Improve the capacity of the Incident Management Operations through:
a. resourcing and renumeration of the IMT - strengthen the model of incident management team to better optimise structures and performance; and
b. internal communications and dynaics - strengthen the frequency and quality of critical information to enhance collaboration and effectiveness across disaster management structures; and
c. LDCC functionality - increase depth in the capability of and redundancy of critical IMT leadership roles to better optimise capacity and quality of functions

Leadership - Strategic and Executive Awareness. Build the activation capability of the LDCC and LDMG arrangements in terms of leadership and oversight to improved efficiency and effectiveness of LDMG operations by:
1.1 Reviewing procedures that guide the communication of the activation status of the LDCC and Cairns LDMG as distinct from Council's BAU, to clearly convey the transition of authority of the counter disaster operations to the LDMG
1.2 Reviewing processes to ensure that all leadership roles are inducted into the QDMA and adhere to the structures through participation in mandatory training
1.3 Conducting skills needs assessments and deliver additional training in enhanced counter disaster capabilities (prediction; forecasting; situational awareness) across all leadership tiers.
1.4 Revewing structures and rostering processes to ensure fail-safe redundancy measures for all leadership roles - particularly for middle tier leaders (e.g. Team Leaders; IMT Operations Room Manager)

The Commonwealth should lead the development of a Nation-wide Natural Disaster Risk Profile (Risk Profile) to enable the Commonwealth to identify risk reduction and resilience priorities and allow the Commonwealth, states, and territories to address agreed risk. The Risk Profile should:
- Be reviewed (including methodology) every five years but updated annually.
-Be led by NEMA and supported by PM&C.
- Encompass all components of natural disaster risk (hazard, exposure, vulnerability and response) with consideration of risk across all domains (natural, social, economic and built).
- Include consideration of the capacity and capabilities that exist to mitigate risks along with consideration of the capability to embed resilience.

In compiling the Risk Profile, the Commonwealth should draw upon existing activities including, but not limited to, the National Climate Risk Assessment and the High-Risk Weather Season Outlook.
- The Risk Profile should incorporate national perspectives on risks and opportunities across the natural, social, economic and built domains, in the context of current and anticipated natural disasters.

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), jointly with the CoordinatorGeneral of National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), should co-chair a coordination mechanism between Commonwealth departments and agencies to promote natural disaster risk reduction and resilience.
- This mechanism should ensure Commonwealth decision makers understand the role of relevant programs, with a view to avoiding duplication and ensuring better program information sharing and alignment.
- In establishing this mechanism, PM&C and NEMA should consider all current Commonwealth emergency and disaster management forums to ensure alignment. This includes reviewing respective terms of reference, frequency at which they meet and the appropriate balance between emergency response coordination and a wider Commonwealth focus on disaster risk reduction and resilience coordination.

The Commonwealth should mandate regular capability assessments of local governments by state and territory governments.
- Where possible, these assessments should form part of the local or regional Disaster Management Plans.
- Priority should be placed on assessing capability, capacity and investment requirements, as well as assessing any barriers to enabling locally led action, including disadvantaged, or disproportionately impacted communities.
- These assessments should help inform broader capability needs considered as part of Recommendation 6.
- Consideration should be given to complementing these local government capability assessments with data held by Regional Development Australia, managed by the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts (DITRDCA).

To support a comprehensive risk-based approach, the Commonwealth should require state and territory governments to develop local or regional Disaster Management Plans. These Disaster Management Plans should:
- Identify the readiness of a region to handle a disaster event (including considerations of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery).
- Include risks and strengths that are specific to that area in the natural, social, economic and built domains.
- Contain information that can be used to inform state and territory risk assessments, inform response activities in advance of disaster events, or help inform resource and funding requirements for recovery, disaster risk reduction, and resilience.
- Recognise and accommodate the lived experience, increased cost, risk and complexity of delivering disaster management services to remote communities, and to First Nations communities.

The Commonwealth should require state and territory governments to complete complementary disaster risk assessments to inform the Risk Profile and guide priority areas for Commonwealth investment and support. Where they exist, climate risk or adaptation profiles developed at local, state and Commonwealth levels should be used to inform the Risk Profile.

The Commonwealth should develop an agreed methodology to underpin the Risk Profile that would identify at-risk communities, capabilities, and assets.

The Commonwealth should use the results of the Risk Profile to work with state and territory governments to identify and prioritise disaster funding.
- The outcome of the Risk Profile should inform decision making elements in response to requests for Commonwealth funding, either directly or via co-contribution. Specifically, the results of the Risk Profile should also form a core consideration for future DRFA, and DRF decision making, as well as any other future programs.
- The Risk Profile should inform other Commonwealth programs, such as infrastructure investment, National Construction Code enhancements, climate change initiatives and the like.
- Understanding the Risk Profile will also allow the Commonwealth to place conditions or requirements on funding approvals that are consistent with a more strategically aligned approach to risk reduction and resilience.
-The Risk Profile should be used in concert with the Outcomes Policy to direct funding towards projects that advance risk reduction priorities, and which contribute to the outcomes the Commonwealth is seeking to achieve with its disaster funding.

Improvements should be made to encourage investments in resilience and adaptation when rebuilding following a catastrophe or severe weather event (where this is cost-beneficial). This should involve coordination between government and the insurance industry to co-incentivise these investments to create mutually beneficial outcomes for the government, insurance industry and more importantly, the customer and their community.

Each NEMMM agenda should have a standing item on disaster risk reduction/resilience and at least one full meeting each year should be devoted to Disaster Resilience and Recovery. Some jurisdictions have established separate ministers responsible for recovery and resilience, and they should be invited to attend these recovery and resilience meetings.

NEMMM’s leading role in the wider national resilience effort should focus on disaster risk reduction, and it should engage as a core stakeholder in a wider range of other resilience issues. It should further elaborate this focus with respect to:
- Prospective risk management (higher infrastructure standards, environmental protection, etc.),
- Corrective risk management (retrofitting, reinforcing, and remedial measures),
- Compensatory risk management (risk financing and transfer), and
- Reactive risk management (early warning systems and effective response and recovery).

Cost benefit framework:That, to enable a more systematic prioritisation of investment options in risk mitigation before, during and immediately following a natural disaster event, Government adopt and utilise a Disaster Cost Benefit Framework. This Framework will enable Government to estimate the investment required for any given disaster, starting with flood events, and will enable the fast allocation of funding based on detailed and rapid analysis of flood and property modification, mitigation, preparation, response and finance related options including:
• flood modification measures/flood defence (including dams/ water management; levees; waterway or floodplain modifications; etc)
• property modification measures/flood risk mitigation (including land filling; flood proofing; house raising; optimum zoning; removal of development (buy back schemes/relocation))
• response modification measures/flood preparation (including flood warnings; upgrading evacuation routes; evacuation planning; emergency response and education programs; flood data collection and sharing; etc)
• finance related options (including building standard reforms; restructure and reduction of stamp duty; direct subsidies; government reinsurance pools; etc)
The Framework should build on the preliminary version developed by NSW Treasury and provided to this Inquiry. To support this Framework, Government should also use the NSW Adaptation Fund that can be drawn on during or immediately following a flood event.

Risk-based approach to calculating flood planning: That, to take account of greater knowledge of climate change, Government reinforce its adoption of a risk-based approach to calculating the flood planning level for planning purposes and, through the NSWRA, immediately start a process of revising all flood planning level calculations in the state’s high-risk catchments. Flood planning level re-determinations for all high-risk catchments should be completed within 3 years. These revised flood planning levels will need to be factored into all development applications (in-progress and new) in those high-risk catchments. The risk profile of high-risk catchments should be revisited at appropriate time intervals to check that levels are current. A review should take place if there has been a significant trigger event (i.e. changed rainfall, development) or at least every 5 years. As well as reviewing the flood planning level, this 5-yearly review should include reviewing any floodplain lease conditions and adjusting them as necessary in the light of better knowledge of climate change impacts. In working out a tolerable, risk-based flood planning level, consideration should be given to the PMF, 1% AEP, 0.02% AEP, existing development, approved but not yet constructed developments, and existing and approved but not yet constructed evacuation routes.
In coordinating this flood planning level re-determination process, NSWRA should work closely with local councils, DPE, communities, state water authorities and state and national engineering and research organisations. In doing so, the NSWRA should also:
• extend and then maintain the DPE state-wide flood database and associated visualisation interface. This database, which should link to LandiQ, would support:
— monitoring of the flood warning and sensing environment
— monitoring of trends in rainfall activity and impacts, including timing, cause, extent and intensity
— tracking trends and identifying patterns in associated weather and climate signals that contribute to severe floods
— evaluation of the cost and effectiveness of risk mitigation efforts, including land preparation, planning use and management, to enable a better understanding of what works
— simulation of extreme rainfall events and resultant flooding
— identification of ‘at risk’ river and catchment systems for flash flooding
— rapid and effective deployment of resources during a flash flood event
• act as the main coordination point for all NSW hydrological modelling, working with local government, other state agencies, universities, professional bodies (e.g. Engineers Australia) and the Australian Government (especially the Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO) to improve future NSW flood risk assessment (and hence accuracy and timeliness of flood prediction) by building more formal connections between the extensive existing physical hydrological modelling (done by various NSW agencies) with the Bureau’s meteorological and climatological research and riverine flood models
• support local councils to improve modelling of and ensure adequate and appropriate alarm systems for flash flooding.

TFS should engage in discussions with government about the construction of purpose-built State Control Centre facilities for emergency management in Tasmania.

That in flood-prone municipalities, the respective Municipal Committee develops or reviews flood-related sub-plans within a Municipal Emergency Management Plan at least every two years and submits each sub-plan to the Regional Controller for approval. In addition, that each Municipal Committee maintains a current flood plan, in a standardised format, which at least identifies: • flood-prone parts of their locality, particularly those where lives may be at risk; • required actions to be taken in the event of a flood threat, especially timely evacuation; • trigger points for taking required actions and how those trigger points will be monitored; and • how the community can access flood-plan information

The Act be amended to require the mandatory appointment of Authorised Officers by each rural council or council that has within its area a Designated Urban Bushfire Risk Area(s) with an option for the CFS Chief Officer to exempt council from this requirement (similar to Section 105B). 

A thorough consultative process be developed and implemented between the CFS and local government. This will determine how bushfire management planning can enable improved process and practice to mitigate bushfire risk, and ensure that fire permits are issued and complied with.

That in establishing new disaster districts, the first guiding principle must be to align with local government boundaries and that divergence should only occur when there is a need to address a unique local circumstance.

That the Commissioners of Police and the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service review the current district disaster boundaries as a matter of urgency in-line with the findings and recommendations of the Auditor–General’s report into the Queensland disaster management system.

Those final determinations of disaster management districts include consultation with the Local Government Association Queensland, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and other Government departments.

That the Inspector General Emergency Management be empowered to provide an assurance to Government that the disaster management system is both appropriate and capable of dealing with complex events.

That the Queensland Police Service Disaster Management Unit is to be permanently located at the State Disaster Coordination Centre to work on a day to day basis with the proposed new Department of Fire and Emergency Services.

Review disaster recovery and business continuity plans.

Noting existing legislative and policy arrangements, there is merit in considering options for the future management of Level 3 fires in Local Government areas.

The State Government give its full support to the Western Australian Local Government Association’s Send to Solve initiative.

Local Government recognise the work of the Gas Technical Regulatory Council and ensure any amendments to the Australian Standard are enforced.
Local Government provide information to residents on any changes to the Australian Standard relating to tethering gas tanks and encourage property owners to take action to comply with the Standard.

Local governments continue to include information on bushfire risk and preparedness with rates notices.

Local Government recognise the work of the Gas Technical Regulatory Council and ensure any amendments to the Australian Standard are enforced. Local Government provide information to residents on any changes to the Australian Standard relating to tethering gas tanks and encourage property owners to take action to comply with the Standard.

Local governments institute a comprehensive program to assess fuel loads and bushfire preparedness on private properties. The program should give reference to the creation and maintenance of a Building Protection Zone, in line with FESA guidelines. This program should be implemented and managed under the Bush Fires Act 1954 in a manner similar to the fire break inspection program.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority and local governments ensure that Community Emergency Service Managers are physically based in local government.

Main Roads Western Australia undertake more frequent examinations of its bridges located in areas prone to bushfire and ensure that the risk posed to loss of infrastructure in a fire is understood by local authorities.

Local governments institute a comprehensive program to assess fuel loads and bushfire preparedness on private properties. The program should give reference to the creation and maintenance of a Building Protection Zone, in line with FESA guidelines.
This program should be implemented and managed under the Bush Fires Act 1954 in a manner similar to the fire break inspection program.

Emergency Management Western Australia and the State Emergency Management Committee amend WESTPLAN-BUSHFIRE to require State Emergency Coordination Group meetings to be held at the State Coordination Centre in West Leederville.

Local governments consider increasing the number of green waste collections carried out each year to encourage a more proactive approach to property (and vegetation) maintenance by residents.

The Western Australian Local Government Association explore the feasibility of local governments utilising aerial and satellite imagery to monitor firebreaks and fuel loads on private property.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority, the Department of Environment and Conservation and local governments jointly develop a single, integrated system for fuel load assessment and management.
The system should enable public access to allow members of the community to access information about the fuel load in a given locality.

the state, following the completion of the Municipal Association of Victoria Improving Emergency Management in Local Government program, work with municipalities to revise the role and responsibilities of local government in emergency management. The issue of capability and capacity of each local government should be addressed in all related emergency management arrangements.

municipal councils undertake a risk assessment of caravan parks and decide if any should be included in the list of facilities where vulnerable people may be located.

Pre‐drilling assessments should include a risk assessment of the worst‐case blowout scenario.

The regulator should pre‐assess and review in a generic sense, and in conjunction with the offshore petroleum industry, available options for well control in the event of a blowout. Being ‘match fit’ in this sense will enable a quicker and more effective response in terms of safety assessment, and will ensure that expectations of both operator and regulator are more readily aligned.

Decision‐making about well control issues should be professionalised. Industry participants must recognise that decision‐makers owe independent duties to the public, not just their employer or principal, in relation to well control. Risk management in the context of well control needs to be understood as an ethical/professional duty. Self‐regulation contemplates self‐regulation by the industry, not just by individual licensees and operators.

Removal of a barrier must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to removal. A proper risk assessment should be carried out and agreed upon, and documented in writing before removal. Joint written certification as to the appropriateness of removal should take place before removal. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

The use/type of barriers (including any change requests relating thereto) must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to installation. A proper risk assessment should be carried out, agreed upon, and documented in writing before installation. Joint written certification as to the appropriateness of the use of particular barriers should take place before installation. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

Problems which arise in the course of installing barriers must be the subject of consultation between licensees, rig operators, and contractors (if used). A proper risk assessment should then be carried out and remedial steps (including further testing/verification) should be agreed upon, and documented in writing before the performance of remedial work whenever practicable. Joint written certification as to resolution of the problem should take place before resumption of drilling operations. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

The industry should develop in conjunction with the Regulator a process for addressing the need to maintain the risk profile of a facility moving into extended life operation at the same risk profile as when it was within design life.

The ITSRR should have permanent access to the RailCorp intranet.

Maintenance plans on all trains should be revised annually.

The ITSRR should conduct its own risk assessment in relation to the risk of any such high consequence, low probability accident and, if necessary, direct RailCorp to conduct a further risk assessment to reduce the level of residual risk to a level ITSRR regards as acceptable.

RailCorp should undertake risk assessments of each of its activities as follows:
(a) identify the features of the system, subsystem or activities that are to be risk assessed and managed, to determine what makes the system work in terms of equipment, infrastructure and human factors;
(b) identify all hazards that may exist within the particular system, subsystem or activity, whether it is a driver safety system, passenger safety system, engineering design system, train maintenance system or involves human factors or performance;
(c) identify what controls are in place to eliminate or minimise the risks associated with any identified hazard;
(d) test the validity of the controls to ensure that the risk is eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level and, if not, institute additional or further control measures;
(e) specify, in safety documentation, the level of any residual risk;
(f) in the case of low probability, high consequence risks retain the services of an independent verifier of the risk assessments and controls to certify that all risks of such potentially catastrophic accidents have either been eliminated, or controlled to the extent identified by the independent expert;
(g) the Board of RailCorp certify that it regards any residual risk of a high consequence, low probability accident as acceptable, notwithstanding the severity of the consequences, by reason of the cost of further measures to control the risk; and
(h) provide to ITSRR records of the processes of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk control, independent verification and certification, and any Board certification relating to any high consequence, low probability accident.