The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment amend their policies on aerial preparedness and standby arrangements, their dispatch protocols and the management of aircraft in order to do the following: ■ require that at locations that attract the risk assessment

The State amend s.

The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment amend their procedures to require that a suitably experienced, qualified and competent person be appointed as Incident Controller, regardless of the control agency for the fire.

The State replace the Fire Services Levy with a property-based levy and introduce concessions for low-income earners.

The State, in conjunction with Emergency Management Australia and the Department of Defence, develop an agreement that allows Commonwealth aerial resources that are suitable for firefighting and support activities to be incorporated in preparedness plans and used on days of high fire risk.

The State initiate the development of education and training options to improve understanding of bushfire risk management in the building and planning regimes by: ■ providing regular training and guidance material to planning and building practitioners; ■ providing regular training and guidance m

The Department of Sustainability and Environment develop and administer a collective offset solution for individual landholders who are permitted to remove native vegetation for the purpose of fire protection.

Councils should improve assessments of business continuity risks by:
• strengthening risk management practices to assure they identify and consider the full range of specific business continuity risks

Councils should improve the structure, format and content of their business continuity plans to provide greater clarity on roles and responsibilities for emergencies, more specificity on continuity and recovery responses, and better integration with other council disaster recovery and emergency p

Councils should strengthen their continuous improvement frameworks by:
• systematically reviewing the effectiveness of their business continuity activities
• regularly testing business continuity plans to assure they are up-to-date and effective

Local Government Victoria should, further to its work on strengthening the oversight role of audit committees, assist councils to develop good practice approaches to implementing, overseeing and continuously improving business continuity management.

Councils should strengthen governance arrangements for business continuity by:

The Department of Human Services should develop practical, operational guidelines for implementing recovery at the state level. 

The Department of Human Services should improve regional recovery plans through:
• developing a consistent format that meets Emergency Management Manual Victoria content requirements
• revising plans biennially with recovery partners 

The Department of Human Services should create evaluation guidelines for recovery operations, including links to planning. 

The Department of Human Services should complete work on emergency communication and information management issues. 

The Department of Human Services should base targets for staff in emergency roles on regional needs and develop a staff deployment strategy. 

The Department of Human Services should regularly test recovery plans with partner agencies. 

The Department of Human Services should communicate strategic priorities to achieve state and regional level alignment in building recovery capacity and capability. 

The Department of Human Services should work with regions and partner agencies at the state level to create consistent, streamlined impact assessment processes and systems. 

The Department of Human Services should make sure relevant senior staff complete recovery training. 

The Department of Human Services should work with the State Emergency Recovery Planning Committee, regions, and other partners to facilitate understanding and ownership of roles and responsibilities for common recovery services. 

Decision‐making about well control issues should be professionalised. Industry participants must recognise that decision‐makers owe independent duties to the public, not just their employer or principal, in relation to well control.

Licensees and rig operators should be astute in ensuring that corporate systems and culture encourage rather than discourage raising of well control issues. For instance, do performance bonuses or rewards actually encourage or discourage reporting of issues?

Regulatory approval to rely on only one barrier should not be given unless (i) a proper risk assessment is carried out; (ii) exceptional circumstances exist; and (iii) risks involved are reduced to ‘as low as reasonably practicable’.

Industry, regulators, and training/research institutions should develop standards that address best practices for cementing operations (including liaising, as appropriate, with overseas regulators) with a view to overcoming problems which can effect the integrity of cemented casing shoes, annulus

Batched drilling operations should only be undertaken after careful assessment of the special risks which such operations give rise to; well control must be maintained during the course of batched drilling operations.

The regulatory regime should also impose an obligation on an operator to ascertain the availability, and provide details to the regulator, of any potential relief well rigs, prior to the commencement of drilling operations (including prior to each phase of a drilling operation where applicable).<

Logistics management of well control equipment should be conducted in such a way as to operate as a check against deficient well control practices, for example, use of serial numbers to track availability, testing, and deployment of well control equipment.

It is recommended that industry, regulators, and training/research institutions liaise with one another with a view to developing better techniques for testing and verifying the integrity of cemented casing shoes as barriers (particularly in atypical situations such as where the casing shoe is lo

The regulator should pre‐assess and review in a generic sense, and in conjunction with the offshore petroleum industry, available options for well control in the event of a blowout.

Consideration should be given to ways to ensure that contractors who are involved in barrier installation (such as cementing companies) have a direct interest in the performance of works to a proper standard.

Tracking and analysis of cementing problems/failures should occur to assess industry trends, principal causes, remedial techniques and so on.

Cement integrity should be evaluated wherever practicable by way of cement evaluation tests, rather than relying on pre‐operational calculations of cement and displacement fluid volumes.

Where multiple wells are drilled, operations and occurrences at one well must be carefully assessed for any implications with respect to well control at other wells.

NOPSA develop a policy of engagement with operators so as to enable experts (including safety experts) to canvas all available options for well control in the event of a blowout.

The National Plan should specify that the cost of responding to an oil spill, or other damage to the offshore marine environment, will be totally met by the owner/operator.

Careful consideration must be given to equipment compatibility as part of well construction design.

It should be standard industry practice to re‐test a cemented casing shoe (that is, after WOC) whenever the plugs do not bump or the float valves apparently fail. Standard industry practice should require consideration of other tests in addition to a repeat pressure test.

The mere fact that the rig is over the platform should not be regarded by licensees or regulators as sufficient justification for reliance on only one barrier.

The Inquiry also supports Bills and Agostini’s recommendation: ‘…in relation to safety case development and compliance overall, that NOPSA revise its approach to interacting with operators prior to the safety case assessment process and subsequently direct more resources into its advisory functio

NOPSA’s prohibition powers should be extended such that a prohibition notice can be issued where a NOPSA Occupational Health and Safety Inspector believes, on reasonable grounds, that an activity is occurring or may occur at a facility involving an immediate threat to the health or safety of a pe

The obligation of companies involved in an incident to meet the full costs of monitoring and remediation should be made a condition of approval of proposals under the EPBC Act and OPGGS Act.

Any indication of a compromised cemented shoe which cannot be resolved with a high measure of confidence should result in the installation of additional well control barrier(s).

Relevant personnel from licensees and rig operators should meet face to face to agree on, and document, well control issues/arrangements prior to commencement of drilling operations.

The National Plan should be reviewed to clarify the arrangements to apply in Commonwealth waters regarding key roles and responsibilities, including in relation to the ESC, in the event of an oil spill. This should also address any necessary training required.

The Minister should appoint a senior policy adviser to investigate and report on the best means to implement the recommendations contained in this Chapter 3 of this report.

Well Operations Management Plan (WOMPs) submitted by licensees to the regulator(s) should continue to be the primary framework document for achieving well integrity.

Volumes of cement used in connection with barrier installation should be calculated with the assistance of a pro‐forma which records all relevant baseline data, which should be verified by onshore personnel.

Prior to commencement of drilling operations, senior representatives of the licensee and rig operator should exchange certificates to the effect that their respective key personnel and contractors have been informed in writing of agreed well control arrangements.

The National Plan should be revised to ensure that it fully comprehends environmental matters and that it recognises the importance of the prompt implementation of Scientific Monitoring to facilitate the assessment of the environmental impacts of an incident.

A single, independent regulatory body should be created, looking after safety as a primary objective, well integrity and environmental approvals. Industry policy and resource development and promotion activities should reside in government departments and not with the regulatory agency.

WOMPs should be comprehensive and freestanding, rather than an overarching document cross‐referencing many other documents (although the Inquiry also recommends a freestanding well control manual; this should be a guide to rig and onshore personnel on good oilfield practice).

If performance of barrier installation is outsourced by a licensee, the contractor (for example, the cementing company) should be engaged on terms which clearly require the provision of expert advisory services by the contractor with respect to barrier integrity.

Information relevant to well control must be captured and communicated within and between licensees and rig operators (and relevant third party contractors), in a manner which ensures it comes to the attention of relevant personnel.

Procedures for the approval of development projects should ensure that conditions of approval are comprehensive and clearly set out the obligations of their proponents in relation to environmental matters (including expected monitoring and remediation obligations).

The proposal of the Productivity Commission’s Research Report (Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector, April 2009) to establish a NOPR should be pursued at a minimum.

There should be a review to determine whether it is appropriate to introduce a rigorous civil penalty regime and/or substantially increase some or all of the penalties that can be imposed for breaches of legislative requirements relating to well integrity and safety.

The concept of ‘good oilfield practice’ should be supplemented by the requirement to incorporate into WOMPs non‐exhaustive minimum compliance standards in relation to well control: for example, stipulations as to when BOPs and/or well control systems must be in place and when they can be removed

Horizontal or high angle penetration of a reservoir should be avoided wherever practicable until such time as the apparent problems associated with the cementing of a casing shoe in these situations are satisfactorily overcome.

All communications between on‐rig and onshore personnel relating to well control should be documented in a timely manner.

DEWHA, in concert with AMSA and with expert input, should develop ‘off the shelf’ monitoring programs that can be speedily implemented following incidents in Commonwealth waters.

Responsibility for well integrity should be moved to NOPSA (as also proposed by the Productivity Commission).

The Minister should, as the JA for the offshore area of the Territory of Ashmore and Cartier Islands, undertake a review of PTTEPAA’s permit and licence to operate at the Montara Oilfield.

Existing well control training programs should be reviewed by the industry, regulators and training providers, with a focus on well control accidents that have occurred (in Australia and overseas).

Well construction and management plans should include provision for an independent compliance review of well integrity (i) in the event of stipulated triggers; and (ii) at least once in the period between perceived achievement of well integrity and production.

The BOP and rig should not move from a well until barrier integrity has been verified.

Licensees, rig operators, and relevant third party contractors should develop well control competency standards for their key personnel. Wherever possible, the competencies of key personnel should be benchmarked against their roles and responsibilities.

The National Plan should be reviewed:
a. to ensure that it adequately addresses the risks associated with offshore oil and gas exploration;
b. to revisit the underlying risk assessment undertaken to inform capacity and preparedness under the National Plan;

DEWHA should participate in training programs and exercises relevant to an oil spill in the marine environment.

In the meantime, the Minister should:

In view of the numerous well integrity problems in all of the Montara Oilfield wells, the Minister should commission a detailed audit of all the other offshore wells operated by PTTEPAA to determine whether they too may suffer from well integrity problems.
 

A specific focus on well control training should be mandatory for key personnel involved in well control operations (including both on‐rig personnel and onshore personnel in supervisory capacities).

Well construction and management plans should include provision(s) for reviewing the integrity of barriers at safety‐critical times or milestones, such as (i) prior to suspension involving departure of the rig from the platform; (ii) prior to re‐entry of a well after suspension; (iii) prior to re

A separate, identifiable barrier manual should be agreed upon and used by licensees, rig operators, and cementing contractors. These manuals should set out best industry practice in relation to achieving and maintaining well integrity.

Barriers should not be installed or removed off‐line. The derrick should be located over a well at the time of removal and installation of any barrier. This will enable more decisive action to be taken in the event a problem arises.

Licensees, rig operators and relevant third party contractors should develop well control competency standards for key personnel in other entities involved in well control operations.

Procedures and accountabilities should be established to ensure, in the event of a future incident, that:
a. there is adequate monitoring of the volume of oil spilt and the spread of the oil (both surface and sub‐surface dispersed oil); and

In the future, and in the interests of ensuring that all possible well control options are comprehensively pursued to exhaustion, decisions as to well control response options should be the result of collaboration between the regulator and the operator rather than leaving one party to make unilat

Licensees and rig operators (and third party contractors involved in well control operations) should specifically assess, and document, the nature and extent of knowledge/skills of relevant personnel in relation to well control (including familiarity of personnel with agency‐specific requirements

Well construction and management plans, and drilling programs, should include provision for testing and verifying the integrity of all barriers as soon as practicable after installation.

Memoranda of Agreement should be entered into between operators in relation to provision of emergency assistance in the event of blowouts.

Secondary barriers (including PCCCs) should only be installed, tested, and removed with a BOP in place unless a documented risk assessment indicates that well control can be maintained at all times.

The Inquiry supports the objective (rather than prescriptive) approach to regulation now followed in Australia. However, the pendulum has swung too far away from prescriptive standards. In some areas relating to well integrity there needs to be minimum standards.

The regulatory framework should provide that in respect of all activities in Commonwealth waters:

Licensees should be subject to an express obligation to inform regulators of problems which arise in the course of installing barriers, even if they consider that well integrity is not thereby compromised.

In any future similar blowout or offshore emergency situation, the Minister appoint (through either a NOPR or the relevant Department) a senior public servant to establish and oversight a central coordinating body that will facilitate interaction between regulators, industry, AMSA and the owner/o

In order that the ACT public can be reassured about the project management and financial planning in relation to the Fairbairn site as a proposed centralised accommodation facility for emergency services, the Auditor-General undertake a review of the project from a financial probity and project m

Wellbore gas bubbling should be regarded as a trigger for independent review of well integrity. Industry and regulators should identify and document other triggers.

Licensees should be subject to an express obligation to inform regulators of the proposed removal of a barrier, even if they consider that well integrity is not thereby compromised.

PCCCs should be installed in a timely manner (for example, to prevent corrosion in the MLS apparatus). Non‐installation in order to park a BOP is not acceptable.

To better ensure that ‘risks’ are identified and managed in accordance with sound engineering principles and good oilfield practice, it is recommended that regulation 25(1)(a)(i) and (2)(a)(i) of the Management of Well Operations Regulations, be reworded as follows: ‘A titleholder must not commen

Environment plans and OSCPs should be made publicly available as a condition of approval of proposals under the OPGGS Act, and should clearly set out Scientific Monitoring requirements in the event of an oil spill.

The funding arrangements that support the National Plan should be reviewed to ensure that the costs associated with both preparedness and response capability are equitably shared between the shipping and offshore petroleum industries.

The successful installation of every barrier should be the subject of written verification within and between licensees and rig operators; and should be the subject of explicit reporting to the relevant regulator(s).

The body established to undertake a central coordination and facilitation role in the event of any future blowout in Commonwealth waters should undertake to make all relevant information publically available from one, authoritative and easy to access source.

If a risk assessment or compliance review is triggered by the happening of a predetermined event, specific consideration should be given to whether a ‘hold point’ should be introduced such that work must cease until the problem is resolved (and the subject of appropriate certification).

Use of single strings of intermediate casing to penetrate hydrocarbon bearing zones should be carefully risk assessed. Multiple strings of intermediate casing have the advantage of isolating lost circulation zones and sealing off anomalous pressure zones.

Wells should be re‐entered with a BOP in place unless a documented risk assessment indicates that well control can be maintained at all times.

The definition of ‘good oilfield practice’ in the OPGGS Act is unduly narrow. The current definition is incapable of application except where things ‘are generally accepted as good and safe’. The definition should be amended such that ‘good oilfield practice includes…’.