That the Australian Government establish the National Climate Service within the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, and consider opportunities for resource and systems sharing, potentially integrating its back office data and computational systems with Environment Information Australia.

That the Australian Government Establish the National Climate Service, which will be available to serve all Australian governments (Commonwealth, state, territory, local) and, over time, provide information to all Australians. The National Climate Service should absorb the remaining Australian Climate Service functions (which are not transferred to the National Emergency Management Agency), and should be able to broaden its services to new users with agreement from the responsible Minister.

That the Australian Government allow the National Emergency Management Agency to make judgements about how to best meet its needs, including by managing its own tasking, data and analysis, with the ability to draw on external sources.

That the Australian Government transfer responsibility for operational support services for emergency management (as set out in the Australian Climate Service Operational Support Services – Service Level Agreement 2023-24) from the Australian Climate Service to the National Emergency Management Agency, to reinforce the real time connection of information and decision-making on emergency responses.

That the Australian Government establish the National Climate Service within the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water with arrangements that encourage the development of a separate and strong public profile.

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), jointly with the CoordinatorGeneral of National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), should co-chair a coordination mechanism between Commonwealth departments and agencies to promote natural disaster risk reduction and resilience.
- This mechanism should ensure Commonwealth decision makers understand the role of relevant programs, with a view to avoiding duplication and ensuring better program information sharing and alignment.
- In establishing this mechanism, PM&C and NEMA should consider all current Commonwealth emergency and disaster management forums to ensure alignment. This includes reviewing respective terms of reference, frequency at which they meet and the appropriate balance between emergency response coordination and a wider Commonwealth focus on disaster risk reduction and resilience coordination.

The Commonwealth, via NEMA, should work with state and territory governments to adopt a leadership and oversight role in ensuring adequate capability, capacity and/or investment exists across Australia for local government and communities to adequately respond to natural disaster events, and to engage with appropriate support and funding structures.

The Commonwealth should mandate regular capability assessments of local governments by state and territory governments.
- Where possible, these assessments should form part of the local or regional Disaster Management Plans.
- Priority should be placed on assessing capability, capacity and investment requirements, as well as assessing any barriers to enabling locally led action, including disadvantaged, or disproportionately impacted communities.
- These assessments should help inform broader capability needs considered as part of Recommendation 6.
- Consideration should be given to complementing these local government capability assessments with data held by Regional Development Australia, managed by the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts (DITRDCA).

The Commonwealth should develop a National Natural Disaster Outcomes Policy (Outcomes Policy) that describes the outcomes the Commonwealth is seeking to achieve through its disaster funding.

To support a comprehensive risk-based approach, the Commonwealth should require state and territory governments to develop local or regional Disaster Management Plans. These Disaster Management Plans should:
- Identify the readiness of a region to handle a disaster event (including considerations of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery).
- Include risks and strengths that are specific to that area in the natural, social, economic and built domains.
- Contain information that can be used to inform state and territory risk assessments, inform response activities in advance of disaster events, or help inform resource and funding requirements for recovery, disaster risk reduction, and resilience.
- Recognise and accommodate the lived experience, increased cost, risk and complexity of delivering disaster management services to remote communities, and to First Nations communities.

The capability and capacity of NEMA should be aligned with the reforms proposed by the Review.
-This includes, but is not limited to, capabilities related to policy and program design, data collection and reporting, program assurance, monitoring and evaluation and program administration.

The Commonwealth should require state and territory governments to complete complementary disaster risk assessments to inform the Risk Profile and guide priority areas for Commonwealth investment and support. Where they exist, climate risk or adaptation profiles developed at local, state and Commonwealth levels should be used to inform the Risk Profile.

The Commonwealth should convene a Disaster Management Advisory Council to provide a constructive view of the Commonwealth’s current disaster arrangements, outcomes, and funding options. This Council should report directly to the Minister for Emergency Management and meet regularly (minimum twice per annum) but not be considered part of the decision making or administrative process.
- A primary purpose of the Disaster Management Advisory Council should include advising on priority projects identified through the Risk Profile, and on how national outcomes could be better achieved.
- The Advisory Council should be chaired by the Coordinator-General, NEMA and be supported by a secretariat within NEMA.
- The Advisory Council should be comprised of a representative mix of government and non-government members.
- Non-government members should be representative of a broad range of knowledge holders: industry, the not-for-profit sector, academia and representation of those groups who are disproportionately impacted by disaster.
- First Nations should also be represented, with that representation drawn from existing First Nations’ governance structures, or as otherwise nominated by First Nations communities.

The Commonwealth should develop an agreed methodology to underpin the Risk Profile that would identify at-risk communities, capabilities, and assets.

The Commonwealth should develop a capability, with agreed accountability measures, to capture and track all Commonwealth expenditure relating to natural disasters.
- This capability should be digitally enabled and provide the supporting architecture for the Commonwealth to collate all disaster-relevant program information and report progress against the Outcomes Policy.
- The capability should be informed by existing Department of Finance data collection arrangements.

The Commonwealth should use the results of the Risk Profile to work with state and territory governments to identify and prioritise disaster funding.
- The outcome of the Risk Profile should inform decision making elements in response to requests for Commonwealth funding, either directly or via co-contribution. Specifically, the results of the Risk Profile should also form a core consideration for future DRFA, and DRF decision making, as well as any other future programs.
- The Risk Profile should inform other Commonwealth programs, such as infrastructure investment, National Construction Code enhancements, climate change initiatives and the like.
- Understanding the Risk Profile will also allow the Commonwealth to place conditions or requirements on funding approvals that are consistent with a more strategically aligned approach to risk reduction and resilience.
-The Risk Profile should be used in concert with the Outcomes Policy to direct funding towards projects that advance risk reduction priorities, and which contribute to the outcomes the Commonwealth is seeking to achieve with its disaster funding.

The Commonwealth should conduct a stocktake to map existing partnerships in natural disaster management across various sectors including but not limited to, construction, healthcare, infrastructure, logistics, technology, philanthropy and the charitable sector.
- This mapping should inform membership of the Disaster Management Advisory Council (Recommendation 8).

The Commonwealth should lead the development of a Nation-wide Natural Disaster Risk Profile (Risk Profile) to enable the Commonwealth to identify risk reduction and resilience priorities and allow the Commonwealth, states, and territories to address agreed risk. The Risk Profile should:
- Be reviewed (including methodology) every five years but updated annually.
-Be led by NEMA and supported by PM&C.
- Encompass all components of natural disaster risk (hazard, exposure, vulnerability and response) with consideration of risk across all domains (natural, social, economic and built).
- Include consideration of the capacity and capabilities that exist to mitigate risks along with consideration of the capability to embed resilience.

The Commonwealth should implement an enhanced national training and exercise regime that tests local capabilities, but also encourages better information sharing, continual improvement, cross-Local Government Area (LGA) and jurisdiction collaboration, and the identification of gaps or weaknesses in local disaster management capability and capacity.
- Capability and capacity should be aligned with the requirements of the Nation-wide Natural Disaster Risk Profile (Risk Profile) and the National Natural Disaster Outcomes Policy (Outcomes Policy).

In compiling the Risk Profile, the Commonwealth should draw upon existing activities including, but not limited to, the National Climate Risk Assessment and the High-Risk Weather Season Outlook.
- The Risk Profile should incorporate national perspectives on risks and opportunities across the natural, social, economic and built domains, in the context of current and anticipated natural disasters.

The Commonwealth should seek to establish enhanced relationships with key nongovernment and private sector partners as part of reforms to the disaster management system.

Improvements should be made to encourage investments in resilience and adaptation when rebuilding following a catastrophe or severe weather event (where this is cost-beneficial). This should involve coordination between government and the insurance industry to co-incentivise these investments to create mutually beneficial outcomes for the government, insurance industry and more importantly, the customer and their community.

The National Cabinet should take a leadership role in coordinating resilience initatives across the Federation

It is appropriate that NEMA should be able to draw on its administered funding to support implementation across jurisdictions of projects associated with delivering the five national priorities for action. NEMA should explore this option.

Each NEMMM agenda should have a standing item on disaster risk reduction/resilience and at least one full meeting each year should be devoted to Disaster Resilience and Recovery. Some jurisdictions have established separate ministers responsible for recovery and resilience, and they should be invited to attend these recovery and resilience meetings.

The Commonwealth should identify the longer-term resourcing and organisational requirements to build coordination capacity for relief and early recovery.

NEMMM’s leading role in the wider national resilience effort should focus on disaster risk reduction, and it should engage as a core stakeholder in a wider range of other resilience issues. It should further elaborate this focus with respect to:
- Prospective risk management (higher infrastructure standards, environmental protection, etc.),
- Corrective risk management (retrofitting, reinforcing, and remedial measures),
- Compensatory risk management (risk financing and transfer), and
- Reactive risk management (early warning systems and effective response and recovery).

The Commonwealth Government should direct the Secretaries Board to ensure the overall coherence and efficiency of the Government’s resilience efforts, spanning both the climate adaptation/disaster risk reduction and the national security domains. A Secretaries Sub-committee on Resilience should be established to support this work.

The National Cabinet should task Ministerial Councils to include resilience activities in their annual reporting, with the NEMMM contribution focussing on natural hazards.

Cost benefit framework:That, to enable a more systematic prioritisation of investment options in risk mitigation before, during and immediately following a natural disaster event, Government adopt and utilise a Disaster Cost Benefit Framework. This Framework will enable Government to estimate the investment required for any given disaster, starting with flood events, and will enable the fast allocation of funding based on detailed and rapid analysis of flood and property modification, mitigation, preparation, response and finance related options including:
• flood modification measures/flood defence (including dams/ water management; levees; waterway or floodplain modifications; etc)
• property modification measures/flood risk mitigation (including land filling; flood proofing; house raising; optimum zoning; removal of development (buy back schemes/relocation))
• response modification measures/flood preparation (including flood warnings; upgrading evacuation routes; evacuation planning; emergency response and education programs; flood data collection and sharing; etc)
• finance related options (including building standard reforms; restructure and reduction of stamp duty; direct subsidies; government reinsurance pools; etc)
The Framework should build on the preliminary version developed by NSW Treasury and provided to this Inquiry. To support this Framework, Government should also use the NSW Adaptation Fund that can be drawn on during or immediately following a flood event.

Risk-based approach to calculating flood planning: That, to take account of greater knowledge of climate change, Government reinforce its adoption of a risk-based approach to calculating the flood planning level for planning purposes and, through the NSWRA, immediately start a process of revising all flood planning level calculations in the state’s high-risk catchments. Flood planning level re-determinations for all high-risk catchments should be completed within 3 years. These revised flood planning levels will need to be factored into all development applications (in-progress and new) in those high-risk catchments. The risk profile of high-risk catchments should be revisited at appropriate time intervals to check that levels are current. A review should take place if there has been a significant trigger event (i.e. changed rainfall, development) or at least every 5 years. As well as reviewing the flood planning level, this 5-yearly review should include reviewing any floodplain lease conditions and adjusting them as necessary in the light of better knowledge of climate change impacts. In working out a tolerable, risk-based flood planning level, consideration should be given to the PMF, 1% AEP, 0.02% AEP, existing development, approved but not yet constructed developments, and existing and approved but not yet constructed evacuation routes.
In coordinating this flood planning level re-determination process, NSWRA should work closely with local councils, DPE, communities, state water authorities and state and national engineering and research organisations. In doing so, the NSWRA should also:
• extend and then maintain the DPE state-wide flood database and associated visualisation interface. This database, which should link to LandiQ, would support:
— monitoring of the flood warning and sensing environment
— monitoring of trends in rainfall activity and impacts, including timing, cause, extent and intensity
— tracking trends and identifying patterns in associated weather and climate signals that contribute to severe floods
— evaluation of the cost and effectiveness of risk mitigation efforts, including land preparation, planning use and management, to enable a better understanding of what works
— simulation of extreme rainfall events and resultant flooding
— identification of ‘at risk’ river and catchment systems for flash flooding
— rapid and effective deployment of resources during a flash flood event
• act as the main coordination point for all NSW hydrological modelling, working with local government, other state agencies, universities, professional bodies (e.g. Engineers Australia) and the Australian Government (especially the Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO) to improve future NSW flood risk assessment (and hence accuracy and timeliness of flood prediction) by building more formal connections between the extensive existing physical hydrological modelling (done by various NSW agencies) with the Bureau’s meteorological and climatological research and riverine flood models
• support local councils to improve modelling of and ensure adequate and appropriate alarm systems for flash flooding.

TFS should engage in discussions with government about the construction of purpose-built State Control Centre facilities for emergency management in Tasmania.

SACFS and the BoM review current weather, fuel loads and curing rates to determine the most appropriate and accurate forecast is prepared, issued and validated against current conditions.

Within three years, the Australian Government should develop and implement a framework for untied grants for community recovery assistance to state and territory governments. This framework should take into account factors such as the type, location and scale of a disaster, and the number of people affected.

A thorough consultative process be developed and implemented between the CFS and local government. This will determine how bushfire management planning can enable improved process and practice to mitigate bushfire risk, and ensure that fire permits are issued and complied with.

That the Commissioners of Police and the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service review the current district disaster boundaries as a matter of urgency in-line with the findings and recommendations of the Auditor–General’s report into the Queensland disaster management system.

Those final determinations of disaster management districts include consultation with the Local Government Association Queensland, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and other Government departments.

That the Inspector General Emergency Management be empowered to provide an assurance to Government that the disaster management system is both appropriate and capable of dealing with complex events.

That the Queensland Police Service Disaster Management Unit is to be permanently located at the State Disaster Coordination Centre to work on a day to day basis with the proposed new Department of Fire and Emergency Services.

Focus the Bureau’s evolving environmental information role on natural hazards in the first instance.

Phase out seasonal prediction development and modelling and rely on products generated elsewhere

Upgrade to the Bureau’s supercomputing capacity:
(a) Status quo
(b) Step change
(c) Further enhancements

Boost the Bureau’s flood warning capacity by:
(a) Increasing the number of frontline hydrologists
(b) Upgrading the flood monitoring system

Cease or reduce the Ionospheric Prediction Service or offer it as a commercial service.

Review disaster recovery and business continuity plans.

Additional frontline meteorologists and specialised centres and systems:
(a) Enhanced severe weather units
(b) National extreme weather centres
(c) Integrated all-hazards decision system
(d) Enhanced observation network

Boost the number of frontline meteorologists to build response capacity in regional forecasting centres.

Centralise media services and establish protocols for media activity.

Lower yield options identified by the Bureau:
(a) Reduce staffing at remote observing stations
(b) Close the training facility at Broadmeadows, Victoria
(c) Consolidate forecasting functions for Northern Queensland
(d) Outsource the Bureau’s library

Explore options to limit forecaster intervention in site-specific web forecasts.

Lower yield options identified by the Bureau:
(a) Reduce staffing at remote observing stations
(b) Close the training facility at Broadmeadows, Victoria
(c) Consolidate forecasting functions for Northern Queensland
(d) Outsource the Bureau’s library

Explore use of social media to enhance data gathering from authorised and informal sources and to disseminate weather information

Complete workforce planning project and succession plans as a matter of urgency.

Fund delivery of improved seasonal forecasting services by:
(c) Identifying potential offsets from government beneficiaries of any additional investment in seasonal forecasting services
(d) Undertaking market research to establish industry willingness to pay for enhanced seasonal forecasting services

Improved seasonal forecasting capabilities: 
(a) Improved presentation of existing products
(b) Enhanced capability – keeping pace with international standards

Emergency Management Western Australia and the State Emergency Management Committee amend WESTPLAN-BUSHFIRE to require State Emergency Coordination Group meetings to be held at the State Coordination Centre in West Leederville.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority, the Department of Environment and Conservation and local governments jointly develop a single, integrated system for fuel load assessment and management.
The system should enable public access to allow members of the community to access information about the fuel load in a given locality.

the Bureau of Meteorology should present water levels in both local datum and Australian Height Datum (gauge zero) for all its published information and warnings

the commonwealth consider including (as part of its review of standards for aged care services) requirements for: • robust ‘all hazards’ evacuation plans that include current after-hour contact details of people who are able to make authoritative decisions during an emergency; and • rehearsal of those plans.

the state and the Bureau of Meteorology liaise to ensure the existence of appropriate quality control processes for gauges and contingency measures in the event that gauges are damaged during flood events.

the Bureau of Meteorology expand its volunteer amateur weather watch groups to enhance its weather and flood information gathering procedures.

the state engage with the Bureau of Meteorology to establish a joint initiative to review existing flash flood warning systems in Victoria and identify where additional systems are needed, with a particular focus on urban centres with a history of flash flooding. This review should seek to achieve outcomes similar to those implemented in NSW. Subject to those outcomes being implemented, the state should determine which agency is responsible for flash flood warnings.

the Bureau of Meteorology provide Incident Control Centres with real-time access to flood data held by the Bureau of Meteorology. This will require Bureau of Meteorology staff making themselves available to respond to enquiries from Incident Control Centres during a flood event.

the state and commonwealth undertake a review into the appropriate institutional arrangements for the forecasting and predictions function currently undertaken by Melbourne Water for the Port Phillip and Westernport region.

the Bureau of Meteorology adjust its flood prediction models to incorporate water storage conditions (to enable it to issue more timely and useful flood predictions for communities based downstream of water storages).

the Bureau of Meteorology undertake a review of its radar coverage in the context of flash and riverine flood warnings for Victoria, with a particular focus on known gap areas such as the Horsham/Nhill region.

the state review the potential for National Registration and Inquiry System 6 to provide a single point of information collection to both register individuals and plan the delivery of recovery services. If the review determines National Registration and Inquiry System 6 is unable to fulfil this function, the state should work with the commonwealth and other states to implement the necessary changes to National Registration and Inquiry System 6. If National Registration and Inquiry System 6 is unable to be developed as a single information collection system: the state should develop and implement a single point of information collection system, including how information obtained from outreach activities can be incorporated into this system and how such information may be linked into the Rapid Impact Assessment process.

In developing and improving its policies and practices for stakeholder engagement, NOPSA should ensure that:
a) they are underpinned by a clearly stated commitment to representative, tripartite and consultative engagement (this could be included in a service charter 5);
b) a clear program for stakeholder engagement be developed and implemented as part of NOPSA’s Annual Operating Plan, with appropriate preliminary scoping of stakeholder needs and issues and the outcomes of such engagement analysed and reported to the Advisory Board

NOPSA should:
a) maintain effective policies and procedures that ensure that NOPSA inspectors and other decision makers interpret and apply the OPGGS legislation and NOPSA’s policies fairly and consistently in similar circumstances; and
b) periodically examine consistency in regulatory decision making and the exercise of regulatory powers, for example, by audits or surveys.

To ensure that NOPSEMA is in a strong position to perform its functions effectively:
a) NOPSA (and NOPSEMA) should continue and strengthen ongoing, constructive engagement, directly and through their representatives, with the industry and the offshore workforce;
b) agreed legislative changes should be given priority attention, including the issues of when its jurisdiction ceases to apply and the proposed updating of the compliance tools available to it under the legislation;
c) consideration should be given to providing for the recovery of costs for NOPSA’s work undertaken on a safety case that is formally submitted but (a) withdrawn before a decision is made on it, or (b) rejected.

In order to improve the effectiveness of National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA), with similar benefits for State or Territory regulators, attention should be given to the following actions.
a) Ministers should consider developing an overarching national understanding under which Commonwealth and State or NT regulators are expected to work cooperatively in respect of a large or complex Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (OPGGS) project or activity that requires their regulatory attention in their respective jurisdictions.
b) The aim of that cooperation would be to ensure that, as far as possible:
i. information about such projects is shared,
ii. regulatory actions are co-ordinated under a regulatory plan relating to the project or activity;
iii. approvals and other necessary steps in each jurisdiction occur speedily, 
iv. possible regulatory gaps or inconsistencies arising from the crossjurisdictional nature of the project or activity are identified and addressed; and
v. there is continuous improvement in the cooperative regulatory inter-action.
c) The understanding would provide a framework for MOUs or similar arrangements between regulators and provide accountability by requiring annual reporting to Ministers on:
i. the OPGGS projects or activities that had come within the scope and application of the MOUs or similar arrangement;
ii. how well the MOUs or other arrangements were working;
iii. what action had been taken or should be taken to improve regulatory cooperation;
iv. whether any significant regulatory gaps or inconsistencies had been identified.
d) To allow for a smooth transition to the Ministerial understanding and supporting regulatory cooperation, the understanding should be developed for early consideration by Ministers.

Responsibility for well integrity should be moved to NOPSA (as also proposed by the Productivity Commission).

The Government should examine the scope for a single environment plan to meet the regulatory requirements of both the OPGGS Act and the EPBC Act. This could possibly be achieved by way of bilateral agreements and accreditation arrangements and/or legislative amendment.

Decision‐making about well control issues should be professionalised. Industry participants must recognise that decision‐makers owe independent duties to the public, not just their employer or principal, in relation to well control. Risk management in the context of well control needs to be understood as an ethical/professional duty. Self‐regulation contemplates self‐regulation by the industry, not just by individual licensees and operators.

The proposal of the Productivity Commission’s Research Report (Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector, April 2009) to establish a NOPR should be pursued at a minimum.

The body established to undertake a central coordination and facilitation role in the event of any future blowout in Commonwealth waters should undertake to make all relevant information publically available from one, authoritative and easy to access source.

Removal of a barrier must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to removal. A proper risk assessment should be carried out and agreed upon, and documented in writing before removal. Joint written certification as to the appropriateness of removal should take place before removal. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

A single, independent regulatory body should be created, looking after safety as a primary objective, well integrity and environmental approvals. Industry policy and resource development and promotion activities should reside in government departments and not with the regulatory agency. The regulatory agency should be empowered (if that is necessary) to pass relevant petroleum information to government departments to assist them to perform the policy roles.

In any future similar blowout or offshore emergency situation, the Minister appoint (through either a NOPR or the relevant Department) a senior public servant to establish and oversight a central coordinating body that will facilitate interaction between regulators, industry, AMSA and the owner/operator. Primary responsibility for stopping a blowout should remain with the owner/operator but should be subject to direction from the central coordinating body in consultation with stakeholders (including the owner/operator).

The use/type of barriers (including any change requests relating thereto) must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to installation. A proper risk assessment should be carried out, agreed upon, and documented in writing before installation. Joint written certification as to the appropriateness of the use of particular barriers should take place before installation. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

In carrying out a review of PTTEPAA’s permit and licence, the Minister should have regard to this Report, particularly (i) the adverse findings set out in this Chapter; and (ii) the extent to which PTTEPAA has implemented the Action Plan submitted to the Inquiry, or otherwise addressed the matters canvassed in this Report.

The Minister should appoint a senior policy adviser to investigate and report on the best means to implement the recommendations contained in this Chapter 3 of this report.

In the future, and in the interests of ensuring that all possible well control options are comprehensively pursued to exhaustion, decisions as to well control response options should be the result of collaboration between the regulator and the operator rather than leaving one party to make unilateral judgements as to the appropriateness of various well control operations. The regulator should provide transparent and contemporaneous explanations to the public of all well control options under consideration at any particular time.

Problems which arise in the course of installing barriers must be the subject of consultation between licensees, rig operators, and contractors (if used). A proper risk assessment should then be carried out and remedial steps (including further testing/verification) should be agreed upon, and documented in writing before the performance of remedial work whenever practicable. Joint written certification as to resolution of the problem should take place before resumption of drilling operations. Senior onshore representatives of stakeholder entities should be involved in that certification process.

For the purposes of that review, the Minister should issue a ‘show cause’ notice to PTTEPAA under s 276 of the OPGGS Act.

In the meantime, the Minister should:
a. consider revoking the existing delegation to the Director of Energy, NT DoR providing the functions and powers of the DA under the OPGGS Act and Regulations specified in item 1 of the Schedule to that instrument (the Minister’s DA powers and functions) and transferring this delegation to either NOPSA, RET, or a DA from another state;
b. enquire into whether the other DAs to whom he has delegated his functions and powers relating to well integrity are adequately fulfilling their roles; and
c. consider amendments to the OPGGS Act to enable DAs to be given direction as to the performance of their regulatory roles.

Pre‐drilling assessments should include a risk assessment of the worst‐case blowout scenario.

OSCPs should be endorsed by AMSA prior to regulatory approval to ensure that they align with the National Plan. Once field operations commence, the capability of operators should be assessed against their plans, and exercises conducted to ensure the plans remain effective.

The regulator should pre‐assess and review in a generic sense, and in conjunction with the offshore petroleum industry, available options for well control in the event of a blowout. Being ‘match fit’ in this sense will enable a quicker and more effective response in terms of safety assessment, and will ensure that expectations of both operator and regulator are more readily aligned.

The industry should develop in conjunction with the Regulator a process for addressing the need to maintain the risk profile of a facility moving into extended life operation at the same risk profile as when it was within design life.

The role of the advisory Board, namely to give advice to Ministers and NOPSA when asked, should be made clear to Board members and all stakeholders. The Board and NOPSA should consider the need for a clear description of who does what based on the legislated responsibilities of the NOPSA CEO.

The ITSRR should have permanent access to the RailCorp intranet.

Maintenance plans on all trains should be revised annually.

The ITSRR should conduct its own risk assessment in relation to the risk of any such high consequence, low probability accident and, if necessary, direct RailCorp to conduct a further risk assessment to reduce the level of residual risk to a level ITSRR regards as acceptable.

RailCorp should undertake risk assessments of each of its activities as follows:
(a) identify the features of the system, subsystem or activities that are to be risk assessed and managed, to determine what makes the system work in terms of equipment, infrastructure and human factors;
(b) identify all hazards that may exist within the particular system, subsystem or activity, whether it is a driver safety system, passenger safety system, engineering design system, train maintenance system or involves human factors or performance;
(c) identify what controls are in place to eliminate or minimise the risks associated with any identified hazard;
(d) test the validity of the controls to ensure that the risk is eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level and, if not, institute additional or further control measures;
(e) specify, in safety documentation, the level of any residual risk;
(f) in the case of low probability, high consequence risks retain the services of an independent verifier of the risk assessments and controls to certify that all risks of such potentially catastrophic accidents have either been eliminated, or controlled to the extent identified by the independent expert;
(g) the Board of RailCorp certify that it regards any residual risk of a high consequence, low probability accident as acceptable, notwithstanding the severity of the consequences, by reason of the cost of further measures to control the risk; and
(h) provide to ITSRR records of the processes of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk control, independent verification and certification, and any Board certification relating to any high consequence, low probability accident.

That the Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council requests that the Australian Government, through the Australian Emergency Management Committee, develops an effective pathway to incorporate hazard science into emergency management policy.

Consolidate the Australian Government decision to establish an Australian Tsunami Warning System through a long-term government commitment to ensure a sustainable and effective national tsunami warning system beyond the current four-year initiative.