business continuity management.

The Department of Human Services should complete work on emergency communication and information management issues. 

The Department of Human Services should create evaluation guidelines for recovery operations, including links to planning. 

The Department of Human Services should base targets for staff in emergency roles on regional needs and develop a staff deployment strategy. 

The Department of Human Services should regularly test recovery plans with partner agencies. 

The Department of Human Services should communicate strategic priorities to achieve state and regional level alignment in building recovery capacity and capability. 

The Department of Human Services should make sure relevant senior staff complete recovery training. 

The Department of Human Services should work with regions and partner agencies at the state level to create consistent, streamlined impact assessment processes and systems. 

The Department of Human Services should work with the State Emergency Recovery Planning Committee, regions, and other partners to facilitate understanding and ownership of roles and responsibilities for common recovery services. 

The Department of Human Services should develop practical, operational guidelines for implementing recovery at the state level. 

The Department of Human Services should improve regional recovery plans through:
• developing a consistent format that meets Emergency Management Manual Victoria content requirements
• revising plans biennially with recovery partners 

A specific focus on well control training should be mandatory for key personnel involved in well control operations (including both on‐rig personnel and onshore personnel in supervisory capacities).

Well construction and management plans should include provision(s) for reviewing the integrity of barriers at safety‐critical times or milestones, such as (i) prior to suspension involving departure of the rig from the platform; (ii) prior to re‐entry of a well after suspension; (iii) prior to re

A separate, identifiable barrier manual should be agreed upon and used by licensees, rig operators, and cementing contractors. These manuals should set out best industry practice in relation to achieving and maintaining well integrity.

Barriers should not be installed or removed off‐line. The derrick should be located over a well at the time of removal and installation of any barrier. This will enable more decisive action to be taken in the event a problem arises.

Licensees, rig operators and relevant third party contractors should develop well control competency standards for key personnel in other entities involved in well control operations.

Procedures and accountabilities should be established to ensure, in the event of a future incident, that:
a. there is adequate monitoring of the volume of oil spilt and the spread of the oil (both surface and sub‐surface dispersed oil); and

DEWHA should participate in training programs and exercises relevant to an oil spill in the marine environment.

In the meantime, the Minister should:

In view of the numerous well integrity problems in all of the Montara Oilfield wells, the Minister should commission a detailed audit of all the other offshore wells operated by PTTEPAA to determine whether they too may suffer from well integrity problems.
 

Licensees and rig operators (and third party contractors involved in well control operations) should specifically assess, and document, the nature and extent of knowledge/skills of relevant personnel in relation to well control (including familiarity of personnel with agency‐specific requirements

Well construction and management plans, and drilling programs, should include provision for testing and verifying the integrity of all barriers as soon as practicable after installation.

Memoranda of Agreement should be entered into between operators in relation to provision of emergency assistance in the event of blowouts.

Secondary barriers (including PCCCs) should only be installed, tested, and removed with a BOP in place unless a documented risk assessment indicates that well control can be maintained at all times.

The Inquiry supports the objective (rather than prescriptive) approach to regulation now followed in Australia. However, the pendulum has swung too far away from prescriptive standards. In some areas relating to well integrity there needs to be minimum standards.

The regulatory framework should provide that in respect of all activities in Commonwealth waters:

In the future, and in the interests of ensuring that all possible well control options are comprehensively pursued to exhaustion, decisions as to well control response options should be the result of collaboration between the regulator and the operator rather than leaving one party to make unilat

Wellbore gas bubbling should be regarded as a trigger for independent review of well integrity. Industry and regulators should identify and document other triggers.

Licensees should be subject to an express obligation to inform regulators of the proposed removal of a barrier, even if they consider that well integrity is not thereby compromised.

PCCCs should be installed in a timely manner (for example, to prevent corrosion in the MLS apparatus). Non‐installation in order to park a BOP is not acceptable.

To better ensure that ‘risks’ are identified and managed in accordance with sound engineering principles and good oilfield practice, it is recommended that regulation 25(1)(a)(i) and (2)(a)(i) of the Management of Well Operations Regulations, be reworded as follows: ‘A titleholder must not commen

Environment plans and OSCPs should be made publicly available as a condition of approval of proposals under the OPGGS Act, and should clearly set out Scientific Monitoring requirements in the event of an oil spill.

Licensees should be subject to an express obligation to inform regulators of problems which arise in the course of installing barriers, even if they consider that well integrity is not thereby compromised.

In any future similar blowout or offshore emergency situation, the Minister appoint (through either a NOPR or the relevant Department) a senior public servant to establish and oversight a central coordinating body that will facilitate interaction between regulators, industry, AMSA and the owner/o

In order that the ACT public can be reassured about the project management and financial planning in relation to the Fairbairn site as a proposed centralised accommodation facility for emergency services, the Auditor-General undertake a review of the project from a financial probity and project m

If a risk assessment or compliance review is triggered by the happening of a predetermined event, specific consideration should be given to whether a ‘hold point’ should be introduced such that work must cease until the problem is resolved (and the subject of appropriate certification).

Use of single strings of intermediate casing to penetrate hydrocarbon bearing zones should be carefully risk assessed. Multiple strings of intermediate casing have the advantage of isolating lost circulation zones and sealing off anomalous pressure zones.

Wells should be re‐entered with a BOP in place unless a documented risk assessment indicates that well control can be maintained at all times.

The definition of ‘good oilfield practice’ in the OPGGS Act is unduly narrow. The current definition is incapable of application except where things ‘are generally accepted as good and safe’. The definition should be amended such that ‘good oilfield practice includes…’.

Arrangements should be developed to minimise duplication between the EPBC Act and the OPGSS Act Environment Regulation.

The funding arrangements that support the National Plan should be reviewed to ensure that the costs associated with both preparedness and response capability are equitably shared between the shipping and offshore petroleum industries.

The successful installation of every barrier should be the subject of written verification within and between licensees and rig operators; and should be the subject of explicit reporting to the relevant regulator(s).

The body established to undertake a central coordination and facilitation role in the event of any future blowout in Commonwealth waters should undertake to make all relevant information publically available from one, authoritative and easy to access source.

As soon as a risk of barrier failure arises, no other activities should take place in the well other than those directed to removal of the risk.

A minimum of two barriers should be in place at all times (including during batched operations) whenever it is reasonably practicable to do so.

Any equipment (including PCCCs) used as, or to install, a barrier should be manufactured for that purpose and be generally recognised as fit for purpose.

Written (rather than verbal) approval from the DA (or new regulator) should be obtained before the commencement of well activities that lead to a physical change of a wellbore, other than in a true emergency situation (requiring amendment to regulation 17 of the Management of Well Operations Regu

The Minister consider legislative amendments to the OPGGS Act which make clear that

Pre‐drilling assessments should include a risk assessment of the worst‐case blowout scenario.

The Government should examine the scope for a single environment plan to meet the regulatory requirements of both the OPGGS Act and the EPBC Act. This could possibly be achieved by way of bilateral agreements and accreditation arrangements and/or legislative amendment.

Achievement and maintenance of well control should be written into the job responsibilities of key personnel, at every level up to and including CEOs. That is, a functional line of accountability for well control must exist up to, and including, CEOs.

If a dispute arises between a licensee and a rig operator in relation to a well control issue, and is not resolved between them, the matter must be raised with the relevant regulator before discretionary operations proceed.

Reliance upon one barrier against a blowout must not take place except with the prior written approval of the relevant regulator and then only in a true emergency situation (see below).

Manufacturers should be consulted about how to address non‐routine operational problems affecting their well control equipment.

The OPGGS Act should be amended to allow for a power to suspend a petroleum production licence (in addition to the current power to cancel a licence or suspend its conditions).

Problems which arise in the course of installing barriers must be the subject of consultation between licensees, rig operators, and contractors (if used).

OSCPs should be endorsed by AMSA prior to regulatory approval to ensure that they align with the National Plan. Once field operations commence, the capability of operators should be assessed against their plans, and exercises conducted to ensure the plans remain effective.

Achievement and maintenance of well control should be written into the job responsibilities of key personnel, at every level up to and including CEOs. That is, a functional line of accountability for well control must exist up to, and including, CEOs.

Perceived time and cost savings relating to any matters impacting upon well control should be subjected to rigorous safety assessment.

Licensees and rig operators should install an additional barrier whenever (i) there is any real doubt as to the integrity of any barrier; (ii) whenever the risk of flow from a reservoir increases materially in the course of operations; and (iii) where the consequences of a blowout are grave (for

Drilling programs dealing with barrier installation should incorporate relevant aspects of manufacturer’s instructions.

The recommendations of the Inquiry in relation to suitable ways of achieving well integrity contained in Chapter 3 be included in a guidance manual that is issued for the assistance of industry and regulators.

The use/type of barriers (including any change requests relating thereto) must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to installation. A proper risk assessment should be carried out, agreed upon, and documented in writing before installation.

For the purposes of that review, the Minister should issue a ‘show cause’ notice to PTTEPAA under s 276 of the OPGGS Act.

Supervision/oversight of well control operations (within licensees, rig operators and by regulators) must occur without assuming adherence to good oilfield practice.

Wells drilled into hydrocarbon zones should be treated as live wells, with the potential to blowout unless a documented risk assessment establishes otherwise.

The industry standard of two barriers should be replaced with the concept of ‘two or more barriers’ as a minimum standard. A minimum standard when operations proceed normally should never be regarded as a sufficient standard in other circumstances.

Any pro‐formas used by licensees, rig operators and contractors for recording information about installation of barriers should explicitly provide for ‘exception reporting’, that is, the form should include provision for recording any unforseen or untoward events which occur in the course of inst

The regulator, rather than the responsible Minister, should be given the power to direct an operator to use a particular rig for the purpose of well control operations, if appropriate in the circumstances, and the power should be used in the future if that rig is the best option available.

Removal of a barrier must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to removal. A proper risk assessment should be carried out and agreed upon, and documented in writing before removal.

In carrying out a review of PTTEPAA’s permit and licence, the Minister should have regard to this Report, particularly (i) the adverse findings set out in this Chapter; and (ii) the extent to which PTTEPAA has implemented the Action Plan submitted to the Inquiry, or otherwise addressed the matter

Licensees and rig operators should be astute in ensuring that corporate systems and culture encourage rather than discourage raising of well control issues. For instance, do performance bonuses or rewards actually encourage or discourage reporting of issues?

Regulatory approval to rely on only one barrier should not be given unless (i) a proper risk assessment is carried out; (ii) exceptional circumstances exist; and (iii) risks involved are reduced to ‘as low as reasonably practicable’.

Industry, regulators, and training/research institutions should develop standards that address best practices for cementing operations (including liaising, as appropriate, with overseas regulators) with a view to overcoming problems which can effect the integrity of cemented casing shoes, annulus

Batched drilling operations should only be undertaken after careful assessment of the special risks which such operations give rise to; well control must be maintained during the course of batched drilling operations.

The regulatory regime should also impose an obligation on an operator to ascertain the availability, and provide details to the regulator, of any potential relief well rigs, prior to the commencement of drilling operations (including prior to each phase of a drilling operation where applicable).<

Decision‐making about well control issues should be professionalised. Industry participants must recognise that decision‐makers owe independent duties to the public, not just their employer or principal, in relation to well control.

Consideration should be given to ways to ensure that contractors who are involved in barrier installation (such as cementing companies) have a direct interest in the performance of works to a proper standard.

Tracking and analysis of cementing problems/failures should occur to assess industry trends, principal causes, remedial techniques and so on.

Cement integrity should be evaluated wherever practicable by way of cement evaluation tests, rather than relying on pre‐operational calculations of cement and displacement fluid volumes.

Where multiple wells are drilled, operations and occurrences at one well must be carefully assessed for any implications with respect to well control at other wells.

NOPSA develop a policy of engagement with operators so as to enable experts (including safety experts) to canvas all available options for well control in the event of a blowout.

Logistics management of well control equipment should be conducted in such a way as to operate as a check against deficient well control practices, for example, use of serial numbers to track availability, testing, and deployment of well control equipment.

It is recommended that industry, regulators, and training/research institutions liaise with one another with a view to developing better techniques for testing and verifying the integrity of cemented casing shoes as barriers (particularly in atypical situations such as where the casing shoe is lo

The regulator should pre‐assess and review in a generic sense, and in conjunction with the offshore petroleum industry, available options for well control in the event of a blowout.

The National Plan should specify that the cost of responding to an oil spill, or other damage to the offshore marine environment, will be totally met by the owner/operator.

Careful consideration must be given to equipment compatibility as part of well construction design.

It should be standard industry practice to re‐test a cemented casing shoe (that is, after WOC) whenever the plugs do not bump or the float valves apparently fail. Standard industry practice should require consideration of other tests in addition to a repeat pressure test.

The mere fact that the rig is over the platform should not be regarded by licensees or regulators as sufficient justification for reliance on only one barrier.