The Departments of Parks and Wildlife and Fire and Emergency Services to adopt the policy that all bushfire Level 3 Incident Management Teams in the Perth Hills and the South West will be integrated and pre-formed from the start of the 2016/17 fire season with substantial involvement of both the Departments of Parks and Wildlife and Fire and Emergency Services personnel on all teams.

The State Government to establish an arrangement to develop a ‘network’ of Western Australian State Government agency personnel who can be called upon for bushfire and emergency incident management capability within Western Australia. The arrangement will be led by the State Emergency Management Committee and modelled on systems used by the Department of Parks and Wildlife.

Flexible pre‐formed multi‐ agency IMTs

Establish multi-agency preformed IMTs: An effective IMT for large and complex fire incidents requires the capacity and expertise of multiple agencies. Establishing multi-agency preformed IMTs will have three main benefits: adequate IMT resources can be deployed with ease • strong working relationships will be built between IMT members • common approaches to incident management and fire response can be embedded.

Future appointments to the role of Incident Controller should be limited to one for the entire duration of the incident, with nominated Deputy Incident Controllers to assist or ‘take charge’ in the Incident Controller’s absence. This measure will provide for a single point of responsibility and control for the incident and assist with any subsequent review or enquiry. If it is not possible to implement this proposal for liability reasons, the number of Incident Controllers should nevertheless be reduced to the minimum.

WA adopts a culture of joint IMTs in future. At Regional and State levels, DFES and DEC maintain standing contributions.

DFES and Local Government Bushfire Brigades ensure that only those with the required AIIMS competence have the authority to manage Level 1 incidents, noting they may not be Fire Control Officers.

St John Ambulance should develop quantitative performance targets for community paramedics and report these to Western Australia Health

Western Australia Health should require service providers to report more comprehensive performance data using additional cost and clinical indicators

Western Australia Health should include in contracts minimum standards for emergency and secondary ambulance services and effective mechanisms to monitor these

Predetermined locations for Level 3 IMTs should be reviewed and adequately resourced with necessary communications and IT capacity.

Early contact with the LG A is critical.

Incident Controllers should be supported by a planning function that combines experienced weather forecasters, fire behaviour experts and local knowledge.

Greater investment in training on specific functions within the AIIMS structure will improve the support provided to the Incident Controller.

Clear direction to divisional and sector commanders and a common communications platform enables maximum return to be gained from the application of tactical resources and this rests on good incident action planning, and good command and control.

An intensive exercise/training program should be developed and maintained across agencies to identify and establish a pool of current Incident Controllers who are capable of managing a Level 3 incident.

To be effective, multi-agency IMTs will need to be exercised regularly and supported by sound and comprehensive doctrine.

Contingency planning is a critical function in the early stages of an escalating incident, and should provide the foundation of an IAP.

Strategic direction seeks to identify and resource those areas of tactical action that offer the greatest advantage.

Within the AIIMS IMT doctrine the roles of the Incident Controller and Deputy Incident Controllers should be defined and well-practiced.

At Level 3, the available fire management expertise should be applied overwhelmingly to the fire management aspects of emergency management, possibly in incident control, and certainly in situations planning and operations roles.

The expected scenario, with a view to the worst-case scenario should provide the basis for an IAP.

Contingency planning before the fire may have supported the IMT in recognising and seizing strategic opportunities earlier.

The state should identify the number of fully trained, experienced and accredited Level 3 Incident Controllers required to be available at any time and establish a process for identification of suitable personnel, ongoing training and accreditation.

DEC’s fire management expertise should be augmented by multi-agency IMTs that incorporate the expertise of other agencies and in fast developing situations the appropriate decisions will need to be made early.

Procedures to relocate IMTs need to be established in doctrine and exercised to ensure continuity of control.

Given the prominent role played by the Shire in the management of welfare aspects in this emergency, there may be a need for state sponsored training for shire staff who are involved in implementing state emergency management policies and plans including how to deal with traumatised individuals.

Logistics and resource officers in IMTs need to collaborate and establish full awareness and control over the available resources.

For incidents of this complexity, effective control in the critical phase (first 24-36 hours of the fire) requires an appropriately resourced IMT.

Reporting and control should be through the incident chain of command and not through agency chains of command

Opportunities be sought to utilise local government representatives in other areas of the IMT particularly in public information or other community related functions.

Good Local Government planning and management facilitates community resilience.

IMTs need to establish early and effective liaison with Local Governments.

As presently implemented, the AIIMS planning role is under-developed and provides insufficient support to the Incident Controller.

In multi-agency responses the culture, training and equipment characteristics of each of the agencies should be considered in their employment.

WA adopts a culture of joint IMTs in future. At Regional and State levels, DFES and DEC maintain standing contributions.

The Ministers for Emergency Services, Environment and Police ensure their departments include in their annual reports the expenditure they have incurred on preparing their staff for critical incidents, and for managing their response to these incidents.

Local government authorities incorporate into their Local Emergency Management Plans their procedures for dealing with any trauma experienced by bushfire brigade volunteers, having regard to best practice in managing trauma.

Housing should further develop its Head Contractor key performance indicators to include quality, cost and tenant satisfaction. Currently performance reporting is focused entirely on timeliness indicators.

Housing should ensure it has sound systems, processes and controls in place that minimise the opportunity for fraud and gives it the best chance of detecting it by:
- conducting structured fraud risk analysis to identify areas of its maintenance processes or systems where the risk of fraud is highest
- putting in place a fraud policy to assist staff to detect fraud and respond appropriately to instances of suspected fraud
- making greater use of its maintenance information to identify patterns of activity that may indicate fraud.

Housing should use risk based analysis of its tenant and property information, job order data and quality assurance results to better inform target setting for KPIs, job order controls, and the sampling used for completed work inspections before and after payment. This analysis should synthesise information from all sources and include a risk assessment of tenants and properties, as well as consideration of the various types of maintenance work being done (emergency, priority and routine, and planned maintenance).

The Board of Tourism WA should take action to ensure that it reviews the quality of Board papers that are submitted to it by the executive of Tourism WA.

Opportunities should be sought to embed other local government representatives in other areas of the IMT particularly in public information.

Reporting and control should be through the incident chain of command, and not through agency chain of command.

All responding crews and the incident command appointments should adopt a ‘Size Up‘ reporting format.

To provide Level 3 IC‘s (and FESA) with a level of confidence and to maintain currency across the pool of accredited IC‘s, regular exercising of IC‘s and Level 3 IMT‘s is required.

FESA should review the size of the existing pre-formed IMT to include additional Information and Planning officers and increased resourcing of scribes and management support for all Level 3 incidents.

Noting existing legislative and policy arrangements, there is merit in considering options for the future management of Level 3 fires in Local Government areas.

FESA and DEC need to appoint accredited Level 3 IC‘s based on experience, competency and currency.

FESA should continue to develop with DEC and Local Government a number of rostered pre-formed IMT‘s available throughout the fire season, regardless of predicted weather.

Review the command function of the MROC for Level 3 incidents when the SOC is activated.

Local governments continue to include information on bushfire risk and preparedness with rates notices.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority and local governments ensure that Community Emergency Service Managers are physically based in local government.

Local Government recognise the work of the Gas Technical Regulatory Council and ensure any amendments to the Australian Standard are enforced. Local Government provide information to residents on any changes to the Australian Standard relating to tethering gas tanks and encourage property owners to take action to comply with the Standard.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority and the Department of Environment and Conservation ensure that their Incident Controllers identify critical infrastructure as part of their initial assessment and preparation of Incident Action Plans when attending major incidents.

Local governments institute a comprehensive program to assess fuel loads and bushfire preparedness on private properties. The program should give reference to the creation and maintenance of a Building Protection Zone, in line with FESA guidelines. This program should be implemented and managed under the Bush Fires Act 1954 in a manner similar to the fire break inspection program.

Local governments institute a comprehensive program to assess fuel loads and bushfire preparedness on private properties. The program should give reference to the creation and maintenance of a Building Protection Zone, in line with FESA guidelines.
This program should be implemented and managed under the Bush Fires Act 1954 in a manner similar to the fire break inspection program.

Main Roads Western Australia undertake more frequent examinations of its bridges located in areas prone to bushfire and ensure that the risk posed to loss of infrastructure in a fire is understood by local authorities.

The Western Australian Local Government Association explore the feasibility of local governments utilising aerial and satellite imagery to monitor firebreaks and fuel loads on private property.

The Interagency Bushfire Management Committee develop a consistent program of education, training (including media), testing and review of Level 3 Incident Controllers. This should include provision for a formal review of the performance of individual Level 3 Incident Controllers after every incident.

Local governments consider increasing the number of green waste collections carried out each year to encourage a more proactive approach to property (and vegetation) maintenance by residents.

Local Government recognise the work of the Gas Technical Regulatory Council and ensure any amendments to the Australian Standard are enforced.
Local Government provide information to residents on any changes to the Australian Standard relating to tethering gas tanks and encourage property owners to take action to comply with the Standard.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority and the Department of Environment and Conservation ensure that their Incident Controllers identify critical infrastructure as part of their initial assessment and preparation of Incident Action Plans when attending major incidents.

The State Government give its full support to the Western Australian Local Government Association’s Send to Solve initiative.

DEC’s incident management capability could be enhanced by: – Appointing a Deputy Incident Controller for every Level 3 IMT. – Establishing a fast response “short” IMT capability for each Level 3 IMT. – Establish clear triggers to initiate sending in a “short” IMT to a fire. – Including FESA officers in pre-formed Level 3 IMT’s. – Establishing additional pre-formed Level 3 IMT’s with FESA. – Where appropriate, appointing a local Bush Fire Brigade officer as Deputy Operations Officer.

Conducting a pre-fire season exercise for each Pre-Formed Incident Management Team could be used to “re-accrediting” each team on an annual basis.

Higher level DEC guidance to Level 3 Incident Controllers could be improved by introducing a more explicit and robust process of questioning, engagement, monitoring and oversight of Level 3 Incident Controllers.

A summary Incident Action Plan could allow the Incident Controller to more quickly appreciate the situation and articulate a plan early in an incident.

FESA establishes a dedicated intelligence function in Incident Management Teams for major bushfires and ensure this function is appropriately supported with threat based tools and systems.

That the Department of the Attorney General, in consultation with FESA and Western Australia Police (WAPOL), consider options for legislative amendments to extend criminal liability to all damage, injury or death directly caused by arson.

A formal IMG meeting should be convened as early as possible at initiating incidents with potential. At the very least early advice to potential IMG members should be made that a meeting is likely to be convened. The initial IMG should include all IMG representatives to ensure comprehensive briefing, agency specific situational awareness and issue identification.

When an OAMG is established, a formal declaration of its establishment needs to be transmitted to all organisation/agencies involved. The declaration should clearly establish the reporting arrangements for Incident Controllers to the OAM as described in Westplan Bushfire.

Potential OAMG membership should be identified in DEMC protocols and local hazard management plans. The information needs to be kept current. The contact details for each member should be recorded. These plans and contact details need to be available to any IMT mobilised to deal with an incident within the jurisdiction. This means access to this information via internet and storage and maintenance at a centralised facility managed by FESA.]

A formal OAMG meeting should be convened as early as possible for incidents with the potential to be Level 3 incidents. At the very least early advice to potential OAMG members should be made on days that exhibit extreme fire weather and other high ignition risk factors that a meeting is likely to be convened. The initial OAMG should include all OAMG representatives identified by LEMAC and DEMAC for each area to ensure comprehensive briefing, agency specific situational awareness and issue identification.

Prior to the bushfire season, potential IMG members, many of whom are members of the Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC) should be made aware of, and possibly exercise, their role as an IMG member.

At Level 3 incidents the Information Services Unit should be adequately resourced with information technology and at least 6 persons, all of whom are very experienced and capable in dealing with the information demands of a Level 3 incident.

Potential IMG membership should be identified in local hazard management plans. The information needs to be kept current. The contact details for each member should be recorded. These plans and contact details need to be available to any IMT mobilised to deal with an incident within the jurisdiction. This means access to this information via internet and storage and maintenance at a centralised facility managed by FESA.

The responsibilities and obligations for an OAM and OAMG (when established) needs to clarified and codified in Westplan Bushfire with regard to • Provision of information to participating organisations about the progress and potential of an incident; • Dealing with information disseminated to the public; and • Sourcing, coordinating and prioritising resources required by incidents within the Operations Area. There is lack of clarity in current arrangements concerning the role of the agency undertaking control operations e.g. DEC or a local govt and the transfer of these responsibilities to an OAMG when established.

That to the extent it has not already done so, DEC take action to ensure that in future cases relevant weather forecast information, particularly information as to significant wind changes, is promptly transmitted through the Incident Management Team and made available to persons with field operation responsibility.

SEMC and EM WA should: monitor and take action to ensure local plans are in place and cover areas where the hazard could occur

SEMC and EM WA should: work with local government to ensure up-to-date, comprehensive local arrangements are in place

Government should: establish a State-wide command structure across volunteer Bush Fire Brigades for fighting major bushfires, to more effectively manage the coordination of personnel and resources

Local authorities prosecute in all cases of deliberate breaches of the provisions of the Bush Fires Act and thay failing this the Bush Fires Board take appropriate action to initiate such prosecutions.