The Inspector-General of Emergency Management recommends Queensland Fire and Emergency Services lead an inter-agency IT system assessment with Queensland Police Service and local governments to identify disaster management systems currently in use and develop options to enhance connectivity and interoperability between systems. Outputs to be considered include, but are not limited to, consideration of requests for assistance (RFA) and the production of situation reports.

The Inspector-General of Emergency Management recommends all local governments that offer an opt-in system develop strategies to increase the number of subscribers who elect to use this service. As part of the annual disaster management plan assessment process for the period 2023–2025, the Office of the Inspector-General of Emergency Management will request information from the relevant local disaster management groups to highlight and share innovative practices that have led to an increase in subscription levels for opt-in services.

The Inspector-General of Emergency Management recommends the Queensland Reconstruction Authority and the Bureau of Meteorology investigate options for the consolidation of ownership, renewed capital and maintenance in the flood warning network in consultation with flood warning infrastructure asset owners.  

Permanent SEOCON: That, to improve NSW’s ability to prepare and respond to floods and other disasters, Government establish a new Deputy Commissioner of NSW Police Force to take on permanently the SEOCON role. This role, in addition to current SEOCON functions, would be responsible for:
• chairing the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC)
• facilitating collaborative risk management and compliance activities working with local and regional emergency management committees, communities, local government, state government agencies, particularly the proposed NSWRA, and the Australian Government
• working with relevant state government agencies to improve their operational readiness and preparedness for emergencies including, but not limited to, training, education, and ensuring proactive understanding of the location and condition of assets available to the combat agency in the event of an emergency, rather than this information being sought during an emergency, with agencies being required to report on implementation and progress through the SEMC
• ownership of a state capability framework to ensure combat agencies can resource a catastrophic event (so, for example, that during a flood emergency SES deploys all available assets, not just assets owned by SES)
• leading training standards across combat agencies, local government, NGOs and essential service providers.
• establishing funded permanent emergency management police positions (at sergeant or senior sergeant level) focussed on local emergency management service delivery for the SEOCON across all 27 police districts in regional NSW, and the 3 police metropolitan regions in Sydney, with priority given to identified high risk-catchments
• supporting existing interstate connectivity
• State Emergency Recovery Controller (SERCON) responsibilities, which could be delegated to a recovery coordinator/s as deemed appropriate
• leading the proposed new agency, Recovery NSW.
That, to support the Deputy Police Commissioner, SEOCON, a full-time secretariat office led by a Deputy Secretary for Emergency Management be established within, though functionally separate from, NSW Police to drive policy development and implementation. This office should be well-trained to ensure the effective chairing of, and secretariat support for, the SEMC.

Knowledge resources to support flood management: That, to provide more accurate and complete data for flood threat identification, warning and modelling systems, Government through the proposed new NSW Reconstruction Authority (NSWRA) work with the Australian Government to:
• improve the rain and river gauge network by:
— implementing the Bureau’s proposed New Policy Proposal for rain and river gauges in NSW
— working to transfer ownership and maintenance responsibility for as many of the river and rain gauges as possible in NSW to the Bureau of Meteorology
— upgrading and ensuring there is a maintenance program across NSW for those gauges that remain in state and local government ownership
• upgrade radar capability in NSW to ensure overlapping coverage and some redundancy, through upgrades to existing fixed radars, and investment in new fixed and mobile radars.
Also that the Government through the NSWRA:
• ensure that all relevant state entities and local councils implement the Bureau flash flooding guidelines for all watercourses for which they have flood warning responsibility, drawing on the state’s significant expertise in remote sensing to implement effective monitoring and warning systems that send warnings to all residents and businesses in affected areas
• make real-time flood warnings and information – both raw information from gauges and processed information from models – available publicly via a smartphone app (ideally part of a state disaster information app) that also allows citizens to provide information during a flood to help authorities and community. This information could include flood imagery and local knowledge observations in the lead into, during, and immediately after flood events.

SES and RFS back-office merger: That, to help protect life and property across NSW in storm and flood events, and to improve resourcing and NSW State Emergency Service (SES) frontline capability, Government implement, before the next storm season, a merger of the SES and NSW Rural Fire Services (RFS) back-office and corporate service functions, while maintaining their separate legislative identity, brand, uniform and volunteer membership. This ‘joined-up’ RFS/SES corporate support structure would be under the command of the RFS given its corporate and operational maturity and would be responsible for:
• placing risk at the centre of all decision making and planning for catastrophic disasters
• establishing a dedicated intelligence unit that synthesises the wealth of intelligence available to inform critical decision making, particularly for flash flooding
• establishing a planning unit to help better prepare communities, NSW combat and other agencies, and local governments about upcoming flood and storm seasons
• establishing a fulltime SES position for each high-risk catchment to ensure flood identification, response assets and supporting infrastructure is serviced, operational and ready to deploy
• designing and implementing a workforce plan to identify any capacity and capability gaps in frontline emergency staff, now and into the future
• improving the hiring standards of frontline full-time staff in operational decision-making positions
• improving the support, training and retention of both frontline staff and volunteers
• improving media protocols and identifying a designated media spokesperson during a disaster.
The newly merged model should be reviewed in 12 months’ time by the SEMC.

Essential services and floodplain infrastructure: That, to minimise disruption to essential services (power, communications, water, sewerage) and to ensure flood infrastructure is fully serviceable before flooding, Government ensure:
• essential services infrastructure (communications, water, power and sewerage) is situated as much as possible above the flood planning level. And to minimise disruption to medical services, aged care services and the police, Government ensure hospitals, medical centres, nursing homes, aged care facilities and police stations are situated above the probable maximum flood level
• floodplain infrastructure (drains, levees, flood gates) items are all assigned to an appropriate lead agency which has responsibility for ensuring they are fully maintained and functioning especially when floods are likely.

Resilience NSW and recovery: That, in order to enhance NSW disaster preparedness, response and recovery, and meet the needs of the people of NSW prior to, during and after a disaster, and provide clarity on agency roles and responsibilities, Resilience NSW be reshaped to ‘Recovery NSW’. The new agency will be more streamlined and agile to drive recovery in the first 100 days post disaster. To achieve this, Resilience NSW’s functions should be reallocated as follows:
• disaster preparedness and support, and disaster emergency management policy and service delivery to the newly created Deputy Commissioner of Police responsible for the SEOCON [Recovery NSW]
• community engagement and public education on disaster risk and preparations to DCS/NSWRA
• disaster recovery and renewal management and coordination to the newly created NSWRA
• evacuation centre management and coordination to the Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ), which includes support for self-styled community evacuation centres. Many of DCJ’s current functions deal with people in crisis, therefore the Inquiry finds it best placed to perform the role of evacuation centre lead. The Inquiry notes the importance of a police or security presence in evacuation centres, particularly in the early days of the establishment of the evacuation centres
• welfare services functional area (WELFAC) to the DCJ
• grants administration to the Department of Customer Service (DCS)/Service NSW for immediate relief and the NSWRA for longer term recovery and reconstruction. There should also be a renewed focus on agency, local and state government training.

Impact to essential services: That, to minimise disruption to essential services, including outages which compromise basic communication coverage, and to ensure access to safe water supply and power during flood events, Government work directly or together with the Australian and other state governments and/or their relevant power and telecommunications regulatory, policy and market bodies to:
• ensure there are sufficient redundancy options known and made available (for example, backup diesel generators, deployed temporary telecommunications facilities, etc.) to supply power to essential telecommunication infrastructure, alternative telecommunications infrastructure and water treatment facilities.
• ensure that the telecommunication entities, electricity network providers and water treatment managers are using up to the minute, whole of catchment models to inform business continuity planning in the event of flooding
• facilitate cross carrier roaming arrangements between carriers and the public for basic text, voice and data during the period of emergency in areas directly affected by flood
• ensure all essential services are mandatory members of the Emergency Management Committees at state, regional and local levels
• ensure the state understands essential services redundancies and what emergency redundancy options are available from Australian Government agencies
• ensure, given the heavy reliance on essential services by community and government during a disaster, essential services loss, redundancy and build back better principles are exercised through emergency management committee processes annually.

That the NSW Government consider abolishing Resilience NSW if it is unable to ensure:
• the organisation's role is clear after reviewing its policies, objectives and funding
• the organisation and its policies are focused on meeting community needs.

That the NSW Government work with relevant agencies and local landowners to find ways to improve the management of drainage channels including looking for recommendations to reduce red and green tape. 

That the NSW Government consider a restructure of the NSW State Emergency Service with consideration to: realigning the focus of the organisation to harness local knowledge and networks; coordinating more closely with other rescue agencies to bolster its capacity to respond; and increasing salaried staff and resources, and driving volunteer recruitment.

That the NSW Government prioritise support for the full restoration of sewage treatment facilities on the Richmond River, for the benefit of communities in the Northern Rivers region. 

That the NSW Government, in consultation with telecommunication providers and satellite communication providers, investigate ways to minimise the complete loss of telecommunication services in natural disasters, including:
• the distribution of satellite phones and satellite terminals to community hubs in flood prone areas
• the prioritisation of services for communities that are highly likely to become isolated in a natural disaster
• the establishment of appropriate protocols to ensure that this equipment is readily available and 'charged' for use with a battery supply.

That the NSW Government advocate through the National Cabinet for the Bureau of Meteorology to review its rain data infrastructure and flood modelling tools, to ensure forecasting locations, rain and flood gauges and other infrastructure are appropriately placed, maintained and updated.

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force consider expanding the panel of psychological advisers it retains and the range of disciplines it consults.

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force review its personnel arrangements and structures for the monitoring of surveillance devices, including the number of officers allocated to a listening or viewing post for monitoring purposes, and the demarcation of roles, including primary monitor, scribe/log keeper, and disseminator. I also recommend that clear communication channels be established for reporting data captured during such surveillance, including via integrated electronic intelligence sharing platforms or applications.

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force investigate the development of an integrated intelligence system that allows selected officers secure access to all information platforms and to record and share operational decisions.

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force review its policy of requiring negotiators to relinquish that role when they are promoted to commissioned officer rank

I recommend that if it has not already done so, the New South Wales Police Force acquires the audio surveillance technology that in similar circumstances would allow a device to be monitored in the Police Forward Command Post and/or the Police Operations Centre and that the organisation ensures that its capacity in this regard keeps pace with technological advances in the area.

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force establish procedures and the technical capability to ensure that phone calls from hostages in sieges or the victims of other ongoing high-risk situations are expeditiously transferred to officers involved in responding to the incident.

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force review the number, rank and function of the officers comprising the Negotiation Unit

I recommend that the New South Wales Police Force review its procedures to ensure that handovers between negotiation teams are staggered so that a fully briefed officer is always available to receive a call from the stronghold.

Emergency Management Queensland should ensure its staff, SES members and disaster managers are familiar with the directive when it is developed.

Emergency Management Queensland, in consultation with councils, should develop a directive that makes clear the authority of an officer of that agency to command a major SES operation. This could be expected to occur when a deployment of additional SES members is made to a region because the response needed is beyond the capacity of its local units. The directive should make clear the powers of the officer and his or her reporting responsibilities to disaster managers in these circumstances. Emergency Management Queensland must also ensure that any officer who assumes such a role has adequate training and skills in the conduct of disaster operations.

The fire service should ensure that station officers are familiar with the procedure for contacting management when requesting the calling in of additional staff; and, in particular, that they have available to them the names and current telephone numbers of the officers to be contacted in the first instance, with alternative contact details in the event that those officers prove unavailable.

Emergency Management Queensland should ensure its staff, SES members and disaster managers are familiar with the directives it develops in relation to these matters.

Emergency Management Queensland, in consultation with councils, should develop clear directives about: • the communication and reporting that should take place between the SES and disaster managers, including in relation to task allocation and completion, once disaster management groups have been activated • the communication and reporting that should take place between the SES and disaster managers, including in relation to task allocation and completion, once disaster management groups have been activated • the process for dealing with requests for assistance that exceed an SES unit’s capacity to respond them • the process for seeking extra support for an SES unit that has been overwhelmed by a disaster (whether by way of Emergency Management Queensland or the disaster management arrangements or both) • the role of SES liaison officers in communications with disaster managers about SES disaster operations • the role of incident controllers, and their teams, relative to those SES (or Emergency Management Queensland) personnel charged with the command of SES operations.

the state ensure that any new systems and equipment purchased by state emergency management agencies are interoperable with other relevant agencies to the fullest extent possible. This should involve the state establishing a procurement gateway process with input from the Emergency Services Commissioner.

the state take the necessary measures to upgrade existing manual stream and rain gauges and ensure that all future gauges provide a seamless transfer of data from the gauges to the Bureau of Meteorology.

That the officer responsible for the importation of horses ensure that:
(a) up-to-date copies of operating procedures or manuals setting out the procedures to be implemented are available both in soft-copy form on the AQIS intranet site and in hard-copy form at any premises where tasks associated with horse importation are ordinarily performed
(b) AQIS personnel involved in the importation of horses are trained in all relevant aspects of procedures relating to the importation of horses
(c) AQIS personnel taking up duties involving tasks related to horse importation and not having performed such tasks for more than 12 months undergo proper training in the relevant procedures before commencing their duties.

That the Department of Primary Industries should endeavour to improve its knowledge and skills base in the pig industry by recruiting a specialist pig industry liaison officer.

That the Department of Primary Industries should ensure that it retains the services of a specialist poultry industry liaison officer in the future.

That agencies assess the cost-effectiveness of establishing a dedicated and proven asset management information system which is integrated with the other information systems used to manage drainage assets.

That agencies integrate condition information into their asset management decision-making practices and use it as the basis for validating asset valuations and depreciation calculations.

That the recommendations of the 2000 DPI report into the reference collection’s storage facility be implemented, to secure the collection in a purpose-built facility.

That DPI makes arrangements to use contract labour for fruit fly trap monitoring and surveillance before the predicted fruit fly outbreak season.

That DPI develops a consistent approach to recording and enforcing breaches of the certification and verification system.

That PSB’s enforcement procedures are consistent with those of the rest of the department.

That DPI negotiates access, as and when required, to an AQIS PC4- accredited laboratory.

That DPI improves monitoring and surveillance of high priority threats and improves the quality of information provided to the Commonwealth.