The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), jointly with the CoordinatorGeneral of National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), should co-chair a coordination mechanism between Commonwealth departments and agencies to promote natural disaster risk reduction and resilience.
- This mechanism should ensure Commonwealth decision makers understand the role of relevant programs, with a view to avoiding duplication and ensuring better program information sharing and alignment.
- In establishing this mechanism, PM&C and NEMA should consider all current Commonwealth emergency and disaster management forums to ensure alignment. This includes reviewing respective terms of reference, frequency at which they meet and the appropriate balance between emergency response coordination and a wider Commonwealth focus on disaster risk reduction and resilience coordination.

The Commonwealth should mandate regular capability assessments of local governments by state and territory governments.
- Where possible, these assessments should form part of the local or regional Disaster Management Plans.
- Priority should be placed on assessing capability, capacity and investment requirements, as well as assessing any barriers to enabling locally led action, including disadvantaged, or disproportionately impacted communities.
- These assessments should help inform broader capability needs considered as part of Recommendation 6.
- Consideration should be given to complementing these local government capability assessments with data held by Regional Development Australia, managed by the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts (DITRDCA).

To support a comprehensive risk-based approach, the Commonwealth should require state and territory governments to develop local or regional Disaster Management Plans. These Disaster Management Plans should:
- Identify the readiness of a region to handle a disaster event (including considerations of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery).
- Include risks and strengths that are specific to that area in the natural, social, economic and built domains.
- Contain information that can be used to inform state and territory risk assessments, inform response activities in advance of disaster events, or help inform resource and funding requirements for recovery, disaster risk reduction, and resilience.
- Recognise and accommodate the lived experience, increased cost, risk and complexity of delivering disaster management services to remote communities, and to First Nations communities.

The Commonwealth should require state and territory governments to complete complementary disaster risk assessments to inform the Risk Profile and guide priority areas for Commonwealth investment and support. Where they exist, climate risk or adaptation profiles developed at local, state and Commonwealth levels should be used to inform the Risk Profile.

The Commonwealth should develop an agreed methodology to underpin the Risk Profile that would identify at-risk communities, capabilities, and assets.

The Commonwealth should use the results of the Risk Profile to work with state and territory governments to identify and prioritise disaster funding.
- The outcome of the Risk Profile should inform decision making elements in response to requests for Commonwealth funding, either directly or via co-contribution. Specifically, the results of the Risk Profile should also form a core consideration for future DRFA, and DRF decision making, as well as any other future programs.
- The Risk Profile should inform other Commonwealth programs, such as infrastructure investment, National Construction Code enhancements, climate change initiatives and the like.
- Understanding the Risk Profile will also allow the Commonwealth to place conditions or requirements on funding approvals that are consistent with a more strategically aligned approach to risk reduction and resilience.
-The Risk Profile should be used in concert with the Outcomes Policy to direct funding towards projects that advance risk reduction priorities, and which contribute to the outcomes the Commonwealth is seeking to achieve with its disaster funding.

The Commonwealth should lead the development of a Nation-wide Natural Disaster Risk Profile (Risk Profile) to enable the Commonwealth to identify risk reduction and resilience priorities and allow the Commonwealth, states, and territories to address agreed risk. The Risk Profile should:
- Be reviewed (including methodology) every five years but updated annually.
-Be led by NEMA and supported by PM&C.
- Encompass all components of natural disaster risk (hazard, exposure, vulnerability and response) with consideration of risk across all domains (natural, social, economic and built).
- Include consideration of the capacity and capabilities that exist to mitigate risks along with consideration of the capability to embed resilience.

In compiling the Risk Profile, the Commonwealth should draw upon existing activities including, but not limited to, the National Climate Risk Assessment and the High-Risk Weather Season Outlook.
- The Risk Profile should incorporate national perspectives on risks and opportunities across the natural, social, economic and built domains, in the context of current and anticipated natural disasters.

Improvements should be made to encourage investments in resilience and adaptation when rebuilding following a catastrophe or severe weather event (where this is cost-beneficial). This should involve coordination between government and the insurance industry to co-incentivise these investments to create mutually beneficial outcomes for the government, insurance industry and more importantly, the customer and their community.

Each NEMMM agenda should have a standing item on disaster risk reduction/resilience and at least one full meeting each year should be devoted to Disaster Resilience and Recovery. Some jurisdictions have established separate ministers responsible for recovery and resilience, and they should be invited to attend these recovery and resilience meetings.

NEMMM’s leading role in the wider national resilience effort should focus on disaster risk reduction, and it should engage as a core stakeholder in a wider range of other resilience issues. It should further elaborate this focus with respect to:
- Prospective risk management (higher infrastructure standards, environmental protection, etc.),
- Corrective risk management (retrofitting, reinforcing, and remedial measures),
- Compensatory risk management (risk financing and transfer), and
- Reactive risk management (early warning systems and effective response and recovery).

Cost benefit framework:That, to enable a more systematic prioritisation of investment options in risk mitigation before, during and immediately following a natural disaster event, Government adopt and utilise a Disaster Cost Benefit Framework. This Framework will enable Government to estimate the investment required for any given disaster, starting with flood events, and will enable the fast allocation of funding based on detailed and rapid analysis of flood and property modification, mitigation, preparation, response and finance related options including:
• flood modification measures/flood defence (including dams/ water management; levees; waterway or floodplain modifications; etc)
• property modification measures/flood risk mitigation (including land filling; flood proofing; house raising; optimum zoning; removal of development (buy back schemes/relocation))
• response modification measures/flood preparation (including flood warnings; upgrading evacuation routes; evacuation planning; emergency response and education programs; flood data collection and sharing; etc)
• finance related options (including building standard reforms; restructure and reduction of stamp duty; direct subsidies; government reinsurance pools; etc)
The Framework should build on the preliminary version developed by NSW Treasury and provided to this Inquiry. To support this Framework, Government should also use the NSW Adaptation Fund that can be drawn on during or immediately following a flood event.

Risk-based approach to calculating flood planning: That, to take account of greater knowledge of climate change, Government reinforce its adoption of a risk-based approach to calculating the flood planning level for planning purposes and, through the NSWRA, immediately start a process of revising all flood planning level calculations in the state’s high-risk catchments. Flood planning level re-determinations for all high-risk catchments should be completed within 3 years. These revised flood planning levels will need to be factored into all development applications (in-progress and new) in those high-risk catchments. The risk profile of high-risk catchments should be revisited at appropriate time intervals to check that levels are current. A review should take place if there has been a significant trigger event (i.e. changed rainfall, development) or at least every 5 years. As well as reviewing the flood planning level, this 5-yearly review should include reviewing any floodplain lease conditions and adjusting them as necessary in the light of better knowledge of climate change impacts. In working out a tolerable, risk-based flood planning level, consideration should be given to the PMF, 1% AEP, 0.02% AEP, existing development, approved but not yet constructed developments, and existing and approved but not yet constructed evacuation routes.
In coordinating this flood planning level re-determination process, NSWRA should work closely with local councils, DPE, communities, state water authorities and state and national engineering and research organisations. In doing so, the NSWRA should also:
• extend and then maintain the DPE state-wide flood database and associated visualisation interface. This database, which should link to LandiQ, would support:
— monitoring of the flood warning and sensing environment
— monitoring of trends in rainfall activity and impacts, including timing, cause, extent and intensity
— tracking trends and identifying patterns in associated weather and climate signals that contribute to severe floods
— evaluation of the cost and effectiveness of risk mitigation efforts, including land preparation, planning use and management, to enable a better understanding of what works
— simulation of extreme rainfall events and resultant flooding
— identification of ‘at risk’ river and catchment systems for flash flooding
— rapid and effective deployment of resources during a flash flood event
• act as the main coordination point for all NSW hydrological modelling, working with local government, other state agencies, universities, professional bodies (e.g. Engineers Australia) and the Australian Government (especially the Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO) to improve future NSW flood risk assessment (and hence accuracy and timeliness of flood prediction) by building more formal connections between the extensive existing physical hydrological modelling (done by various NSW agencies) with the Bureau’s meteorological and climatological research and riverine flood models
• support local councils to improve modelling of and ensure adequate and appropriate alarm systems for flash flooding.

To enable entities to have a shared understanding of forecast information for dam failure events during a flood, including flood wave travel time, speed and height, Emergency Action Plans contain protocols and responsibilities of relevant stakeholders for these aspects. 

To ensure enhanced capability integration and enable timely community messaging Bundaberg LDMG in consultation with Sunwater develop additional Emergency Alerts and associated polygons for a Paradise Dam failure and load these on to the disaster management portal. 

To enhance shared capacity and collaboratively manage risk, the Chair of the Bundaberg DDMG use the QERMF process to determine if dam failure for Paradise Dam should be reported as a residual risk in this instance due to known changes in the risk profile to:
- the State Disaster Coordination Group (SDCG) in accordance with their responsibilities under the State Plan
- QFES for ensuring the development of the state-wide risk assessment. 

To increase shared understanding of risks, ensure the coordination of plans and manage risks, dam failure for Paradise Dam be included as a separate risk within the Bundaberg District Disaster Management Plan (DDMP). 

To increase understanding of hazards and manage risks, dam failure for Paradise Dam be included as a separate risk within the North Burnett Local Disaster Management Plan (LDMP). 

The state’s arrangements for disaster management, including recovery, are articulated in the Disaster Management Act (2003), the Queensland Reconstruction Authority Act (2011), the State Disaster Management Plan and the Queensland Recovery Plan. To enable state-level arrangements to better support community-led recovery and to improve Queensland’s recovery governance
arrangements:
a. State-level roles and responsibilities of:
i. the Leadership Board Sub-committee (Recovery)
ii. the State Recovery Policy and Planning Coordinator
iii. the State Recovery Coordinator
iv. the Queensland Reconstruction Authority
v. functional recovery groups
for coordinating and reporting on recovery should be made more distinct from each other, and any overlap between them removed for greater clarity. Roles and responsibilities should be published on relevant websites.
b. A capability that delivers the effectiveness of the State Disaster Coordination Group and its supporting apparatus for response should exist for recovery. The capability should support coordination and reporting, and improve communication arrangements and sharing of operational information between functional recovery groups and agencies. Such a capability may be established by revising the State Disaster Coordination Group terms of reference and membership, or investigating the capacity for Queensland Reconstruction Authority to deliver it.

A strategy should be developed to improve the availability of information to decision-makers and other audiences. Information should be searchable, more specific, timely, and allow stake-holders to find what they want.

Planning and warnings for storm tide should be based on modelling that shows the chances of an event occurring (probabilistic).

The future risk of bushfires to Queensland communities should be re-evaluated as part of the 2020 State Risk Assessment in light of recent and emerging science, events and lessons.

The outputs of these capabilities should be shared and actively inform the disaster management sector, including response operations and the creation of warnings and public messaging.

Discontinue the automatic allocation of Fire Warden powers to Council and Committee members and substitute an option for members to be appointed as Fire Wardens.

TFS should engage in discussions with government about the construction of purpose-built State Control Centre facilities for emergency management in Tasmania.

A thorough consultative process be developed and implemented between the CFS and local government. This will determine how bushfire management planning can enable improved process and practice to mitigate bushfire risk, and ensure that fire permits are issued and complied with.

That the Commissioners of Police and the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service review the current district disaster boundaries as a matter of urgency in-line with the findings and recommendations of the Auditor–General’s report into the Queensland disaster management system.

Those final determinations of disaster management districts include consultation with the Local Government Association Queensland, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and other Government departments.

That the Inspector General Emergency Management be empowered to provide an assurance to Government that the disaster management system is both appropriate and capable of dealing with complex events.

That the Queensland Police Service Disaster Management Unit is to be permanently located at the State Disaster Coordination Centre to work on a day to day basis with the proposed new Department of Fire and Emergency Services.

Regulators can help to achieve improved outcomes by considering the issues identified by this review

Fire services can improve outcomes by initiating discussions with landfill operators about fire management planning and emphasising the critical importance of water supplies and early intervention

That the concession holder of the rail corridor be approached to formalise a Memorandum of Understanding for the maintenance of the railway corridor for the purposes of fuel load reduction.

Prepare a formal proposal for the creation of pastoral/Indigenous Lands Fire Management Teams.

Investigate the application and cost of the creation of District Coordination Officers to key high demand brigade districts.

PowerWater Corporation be consulted with the intention of establishing a Memorandum Of Understanding for the maintenance of PowerWater land for the purpose of coordinated fire reduction.

Review disaster recovery and business continuity plans.

Emergency Management Western Australia and the State Emergency Management Committee amend WESTPLAN-BUSHFIRE to require State Emergency Coordination Group meetings to be held at the State Coordination Centre in West Leederville.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority, the Department of Environment and Conservation and local governments jointly develop a single, integrated system for fuel load assessment and management.
The system should enable public access to allow members of the community to access information about the fuel load in a given locality.

Decision‐making about well control issues should be professionalised. Industry participants must recognise that decision‐makers owe independent duties to the public, not just their employer or principal, in relation to well control. Risk management in the context of well control needs to be understood as an ethical/professional duty. Self‐regulation contemplates self‐regulation by the industry, not just by individual licensees and operators.

Removal of a barrier must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to removal. A proper risk assessment should be carried out and agreed upon, and documented in writing before removal. Joint written certification as to the appropriateness of removal should take place before removal. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

The use/type of barriers (including any change requests relating thereto) must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to installation. A proper risk assessment should be carried out, agreed upon, and documented in writing before installation. Joint written certification as to the appropriateness of the use of particular barriers should take place before installation. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

Problems which arise in the course of installing barriers must be the subject of consultation between licensees, rig operators, and contractors (if used). A proper risk assessment should then be carried out and remedial steps (including further testing/verification) should be agreed upon, and documented in writing before the performance of remedial work whenever practicable. Joint written certification as to resolution of the problem should take place before resumption of drilling operations. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

Pre‐drilling assessments should include a risk assessment of the worst‐case blowout scenario.

The regulator should pre‐assess and review in a generic sense, and in conjunction with the offshore petroleum industry, available options for well control in the event of a blowout. Being ‘match fit’ in this sense will enable a quicker and more effective response in terms of safety assessment, and will ensure that expectations of both operator and regulator are more readily aligned.

The industry should develop in conjunction with the Regulator a process for addressing the need to maintain the risk profile of a facility moving into extended life operation at the same risk profile as when it was within design life.

The ITSRR should have permanent access to the RailCorp intranet.

Maintenance plans on all trains should be revised annually.

The ITSRR should conduct its own risk assessment in relation to the risk of any such high consequence, low probability accident and, if necessary, direct RailCorp to conduct a further risk assessment to reduce the level of residual risk to a level ITSRR regards as acceptable.

RailCorp should undertake risk assessments of each of its activities as follows:
(a) identify the features of the system, subsystem or activities that are to be risk assessed and managed, to determine what makes the system work in terms of equipment, infrastructure and human factors;
(b) identify all hazards that may exist within the particular system, subsystem or activity, whether it is a driver safety system, passenger safety system, engineering design system, train maintenance system or involves human factors or performance;
(c) identify what controls are in place to eliminate or minimise the risks associated with any identified hazard;
(d) test the validity of the controls to ensure that the risk is eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level and, if not, institute additional or further control measures;
(e) specify, in safety documentation, the level of any residual risk;
(f) in the case of low probability, high consequence risks retain the services of an independent verifier of the risk assessments and controls to certify that all risks of such potentially catastrophic accidents have either been eliminated, or controlled to the extent identified by the independent expert;
(g) the Board of RailCorp certify that it regards any residual risk of a high consequence, low probability accident as acceptable, notwithstanding the severity of the consequences, by reason of the cost of further measures to control the risk; and
(h) provide to ITSRR records of the processes of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk control, independent verification and certification, and any Board certification relating to any high consequence, low probability accident.

That DSE and CFA as part of their long term planning, and in conjunction with the Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology, consider ways in which evidence for climate change and El Niño–Southern Oscillation cycle impacts on the likelihood of unplanned fire, can be better incorporated into preparedness and response planning.

That CFA, DSE and MFESB continue to develop the partnership approach for fire safety with Local Government, industry and communities. 

That DSE, with adequate resourcing, moves to a 12-month cycle of fire management to establish and maintain a more appropriate and balanced work program of prevention/mitigation and suppression.