The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet:
- document a process for annual administrative updates that provides a consistent approach including ensuring appropriate records of engagement and input are maintained; and
- ensure significant issues are documented to be considered in comprehensive reviews of the AGCMF

The National Emergency Management Agency document its consideration of Crisis Arrangements Committee advice on gaps and priorities for whole-of-government exercising, as well as the annual analysis undertaken to review and update the list of identified hazards under AGCMF, to inform the development of the annual national exercise program. This should include ensuring that exercises consider both natural and all-hazard scenarios.

That the Australian Government require the National Climate Service to develop and publish a climate services roadmap, describing how to build to a national capability with explicit and ambitious time frames.

That the Australian Government deliver National Climate Risk Assessments through the National Climate Service on a regular program, aligned to the Intergenerational Report.

That the Australian Government establish a mechanism within the National Climate Service to track user experience and satisfaction which gathers user needs and preferences, to guide the development of future products and services.

That the Australian Government task the Climate Change Authority with a regular review of the National Climate Service against the KPIs

That the Australian Government regularly monitor against the new Statement of Expectations (refer Recommendation 4.1 and KPIs in Box 7) to ensure the National Climate Service is meeting expectations.

That the Australian Government publish all National Climate Service strategic documents by default to provide transparency on the National Climate Service’s program and timelines for implementation.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission develop and define key outcomes measures for the consumer experience, including:
- Communication (outcome measures)
o Overall customer satisfaction, such as a customer satisfaction score o Consumer comprehension of communications (random sample)
- Claims processing
o Average time taken to respond to a customer after first making an enquiry or initiating a claim
- Vulnerable customers o Proportion of customers identified as vulnerable (BAU, quarterly)
o Proportion of customers identified as vulnerable (designated events, monthly)
- Internal dispute resolution o Proportion of total cases that involved internal dispute resolution
o Average time taken to resolve internal dispute cases
- External dispute resolution
o Proportion of total cases that were referred to the Australian Financial Complaints Authority
o Success rate at the Australian Financial Complaints Authority
- Cash settlements
o Proportion of resolved cases that are final cash settlements
- Claims acceptance rates
o Percentage of claims acceptedPercentage of claims closed (at key points in time, for example 6 months, 12 months, 18 months)
- General Insurance Code of Practice Compliance Breaches of the General Insurance Code of Practice per thousand claims by clause, insurer, and brand.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s MoneySmart life insurance claims comparison tool be extended to general insurance.

The Committee recommends that insurers report case management key performance indicators to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.

The Committee recommends that insurers invest in their IT systems to improve the storage of policyholders’ key documentation and case notes, including correspondence and discussions. Case managers should also be suitably trained and resourced to implement quality record-keeping.

The Committee recommends that for each declared event, insurers be required to report the number of unresolved cases after 12 months to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the overarching strategy for resolving these cases. This report should include the total number of outstanding claims and the most common reasons for the delay.

The Committee recommends the Australian Securities and Investments Commission publish quarterly insurer and brand level data on their performance on the metrics recommended in Recommendation 51.

The Commonwealth should use reporting established by the Outcomes Policy to inform requirements associated with international obligations (e.g., the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction).

The Commonwealth should embed regular sharing of lessons learnt from program outcomes between state and territory governments, and the Commonwealth, to develop a continuous improvement culture.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government propose that road asset infrastructure resilience planning and investment frameworks be made a standing item on the Infrastructure and Transport Senior Officials’ Committee meeting agenda.

The National Emergency Management Agency establish monitoring and reporting arrangements that demonstrate performance against the Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements’ principles.

The National Emergency Management Agency:
a. establishes targets, monitoring and reporting for the time required to complete the assurance and acquittal processes; and
b. develops procedures for finalsing claims when requested information is not provided in the timeframes established under the Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements 2018 ministerial determination

The First Secretaries, on behalf of the National Cabinet, should oversee (via a subordinate Deputy Secretaries Group) the development of an annual Australian National Resilience Report (ANRR) that combines the Ministerial Council resilience reporting, existing resilience strategies in jurisdictions and new initiatives.

NEMMM’s Terms of Reference should be amended to reflect the recommendations above.

The next iteration of NEMMM’s Five Priorities for Action should be explicit and measurable, bold but achievable and focused on national outcomes, rather than outputs. They should:
- Be formulated in terms such as “By 2026 we will have established…which will have reduced…”, etc.
- Be developed through a process that includes consultations with key stakeholders, including First Nations organisations, civil society, the private sector, foundations, and key entities active in the emergency management space, such as Australian Red Cross and the National Council for Fire and Emergency Services (formerly the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council or AFAC).
- Be highly compelling for each jurisdiction, large and small.
- Directly address our rapidly accelerating disaster risk environment, in which we can anticipate yearly, national-scale disasters with preparedness, response, recovery and resilience occurring simultaneously, year-round.
- Include at the approval stage the initial estimates of the resourcing required to achieve the outcomes and the sources of the funding.

At least once each year, coinciding with the production of the ANRR, the National Cabinet should evaluate progress in bolstering national resilience.

The Commonwealth together with the States and Territories should identify their shared high-level resilience objectives and develop indicators to monitor national progress in achieving them. The ANRR should also provide annual updates on progress in achieving the objectives.

The ANRR should be a National Cabinet product focused on climate and disaster risk as well as other key resilience risks agreed by the Commonwealth and the jurisdictions.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority shares the risk assessment outputs of Sky Sentinel, its computerised risk assessment system, with the applicable authorisation holder.

Firefighitng capability at Marrangaroo Training Area be upgraded so that Australian Defence Force members are not placed in situations of unacceptable risk. Specifically, those participating in range practices must have access to a firefighting vehicle close by and easily deployed, and capable of throwing a large quantity of water an appreciable distance into areas adjacent to the ranges, should a fire occur. 

A Stryker unit, or an upgraded firefighting unit, be present at the range sentry point, remain manned and ready to deploy during range activites, with its driver in direct radio contact with the Range Safety Officer. Upon the range being declared clear by the Safety Officer inspecting the range after a demolition serial, the firefighting unit must proceed forward to the range wile the periphery of the range continues to be inspected by the Safety Officer, and remain on the range until the Safety officer declares that the area is clear of fire or that it is otherwise appropriate for the fireghting unit to leave the range area. 

Defence should not procure any firefighting vehicle for Marrangaroo Training Area without first consulting relevant personnel within the Rural Fire Service on an appropriate type of vehicle, and obtaining training for the personnel proposed to use it. Alternatively, Defence should explore contracted firefighitng support during periods of live-fire on Marrangaroo Training Area.

The ANAO recommends that the Department of Defence take steps to strengthen the priority afforded by Defence units to meeting these reporting requirements.

The committee recommends that where a safety action has not been completed before a report being issued that a recommendation should be made. If it has been completed the report should include details of the action, who was involved and how it was resolved.

The committee recommends that the ATSB prepare and release publicly a list of all its identified safety issues and the actions which are being taken or have been taken to address them. The ATSB should indicate its progress in monitoring the actions every 6 months and report every 12 months to Parliament.

The committee recommends that in relation to mandatory and confidential reporting, the default position should be that no identifying details should be provided or disclosed. However, if there is a clear risk to safety then the ATSB, CASA and industry representatives should develop a process that contains appropriate checks and balances.

To strengthen its oversight of Queensland reconstruction progress, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)  recommends that the National Disaster Recovery Taskforce:
(a) monitor revisions to scheduled project completion dates, and raise with the Queensland Reconstruction Authority any issues and anomalies, as appropriate; and
(b) adopt a more pro‐active approach to requesting timely progress and completion reporting documentation from the Queensland Reconstruction Authority according to planned and reported actual completion dates.

The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) recommends that the Australian Government Reconstruction Inspectorate and the National Disaster Recovery Taskforce seek to maximise the benefits from their value for money review activities by obtaining more timely and comprehensive information on project progress and completion from the Queensland Reconstruction Authority, to enable the preliminary value for money assessments to be finalised based on the scope and cost of works that were actually delivered (rather than estimates).

The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) recommends that the Department of Regional Australia, Local Government, Arts and Sport improve its monitoring of the delivery of the Natural Disaster Recovery Work Plans for Queensland and Victoria by:
(a) seeking from each state the project level data that is required to report to Ministers on reconstruction progress in the manner required by each National Partnership Agreement (or as may otherwise be agreed); and
(b) undertaking analysis of relevant data that has been reported by each state over time to identify significant trends and other matters of importance, and updating this analysis as and when further data is reported.

Extend ICT governance arrangements to all applications and subject in-house development to rigorous approval processes.

The committee recommends the Commonwealth Government allocate sufficient spectrum for dedicated broadband public protection and disaster relief (PPDR) radiocommunications in Australia.

The committee recommends that interoperability of narrowband voice radiocommunications between federal, state and territory emergency service organisations is achieved as soon as practicable and that all services attending major incidents be compelled to maintain a common emergency communications platform to ensure seamless real time communication from and to the Incident Controller.

The committee further recommends that any allocation of broadband spectrum to emergency service organisations (ESOs) for PPDR must be provided on the basis of interoperability amongst Australian ESOs and with ESO counterparts overseas.

The successful installation of every barrier should be the subject of written verification within and between licensees and rig operators; and should be the subject of explicit reporting to the relevant regulator(s).

Licensees should be subject to an express obligation to inform regulators of problems which arise in the course of installing barriers, even if they consider that well integrity is not thereby compromised. The information should be provided by way of special report, rather than included in a standard reporting document (such as a DDR). The information provided should include risk assessment details.

Logistics management of well control equipment should be conducted in such a way as to operate as a check against deficient well control practices, for example, use of serial numbers to track availability, testing, and deployment of well control equipment.

The committee recommends that the Commonwealth co-ordinate a national approach to the pooling of ground fire fighting resources across agencies and jurisdictions to maximise the efficiency of their use.

In order to identify key business processes and provide for the regular comparative assessment of Maximum Allowable Outage periods (MAOs), the ANAO recommends that Centrelink:
(a) commission a formal Business Criticality Review of its operations, including National Support Office, Area Offices and its service delivery channels; and
(b) establish a process for the annual review and endorsement of MAOs determined by branches to ensure that they represent a collective view on the relative criticality of the services that Centrelink provides.

The ANAO recommends that Centrelink:
(a) develop performance measures against which its business continuity management preparation and response can be regularly monitored and assessed by the Business Continuity, Crisis Management and Security Sub-committee; and
(b) provide reports to the Business Continuity, Crisis Management and Security Sub-committee on the findings and implementation of there commendations of post–implementation review reports on business continuity incidents, including IT-related incidents.

The ANAO recommends that the Business Continuity, Crisis Management and Security Sub committee:
(a) endorse an annual program of scheduled testing for business continuity plans, including relevant Disaster Recovery Plans for all services and systems assessed by the agency as being business critical; and
(b) receive performance reports on the completion and key results of plan testing.

The current KPI measures used by the Regulator and industry need to be reassessed and the performance indicators need to be related to the risk profiles of the industry. The industry needs to develop the indicators, which need to be agreed and measured by the industry in discussion with other stakeholders. The KPI's selected should be published in comparison with the worldwide offshore industry and with other industries. NOPSA should continue discussions with Australian Safety and Compensation Council (ASCC) with a view to adopting their goals. 

That the officer responsible for the importation of horses prepare a report to the Executive Director of AQIS that:
(a) identifies (by category) all non-AQIS personnel involved in the importation of horses, including post-arrival quarantine, from countries other than New Zealand
(b) identifies the requirements in respect of biosecurity that AQIS has of those people
(c) identifies the source of those requirements—for example, by import conditions, agreement or understanding, whether formal or informal, with AQIS, and compliance agreement under s. 66B of the Quarantine Act 1908
(d) assesses whether compliance with those requirements can be and is adequately being enforced
(e) recommends measures to be taken to rectify any shortcomings.

That there be established the position of Inspector General of Horse Importation, the duties of that position being:
(a) to check, by inspection and audit at least once every 30 months, that operations and procedures at each approved pre-export quarantine premises are documented and being complied with
(b) to check, by inspection and audit from time to time at the Inspector General’s discretion, that import conditions covering the period until horses arrive at an airport in Australia are being complied with
(c) to check, by inspection and audit at least once every 30 months, that operations and procedures applying from when horses arrive at an airport in Australia until the completion of post-arrival quarantine are documented and being complied with
(d) to report in writing at least once every 12 months to the Minister responsible for quarantine on the results of such inspections and audits and such other related matters as the Inspector General thinks necessary.

The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) recommends that, in order to assist management decision making and to inform Parliament about performance, Emergency Management Australia (EMA) develop and report appropriate measures for its key emergency management activities and outcomes.

The Committee recommends that, following the completion of the ‘first pass’ National Coastal Vulnerability Assessment, the Australian Government consider the resourcing and financing of second and third pass assessments, in conjunction with state, territory and local government authorities.

The ANAO recommends that, to ensure the outcomes of evaluations are effectively used to enhance the national counter-terrorism arrangements, the Attorney-General’s Department and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet take appropriate measures to ensure:
a) the continuous improvement process for the counter-terrorism arrangements is strengthened and made transparent. Key areas for improvement in this regard include:
• a more strategic approach to the determination of desired outcomes,
• a more strategic and systematic approach to the setting of evaluation objectives and performance information and assessment mechanisms,
• increased analysis of actual performance against objectives, and
• amoresystematicmonitoringandfollow-up of evaluation outcomes and recommendations; and
b) sufficient and skilled resources are assigned to undertake the data management and analysis required.

The ANAO recommends that, to provide better information to contribute to strategic assessments, decisions and reporting, the Attorney-General’s Department, with input and guidance from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet:
a) centrally coordinate and amalgamate the issues and recommendations arising from the various reviews and exercises; and
b) provide strategic analyses of this information.

The Committee recommends that the Department of Transport and Regional Services review its record keeping practices to show the type of emergency for which assistance is provided through the Natural Disaster
Relief Arrangements.

The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth seeks to ensure that the Council of Australian Governments initiate consideration of the relaxation of restrictions on the movement of fire fighting equipment
during declared emergencies.