The committee recommends that Treasury develop options for a levy on coal and gas extraction companies, based on the annual energy content they have extracted, from which the funds raised would be invested in disaster mitigation and resilience measures, and the cost of rising insurance.

The committee recommends that the Australian Government pursue the matter of land use and planning laws, including the feasibility of prohibiting future development in high-risk areas, through the Housing and Homelessness Ministerial Council and other relevant ministerial council arrangements.

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet:
- provide stronger guidance to entities in their development and updating of entity level and relevant national level crisis management policies and plans; and
- provide a formal response to the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit that outlines actions taken to address recommendation three from Report 494: Inquiry into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's crisis management and arrangements

That the Australian Government establish the National Climate Service within the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water with arrangements that encourage the development of a separate and strong public profile.

That the Australian Government establish the National Climate Service within the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, and consider opportunities for resource and systems sharing, potentially integrating its back office data and computational systems with Environment Information Australia.

That the Australian Government Establish the National Climate Service, which will be available to serve all Australian governments (Commonwealth, state, territory, local) and, over time, provide information to all Australians. The National Climate Service should absorb the remaining Australian Climate Service functions (which are not transferred to the National Emergency Management Agency), and should be able to broaden its services to new users with agreement from the responsible Minister.

That the Australian Government allow the National Emergency Management Agency to make judgements about how to best meet its needs, including by managing its own tasking, data and analysis, with the ability to draw on external sources.

That the Australian Government transfer responsibility for operational support services for emergency management (as set out in the Australian Climate Service Operational Support Services – Service Level Agreement 2023-24) from the Australian Climate Service to the National Emergency Management Agency, to reinforce the real time connection of information and decision-making on emergency responses.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government work with state, territory and local governments through National Cabinet to ensure that publicly disclosed risk information at the individual property level is available through the property conveyancing process or mandated in state rental agreement regulation.

The Committee recommends the Australian Government collaborate with state governments to implement measures to repurpose areas with high flood risk for alternative purposes, including returning developed land into a predeveloped state or repurposing land for recreational or agricultural use.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government work with State, Territory and local government through National Cabinet to ensure that further development does not occur in areas of 1-in-100 flood risk or greater. The boundary for no future development should take account of climate modelling of future increases in risk, in addition to current estimates of risk. The Committee further recommends that the Australian Government explore mechanisms that it can adopt to give effect to this unilaterally, including:
- Publicly disclosed risk information at the individual property level, including for new developments. This could be through a range of mechanisms, including:
- a portal informed by data provided to the Commonwealth government through the Hazards Insurance Partnership for all property released for development.
- A regulatory mechanism to discourage banks from loaning for further development at a 1/100 risk or higher (such as risk rating banks’ capital to appropriately reflect flood risk; an agreement between government, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, and major banks that such loans will not occur, or other regulatory mechanisms). These measures could apply to lending to both developers and to residential purchasers.
- Access to any flood pool (or subsidies) would not be available to properties approved in high-risk areas after the creation of the scheme.

The Committee recommends the Australian Government work with state and territory governments to review the operation of existing buy-back schemes to ensure they are targeted appropriately and to evaluate the outcomes for households that have received assistance.

The Committee recommends that legislation provide the Australian Securities and Investments Commission with sufficient data-gathering powers to obtain the information required to monitor and report on the metrics recommended in Recommendation 51.

The Committee recommends that state and territory governments develop buyback and resilience programs for households with very high flood risk and where alternative mitigation measures are unlikely to manage the risk. The Australian Government should consider working with state and territory governments, including through co-funding models, where appropriate.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government investigate mechanisms to require insurers to more clearly communicate the basis for the price of premiums. This could include:
- at a high level, highlighting the nature of risk for the property for each major peril type (for example, a traffic light rating system)
- last year’s premium alongside the current year’s premium, along with a descriptive analysis of why there has been a change if it is material (for example, over 10 per cent). The analysis could include highlighting different factors that may influence pricing such as changes in building costs or changes in the assessment of one or more perils, or the impact of household or community level mitigation, without attaching numerical estimates to each factor.

The Committee recommends the Australian Government consider measures to reduce household level risks, including whether it would be appropriate to extend the Bushfire Resilience Rating Home Self-Assessment App to flood risks.

The Committee recommends the Australian Government consider appropriate regulatory or other mechanisms to reduce the instances of third-party builders and other contractors making changes to properties without the policyholder’s consent, including the practice of gaining entry, removing property (strip-outs) or conducting repairs without the policyholder’s knowledge or consent. Solutions should take into account the unique circumstances and challenges created by catastrophic flood events.

The Committee recommends that building codes and planning rules be strengthened and future-proofed to improve the resilience of communities and households, consistent with Recommendation 2 of the Actuaries Institute’s Funding for Flood Costs report.
- This should take into account not just current flood risks, but also projected increases in risks based on climate modelling
- Consideration should be given to the publication of a freely available disaster risk rating system.

The committee recommends that the Australian Government convene a disaster resilience mental health summit to hear from all related agencies and stakeholders to identify solutions to the mental health impacts of disaster.

The committee recommends that the Australian Government design and implement consistent national trauma-informed care principles, ensuring that first responders—both professional and volunteer—receive training and support in these national principles to better address the mental health and well-being of disaster-affected individuals and communities.

The committee recommends that the Australian Government establish a national disaster mental health hub to coordinate and provide mental health resources, training, and support for first responders and communities affected by disasters across the nation. This hub should serve as a comprehensive resource centre for addressing the mental health needs of all stakeholders involved in disaster response and recovery efforts.

The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider how it can further support Disaster Relief Australia, and other similar organisations, not only with funding beyond 2026, but also how the Australian Government can further incorporate Disaster Relief Australia into its national disaster response arrangements and boost its numbers through partnerships with the Australian Defence Force and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs.

The Commonwealth should develop an agreed methodology to underpin the Risk Profile that would identify at-risk communities, capabilities, and assets.

The Commonwealth should use the results of the Risk Profile to work with state and territory governments to identify and prioritise disaster funding.
- The outcome of the Risk Profile should inform decision making elements in response to requests for Commonwealth funding, either directly or via co-contribution. Specifically, the results of the Risk Profile should also form a core consideration for future DRFA, and DRF decision making, as well as any other future programs.
- The Risk Profile should inform other Commonwealth programs, such as infrastructure investment, National Construction Code enhancements, climate change initiatives and the like.
- Understanding the Risk Profile will also allow the Commonwealth to place conditions or requirements on funding approvals that are consistent with a more strategically aligned approach to risk reduction and resilience.
-The Risk Profile should be used in concert with the Outcomes Policy to direct funding towards projects that advance risk reduction priorities, and which contribute to the outcomes the Commonwealth is seeking to achieve with its disaster funding.

The Commonwealth should develop a capability, with agreed accountability measures, to capture and track all Commonwealth expenditure relating to natural disasters.
- This capability should be digitally enabled and provide the supporting architecture for the Commonwealth to collate all disaster-relevant program information and report progress against the Outcomes Policy.
- The capability should be informed by existing Department of Finance data collection arrangements.

The Commonwealth should lead the development of a Nation-wide Natural Disaster Risk Profile (Risk Profile) to enable the Commonwealth to identify risk reduction and resilience priorities and allow the Commonwealth, states, and territories to address agreed risk. The Risk Profile should:
- Be reviewed (including methodology) every five years but updated annually.
-Be led by NEMA and supported by PM&C.
- Encompass all components of natural disaster risk (hazard, exposure, vulnerability and response) with consideration of risk across all domains (natural, social, economic and built).
- Include consideration of the capacity and capabilities that exist to mitigate risks along with consideration of the capability to embed resilience.

In compiling the Risk Profile, the Commonwealth should draw upon existing activities including, but not limited to, the National Climate Risk Assessment and the High-Risk Weather Season Outlook.
- The Risk Profile should incorporate national perspectives on risks and opportunities across the natural, social, economic and built domains, in the context of current and anticipated natural disasters.

The Commonwealth should implement an enhanced national training and exercise regime that tests local capabilities, but also encourages better information sharing, continual improvement, cross-Local Government Area (LGA) and jurisdiction collaboration, and the identification of gaps or weaknesses in local disaster management capability and capacity.
- Capability and capacity should be aligned with the requirements of the Nation-wide Natural Disaster Risk Profile (Risk Profile) and the National Natural Disaster Outcomes Policy (Outcomes Policy).

The Commonwealth should introduce a systematic and consistent approach to measuring and evaluating the impact of disaster programs against the nationally determined outcomes specified in the Outcomes Policy.

The Commonwealth should mandate regular capability assessments of local governments by state and territory governments.
- Where possible, these assessments should form part of the local or regional Disaster Management Plans.
- Priority should be placed on assessing capability, capacity and investment requirements, as well as assessing any barriers to enabling locally led action, including disadvantaged, or disproportionately impacted communities.
- These assessments should help inform broader capability needs considered as part of Recommendation 6.
- Consideration should be given to complementing these local government capability assessments with data held by Regional Development Australia, managed by the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts (DITRDCA).

The Commonwealth, via NEMA, should work with state and territory governments to adopt a leadership and oversight role in ensuring adequate capability, capacity and/or investment exists across Australia for local government and communities to adequately respond to natural disaster events, and to engage with appropriate support and funding structures.

The Commonwealth should develop a National Natural Disaster Outcomes Policy (Outcomes Policy) that describes the outcomes the Commonwealth is seeking to achieve through its disaster funding.

To support a comprehensive risk-based approach, the Commonwealth should require state and territory governments to develop local or regional Disaster Management Plans. These Disaster Management Plans should:
- Identify the readiness of a region to handle a disaster event (including considerations of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery).
- Include risks and strengths that are specific to that area in the natural, social, economic and built domains.
- Contain information that can be used to inform state and territory risk assessments, inform response activities in advance of disaster events, or help inform resource and funding requirements for recovery, disaster risk reduction, and resilience.
- Recognise and accommodate the lived experience, increased cost, risk and complexity of delivering disaster management services to remote communities, and to First Nations communities.

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), jointly with the CoordinatorGeneral of National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), should co-chair a coordination mechanism between Commonwealth departments and agencies to promote natural disaster risk reduction and resilience.
- This mechanism should ensure Commonwealth decision makers understand the role of relevant programs, with a view to avoiding duplication and ensuring better program information sharing and alignment.
- In establishing this mechanism, PM&C and NEMA should consider all current Commonwealth emergency and disaster management forums to ensure alignment. This includes reviewing respective terms of reference, frequency at which they meet and the appropriate balance between emergency response coordination and a wider Commonwealth focus on disaster risk reduction and resilience coordination.

The Commonwealth should conduct a stocktake to map existing partnerships in natural disaster management across various sectors including but not limited to, construction, healthcare, infrastructure, logistics, technology, philanthropy and the charitable sector.
- This mapping should inform membership of the Disaster Management Advisory Council (Recommendation 8).

The capability and capacity of NEMA should be aligned with the reforms proposed by the Review.
-This includes, but is not limited to, capabilities related to policy and program design, data collection and reporting, program assurance, monitoring and evaluation and program administration.

The Commonwealth should require state and territory governments to complete complementary disaster risk assessments to inform the Risk Profile and guide priority areas for Commonwealth investment and support. Where they exist, climate risk or adaptation profiles developed at local, state and Commonwealth levels should be used to inform the Risk Profile.

The Commonwealth should seek to establish enhanced relationships with key nongovernment and private sector partners as part of reforms to the disaster management system.

The Commonwealth should convene a Disaster Management Advisory Council to provide a constructive view of the Commonwealth’s current disaster arrangements, outcomes, and funding options. This Council should report directly to the Minister for Emergency Management and meet regularly (minimum twice per annum) but not be considered part of the decision making or administrative process.
- A primary purpose of the Disaster Management Advisory Council should include advising on priority projects identified through the Risk Profile, and on how national outcomes could be better achieved.
- The Advisory Council should be chaired by the Coordinator-General, NEMA and be supported by a secretariat within NEMA.
- The Advisory Council should be comprised of a representative mix of government and non-government members.
- Non-government members should be representative of a broad range of knowledge holders: industry, the not-for-profit sector, academia and representation of those groups who are disproportionately impacted by disaster.
- First Nations should also be represented, with that representation drawn from existing First Nations’ governance structures, or as otherwise nominated by First Nations communities.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government consider development opportunities between the Australian Volunteers Program for Samoa and the Australian Engineers Association mentoring program and other relevant Australian mentoring programs.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government highlight opportunities for Australian partnerships with Samoa through Austrade and communicate opportunities for joint ventures with Australian organisations.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government strengthen bilateral ties with New Zealand and Samoa, particularly in relation to disaster management and infrastructure issues.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government propose that the Infrastructure and Transport Senior Officials’ Committee, in consultation with Austroads and other relevant stakeholders, progress the development of national road infrastructure resilience guidelines to inform asset management and project investment.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government consider options for a formal exchange program between the New Zealand National Emergency Management Agency and the Australian National Emergency Management Agency.

The Commonwealth should identify the longer-term resourcing and organisational requirements to build coordination capacity for relief and early recovery.

Each NEMMM agenda should have a standing item on disaster risk reduction/resilience and at least one full meeting each year should be devoted to Disaster Resilience and Recovery. Some jurisdictions have established separate ministers responsible for recovery and resilience, and they should be invited to attend these recovery and resilience meetings.

NEMMM’s leading role in the wider national resilience effort should focus on disaster risk reduction, and it should engage as a core stakeholder in a wider range of other resilience issues. It should further elaborate this focus with respect to:
- Prospective risk management (higher infrastructure standards, environmental protection, etc.),
- Corrective risk management (retrofitting, reinforcing, and remedial measures),
- Compensatory risk management (risk financing and transfer), and
- Reactive risk management (early warning systems and effective response and recovery).

The Commonwealth Government should direct the Secretaries Board to ensure the overall coherence and efficiency of the Government’s resilience efforts, spanning both the climate adaptation/disaster risk reduction and the national security domains. A Secretaries Sub-committee on Resilience should be established to support this work.

The National Cabinet should task Ministerial Councils to include resilience activities in their annual reporting, with the NEMMM contribution focussing on natural hazards.

It is appropriate that NEMA should be able to draw on its administered funding to support implementation across jurisdictions of projects associated with delivering the five national priorities for action. NEMA should explore this option.

The National Cabinet should take a leadership role in coordinating resilience initatives across the Federation

The Australian Government, working with state and territory governments and critical infrastructure operators, should lead a process to:
(1) identify critical infrastructure
(2) assess key risks to identified critical infrastructure from natural disasters
of national scale or consequence
(3) identify steps needed to mitigate these risks
(4) identify steps to make the critical infrastructure more resilient, and
(5) track achievement against an agreed plan. 

Australian, state and territory governments should review the assessment and approval processes relating to vegetation management, bushfire mitigation and hazard reduction to:
(1) ensure that there is clarity about the requirements and scope for landholders and land managers to undertake bushfire hazard reduction activities, and
(2) minimise the time taken to undertake assessments and obtain approvals. 

Australian, state and territory governments should support the implementation of the National Disaster Risk Information Services Capability and aligned climate adaptation initiatives. 

Australian, state and territory governments, in consultation with local governments and the private sector, should review supply chain risks, and consider options to ensure supply of essential goods in times of natural disasters. 

Public land managers should clearly convey and make available to the public their fuel load management strategies, including the rationale behind them, as well as report annually on the implementation and outcomes of those strategies. 

The Australian Government should establish accountability and assurance mechanisms to promote continuous improvement and best practice in natural disaster arrangements. 

The Australian Government should establish a standing entity that will enhance national natural disaster resilience and recovery, focused on long-term disaster risk reduction. 

Australian, state and territory governments should conduct multi-agency, national-level exercises, not limited to cross-border jurisdictions. These exercises should, at a minimum:
(1) assess national capacity, inform capability development and coordination in response to, and recovery from, natural disasters, and
(2) use scenarios that stress current capabilities. 

Australian, state and territory governments should develop arrangements that facilitate greater inclusion of primary healthcare providers in disaster management, including: representation on relevant disaster committees and plans and providing training, education and other supports. 

Australian, state and territory governments should work together to develop a program for national level recovery exercises, building on the work currently underway through the Community Outcomes and Recovery Subcommittee of the Australia-New Zealand Emergency Management Committee. 

Australian, state and territory governments should expedite the delivery of a Public Safety Mobile Broadband capability. 

State and territory governments, working with local governments and fire and emergency service agencies, should ensure that there are appropriate arrangements for roadside vegetation management that take into account, among other things:
(1) priority access and egress routes
(2) road priority, utility and strategic value
(3) cost, and
(4) residual risk to national natural disasters. 

The Australian Building Codes Board, working with other bodies as appropriate, should:
(1) assess the extent to which AS 3959:2018 Construction of buildings in bushfire-prone areas, and other relevant building standards, are effective in reducing risk from natural hazards to lives and property, and 
(2) conduct an evaluation as to whether the National Construction Code should be amended to specifically include, as an objective of the code, making buildings more resilient to natural hazards. 

State and territory governments should have a structured process to regularly assess the capacity and capability requirements of fire and emergency services, in light of both current and future natural disaster risk. 

The Australian Government should work with state and territory governments and critical infrastructure operators to improve information flows during and in response to natural disasters:
(1) between critical infrastructure operators, and
(2) between critical infrastructure operators and government. 

State, territory and local governments should be required to consider present and future natural disaster risk when making land-use planning decisions for new developments. 

The National Disaster Risk Information Services Capability should include tools and systems to support operational and strategic decision making, including integrated climate and disaster risk scenarios tailored to various needs of relevant industry sectors and end users. 

The committee recommends that the Australian Government recognise the need to enhance protection and conservation efforts in the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area by allocating increased funding:
• to the Parks and Wildlife Service, Tasmania, for appropriate management activities and resources; and
• for research projects aimed at providing qualitative and quantitative data specific to climate-related and ecological threats to the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area (such as dry lightning strike).

The committee recommends that the Australian Government commit to long-term funding for the the National Aerial Firefighting Centre of an amount that is at least equal to government's current contribution, rising in line with the Consumer Price Index

The committee recommends that the Australian Government, in conjunction with state and territory governments, investigate a national remote area firefighting capability, to support Australian fire agencies.

The committee recommends that the Australian Government: • recognise that climate change has increased fire conditions in south-eastern Australia and the risk to natural and cultural values in the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area; and • report annually to the World Heritage Committee on the state of conservation in the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area.

The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) recommends that the Attorney‐General’s Department significantly improve the administration of disaster relief and recovery funding by:
(a) adopting more timely processes for developing, finalising and promulgating disaster funding guidelines and advisories; and
(b) implementing administrative arrangements that provide it with greater details of the amounts included in expenditure claims, including project specific information.

To provide improved oversight and assurance in its administration of the Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) recommends that the Attorney‐General’s Department:
(a) obtain project level information from states and territories to enable more informed analysis of claim amounts; and
(b) implement a risk‐based approach to examining the eligibility and value for money of a sample of recovery and reconstruction projects.

Within three years, the Australian Government should develop and implement a framework for untied grants for community recovery assistance to state and territory governments. This framework should take into account factors such as the type, location and scale of a disaster, and the number of people affected.

All governments should put in place best-practice institutional and governance arrangements for the provision of public infrastructure, including road infrastructure. These should include:
• stronger processes for project selection that incorporate requirements for cost–benefit analyses that are independently scrutinised and publicly released
• consideration of natural disaster risk in project selection and asset management planning
• a clearer link between road-user preferences and maintenance and investment decisions.

The Australian Government coordinate the development of a highly skilled workforce which can respond effectively to a sustained pandemic in Australia.

The Commonwealth Government support the growth of vaccine development and production capacity for vaccines in Australia, to enhance Australia’s preparedness to respond to outbreaks of infectious disease in Australia, and in particular, pandemic influenza.

The Australian Department of Health and Ageing consult with members of the general public or representatives of health consumers in the pandemic planning process, including in pandemic exercises designed to test the ability of government to respond to a pandemic event. Consumer involvement should include testing the ability of any communication strategy designed to inform and engage consumers about a pandemic event.

The Australian Government test Australia’s ability to respond to a widespread outbreak of infectious disease other than influenza, by undertaking a pandemic exercise across the relevant Commonwealth, state and territory government agencies.

Having regard to the terms of the Torres Strait Treaty, the Department of Health and Ageing, Queensland Health, AusAID and the Papua New Guinea Government:
- establish a set of protocols and procedures for the identification and treatment of tuberculosis and other infectious diseases in Papua New Guinea and the Torres Strait Islands; and
- consider what clinical services should be available in both Papua New Guinea and Australia for the identification and treatment of tuberculosis and other infectious diseases.

The Australian Government work with the state and territory governments to assess the viability of providing a centralised refugee and migrant health service in each state and territory, which would automatically refer people who move from immigration detention into the wider Australian community.

If recommendation 1 is not supported by the Australian Government, the committee recommends that the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy issue a Ministerial Direction to the Australian Communications and Media Authority to allocate as a minimum requirement, 20 MHz in the 800 MHz band for the purposes of a public safety mobile broadband network.

The committee recommends that the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy take appropriate measures to secure, for public service agencies, priority access to an additional 10 MHz of spectrum in the 700 MHz band for public safety purposes.

The committee recommends that the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy issue a Ministerial Direction to the Australian Communications and Media Authority to allocate 20 MHz of contiguous spectrum in the 700 MHz band for the purposes of a public safety mobile broadband network.

The committee recommends that credible and reliable flood mapping activities and the development of other information that would best inform landowners or prospective landowners of potential risks from extreme weather events are prioritised and used to inform land use planning laws.

The committee recommends relevant authorities work with community service organisations in both planning responses to and responding to extreme weather events, in particular those organisations that provide vital services to vulnerable groups.

The committee recommends that building codes incorporate mitigation measures that take into account foreseeable risks from extreme weather events.

Fund delivery of improved seasonal forecasting services by:
(c) Identifying potential offsets from government beneficiaries of any additional investment in seasonal forecasting services
(d) Undertaking market research to establish industry willingness to pay for enhanced seasonal forecasting services

Improved seasonal forecasting capabilities: 
(a) Improved presentation of existing products
(b) Enhanced capability – keeping pace with international standards

Complete workforce planning project and succession plans as a matter of urgency.

Phase out seasonal prediction development and modelling and rely on products generated elsewhere

Upgrade to the Bureau’s supercomputing capacity:
(a) Status quo
(b) Step change
(c) Further enhancements

Focus the Bureau’s evolving environmental information role on natural hazards in the first instance.

Cease or reduce the Ionospheric Prediction Service or offer it as a commercial service.

Additional frontline meteorologists and specialised centres and systems:
(a) Enhanced severe weather units
(b) National extreme weather centres
(c) Integrated all-hazards decision system
(d) Enhanced observation network

Boost the Bureau’s flood warning capacity by:
(a) Increasing the number of frontline hydrologists
(b) Upgrading the flood monitoring system

Centralise media services and establish protocols for media activity.

Lower yield options identified by the Bureau:
(a) Reduce staffing at remote observing stations
(b) Close the training facility at Broadmeadows, Victoria
(c) Consolidate forecasting functions for Northern Queensland
(d) Outsource the Bureau’s library

Boost the number of frontline meteorologists to build response capacity in regional forecasting centres.

Explore options to limit forecaster intervention in site-specific web forecasts.

Lower yield options identified by the Bureau:
(a) Reduce staffing at remote observing stations
(b) Close the training facility at Broadmeadows, Victoria
(c) Consolidate forecasting functions for Northern Queensland
(d) Outsource the Bureau’s library

Explore use of social media to enhance data gathering from authorised and informal sources and to disseminate weather information

Review disaster recovery and business continuity plans.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government investigate ways to reduce the cost of calling 1300 numbers from mobile telephones in areas of natural disasters.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government work with the Insurance Council of Australia to make the following amendments to the General Insurance Code of Practice by 1 July 2012:
- remove the clauses that set aside the Code standards in times of disasters;
- require insurers to refrain from advising policyholders against making a claim under their insurance policy, and incorporate a ‘right to claim’ so that policyholders who contact their insurer about their eligibility to make a claim are offered the opportunity to lodge a claim and have it assessed fully;
- ensure that a full explanation of the claims-handling process, including the right to escalate decisions to internal dispute and external dispute resolution systems, is given when policyholders lodge a claim;
- ensure that an acknowledgement of the claims lodgement, contact details of the claims officer, and expected timeframes for the claims-handling process are provided to policyholders in writing;
- require that copies of external expert reports used in the determination of a claim to be provided to claimants within 10 days of request; and
- introduce the following minimum standards for claims handling in times of exceptional circumstances such as declared disasters:
⇒ a timeframe for informing claimants of the progress of the claim;
⇒ a timeframe for advising claimants if an external expert has been appointed;
⇒ assurance that external experts are fully qualified to undertake assessments;
⇒ an undertaking to provide claimants with information about the qualifications, employer, and role of external experts that are appointed to assist with their claim;
⇒ a maximum timeframe of 12 weeks for external experts to provide reports;
⇒ a maximum timeframe for accepting or denying a claim;
⇒ a timeframe for responding to requests for information;
⇒ an undertaking to communicate all decisions about insurance claims to the claimant in writing with clear and explicit reasons relating to their particular claim; and
⇒ a timeframe for informing claimants of the progress of their complaint or dispute.

The Committee recommends that the Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation immediately establish a joint industry-Government action group to address evidence of the rising costs and market failure of insurance premiums across Australia.

The Council of Australian Governments’ Building Ministers’ Forum should provide formal direction to the Australian Building Codes Board to:
• monitor projections of climate change risks to buildings
• revise the standards in the National Construction Code to take into account these projections where this delivers a net benefit to the community.
This body of work should be transparently and formally incorporated in the Australian Building Codes Board’s annual work program.

As a priority, state and territory governments should ensure that land-use planning systems are sufficiently flexible to enable a risk management approach to incorporating climate change risks into planning decisions at the state, territory, regional and local government levels. Consideration should be given to:
• transparent and rigorous community consultation processes that enable an understanding of the community’s acceptable levels of risk for different types of land use
• the timeframe of risks and the expected lifetime of proposed land use
• the costs and benefits of land use.
State and territory governments should provide appropriate guidance to local governments to implement these provisions in local government schemes.

In developing and improving its policies and practices for stakeholder engagement, NOPSA should ensure that:
a) they are underpinned by a clearly stated commitment to representative, tripartite and consultative engagement (this could be included in a service charter 5);
b) a clear program for stakeholder engagement be developed and implemented as part of NOPSA’s Annual Operating Plan, with appropriate preliminary scoping of stakeholder needs and issues and the outcomes of such engagement analysed and reported to the Advisory Board

NOPSA should:
a) maintain effective policies and procedures that ensure that NOPSA inspectors and other decision makers interpret and apply the OPGGS legislation and NOPSA’s policies fairly and consistently in similar circumstances; and
b) periodically examine consistency in regulatory decision making and the exercise of regulatory powers, for example, by audits or surveys.

To ensure that NOPSEMA is in a strong position to perform its functions effectively:
a) NOPSA (and NOPSEMA) should continue and strengthen ongoing, constructive engagement, directly and through their representatives, with the industry and the offshore workforce;
b) agreed legislative changes should be given priority attention, including the issues of when its jurisdiction ceases to apply and the proposed updating of the compliance tools available to it under the legislation;
c) consideration should be given to providing for the recovery of costs for NOPSA’s work undertaken on a safety case that is formally submitted but (a) withdrawn before a decision is made on it, or (b) rejected.

In order to improve the effectiveness of National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA), with similar benefits for State or Territory regulators, attention should be given to the following actions.
a) Ministers should consider developing an overarching national understanding under which Commonwealth and State or NT regulators are expected to work cooperatively in respect of a large or complex Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (OPGGS) project or activity that requires their regulatory attention in their respective jurisdictions.
b) The aim of that cooperation would be to ensure that, as far as possible:
i. information about such projects is shared,
ii. regulatory actions are co-ordinated under a regulatory plan relating to the project or activity;
iii. approvals and other necessary steps in each jurisdiction occur speedily, 
iv. possible regulatory gaps or inconsistencies arising from the crossjurisdictional nature of the project or activity are identified and addressed; and
v. there is continuous improvement in the cooperative regulatory inter-action.
c) The understanding would provide a framework for MOUs or similar arrangements between regulators and provide accountability by requiring annual reporting to Ministers on:
i. the OPGGS projects or activities that had come within the scope and application of the MOUs or similar arrangement;
ii. how well the MOUs or other arrangements were working;
iii. what action had been taken or should be taken to improve regulatory cooperation;
iv. whether any significant regulatory gaps or inconsistencies had been identified.
d) To allow for a smooth transition to the Ministerial understanding and supporting regulatory cooperation, the understanding should be developed for early consideration by Ministers.

That a national agency sponsored by the Commonwealth Government be established to undertake national coordination of flood risk management and to operate the system of premium discounts and the flood risk reinsurance facility. The Agency would:
• coordinate flood mapping across the country (while leaving responsibility for undertaking flood mapping in the hands of State and Territory governments and local authorities);
• introduce national guidelines for flood risk mapping and classifications, prepared in consultation with producers and users of flood risk information;
• act as a national repository of flood risk information, primarily through collating and analysing information collected by others;
• continue development of the Insurance Council of Australia’s National Flood Information Database or an equivalent developed by the Agency;
• monitor the effectiveness of flood risk mitigation initiatives across the country and advise on priorities for flood risk mitigation;
• publish and disseminate flood risk information in forms appropriate to various groups of users; and
• oversee the quality of flood risk information.

That an agency sponsored by the Commonwealth Government be created to manage the national coordination of flood risk management and to operate a system of premium discounts and a flood risk reinsurance facility, supported by a funding guarantee from the Commonwealth.

The committee recommends the Commonwealth Government require guaranteed access to emergency call services for people with a disability at all times.

In the meantime, the Minister should:
a. consider revoking the existing delegation to the Director of Energy, NT DoR providing the functions and powers of the DA under the OPGGS Act and Regulations specified in item 1 of the Schedule to that instrument (the Minister’s DA powers and functions) and transferring this delegation to either NOPSA, RET, or a DA from another state;
b. enquire into whether the other DAs to whom he has delegated his functions and powers relating to well integrity are adequately fulfilling their roles; and
c. consider amendments to the OPGGS Act to enable DAs to be given direction as to the performance of their regulatory roles.

The Government should examine the scope for a single environment plan to meet the regulatory requirements of both the OPGGS Act and the EPBC Act. This could possibly be achieved by way of bilateral agreements and accreditation arrangements and/or legislative amendment.

The use/type of barriers (including any change requests relating thereto) must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to installation. A proper risk assessment should be carried out, agreed upon, and documented in writing before installation. Joint written certification as to the appropriateness of the use of particular barriers should take place before installation. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

Responsibility for well integrity should be moved to NOPSA (as also proposed by the Productivity Commission).

The body established to undertake a central coordination and facilitation role in the event of any future blowout in Commonwealth waters should undertake to make all relevant information publically available from one, authoritative and easy to access source.

Problems which arise in the course of installing barriers must be the subject of consultation between licensees, rig operators, and contractors (if used). A proper risk assessment should then be carried out and remedial steps (including further testing/verification) should be agreed upon, and documented in writing before the performance of remedial work whenever practicable. Joint written certification as to resolution of the problem should take place before resumption of drilling operations. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

The proposal of the Productivity Commission’s Research Report (Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector, April 2009) to establish a NOPR should be pursued at a minimum.

In any future similar blowout or offshore emergency situation, the Minister appoint (through either a NOPR or the relevant Department) a senior public servant to establish and oversight a central coordinating body that will facilitate interaction between regulators, industry, AMSA and the owner/operator. Primary responsibility for stopping a blowout should remain with the owner/operator but should be subject to direction from the central coordinating body in consultation with stakeholders (including the owner/operator).

Pre‐drilling assessments should include a risk assessment of the worst‐case blowout scenario.

In carrying out a review of PTTEPAA’s permit and licence, the Minister should have regard to this Report, particularly (i) the adverse findings set out in this Chapter; and (ii) the extent to which PTTEPAA has implemented the Action Plan submitted to the Inquiry, or otherwise addressed the matters canvassed in this Report.

A single, independent regulatory body should be created, looking after safety as a primary objective, well integrity and environmental approvals. Industry policy and resource development and promotion activities should reside in government departments and not with the regulatory agency. The regulatory agency should be empowered (if that is necessary) to pass relevant petroleum information to government departments to assist them to perform the policy roles.

The regulator should pre‐assess and review in a generic sense, and in conjunction with the offshore petroleum industry, available options for well control in the event of a blowout. Being ‘match fit’ in this sense will enable a quicker and more effective response in terms of safety assessment, and will ensure that expectations of both operator and regulator are more readily aligned.

The Minister should appoint a senior policy adviser to investigate and report on the best means to implement the recommendations contained in this Chapter 3 of this report.

For the purposes of that review, the Minister should issue a ‘show cause’ notice to PTTEPAA under s 276 of the OPGGS Act.

Decision‐making about well control issues should be professionalised. Industry participants must recognise that decision‐makers owe independent duties to the public, not just their employer or principal, in relation to well control. Risk management in the context of well control needs to be understood as an ethical/professional duty. Self‐regulation contemplates self‐regulation by the industry, not just by individual licensees and operators.

In the future, and in the interests of ensuring that all possible well control options are comprehensively pursued to exhaustion, decisions as to well control response options should be the result of collaboration between the regulator and the operator rather than leaving one party to make unilateral judgements as to the appropriateness of various well control operations. The regulator should provide transparent and contemporaneous explanations to the public of all well control options under consideration at any particular time.

OSCPs should be endorsed by AMSA prior to regulatory approval to ensure that they align with the National Plan. Once field operations commence, the capability of operators should be assessed against their plans, and exercises conducted to ensure the plans remain effective.

Removal of a barrier must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to removal. A proper risk assessment should be carried out and agreed upon, and documented in writing before removal. Joint written certification as to the appropriateness of removal should take place before removal. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

The Commonwealth seek agreement from the states and territories that would enable it to evaluate the adequacy of fuel reduction programs applied by public land management agencies in high bushfire risk areas, and audit their implementation against the program's stated objectives.

Subject to the findings of the Productivity Commission, the Commonwealth examine options for the funding of replacement of power infrastructure that presents an unacceptable bushfire risk.

The Productivity Commission undertake an examination of bushfire risk from ageing power infrastructure, including an assessment of replacement costs and likely suppression costs from bushfires caused by defective infrastructure.

The Commonwealth encourages further research into prescribed burning and its effectiveness and into alternative bushfire mitigation approaches through improved bushfire risk understanding at the asset level.

The Commonwealth co-ordinate a standing national arson forum between fire and law enforcement agencies to be held every two years.

The Commonwealth consult with local, state and territory government planning authorities on the development and dissemination of a house loss risk index for households in Australia's highest risk bushfire areas.

The Commonwealth Government examine potential new arrangements for Commonwealth involvement in the development and implementation of a national policy for bushfire management.

The Commonwealth publish all fuel reduction plans and related audit findings on a national database.

To improve Centrelink’s preparedness for responding to future disasters, the ANAO recommends that Centrelink include disasters that impact on multiple Areas in its emergency and business continuity test exercise program.

The ANAO recommends that Centrelink develop and promulgate a business continuity plan (BCP) template and require business units to develop BCPs that identify:
(a) risks to the business/service and their impact, based on the respective business impact analysis; and
(b) risk treatments and business resumption tasks to manage these risks, which can then be tested on a regular basis.

To improve the governance arrangements for business continuity management (BCM) in Centrelink ,the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)
recommends that:
(a) the recently constituted Business Continuity, Crisis Management and Security Sub committee be provided with regular reports on IT business continuity
issues; and
(b) Centrelink review existing BC and risk management planning and implementation activities to identify areas where coordination and collaboration could be further improved.

The industry should develop in conjunction with the Regulator a process for addressing the need to maintain the risk profile of a facility moving into extended life operation at the same risk profile as when it was within design life.

The role of the advisory Board, namely to give advice to Ministers and NOPSA when asked, should be made clear to Board members and all stakeholders. The Board and NOPSA should consider the need for a clear description of who does what based on the legislated responsibilities of the NOPSA CEO.

That the facilities for unloading and transferring of horses at Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport be upgraded without delay, following the advice of experts in biosecurity containment, so as to enable appropriate biosecurity precautions to be taken effectively and to minimise the risk of injury to horses and those handling them. The facilities should include at least one padded box or stall sound-proofed to the extent that it is reasonable to do so.

That, in the absence of other satisfactory government controlled and operated post-arrival quarantine stations becoming available before the options to renew the leases of Eastern Creek and Spotswood Quarantine Stations expire, those options be exercised.

That the person holding the position of Inspector General of Horse Importation may be removed in the following circumstances only:
(a) automatically
(i) on bankruptcy or on an application to take the benefit of a law for
the relief of bankruptcy
(ii) on conviction for an indictable offence
or
(iii) on loss or suspension of any licence or authority to practise his or her regular profession
(b) by dismissal by the Governor-General in Council for proved misconduct in or relating directly or indirectly to the performance of his or her duties
(c) by resignation in writing to the Minister responsible for quarantine
(d) on certification by two medical practitioners of mental or physical
incapacity to perform the duties of Inspector General.

That there continue to be in Australia government controlled and operated post-arrival quarantine stations for horses.

That the person holding the position of Inspector General of Horse
Importation:
(a) be appointed by the Governor-General in Council following public advertisement
(b) be appointed for a term of five years only or for such lesser term as may remain at the time of appointment
(c) receive such remuneration and other benefits as fixed or recommended by the Remuneration Tribunal
(d) be a person with expertise in equine affairs and with such other qualifications and experience as the Governor-General in Council considers appropriate
(e) not hold or take other employment or consultancies that might give rise to an actual or perceived conflict of interest with the duties of Inspector General
(f) be obliged to submit to any medical examination reasonably required by the Minister responsible for quarantine before or during the term of appointment for the purpose of assessing his or her suitability for the position
(g) shall not be, or have been within the two years immediately preceding the appointment, employed or engaged by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.

That there be similar facilities for the unloading and transfer of horses at any other airport in Australia that might receive horses imported from places other than New Zealand.

That the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry designate, without delay, a Senior Executive Service officer to be primarily responsible and accountable for the importation of horses into Australia and to that end to have the power to exercise all necessary authority.

That there be provided without delay at Sydney (Kingsford Smith) and Tullamarine Airports facilities to enable people who might have had contact with imported horses to shower and change their clothes, under supervision, before leaving the airport.

That Biosecurity Australia undertake and complete within 12 months a non-regulated but formal import risk analysis relating to the importation of horses from the countries and regions from which Australia currently permits such importation, and make such recommendations for any changes to policies for importation as are warranted by its risk analysis to the officer responsible for the importation of horses and the Executive Director of AQIS.

That facilities for the unloading and transferring of horses at Tullamarine Airport in Melbourne be constructed urgently, upon advice of experts in biosecurity containment, to enable adequate biosecurity precautions to be taken effectively and to minimise the risk of injury to horses and those handling them.

That each government controlled and operated quarantine station have sufficient staff to carry out properly all activities and measures required by the current operating procedures dealing with the quarantine of horses.

The committee recommends the Australian Government strengthen CASA's governance framework and administrative capability by:
• introducing a small board of up to five members to provide enhanced oversight and strategic direction for CASA; and
• undertaking a review of CASA's funding arrangements to ensure CASA is equipped to deal with new regulatory challenges.

The Committee notes that major initiatives relating to climate change adaptation risk assessment and infrastructure are currently in progress. Given that much of Australia’s infrastructure is in the coastal zone and the particular threats facing the coastal zone from climate change, involving significant socioeconomic costs, the Committee recommends that the Australian Government ensure there is a comprehensive national assessment of coastal infrastructure vulnerability to inundation from sea level rise and extreme sea level events.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government:
- continue working with the Queensland Government and local councils under the existing Great Barrier Reef Intergovernmental Agreement to improve land use planning in the catchment
- commission analysis of the Great Barrier Reef as a case study for integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) in Australia. The study should draw out possible directions for ICZM in Australia with regard to:
* addressing challenges associated with climate change impacts on biodiversity
* declining water quality from catchment runoff and loss of coastal habitat from coastal development and population pressures
* building cooperative partnerships between Commonwealth, state and local government, and other stakeholders
* establishing governance and institutional frameworks

The Committee recommends that:
- the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government undertake a study into the human and resourcing needs of local governments to effectively plan for and adapt to the impacts of climate change
- this study be carried out in conjunction with the Australian Local Government Association and the National Sea Change Taskforce

The Committee recommends that the Building Code of Australia, including cyclone building codes, be revised with the objective of increasing resilience to climate change.

The Committee notes the importance of mitigation measures in addressing climate change impacts and accordingly recommends that the Australian Government continue to take urgent action to ensure that Australia can best contribute to a reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government consider the benefits of adopting a nationally consistent sea level rise planning benchmark and, if so, whether this be done on a statutory basis or otherwise. The outcomes of this consideration should then be included as part of the action plan for the proposed Intergovernmental Agreement on the Coastal Zone.

The Committee notes the Council of Australian Governments initiative (through the Local Government and Planning Ministers Council) to develop state-specific climate change planning policies by mid 2011, to inform local governments and regional planning responses to climate change. The Committee recommends that the Australian Government ensure that the outcomes of this initiative are included as part of the action plan under the proposed new Intergovernmental Agreement on the Coastal Zone.

The Committee recommends that the Department of Climate Change, in collaboration with the Queensland Government, CSIRO and Indigenous communities in the Torres Strait, undertake a major study into the vulnerability of the Torres Strait to the impacts of climate change and provide assistance in the development of an adaptation plan.

The Committee recommends that coastal based Natural Resource Management bodies seeking funding under the Caring for our Country program have coastal and marine priorities, as well as coastal zone management principles integrated in their management plans.

To improve the management of the National Medical Stockpile, the ANAO recommends that the Department of Health and Ageing incorporate into its governance framework:
(a) an assessment of the risks associated with the Stockpile in a risk management plan that is periodically reviewed; and
(b) a performance management and reporting framework for the Stockpile.

That the Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council requests that the Australian Government, through the Australian Emergency Management Committee, develops an effective pathway to incorporate hazard science into emergency management policy.

Consolidate the Australian Government decision to establish an Australian Tsunami Warning System through a long-term government commitment to ensure a sustainable and effective national tsunami warning system beyond the current four-year initiative.

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter- Terrorism Committee, pursue the adoption of a more strategic approach to determining the National Capability Development Exercise Programme so that:
a) the exercises conducted better address the areas of greatest priority and maximise their contribution to the enhancement of a basic, viable nation-wide capability;
b) synergies with other exercises and reviews can be better taken into account; and
c) the rationale for the setting of the programme, including the individual components, is clearly documented.

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, strengthens the reporting on the National Capability Development Exercise Programme through:
a) the provision of clearer guidance on, and monitoring of, the quality of reporting required for the exercises; and
b) a review of the exercise umpiring process to maximise the contribution umpires make to effective performance measurement and reporting and hence to continuous improvement.

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee:
a) clearly distinguish between the testing/evaluation components and the training components for the exercises conducted under the National Capability Development Exercise Programme; and
b) ensure that the National Capability Development Exercise Programme, and each of the exercises conducted, places sufficient emphasis on evaluation.

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, pursue a more strategic and systematic approach to the measurement of performance via the National Capability Development Exercise Programme by:
a) the setting of broad exercise objectives and supporting performance indicators that are aligned with the priority areas of the national arrangements to be tested;
b) the consistent setting of objectives and performance indicators that allow for the measurement and reporting of performance over time; and
c) encouraging agencies to set objectives and performance indicators that are more aligned with those of the broad exercise and those of other relevant participating agencies.

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in conjunction with the National Counter-Terrorism Committee’s exercise management advisers, explore options for the incorporation of more contemporary and varied testing and training aids in the National Capability Development Exercise Programme.

The Working Group recommends that State/Territory emergency management plans should explicitly take the need for rapid assessment of damaged physical infrastructure into account. The importance of rapid physical infrastructure assessment in ensuring the supply of utilities including sewerage and drainage, electricity, water and gas to residential structures and other types should be recognised and considered. 

The Working Group recommends that Emergency Management Australia and the jurisdictions through the AEMC develop a three year rolling national exercise strategy aimed at testing the response and recovery aspects of large scale disasters. 

The Working Group recommends that in addition to existing disease control and pandemic management plans, States/Territories should consider developing a pandemic emergency management plan that considers the impact of pandemic disease broadly, encompasses all government and private sector agencies and addresses:
• Continuity of government
• Continuity of essential services and lifelines
• Maintenance of community functions
• Continuity of business and commerce.
Where possible, pandemic emergency management planning elements should be built into existing ‘all hazards’ plans and these should also consider those specific elements identified above.

The Working Group recommends that the Australian Government and the States/Territories use the survey templates compiled in each of their jurisdictions during the capability review workshops, and the scenarios to consider their current and future capabilities, to respond to and recover from large scale disasters. 

The working group recommends that a similar project to the Review of Australia's Ability to Respond to and Recover from Catastrophic Disasters be established to consider the longer term consequences of catastrophic disasters and their resulting recovery implications. Key aspects of such a review would include:
• Researching the likely longer term consequences of catastrophic disasters/emergencies,
• Consideration of Australia's capacity from all perspectives to address the long term recovery consequences of a catastrophic disaster/emergency.

The Working Group recommends that the results of the scenario modeling be presented to the Australian Emergency Management Committee (AEMC) upon completion, and that AEMC form Sub Working Groups of State/Territory emergency management representatives as appropriate to be tasked with considering response and recovery capability (both state/territory and national) against the identified consequences. 

Related to recommendation 16, the Working Group recommends that the likelihood and consequences be systematically assessed by appropriate agencies that would include Geoscience Australia, the Bureau of Meteorology, CSIRO and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry among others. The range of hazards to be considered should include but not be limited to;
• Tsunami
• Bushfire (working with the Bushfire CRC)
• Severe storm
• Flood
• Cyclonic wind and storm surge
• Earthquake
• Temperature extremes and the impact of climatic change
• Disease threat – human, animal and flora/fauna 

The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth seeks to ensure that the Council of Australian Governments resolve when asset protection zones will be located on private land and when on public land and gain assurances that adequate maintenance of zones will be enforced.

The Committee recommends that Emergency Management Australia and the Australian Communications Authority, in conjunction with the respective state and territory governments, ensure the survivability of essential communication installations during fire incidents by strategic fuel management around the assets.

The Committee recommends in acknowledgement of the expertise that the Commonwealth can bring to the Australasian Fire Authorities Council and of funding already supplied to the Council for the development of a National Aerial Firefighting Strategy, that the current status of Emergency Management Australia on AFAC as an associate member be upgraded to full membership and that full membership also be extended to the Department of Defence.

The Committee recommends that Emergency Management Australia and the Australian Communications Authority jointly with the Australasian Fire Authorities Council:
- Initiate an urgent review on a district basis, of the suitability of the current allocated radio spectrum to ensure that as far as possible, fire fighter safety is not being compromised through inadequate communications.
- Commit to the development, in conjunction with representative bodies of all emergency services, to a National Strategic Radio System.
- That the coordination of the deliberations be assigned to Emergency Management Australia.

The Committee recommends that the functions and administration of Emergency Management Australia be reviewed to develop an organisation that is proactive and involved in the development and implementation of national policy on emergency response.

The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth seek to ensure that the Council of Australian Governments seek agreement from the states and territories on the optimisation and implementation of prescribed burning targets and programs to a degree that is recognised as adequate for the protection of life, property and the environment. The prescribed burning programs should include strategic evaluation of fuel management at the regional level and the results of annual fuel management in each state should be publicly reported and audited.

The Committee recommends that Standards Australia review the clarity of AS3959–1999: Construction of buildings in Bushfire Prone Areas to ensure that all relevant stakeholders can interpret and apply the Standard in the way it is intended.

The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth seeks to ensure that the Council of Australian Governments resolve to increase water access points for bushfire fighting on public land to the minimum national standard.

The Committee recommends that state and territory governments be required to regularly perform risk assessments to the land within their jurisdictions to ensure that bushfire prone areas are accurately identified
and can be appropriately managed. This should include possibly prohibiting, or at least limiting, reticulated development in these areas. If building is effectively prohibited on land previously zoned for residential
or commercial building, state and territory governments, in conjunction with local councils, should adequately compensate the affected landholders.

The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth through the National Heritage Trust assist the states and territories in the construction, maintenance and signage of fire trail networks.

The Committee recommends that Standards Australia incorporate building maintenance into AS3959–1999: Construction of buildings in Bushfire Prone Areas, perhaps renaming it as AS3959–1999: Construction and maintenance of buildings in Bushfire Prone Areas.

Mitigation and preparedness be enhanced and maintained for the future. Some co—ordinating mechanism or system be introduced at State Government level for this purpose. [Reference paragraphs: 114 to 128]