To increase shared understanding of risks, ensure the coordination of plans and manage risks, dam failure for Paradise Dam be included as a separate risk within the Bundaberg District Disaster Management Plan (DDMP). 

To increase understanding of hazards and manage risks, dam failure for Paradise Dam be included as a separate risk within the North Burnett Local Disaster Management Plan (LDMP). 

To enable entities to have a shared understanding of forecast information for dam failure events during a flood, including flood wave travel time, speed and height, Emergency Action Plans contain protocols and responsibilities of relevant stakeholders for these aspects. 

To ensure enhanced capability integration and enable timely community messaging Bundaberg LDMG in consultation with Sunwater develop additional Emergency Alerts and associated polygons for a Paradise Dam failure and load these on to the disaster management portal. 

To enhance shared capacity and collaboratively manage risk, the Chair of the Bundaberg DDMG use the QERMF process to determine if dam failure for Paradise Dam should be reported as a residual risk in this instance due to known changes in the risk profile to:
- the State Disaster Coordination Group (SDCG) in accordance with their responsibilities under the State Plan
- QFES for ensuring the development of the state-wide risk assessment. 

A revised Victoria Flood Management Strategy should identify and assign roles and responsibilities for the management and ongoing maintenance of Victoria’s waterways, for the purposes of flood protection and flood mitigation:
• CMAs are confirmed as the responsible authority for the management and ongoing maintenance of waterways, including vegetation management, for the purposes of flood protection; and
• CMAs will negotiate with landholders, councils and other authorities, and conduct agreed flood mitigation works on the basis of beneficiary pays.

The protocol should make provision for the use of telephone and/or radio where communication by email is not possible. Where necessary, CS Energy and Seqwater should make additional radio equipment available to relevant personnel.

CS Energy and Seqwater should agree upon and adhere to a formal communication protocol that requires CS Energy personnel to advise Seqwater, through the Flood Operations Centre, of water movements between Splityard Creek Dam and Wivenhoe Dam or Pryde Creek once a flood event is declared under the Manual of Operational Procedures for Flood Mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam. The protocol should ensure that a direct line of communication is established between CS Energy personnel physically located at the power station and the Flood Operations Centre.

the state take the necessary measures to upgrade existing manual stream and rain gauges and ensure that all future gauges provide a seamless transfer of data from the gauges to the Bureau of Meteorology.

the state ensure, as a matter of priority, that the State Control Centre is able to function as a fit for purpose, multi-agency emergency management centre. Necessary works to achieve this outcome should have an overarching focus on the implementation of common agency systems and processes to the fullest extent possible.

the state ensure that any new systems and equipment purchased by state emergency management agencies are interoperable with other relevant agencies to the fullest extent possible. This should involve the state establishing a procurement gateway process with input from the Emergency Services Commissioner.

That Biosecurity Australia undertake and complete within 12 months a non-regulated but formal import risk analysis relating to the importation of horses from the countries and regions from which Australia currently permits such importation, and make such recommendations for any changes to policies for importation as are warranted by its risk analysis to the officer responsible for the importation of horses and the Executive Director of AQIS.

We recommend that NSW Health continue with its good work and consider a more structured and systematic approach to the planning and risk assessment of major infectious diseases to assist transparency and decision making.

We recommend that NSW Health continue with its good work and consider building on influenza pandemic preparedness planning to develop broader contingency plans to address the emergence of other new, highly transmissible and/or severe infectious diseases.

That Melbourne Water and councils explore opportunities for working collaboratively to address the management of flooding risks with a view to optimising the efficient and effective use of their flood mitigation resources.

That agencies assess the cost-effectiveness of establishing a dedicated and proven asset management information system which is integrated with the other information systems used to manage drainage assets.

That the recommendations of the 2000 DPI report into the reference collection’s storage facility be implemented, to secure the collection in a purpose-built facility.

That DPI formalises agreements between divisions and groups that allow staff to be involved in incursion responses and reflects this requirement in individual duty statements.

That better use be made of Primary Industries Research Victoria's (PIRVIC) facilities by strengthening links with relevant groups of expertise, such as the Forest Science Centre.