The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet include in the Australian Government Crisis Management Handbook criteria for the publication of plans to appropriately inform stakeholders of crisis arrangements.

That the Australian Government formalise the National Partnership for Climate Projections as a sub-committee to the Adaptation Working Group and support it through the National Climate Service with appropriate resources to drive the broader co-ordinated work program and achieve national participation.

The Committee recommends the Australian Government consider measures to reduce household level risks, including whether it would be appropriate to extend the Bushfire Resilience Rating Home Self-Assessment App to flood risks.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) appropriately use powers that it has as a result of the removal of the exemption of claims handling of insurance products under the Corporations Act 2001. The Committee notes that ASIC has only recently been granted such powers and they are as yet untested.

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), jointly with the CoordinatorGeneral of National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), should co-chair a coordination mechanism between Commonwealth departments and agencies to promote natural disaster risk reduction and resilience.
- This mechanism should ensure Commonwealth decision makers understand the role of relevant programs, with a view to avoiding duplication and ensuring better program information sharing and alignment.
- In establishing this mechanism, PM&C and NEMA should consider all current Commonwealth emergency and disaster management forums to ensure alignment. This includes reviewing respective terms of reference, frequency at which they meet and the appropriate balance between emergency response coordination and a wider Commonwealth focus on disaster risk reduction and resilience coordination.

The Commonwealth should mandate regular capability assessments of local governments by state and territory governments.
- Where possible, these assessments should form part of the local or regional Disaster Management Plans.
- Priority should be placed on assessing capability, capacity and investment requirements, as well as assessing any barriers to enabling locally led action, including disadvantaged, or disproportionately impacted communities.
- These assessments should help inform broader capability needs considered as part of Recommendation 6.
- Consideration should be given to complementing these local government capability assessments with data held by Regional Development Australia, managed by the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts (DITRDCA).

The Minister for Emergency Management should deliver an annual Statement to Parliament that:
- Defines the Commonwealth’s role in prioritising risk reduction, prevention, resilience, and mitigation against natural disasters.
- Outlines the national natural disaster risk reduction investment priorities.
- Reports against nationally agreed natural disaster risk reduction and resilience investment outcomes.
- Updates Parliament on the progress of disaster impacted communities where Commonwealth programs and investment are involved.

To support a comprehensive risk-based approach, the Commonwealth should require state and territory governments to develop local or regional Disaster Management Plans. These Disaster Management Plans should:
- Identify the readiness of a region to handle a disaster event (including considerations of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery).
- Include risks and strengths that are specific to that area in the natural, social, economic and built domains.
- Contain information that can be used to inform state and territory risk assessments, inform response activities in advance of disaster events, or help inform resource and funding requirements for recovery, disaster risk reduction, and resilience.
- Recognise and accommodate the lived experience, increased cost, risk and complexity of delivering disaster management services to remote communities, and to First Nations communities.

The Commonwealth should require state and territory governments to complete complementary disaster risk assessments to inform the Risk Profile and guide priority areas for Commonwealth investment and support. Where they exist, climate risk or adaptation profiles developed at local, state and Commonwealth levels should be used to inform the Risk Profile.

The Commonwealth should develop an agreed methodology to underpin the Risk Profile that would identify at-risk communities, capabilities, and assets.

The Commonwealth should use the results of the Risk Profile to work with state and territory governments to identify and prioritise disaster funding.
- The outcome of the Risk Profile should inform decision making elements in response to requests for Commonwealth funding, either directly or via co-contribution. Specifically, the results of the Risk Profile should also form a core consideration for future DRFA, and DRF decision making, as well as any other future programs.
- The Risk Profile should inform other Commonwealth programs, such as infrastructure investment, National Construction Code enhancements, climate change initiatives and the like.
- Understanding the Risk Profile will also allow the Commonwealth to place conditions or requirements on funding approvals that are consistent with a more strategically aligned approach to risk reduction and resilience.
-The Risk Profile should be used in concert with the Outcomes Policy to direct funding towards projects that advance risk reduction priorities, and which contribute to the outcomes the Commonwealth is seeking to achieve with its disaster funding.

The Commonwealth should lead the development of a Nation-wide Natural Disaster Risk Profile (Risk Profile) to enable the Commonwealth to identify risk reduction and resilience priorities and allow the Commonwealth, states, and territories to address agreed risk. The Risk Profile should:
- Be reviewed (including methodology) every five years but updated annually.
-Be led by NEMA and supported by PM&C.
- Encompass all components of natural disaster risk (hazard, exposure, vulnerability and response) with consideration of risk across all domains (natural, social, economic and built).
- Include consideration of the capacity and capabilities that exist to mitigate risks along with consideration of the capability to embed resilience.

In compiling the Risk Profile, the Commonwealth should draw upon existing activities including, but not limited to, the National Climate Risk Assessment and the High-Risk Weather Season Outlook.
- The Risk Profile should incorporate national perspectives on risks and opportunities across the natural, social, economic and built domains, in the context of current and anticipated natural disasters.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government propose that the Infrastructure and Transport Senior Officials’ Committee, in consultation with Austroads and other relevant stakeholders, progress the development of national road infrastructure resilience guidelines to inform asset management and project investment.

The Committee recommends that clearer demarcation of climate data and sharing responsibilities between the Bureau of Meteorology and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation and state and territory and local governments be established to facilitate adequate warning and risk mitigation.

The Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water develop a stakeholder engagement plan, including maintaining an up-to-date list of stakeholders, to ensure appropriate engagement in future wildlife and habitat disaster recovery programs.

NEMA with CCOSC should investigate ways to better integrate and align CCOSC and the NRSC with the national coordination capacity.
- This should include building on the existing arrangements in exceptional circumstances to outpost NRSC staff as liaison officers to the Australian Government National Situation Room.
- This should also include identifying event thresholds that would trigger the need for greater integration.

NEMMM agendas should ensure that discussion of urgent tactical challenges don’t crowd-out consideration of the strategic challenges.
- NEMMM should request ANZEMC, facilitated by NEMA, to conduct “stress-testing” scenario planning of the consequences (e.g., exhausted emergency workers, insufficient emergency housing and shortages of trades people) of year-on-year increases in consecutive and intensifying national-scale disasters.

Each jurisdiction should be allowed a maximum of three senior officials on ANZEMC to enable the inclusion of these jurisdictional responsibilities (see Appendix F for Summary of State and Territory responsibilities).

ANZEMC’s Terms of Reference should be amended to reflect the recommendations above.

NEMMM should co-convene a joint Ministerial Council meeting with climate change adaptation ministers to promote greater coherence between NEMMM’s resilience work and climate adaptation—two key components of a future national resilience strategy. This should be a face-to-face meeting.

The government members of ANZEMC should be senior officials (Commissioners, Deputy Secretaries or Heads of Agencies) from agencies that have the lead jurisdictional responsibility for preparedness and response and resilience and recovery.

ANZEMC should map out the many existing time-limited working groups and reference and advisory groups and the communities of practice, to identify which are no longer required and should be discontinued, which should continue and be officially sanctioned by ANZEMC, which should continue as informal interest groups, and to identify potential gaps.

Each NEMMM agenda should have a standing item on disaster risk reduction/resilience and at least one full meeting each year should be devoted to Disaster Resilience and Recovery. Some jurisdictions have established separate ministers responsible for recovery and resilience, and they should be invited to attend these recovery and resilience meetings.

The ANZEMC workplan and meeting agendas should be explicitly organised under two headings: “Disaster Resilience and Recovery” and “Preparedness and Capabilities Policy”.

The current ANZEMC Sub-committees and other subsidiary bodies should be reconceptualised as “communities of practice” and important sources of expert advice, rather than as national governance bodies.

NEMMM’s leading role in the wider national resilience effort should focus on disaster risk reduction, and it should engage as a core stakeholder in a wider range of other resilience issues. It should further elaborate this focus with respect to:
- Prospective risk management (higher infrastructure standards, environmental protection, etc.),
- Corrective risk management (retrofitting, reinforcing, and remedial measures),
- Compensatory risk management (risk financing and transfer), and
- Reactive risk management (early warning systems and effective response and recovery).

ANZEMC’s core mission should be narrowed to:
1) Supporting the NEMMM, particularly to identify its five priorities for action and ensuring they are implemented; and
2) Providing a forum for key senior officials to address other nationally (e.g., cross- jurisdictionally) pressing, emerging and longer-term challenges.

ANZEMC should establish time-limited, flexible task forces, reporting directly to ANZEMC, to implement NEMMM’s five priorities for action and essential other initiatives, comprised of diverse membership (e.g., government, private sector, academia, civil society), determined by the requirements of the task.

Given the importance of NEMMM’s work, meetings should occur quarterly and be in-person at least twice yearly, be of sufficient length to allow for issues to be properly canvassed and discussed and be preceded by an opportunity for the NEMMM members to meet informally alone together.

ANZEMC should meet four times each year, including twice face-to- face, with one of the in-person meetings devoted predominantly to “Disaster Resilience and Recovery.” The face-to-face meetings should be preceded by an opportunity for the ANZEMC members to meet informally.

Australian, state and territory governments should support the implementation of the National Disaster Risk Information Services Capability and aligned climate adaptation initiatives. 

Australian, state and territory governments should continue to explore the feasibility of a national, all-hazard emergency warning app. 

State and territory governments should include road closure and opening information on all roads within their borders on public apps. 

State and territory governments should provide further community education on the function and limitations of different sheltering facilities, including evacuation centres, Neighbourhood Safer Places, places of last resort and natural disaster shelters. This education should be nationally consistent. 

The Australian Government should establish a standing entity that will enhance national natural disaster resilience and recovery, focused on long-term disaster risk reduction. 

The Australian Government should facilitate state and territory governments working together to develop minimum national standards of information to be included in bushfire warnings apps. 

Australian, state and territory governments, in consultation with local governments and the private sector, should review supply chain risks, and consider options to ensure supply of essential goods in times of natural disasters. 

State and territory governments should, as a priority, adopt nationally consistent terminology and functions for the different sheltering facilities, including evacuation centres, Neighbourhood Safer Places, places of last resort and natural disaster shelters. 

State and territory governments should urgently deliver and implement thevall-hazard Australian Warning System. 

State and territory governments should have a structured process to regularly assess the capacity and capability requirements of fire and emergency services, in light of both current and future natural disaster risk. 

State and territory governments should ensure that those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review those plans, and update them where appropriate, including in relation to:
(1) key risks that essential service outages have on communities during a severe or catastrophic natural disaster (particularly communications an
power)
(2) availability of essential supplies, including food and water, and
(3) consequence management and compounding events such as the loss of essential services or health impacts. 

State and territory governments should expedite the development and implementation of the Australian Fire Danger Rating System. It should ensure that there is national consistency in the visual display of the AFDRS and action to be taken in response to each rating. 

The Australian Government should make provision, in legislation, for a declaration of a state of national emergency. The declaration should include the following components:
(1) the ability for the Australian Government to make a public declaration to communicate the seriousness of a natural disaster
(2) processes to mobilise and activate Australian Government agencies quickly to support states and territories to respond to and recover from a natural disaster, and
(3) the power to take action without a state or territory request for assistance in clearly defined and limited circumstances. 

State and territory governments should ensure that those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review those plans, and update them where appropriate, including in relation to:
(1) roles and responsibilities of state and territory governments, local governments and local communities
(2) education and signage about evacuations and evacuation routes, including education of seasonal populations
(3) the adequacy of evacuation routes; including contingencies if evacuation routes or centres are assessed as not being able to cope, and
(4) the potential inability to evacuate, either by reason of circumstances or personal characteristics. 

State and territory governments should ensure those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review those plans, and update where appropriate, to provide for coordination between states and territories in cross border areas and to provide cross-border access to evacuation centres. 

The National Disaster Risk Information Services Capability should include tools and systems to support operational and strategic decision making, including integrated climate and disaster risk scenarios tailored to various needs of relevant industry sectors and end users. 

Australian, state and territory governments should develop arrangements that facilitate greater inclusion of primary healthcare providers in disaster management, including: representation on relevant disaster committees and plans and providing training, education and other supports. 

State and territory governments should provide information to the public on the closure and opening of roads. Information should be provided in real-time, or in advance based on predictions, where possible. 

State and territory governments should ensure those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review these plans, and update them where appropriate, to account for the existence and standard of any evacuation centres and safer places (however described) in the community, including:
(1) the capacity of a centre to handle seasonal population variation
(2) the suitability of facilities to cater for diverse groups, including vulnerable people, and those evacuating with animals, and
(3) the existence of communications facilities and alternate power sources.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s Director of Aviation Safety meet with industry sector leaders to jointly develop a plan for renewing a collaborative and effective Standards Consultative Committee.

The lines of responsibility be made clearer and some individual, perhaps the Regional Environmental Officer, or agency be given overarching responsibility to ensure recommended works related to bushfire mitigation on Defence Estate are carried out in accordance with the Bushfire Management Plan which the Manual for Fire Protection Engineering directs be prepared.

The Marrangaroo Training Area Regional Environmental Officer confer with the local Rural Fire Service at least annually and determine a hazard reduction regime capable of implementation. It is furter recommended all ranges be reviewed in relation to the same issue, that is, that personnel involved in the management of each range under Defence control be directed to confer with local firefighting authorities on at least an annual basis to assess hazard reduction responses to be pursued for that range in subsequent years. 

Range Control Officer Marrangaroo Training Area liase with the local Rural Fire Service units to develop a map indicating the areas of the range likely to contain unexploded ordnance. 

The committee recommends that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau retrieve VH-NGA flight data recorders without further delay.

Governments and other stakeholders consider reviewing their existing emergency management arrangements to ensure public communications are clear and the public is kept informed of the incident response.

Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE) to work with the Triple Zero Awareness Work Group through Australian Communications and Media Authority's (ACMA) Emergency Service Advisory Committee to review Triple Zero awareness messages with regard to telecommunications outages.

Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy will work with the Communications Sector Group within the Trusted Information Sharing Network to develop best practice guidance for owners of critical communications infrastructure regarding public messaging during a prolonged telecommunications outage covering:
- the provision of early and accurate advice to the community;
- the dissemination of information to business, government, community service providers and critical industry sectors such as banks;
- engagement with emergency service providers and the appointed local incident manager;
- public communications over radio, by personal contact etc. - avoiding a reliance on phone and internet;
- communications with other wholesale providers including on matters dealing with compensation;
- public notices, such as the use of prominent notices on websites, explaining the outage to customers and clients outside the affected area; and
- the use of recorded voice announcements to inform incoming callers of the outage.

The Australian Government, in consultation with consumers and other relevant federal, state and territory agencies, develop a national communication strategy for consumers to be used in the event of an infectious disease outbreak.

The committee recommends that Australian governments specifically address issues of compatibility and capacity to facilitate the most effective interoperability of emergency service organisations and their key personnel, especially for fire services.

The committee recommends relevant authorities work with community service organisations in both planning responses to and responding to extreme weather events, in particular those organisations that provide vital services to vulnerable groups.

Review disaster recovery and business continuity plans.

The committee recommends the government consider granting public broadcasters priority access to fuel during times of emergency for the purpose of broadcasting emergency warnings and information, and in a way that does not impede the ability of emergency service organisations to access fuel.

Decision‐making about well control issues should be professionalised. Industry participants must recognise that decision‐makers owe independent duties to the public, not just their employer or principal, in relation to well control. Risk management in the context of well control needs to be understood as an ethical/professional duty. Self‐regulation contemplates self‐regulation by the industry, not just by individual licensees and operators.

Removal of a barrier must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to removal. A proper risk assessment should be carried out and agreed upon, and documented in writing before removal. Joint written certification as to the appropriateness of removal should take place before removal. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

The use/type of barriers (including any change requests relating thereto) must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to installation. A proper risk assessment should be carried out, agreed upon, and documented in writing before installation. Joint written certification as to the appropriateness of the use of particular barriers should take place before installation. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

Problems which arise in the course of installing barriers must be the subject of consultation between licensees, rig operators, and contractors (if used). A proper risk assessment should then be carried out and remedial steps (including further testing/verification) should be agreed upon, and documented in writing before the performance of remedial work whenever practicable. Joint written certification as to resolution of the problem should take place before resumption of drilling operations. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

The regulator should pre‐assess and review in a generic sense, and in conjunction with the offshore petroleum industry, available options for well control in the event of a blowout. Being ‘match fit’ in this sense will enable a quicker and more effective response in terms of safety assessment, and will ensure that expectations of both operator and regulator are more readily aligned.

Pre‐drilling assessments should include a risk assessment of the worst‐case blowout scenario.

NOPSA’s prohibition powers should be extended such that a prohibition notice can be issued where a NOPSA Occupational Health and Safety Inspector believes, on reasonable grounds, that an activity is occurring or may occur at a facility involving an immediate threat to the health or safety of a person.

The Commonwealth Government work with the states and their agencies to ensure consistent terminology is used when communicating with the public.

To improve Centrelink’s preparedness for responding to future disasters, the ANAO recommends that Centrelink include disasters that impact on multiple Areas in its emergency and business continuity test exercise program.

The industry should develop in conjunction with the Regulator a process for addressing the need to maintain the risk profile of a facility moving into extended life operation at the same risk profile as when it was within design life.

That Biosecurity Australia undertake and complete within 12 months a non-regulated but formal import risk analysis relating to the importation of horses from the countries and regions from which Australia currently permits such importation, and make such recommendations for any changes to policies for importation as are warranted by its risk analysis to the officer responsible for the importation of horses and the Executive Director of AQIS.

The Committee recommends that coastal based Natural Resource Management bodies seeking funding under the Caring for our Country program have coastal and marine priorities, as well as coastal zone management principles integrated in their management plans.

The Committee recommends that the Department of Climate Change, in collaboration with the Queensland Government, CSIRO and Indigenous communities in the Torres Strait, undertake a major study into the vulnerability of the Torres Strait to the impacts of climate change and provide assistance in the development of an adaptation plan.

The Committee notes that major initiatives relating to climate change adaptation risk assessment and infrastructure are currently in progress. Given that much of Australia’s infrastructure is in the coastal zone and the particular threats facing the coastal zone from climate change, involving significant socioeconomic costs, the Committee recommends that the Australian Government ensure there is a comprehensive national assessment of coastal infrastructure vulnerability to inundation from sea level rise and extreme sea level events.

The Committee recommends that:
- the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government undertake a study into the human and resourcing needs of local governments to effectively plan for and adapt to the impacts of climate change
- this study be carried out in conjunction with the Australian Local Government Association and the National Sea Change Taskforce

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, seek to create systematic mechanisms for better targeting and evaluating inter- agency coordination within the National Capability Development Exercise Programme and continuous improvement cycle.

The Working Group recommends that the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department hold discussions with the Commonwealth Department of Communications, Information, Technology and the Arts regarding the Integrated Public Telephone Network Database (IPND) being made accessible for use in times of emergency where the need to disseminate community information and warnings to telephones within a specified area is identified. Discussions should also be held between the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department and with the Federal Privacy Commissioner’s Office to identify any impediments to the use of the IPND in such circumstances. 

The Working Group recommends that in addition to existing disease control and pandemic management plans, States/Territories should consider developing a pandemic emergency management plan that considers the impact of pandemic disease broadly, encompasses all government and private sector agencies and addresses:
• Continuity of government
• Continuity of essential services and lifelines
• Maintenance of community functions
• Continuity of business and commerce.
Where possible, pandemic emergency management planning elements should be built into existing ‘all hazards’ plans and these should also consider those specific elements identified above.

The Working Group recommends that Emergency Management Australia (EMA) facilitate national discussions into the capability of States/Territories to ensure thorough collaborative systems and plans for inter-jurisdictional resource interoperability exist, and where this has not already occurred at State/Territory level and appropriate agencies, committees or government departments can be identified, they should be tasked with progressing specific issues in the following areas:
• Communications equipment
• Landline and mobile telephones
• Response equipment
• National registration of health and other professionals
• Legal consistency in State/Territory disaster/emergency legislation and any other legislation that impacts upon the ability to deliver a national response to catastrophic disasters
• National resource sharing arrangements
• Acceptance and utilisation of international resources.

The Working Group recommends that the Australian Government and the States/Territories use the survey templates compiled in each of their jurisdictions during the capability review workshops, and the scenarios to consider their current and future capabilities, to respond to and recover from large scale disasters. 

The working group recommends that a similar project to the Review of Australia's Ability to Respond to and Recover from Catastrophic Disasters be established to consider the longer term consequences of catastrophic disasters and their resulting recovery implications. Key aspects of such a review would include:
• Researching the likely longer term consequences of catastrophic disasters/emergencies,
• Consideration of Australia's capacity from all perspectives to address the long term recovery consequences of a catastrophic disaster/emergency.

The Committee recommends that Emergency Management Australia and the Australian Communications Authority work with state and territory bush fire authorities to ensure that that district communication plans
have regard for the amount of radio traffic that may be generated under the most severe conditions.

The Committee recommends that:
- As a short term objective, the use of ‘40’ channel UHF CB equipment be adopted for coordination and interoperability of communications at fire ground level.
- As a longer term objective a national communications plan be developed and incorporate the provision of low powered VHF channel allocations for the purpose of ensuring compatible fire ground communications between all agencies on a national basis.
- That the use of UHF CB between units on the fire ground be included in communications planning for intra-state and interstate deployments.

The Committee recommends that the state and territory bushfire agencies ensure that, on a district basis, communications are addressed within the district operations plans and that the plans are capable of easy adoption to incident action plans.

The Committee recommends that the Australasian Fire Authorities Council’s suggested evacuation protocol be adopted by all of the Australian States and Territories.

The Committee recommends that state and territory governments be required to regularly perform risk assessments to the land within their jurisdictions to ensure that bushfire prone areas are accurately identified
and can be appropriately managed. This should include possibly prohibiting, or at least limiting, reticulated development in these areas. If building is effectively prohibited on land previously zoned for residential
or commercial building, state and territory governments, in conjunction with local councils, should adequately compensate the affected landholders.

The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth investigate, and where necessary, require the urgent enhancement of the provision of emergency power and telecommunications services for the purpose of
restoring essential services expeditiously in areas affected by fire or other natural disaster and where necessary to place licence requirements on telecommunication providers to do so.