The Inspector-General of Emergency Management recommends that the Queensland Police Service lead a review to establish a framework to clearly define the intersect between self-evacuation and emergency shelters, including but not limited to places of refuge, evacuation centres and public cyclone shelters, ensuring roles and responsibilities are clearly articulated.

The committee recommends that Treasury develop options for a levy on coal and gas extraction companies, based on the annual energy content they have extracted, from which the funds raised would be invested in disaster mitigation and resilience measures, and the cost of rising insurance.

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet:
- provide stronger guidance to entities in their development and updating of entity level and relevant national level crisis management policies and plans; and
- provide a formal response to the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit that outlines actions taken to address recommendation three from Report 494: Inquiry into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's crisis management and arrangements

That the Australian Government establish the National Climate Service within the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, and consider opportunities for resource and systems sharing, potentially integrating its back office data and computational systems with Environment Information Australia.

That the Australian Government Establish the National Climate Service, which will be available to serve all Australian governments (Commonwealth, state, territory, local) and, over time, provide information to all Australians. The National Climate Service should absorb the remaining Australian Climate Service functions (which are not transferred to the National Emergency Management Agency), and should be able to broaden its services to new users with agreement from the responsible Minister.

That the Australian Government allow the National Emergency Management Agency to make judgements about how to best meet its needs, including by managing its own tasking, data and analysis, with the ability to draw on external sources.

That the Australian Government transfer responsibility for operational support services for emergency management (as set out in the Australian Climate Service Operational Support Services – Service Level Agreement 2023-24) from the Australian Climate Service to the National Emergency Management Agency, to reinforce the real time connection of information and decision-making on emergency responses.

That the Australian Government establish the National Climate Service within the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water with arrangements that encourage the development of a separate and strong public profile.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government investigate mechanisms to require insurers to more clearly communicate the basis for the price of premiums. This could include:
- at a high level, highlighting the nature of risk for the property for each major peril type (for example, a traffic light rating system)
- last year’s premium alongside the current year’s premium, along with a descriptive analysis of why there has been a change if it is material (for example, over 10 per cent). The analysis could include highlighting different factors that may influence pricing such as changes in building costs or changes in the assessment of one or more perils, or the impact of household or community level mitigation, without attaching numerical estimates to each factor.

The Committee recommends the Australian Government consider appropriate regulatory or other mechanisms to reduce the instances of third-party builders and other contractors making changes to properties without the policyholder’s consent, including the practice of gaining entry, removing property (strip-outs) or conducting repairs without the policyholder’s knowledge or consent. Solutions should take into account the unique circumstances and challenges created by catastrophic flood events.

The Committee recommends that legislation provide the Australian Securities and Investments Commission with sufficient data-gathering powers to obtain the information required to monitor and report on the metrics recommended in Recommendation 51.

The committee recommends that the Australian Government establish a national disaster mental health hub to coordinate and provide mental health resources, training, and support for first responders and communities affected by disasters across the nation. This hub should serve as a comprehensive resource centre for addressing the mental health needs of all stakeholders involved in disaster response and recovery efforts.

The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider how it can further support Disaster Relief Australia, and other similar organisations, not only with funding beyond 2026, but also how the Australian Government can further incorporate Disaster Relief Australia into its national disaster response arrangements and boost its numbers through partnerships with the Australian Defence Force and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs.

The committee recommends that the Australian Government convene a disaster resilience mental health summit to hear from all related agencies and stakeholders to identify solutions to the mental health impacts of disaster.

The committee recommends that the Australian Government design and implement consistent national trauma-informed care principles, ensuring that first responders—both professional and volunteer—receive training and support in these national principles to better address the mental health and well-being of disaster-affected individuals and communities.

The Commonwealth should develop a capability, with agreed accountability measures, to capture and track all Commonwealth expenditure relating to natural disasters.
- This capability should be digitally enabled and provide the supporting architecture for the Commonwealth to collate all disaster-relevant program information and report progress against the Outcomes Policy.
- The capability should be informed by existing Department of Finance data collection arrangements.

The Commonwealth should conduct a stocktake to map existing partnerships in natural disaster management across various sectors including but not limited to, construction, healthcare, infrastructure, logistics, technology, philanthropy and the charitable sector.
- This mapping should inform membership of the Disaster Management Advisory Council (Recommendation 8).

The Commonwealth should implement an enhanced national training and exercise regime that tests local capabilities, but also encourages better information sharing, continual improvement, cross-Local Government Area (LGA) and jurisdiction collaboration, and the identification of gaps or weaknesses in local disaster management capability and capacity.
- Capability and capacity should be aligned with the requirements of the Nation-wide Natural Disaster Risk Profile (Risk Profile) and the National Natural Disaster Outcomes Policy (Outcomes Policy).

The Commonwealth should seek to establish enhanced relationships with key nongovernment and private sector partners as part of reforms to the disaster management system.

The Commonwealth, via NEMA, should work with state and territory governments to adopt a leadership and oversight role in ensuring adequate capability, capacity and/or investment exists across Australia for local government and communities to adequately respond to natural disaster events, and to engage with appropriate support and funding structures.

The Commonwealth should develop a National Natural Disaster Outcomes Policy (Outcomes Policy) that describes the outcomes the Commonwealth is seeking to achieve through its disaster funding.

The capability and capacity of NEMA should be aligned with the reforms proposed by the Review.
-This includes, but is not limited to, capabilities related to policy and program design, data collection and reporting, program assurance, monitoring and evaluation and program administration.

The Commonwealth should convene a Disaster Management Advisory Council to provide a constructive view of the Commonwealth’s current disaster arrangements, outcomes, and funding options. This Council should report directly to the Minister for Emergency Management and meet regularly (minimum twice per annum) but not be considered part of the decision making or administrative process.
- A primary purpose of the Disaster Management Advisory Council should include advising on priority projects identified through the Risk Profile, and on how national outcomes could be better achieved.
- The Advisory Council should be chaired by the Coordinator-General, NEMA and be supported by a secretariat within NEMA.
- The Advisory Council should be comprised of a representative mix of government and non-government members.
- Non-government members should be representative of a broad range of knowledge holders: industry, the not-for-profit sector, academia and representation of those groups who are disproportionately impacted by disaster.
- First Nations should also be represented, with that representation drawn from existing First Nations’ governance structures, or as otherwise nominated by First Nations communities.

The committee recommends that the Australian Government announce a position on the inclusion of marine insurance in the Cyclone Reinsurance Pool.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government consider development opportunities between the Australian Volunteers Program for Samoa and the Australian Engineers Association mentoring program and other relevant Australian mentoring programs.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government highlight opportunities for Australian partnerships with Samoa through Austrade and communicate opportunities for joint ventures with Australian organisations.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government strengthen bilateral ties with New Zealand and Samoa, particularly in relation to disaster management and infrastructure issues.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government consider options for a formal exchange program between the New Zealand National Emergency Management Agency and the Australian National Emergency Management Agency.

Insurers should conduct operational and economic stress testing to identify and understand vulnerabilities within their product portfolio, operations and dependencies on market conditions when responding to catastrophes. The stress testing will need sufficient allocated resources and should be conducted alongside normal business activity to simulate realistic catastrophe operating environments.

The Commonwealth Government should direct the Secretaries Board to ensure the overall coherence and efficiency of the Government’s resilience efforts, spanning both the climate adaptation/disaster risk reduction and the national security domains. A Secretaries Sub-committee on Resilience should be established to support this work.

The National Cabinet should task Ministerial Councils to include resilience activities in their annual reporting, with the NEMMM contribution focussing on natural hazards.

The National Cabinet should take a leadership role in coordinating resilience initatives across the Federation

It is appropriate that NEMA should be able to draw on its administered funding to support implementation across jurisdictions of projects associated with delivering the five national priorities for action. NEMA should explore this option.

The Commonwealth should identify the longer-term resourcing and organisational requirements to build coordination capacity for relief and early recovery.

The Inspector-General of Emergency Management recommends Queensland Fire and Emergency Services conduct annual exercises with every local disaster management group and district disaster management group to confirm the process for developing, approving and issuing of an Emergency Alert, including the use of pre-formatted polygons and messages. Upon completion of the initial statewide exercise, Queensland Fire and Emergency Services will furnish an exercise evaluation report to the Office of the Inspector-General of Emergency Management by 1 November 2023.

Roads: That, to improve the planning and protection of road infrastructure and to ensure communities, freight movers, combat agencies and emergency services have appropriate access and egress during and following a flood event, Government, through TfNSW and NSWRA and working with combat agencies and local and federal governments as needed, should:
• develop a state-wide road evacuation plan to establish a coordinated view of evacuation routes to ensure they are well-maintained and, particularly working with the Commonwealth Government, ensure that funding is coordinated and prioritised to target upgrades where it is most needed to increase flood resilience. This plan should be informed by catchment-wide flood risk modelling
• identify and prioritise communities at high risk of flooding where access and egress will be affected (for example rural communities connected by a single road affected by landslips) to coordinate logistics options to sustain communities isolated as a result of flooding.

Task Force Hawk: That, to ensure disaster readiness, Government establish a high-level Government standing committee, Task Force ‘Hawk’, comprising key Cabinet Ministers, Secretaries and Commissioners that meets, trains and exercises to ensure Government is prepared to respond to any emergency. Task Force ‘Hawk’ should resonate with the community in difficult times to ensure the highest level of confidence in Government’s response.
Further, to improve the preparation for and timely response to disasters, and to ensure the emergency management systems and plans are fit for purpose, effective and appropriate, within 12 months Government, via the SEOCON, ensure all emergency management processes and plans have been updated and implemented.

That the NSW Government accelerate its caravan program and ensure it is made available as an option to all displaced residents from the February-March 2022 floods. 

That the NSW Government establish a standing workforce from within the public service to staff evacuation and recovery centres, with this workforce to be trained ahead of time and mobilised as soon as a natural disaster occurs. 

That the NSW Government ensure that the current review of evacuation centres considers the role, accreditation and support of community evacuation centres, with the outcomes of this review to be made public and incorporated into the update of state emergency plans.

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends the Department of Environment and Science review the format and delivery of Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service annual fire refresher training to include a scenario-based exercise.

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends the Maryborough District Disaster Management Group works with the Fraser Coast Local Disaster Management Group to plan for the evacuation of K’gari due to bushfire. Once developed, the plan should be exercised and regularly reviewed.

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends Queensland Fire and Emergency Services facilitate an annual state level exercise of the Queensland Bushfire Plan that includes all relevant stakeholders and land managers. The exercise should focus on roles, responsibilities, interagency arrangements and handover arrangements between agencies and land managers.

Humanitarian relief: The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that the Department of Jobs, Precincts and Regions work with the Municipal Association of Victoria and councils to build contingencies into emergency relief centre planning to ensure places of shelter are inclusive, recognise diversity and are better placed to support all displaced people in circumstances of: 
(a) community isolation 
(b) prolonged emergencies 
(c) community-led activation of centres.

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that Victoria Police – in collaboration with the community and the emergency management sector – reflect on events of the 2019–20 fire season to review and enhance evacuation plans and processes with consideration of:
a) high risk areas (including remote locations)
b) early evacuation triggers
c) the potential for isolated communities
d) the presence of tourists and non-residents
e) individual decisions to not evacuate
f) the inability to evacuate
g) consequence management and compounding events such as the loss of essential services or health impacts. 

State and territory governments should provide further community education on the function and limitations of different sheltering facilities, including evacuation centres, Neighbourhood Safer Places, places of last resort and natural disaster shelters. This education should be nationally consistent. 

State and territory governments should, as a priority, adopt nationally consistent terminology and functions for the different sheltering facilities, including evacuation centres, Neighbourhood Safer Places, places of last resort and natural disaster shelters. 

Australian, state and territory governments should work together to develop a program for national level recovery exercises, building on the work currently underway through the Community Outcomes and Recovery Subcommittee of the Australia-New Zealand Emergency Management Committee. 

State and territory governments should ensure that those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review those plans, and update them where appropriate, including in relation to:
(1) key risks that essential service outages have on communities during a severe or catastrophic natural disaster (particularly communications an
power)
(2) availability of essential supplies, including food and water, and
(3) consequence management and compounding events such as the loss of essential services or health impacts. 

The Australian Government should establish accountability and assurance mechanisms to promote continuous improvement and best practice in natural disaster arrangements. 

State and territory governments should ensure those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review those plans, and update where appropriate, to provide for coordination between states and territories in cross border areas and to provide cross-border access to evacuation centres. 

Australian, state and territory governments should conduct multi-agency, national-level exercises, not limited to cross-border jurisdictions. These exercises should, at a minimum:
(1) assess national capacity, inform capability development and coordination in response to, and recovery from, natural disasters, and
(2) use scenarios that stress current capabilities. 

State and territory governments should ensure that those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review those plans, and update them where appropriate, including in relation to:
(1) roles and responsibilities of state and territory governments, local governments and local communities
(2) education and signage about evacuations and evacuation routes, including education of seasonal populations
(3) the adequacy of evacuation routes; including contingencies if evacuation routes or centres are assessed as not being able to cope, and
(4) the potential inability to evacuate, either by reason of circumstances or personal characteristics. 

State and territory governments should ensure those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review these plans, and update them where appropriate, to account for the existence and standard of any evacuation centres and safer places (however described) in the community, including:
(1) the capacity of a centre to handle seasonal population variation
(2) the suitability of facilities to cater for diverse groups, including vulnerable people, and those evacuating with animals, and
(3) the existence of communications facilities and alternate power sources.

The PICC be exercised in conjunction with any and all Emergency Plan exercises to test and refine strengthened arrangements.

Concurrent and/or non–standard emergencies such as energy supply impacts be included in future exercise programs.

A Relocation and Evacuation working group be established from stakeholder organisations to consider and develop an Evacuation and Relocations Sub- Plan. The Sub-Plan should consider the lessons learned this year and address principles, lead agency, WHoG coordination, trigger points etc. This could be the same working group formed for reviewing the Emergencies Act, Plan and sub-plans.

Any changes to the ECC structure and role be exercised both within ESA and across a WHoG exercise and testing program.

An opportunity to exercise and test the formation and functioning of a Management Executive through desktop and/or limited scenario-based exercises be provided.

That, in order to ensure evacuation centres are fit-for-purpose, Resilience NSW work with Local Emergency Management Committees (LEMCs) to:                                                                                                                                       a) update the guidelines for LEMCs identifying evacuation centres to require a risk assessment of potential locations, which should include identifying alternate sources of power for use by evacuation centres and recording these appropriately
b) review existing evacuation centre locations to assess compliance with updated LEMC guidelines and report to the State Emergency Management Committee on their suitability.

That, in order to ensure evacuation arrangements can be scaled up when needed, Resilience NSW:
a) ensure staff who are willing to be deployed to evacuation centres are trained as soon as possible to bolster evacuation centre staff surge capacity
b) train council and NSW government regional staff in evacuation centre establishment and management, supported by a one-page ‘start up sheet’ for opening an evacuation centre
c) enable interested community members to be trained to assist in evacuation centre establishment and management and provide an avenue for skilled volunteers to register their interest
d) develop an exercise for the management of multiple evacuation centres dealing with large numbers of people for a protracted period over a widespread area.

That the NSW RFS identifies remote bush fire prone areas that do not already have an indoor Neighbourhood Safer Place (NSP) and upgrades the relevant NSW RFS Stations to meet NSP guidelines. These stations would require adequate Asset Protection Zones and active/passive protection systems to provide short-term protection.

That, in order to improve support for people evacuating with animals, the Department of Primary Industries:
a) work with Resilience NSW to develop evacuation protocols and procedures to ensure appropriate supports are provided for both people and animals (informed by the findings from Project Ohana), including a process for animal registration at evacuation centres and mutually agreed naming conventions, and provide this information to Local Emergency Management Committees (LEMCs)
b) work with LEMCs to identify overflow sites that can be used for evacuated animals when preferred sites are full
c) further develop the domestic pets evacuation protocol.

That, in order to ensure equitable access to evacuation centres and associated support services for people in border communities, Resilience NSW ensure cross-border access arrangements are reflected in evacuation centre management guidelines.

That, in order to ensure the safety and wellbeing of vulnerable people during an evacuation, Resilience NSW:
a) identify aged care facilities in fire and flood prone areas, and ensure that emergency plans are in place and comply with the Evacuation Decision Guidelines for Private Health and Residential Care Facilities
b) develop/refresh evacuation centre protocols to specifically address the needs of vulnerable people.

To increase shared understanding of risks and enhance capability integration and collaborative planning, both Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG) participate in the exercising of the Paradise Dam Emergency Action Plan. 

Energy Queensland and local groups consider establishing formal arrangements that embed measures that assist evacuation plans to increase levels of safety. 

The Department of Housing and Public Works should be included within Local Disaster Management Group evacuation centre planning and plans and assist with decision making around the relocation of evacuees from evacuation centres.

Evacuation centre plans be revised to better manage vulnerable persons, including the safe storage of medications and providing alternate arrangements for evacuees with additional needs. (e.g. evacuation centre for aged persons). 

Relevant authorities should work with the tourism sector to clarify future arrangements for evacuation. In particular they should look closely at differentiating voluntary and directed evacuations in their messaging,
ensure the differences are explained to the community in pre-season campaigns, and that necessary information is passed on to tourists. 

Exercising should focus on vertical integration and include all levels of the system. A strategic program of exercises should be developed and implemented.

The Queensland Chief Health Officer should work with the Office of the Inspector-General Emergency Management to raise, with the Commonwealth, the need for all aged care providers to plan and exercise for evacuation to a similar safe establishment.

All disaster management groups should run an exercise that has full involvement of a hazard-specific primary agency in the next 12 months and regularly thereafter.

I recommend that: the Commonwealth Attorney-General and ASIO confer with the Australian Psychological Society regarding the restrictions in clause A 5 2 of the Code of Ethics (2007) with respect to radicalisation, terrorism and politically motivated violence; and the Australian Psychological Society consider amending clause A 5 2 of the Code of Ethics (2007) to enable psychologists to report risks of a terrorist nature.

I recommend that the Commonwealth Attorney-General liaise with ASIO to develop a policy to ensure that where correspondence is received by a government agency, minister or public office holder, from a non government entity, and that correspondence is relevant to the security assessments of the author, the correspondence be referred to: ASIO; and a Fixated Threat Assessment Centre.

I recommend that ASIO liaise with the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre with a view to both agencies cooperating in the identification, assessment and management of fixated, radicalised individuals.

The Department of Fire and Emergency Services to work with the Department of Planning and Local Governments to adopt a policy which enables Local Governments to identify, register and communicate, ‘Places of Bushfire Last Resort’ in settlements and townsites where the life risk from bushfire is very high or greater.

Nuance the exercises for flood / dam-break / debris flow to incorporate consideration.

Identify facilities that can be used as cool spaces during heatwaves and establish linkages between operators and emergency management organisations

Develop, implement, review and exercise inter-agency community evacuation and recovery plans across the State.

Exercise heatwave arrangements with a focus on the public administration sector and management of vulnerable people

Develop and exercise Severe Storm Emergency Management Plan.

Develop flood evacuation plans for at risk communities.

Undertake inter-agency severe storm exercises.

Review coastal inundation evacuation and response plans.

Review and exercise the Tasmanian Mass Vaccination Plan.

Exercise time-critical decision making processes within the context of an earthquake scenario.

The committee recommends that the Australian Government: • recognise that climate change has increased fire conditions in south-eastern Australia and the risk to natural and cultural values in the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area; and • report annually to the World Heritage Committee on the state of conservation in the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area.

The committee recommends that the Australian Government recognise the need to enhance protection and conservation efforts in the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area by allocating increased funding:
• to the Parks and Wildlife Service, Tasmania, for appropriate management activities and resources; and
• for research projects aimed at providing qualitative and quantitative data specific to climate-related and ecological threats to the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area (such as dry lightning strike).

The committee recommends that the Australian Government commit to long-term funding for the the National Aerial Firefighting Centre of an amount that is at least equal to government's current contribution, rising in line with the Consumer Price Index

The committee recommends that the Australian Government, in conjunction with state and territory governments, investigate a national remote area firefighting capability, to support Australian fire agencies.

SACFS and the BoM review current weather, fuel loads and curing rates to determine the most appropriate and accurate forecast is prepared, issued and validated against current conditions.

To provide improved oversight and assurance in its administration of the Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) recommends that the Attorney‐General’s Department:
(a) obtain project level information from states and territories to enable more informed analysis of claim amounts; and
(b) implement a risk‐based approach to examining the eligibility and value for money of a sample of recovery and reconstruction projects.

The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) recommends that the Attorney‐General’s Department significantly improve the administration of disaster relief and recovery funding by:
(a) adopting more timely processes for developing, finalising and promulgating disaster funding guidelines and advisories; and
(b) implementing administrative arrangements that provide it with greater details of the amounts included in expenditure claims, including project specific information.

Within three years, the Australian Government should develop and implement a framework for untied grants for community recovery assistance to state and territory governments. This framework should take into account factors such as the type, location and scale of a disaster, and the number of people affected.

That evacuation centres and other centres have plans and arrangements for electrical power redundancy.

That decisions to open Community Fire Refuges and evacuation centres be coordinated with Tasmania Police.

That Tasmania Police be identified as the lead agency on evacuations.

That arrangements are made and appropriate pre-planning occurs to effectively implement the policy on evacuation.

That qualifying the evacuation authority in section 47 of the Fire Service Act 1979 be considered — by exempting those people with a pecuniary interest in a property from a directed evacuation where it is reasonable for them to remain.

That a state-level policy on evacuations be developed in the emergency management plans, including specific requirements for vulnerable people and guidelines for its implementation.

That Government agencies work closely with the Bureau of Meteorology and radio stations that broadcast emergency service announcements, to ensure the earliest possible determination of, and communications about, dangerous bushfire conditions.

The Australian Government coordinate the development of a highly skilled workforce which can respond effectively to a sustained pandemic in Australia.

The Commonwealth Government support the growth of vaccine development and production capacity for vaccines in Australia, to enhance Australia’s preparedness to respond to outbreaks of infectious disease in Australia, and in particular, pandemic influenza.

Having regard to the terms of the Torres Strait Treaty, the Department of Health and Ageing, Queensland Health, AusAID and the Papua New Guinea Government:
- establish a set of protocols and procedures for the identification and treatment of tuberculosis and other infectious diseases in Papua New Guinea and the Torres Strait Islands; and
- consider what clinical services should be available in both Papua New Guinea and Australia for the identification and treatment of tuberculosis and other infectious diseases.

The Australian Government work with the state and territory governments to assess the viability of providing a centralised refugee and migrant health service in each state and territory, which would automatically refer people who move from immigration detention into the wider Australian community.

The Australian Department of Health and Ageing consult with members of the general public or representatives of health consumers in the pandemic planning process, including in pandemic exercises designed to test the ability of government to respond to a pandemic event. Consumer involvement should include testing the ability of any communication strategy designed to inform and engage consumers about a pandemic event.

The Australian Government test Australia’s ability to respond to a widespread outbreak of infectious disease other than influenza, by undertaking a pandemic exercise across the relevant Commonwealth, state and territory government agencies.

I recommend that the Commonwealth ensure that there is a mooring buoy which will enable the mooring of SIEVs to take place and free up the Christmas Island response vessel for ongoing surveillance duties. 

I recommend that the Commonwealth liaise closely with representatives of the Christmas Island VMRS prior to purchasing or replacing any vessels for the VMRS in the future. 

I recommend that the Commonwealth and the Shire of Christmas Island take steps to ensure that the Ethel Beach boat ramp is significantly upgraded, that it should be provided with shelter in the form of a rock groyne or similar buffer and that provision should be made so that a person can walk beside the ramp on a stable footing; or If this is not considered likely to be effective in providing an appropriate means of deploying a rescue vessel in adverse conditions, such other action be taken as is necessary to ensure that there is a means of deploying a rescue vessel in adverse conditions. 

Decisions on evacuations need to be made early enough for people to be fully informed, prepared and to move to a place of greater safety. Failure to conduct good planning can create situations where loss of life can occur

The Ministers for Health, Emergency Services, Environment and Police provide additional funds to their agencies so that a detailed exercise is held on a regular basis based on a disaster that will create the worst outcome for the State.

That the Department of Sustainability and Environment continue to invest in the auditing of Victoria’s levee systems, both public and private, so that the Victoria Flood Database contains reliable and up to date data, including information on levees’ location, height, condition and ongoing viability for flood protection.

Carriers, councils and the Australian Communications and Media Authority should take into account the risk of flooding when considering the placement of telecommunications facilities.

A regular program that tests fire based incidents of command, control and coordination of operational procedures using scenario planning, training simulations and coordination of emergency responses between NTFRS, NTES and NT Police be instituted.

Upgrade to the Bureau’s supercomputing capacity:
(a) Status quo
(b) Step change
(c) Further enhancements

Boost the Bureau’s flood warning capacity by:
(a) Increasing the number of frontline hydrologists
(b) Upgrading the flood monitoring system

Cease or reduce the Ionospheric Prediction Service or offer it as a commercial service.

Additional frontline meteorologists and specialised centres and systems:
(a) Enhanced severe weather units
(b) National extreme weather centres
(c) Integrated all-hazards decision system
(d) Enhanced observation network

Boost the number of frontline meteorologists to build response capacity in regional forecasting centres.

Centralise media services and establish protocols for media activity.

Lower yield options identified by the Bureau:
(a) Reduce staffing at remote observing stations
(b) Close the training facility at Broadmeadows, Victoria
(c) Consolidate forecasting functions for Northern Queensland
(d) Outsource the Bureau’s library

Explore options to limit forecaster intervention in site-specific web forecasts.

Lower yield options identified by the Bureau:
(a) Reduce staffing at remote observing stations
(b) Close the training facility at Broadmeadows, Victoria
(c) Consolidate forecasting functions for Northern Queensland
(d) Outsource the Bureau’s library

Explore use of social media to enhance data gathering from authorised and informal sources and to disseminate weather information

Complete workforce planning project and succession plans as a matter of urgency.

Fund delivery of improved seasonal forecasting services by:
(c) Identifying potential offsets from government beneficiaries of any additional investment in seasonal forecasting services
(d) Undertaking market research to establish industry willingness to pay for enhanced seasonal forecasting services

Improved seasonal forecasting capabilities: 
(a) Improved presentation of existing products
(b) Enhanced capability – keeping pace with international standards

Focus the Bureau’s evolving environmental information role on natural hazards in the first instance.

Phase out seasonal prediction development and modelling and rely on products generated elsewhere

The Committee recommends that the Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation immediately establish a joint industry-Government action group to address evidence of the rising costs and market failure of insurance premiums across Australia.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government investigate ways to reduce the cost of calling 1300 numbers from mobile telephones in areas of natural disasters.

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government work with the Insurance Council of Australia to make the following amendments to the General Insurance Code of Practice by 1 July 2012:
- remove the clauses that set aside the Code standards in times of disasters;
- require insurers to refrain from advising policyholders against making a claim under their insurance policy, and incorporate a ‘right to claim’ so that policyholders who contact their insurer about their eligibility to make a claim are offered the opportunity to lodge a claim and have it assessed fully;
- ensure that a full explanation of the claims-handling process, including the right to escalate decisions to internal dispute and external dispute resolution systems, is given when policyholders lodge a claim;
- ensure that an acknowledgement of the claims lodgement, contact details of the claims officer, and expected timeframes for the claims-handling process are provided to policyholders in writing;
- require that copies of external expert reports used in the determination of a claim to be provided to claimants within 10 days of request; and
- introduce the following minimum standards for claims handling in times of exceptional circumstances such as declared disasters:
⇒ a timeframe for informing claimants of the progress of the claim;
⇒ a timeframe for advising claimants if an external expert has been appointed;
⇒ assurance that external experts are fully qualified to undertake assessments;
⇒ an undertaking to provide claimants with information about the qualifications, employer, and role of external experts that are appointed to assist with their claim;
⇒ a maximum timeframe of 12 weeks for external experts to provide reports;
⇒ a maximum timeframe for accepting or denying a claim;
⇒ a timeframe for responding to requests for information;
⇒ an undertaking to communicate all decisions about insurance claims to the claimant in writing with clear and explicit reasons relating to their particular claim; and
⇒ a timeframe for informing claimants of the progress of their complaint or dispute.

When people are being moved away from their homes it’s important that they move to a place of greater safety and that their movement is relatively assured.

FESA seek legal and policing advice regarding the policy to leave residents who chose not to evacuate in a declared ‗dangerous area‘ after a bushfire.

Hazard Management Agencies overseeing the response to incidents on the urban fringe select evacuation centres that are well within the urban environment and unlikely to be impacted by the incident.

Hazard Management Agencies overseeing the response to incidents on the urban fringe select evacuation centres that are well within the urban environment and unlikely to be impacted by the incident.

Emergency service agencies undertake more consultation and joint exercising involving the Fire and Emergency Services Authority, the Department of Environment, the Western Australian Police, the Department for Child Protection, local governments and volunteers – including Volunteer Bush Fire Brigades.
This should include field exercises which test:
- Evacuation centres
- Critical infrastructure (including at the local level)
- Traffic management, including road blocks.
Consideration should also be given to involving the community in exercising (see Recommendation 7) and using prescribed burns as exercises (see Recommendation 14).
More detailed planning for exercises should be included in a revised WESTPLANBUSHFIRE to be endorsed by the State Emergency Management Committee.

the state and commonwealth undertake a review into the appropriate institutional arrangements for the forecasting and predictions function currently undertaken by Melbourne Water for the Port Phillip and Westernport region.

the Bureau of Meteorology adjust its flood prediction models to incorporate water storage conditions (to enable it to issue more timely and useful flood predictions for communities based downstream of water storages).

the Bureau of Meteorology undertake a review of its radar coverage in the context of flash and riverine flood warnings for Victoria, with a particular focus on known gap areas such as the Horsham/Nhill region.

the state review the potential for National Registration and Inquiry System 6 to provide a single point of information collection to both register individuals and plan the delivery of recovery services. If the review determines National Registration and Inquiry System 6 is unable to fulfil this function, the state should work with the commonwealth and other states to implement the necessary changes to National Registration and Inquiry System 6. If National Registration and Inquiry System 6 is unable to be developed as a single information collection system: the state should develop and implement a single point of information collection system, including how information obtained from outreach activities can be incorporated into this system and how such information may be linked into the Rapid Impact Assessment process.

the Bureau of Meteorology should present water levels in both local datum and Australian Height Datum (gauge zero) for all its published information and warnings

the commonwealth consider including (as part of its review of standards for aged care services) requirements for: • robust ‘all hazards’ evacuation plans that include current after-hour contact details of people who are able to make authoritative decisions during an emergency; and • rehearsal of those plans.

the state and the Bureau of Meteorology liaise to ensure the existence of appropriate quality control processes for gauges and contingency measures in the event that gauges are damaged during flood events.

the Bureau of Meteorology expand its volunteer amateur weather watch groups to enhance its weather and flood information gathering procedures.

the state engage with the Bureau of Meteorology to establish a joint initiative to review existing flash flood warning systems in Victoria and identify where additional systems are needed, with a particular focus on urban centres with a history of flash flooding. This review should seek to achieve outcomes similar to those implemented in NSW. Subject to those outcomes being implemented, the state should determine which agency is responsible for flash flood warnings.

the Bureau of Meteorology provide Incident Control Centres with real-time access to flood data held by the Bureau of Meteorology. This will require Bureau of Meteorology staff making themselves available to respond to enquiries from Incident Control Centres during a flood event.

The Fire Services Commissioner requests the Federal Government to revise the National SEWS Guidelines

The Committee recommends that Parliament establish a standing committee for natural disasters. The purpose of this committee would be to ensure that Government agencies and emergency services are fully prepared to deal with natural disasters and to provide an opportunity for Members of Parliament, as opposed to Cabinet, to have input into disaster management.

NOPSA should:
a) maintain effective policies and procedures that ensure that NOPSA inspectors and other decision makers interpret and apply the OPGGS legislation and NOPSA’s policies fairly and consistently in similar circumstances; and
b) periodically examine consistency in regulatory decision making and the exercise of regulatory powers, for example, by audits or surveys.

To ensure that NOPSEMA is in a strong position to perform its functions effectively:
a) NOPSA (and NOPSEMA) should continue and strengthen ongoing, constructive engagement, directly and through their representatives, with the industry and the offshore workforce;
b) agreed legislative changes should be given priority attention, including the issues of when its jurisdiction ceases to apply and the proposed updating of the compliance tools available to it under the legislation;
c) consideration should be given to providing for the recovery of costs for NOPSA’s work undertaken on a safety case that is formally submitted but (a) withdrawn before a decision is made on it, or (b) rejected.

In order to improve the effectiveness of National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA), with similar benefits for State or Territory regulators, attention should be given to the following actions.
a) Ministers should consider developing an overarching national understanding under which Commonwealth and State or NT regulators are expected to work cooperatively in respect of a large or complex Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (OPGGS) project or activity that requires their regulatory attention in their respective jurisdictions.
b) The aim of that cooperation would be to ensure that, as far as possible:
i. information about such projects is shared,
ii. regulatory actions are co-ordinated under a regulatory plan relating to the project or activity;
iii. approvals and other necessary steps in each jurisdiction occur speedily, 
iv. possible regulatory gaps or inconsistencies arising from the crossjurisdictional nature of the project or activity are identified and addressed; and
v. there is continuous improvement in the cooperative regulatory inter-action.
c) The understanding would provide a framework for MOUs or similar arrangements between regulators and provide accountability by requiring annual reporting to Ministers on:
i. the OPGGS projects or activities that had come within the scope and application of the MOUs or similar arrangement;
ii. how well the MOUs or other arrangements were working;
iii. what action had been taken or should be taken to improve regulatory cooperation;
iv. whether any significant regulatory gaps or inconsistencies had been identified.
d) To allow for a smooth transition to the Ministerial understanding and supporting regulatory cooperation, the understanding should be developed for early consideration by Ministers.

In developing and improving its policies and practices for stakeholder engagement, NOPSA should ensure that:
a) they are underpinned by a clearly stated commitment to representative, tripartite and consultative engagement (this could be included in a service charter 5);
b) a clear program for stakeholder engagement be developed and implemented as part of NOPSA’s Annual Operating Plan, with appropriate preliminary scoping of stakeholder needs and issues and the outcomes of such engagement analysed and reported to the Advisory Board

That a national agency sponsored by the Commonwealth Government be established to undertake national coordination of flood risk management and to operate the system of premium discounts and the flood risk reinsurance facility. The Agency would:
• coordinate flood mapping across the country (while leaving responsibility for undertaking flood mapping in the hands of State and Territory governments and local authorities);
• introduce national guidelines for flood risk mapping and classifications, prepared in consultation with producers and users of flood risk information;
• act as a national repository of flood risk information, primarily through collating and analysing information collected by others;
• continue development of the Insurance Council of Australia’s National Flood Information Database or an equivalent developed by the Agency;
• monitor the effectiveness of flood risk mitigation initiatives across the country and advise on priorities for flood risk mitigation;
• publish and disseminate flood risk information in forms appropriate to various groups of users; and
• oversee the quality of flood risk information.

That an agency sponsored by the Commonwealth Government be created to manage the national coordination of flood risk management and to operate a system of premium discounts and a flood risk reinsurance facility, supported by a funding guarantee from the Commonwealth.

The committee recommends the Commonwealth Government require guaranteed access to emergency call services for people with a disability at all times.

The State revise its bushfire safety policy. While adopting the national Prepare. Act. Survive. framework in Victoria, the policy should do the following: ■ enhance the role of warnings—including providing for timely and informative advice about the predicted passage of a fire and the actions to be taken by people in areas potentially in its path; ■ emphasise that all fires are different in ways that require an awareness of fire conditions, local circumstances and personal capacity; ■ recognise that the heightened risk on the worst days demands a different response; ■ retain those elements of the existing bushfire policy that have proved effective; ■ strengthen the range of options available in the face of fire, including community refuges, bushfire shelters and evacuation; ■ ensure that local solutions are tailored and known to communities through local bushfire planning; ■ improve advice on the nature of fire and house defendability, taking account of broader landscape risks.

The State introduce a comprehensive approach to shelter options that includes the following: ■ developing standards for community refuges as a matter of priority and replacing the 2005 Fire Refuges in Victoria: Policy and Practice; ■ designating community refuges—particularly in areas of very high risk—where other bushfire safety options are limited; ■ working with municipal councils to ensure that appropriate criteria are used for bushfire shelters, so that people are not discouraged from using a bushfire shelter if there is no better option available; ■ acknowledging personal shelters around their homes as a fallback option for individuals.

The Commonwealth, states and territories continue to pursue the National Action Plan to Reduce Bushfire Arson in Australia, giving priority to producing a nationally consistent framework for data collection and evaluating current and proposed programs in order to identify and share best-practice approaches.

The State introduce a comprehensive approach to evacuation, so that this option is planned, considered and implemented when it is likely to offer a higher level of protection than other contingency options. The approach should: ■ encourage individuals—especially vulnerable people—to relocate early; ■ include consideration of plans for assisted evacuation of vulnerable people; ■ include consideration of plans for assisted evacuation of vulnerable people.

The Department of Human Services should regularly test recovery plans with partner agencies. 

The Government should examine the scope for a single environment plan to meet the regulatory requirements of both the OPGGS Act and the EPBC Act. This could possibly be achieved by way of bilateral agreements and accreditation arrangements and/or legislative amendment.

The proposal of the Productivity Commission’s Research Report (Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector, April 2009) to establish a NOPR should be pursued at a minimum.

The body established to undertake a central coordination and facilitation role in the event of any future blowout in Commonwealth waters should undertake to make all relevant information publically available from one, authoritative and easy to access source.

A single, independent regulatory body should be created, looking after safety as a primary objective, well integrity and environmental approvals. Industry policy and resource development and promotion activities should reside in government departments and not with the regulatory agency. The regulatory agency should be empowered (if that is necessary) to pass relevant petroleum information to government departments to assist them to perform the policy roles.

In any future similar blowout or offshore emergency situation, the Minister appoint (through either a NOPR or the relevant Department) a senior public servant to establish and oversight a central coordinating body that will facilitate interaction between regulators, industry, AMSA and the owner/operator. Primary responsibility for stopping a blowout should remain with the owner/operator but should be subject to direction from the central coordinating body in consultation with stakeholders (including the owner/operator).

In carrying out a review of PTTEPAA’s permit and licence, the Minister should have regard to this Report, particularly (i) the adverse findings set out in this Chapter; and (ii) the extent to which PTTEPAA has implemented the Action Plan submitted to the Inquiry, or otherwise addressed the matters canvassed in this Report.

The Minister should appoint a senior policy adviser to investigate and report on the best means to implement the recommendations contained in this Chapter 3 of this report.

In the future, and in the interests of ensuring that all possible well control options are comprehensively pursued to exhaustion, decisions as to well control response options should be the result of collaboration between the regulator and the operator rather than leaving one party to make unilateral judgements as to the appropriateness of various well control operations. The regulator should provide transparent and contemporaneous explanations to the public of all well control options under consideration at any particular time.

For the purposes of that review, the Minister should issue a ‘show cause’ notice to PTTEPAA under s 276 of the OPGGS Act.

In the meantime, the Minister should:
a. consider revoking the existing delegation to the Director of Energy, NT DoR providing the functions and powers of the DA under the OPGGS Act and Regulations specified in item 1 of the Schedule to that instrument (the Minister’s DA powers and functions) and transferring this delegation to either NOPSA, RET, or a DA from another state;
b. enquire into whether the other DAs to whom he has delegated his functions and powers relating to well integrity are adequately fulfilling their roles; and
c. consider amendments to the OPGGS Act to enable DAs to be given direction as to the performance of their regulatory roles.

OSCPs should be endorsed by AMSA prior to regulatory approval to ensure that they align with the National Plan. Once field operations commence, the capability of operators should be assessed against their plans, and exercises conducted to ensure the plans remain effective.

Responsibility for well integrity should be moved to NOPSA (as also proposed by the Productivity Commission).

The Commonwealth co-ordinate a standing national arson forum between fire and law enforcement agencies to be held every two years.

The Commonwealth Government examine potential new arrangements for Commonwealth involvement in the development and implementation of a national policy for bushfire management.

The Commonwealth publish all fuel reduction plans and related audit findings on a national database.

Planning and consultation be undertaken by EMQ with all levels of the Disaster Management system to ensure that necessary risk-based disaster evacuation plans are prepared at Local, District and State levels, supported by necessary community education and preparedness programs.

The ANAO recommends that Centrelink develop and promulgate a business continuity plan (BCP) template and require business units to develop BCPs that identify:
(a) risks to the business/service and their impact, based on the respective business impact analysis; and
(b) risk treatments and business resumption tasks to manage these risks, which can then be tested on a regular basis.

To improve the governance arrangements for business continuity management (BCM) in Centrelink ,the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)
recommends that:
(a) the recently constituted Business Continuity, Crisis Management and Security Sub committee be provided with regular reports on IT business continuity
issues; and
(b) Centrelink review existing BC and risk management planning and implementation activities to identify areas where coordination and collaboration could be further improved.

The Bureau of Meteorology contact list for severe weather warning be strategically managed in consultation with Emergency Service Organisations, to identify critical contacts. The Bureau of Meteorology must ensure the detail for these critical contacts remains up to date.

To improve response preparedness, DPI should clearly link the selection of simulation exercises to the risk management framework to target coverage of high risks.

DPI should formalise the approach and framework for evaluating simulation exercises and response to Emergency Animal Disease incidents with guidelines to define the nature of the review process. This should include:
• developing a standardised internal evaluation framework to provide guidelines on the review process
• introducing periodic external evaluations of simulation exercises to enable comparison over time and to demonstrate independence and rigour
• developing guidelines for commissioning external evaluations of response to EAD incidents
• recording the implementation of recommendations from simulation exercises and response to EAD incidents
• introducing a system-level review of lessons learned.

The role of the advisory Board, namely to give advice to Ministers and NOPSA when asked, should be made clear to Board members and all stakeholders. The Board and NOPSA should consider the need for a clear description of who does what based on the legislated responsibilities of the NOPSA CEO.

That facilities for the unloading and transferring of horses at Tullamarine Airport in Melbourne be constructed urgently, upon advice of experts in biosecurity containment, to enable adequate biosecurity precautions to be taken effectively and to minimise the risk of injury to horses and those handling them.

That each government controlled and operated quarantine station have sufficient staff to carry out properly all activities and measures required by the current operating procedures dealing with the quarantine of horses.

That the facilities for unloading and transferring of horses at Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport be upgraded without delay, following the advice of experts in biosecurity containment, so as to enable appropriate biosecurity precautions to be taken effectively and to minimise the risk of injury to horses and those handling them. The facilities should include at least one padded box or stall sound-proofed to the extent that it is reasonable to do so.

That, in the absence of other satisfactory government controlled and operated post-arrival quarantine stations becoming available before the options to renew the leases of Eastern Creek and Spotswood Quarantine Stations expire, those options be exercised.

That the person holding the position of Inspector General of Horse Importation may be removed in the following circumstances only:
(a) automatically
(i) on bankruptcy or on an application to take the benefit of a law for
the relief of bankruptcy
(ii) on conviction for an indictable offence
or
(iii) on loss or suspension of any licence or authority to practise his or her regular profession
(b) by dismissal by the Governor-General in Council for proved misconduct in or relating directly or indirectly to the performance of his or her duties
(c) by resignation in writing to the Minister responsible for quarantine
(d) on certification by two medical practitioners of mental or physical
incapacity to perform the duties of Inspector General.

That there continue to be in Australia government controlled and operated post-arrival quarantine stations for horses.

That the person holding the position of Inspector General of Horse
Importation:
(a) be appointed by the Governor-General in Council following public advertisement
(b) be appointed for a term of five years only or for such lesser term as may remain at the time of appointment
(c) receive such remuneration and other benefits as fixed or recommended by the Remuneration Tribunal
(d) be a person with expertise in equine affairs and with such other qualifications and experience as the Governor-General in Council considers appropriate
(e) not hold or take other employment or consultancies that might give rise to an actual or perceived conflict of interest with the duties of Inspector General
(f) be obliged to submit to any medical examination reasonably required by the Minister responsible for quarantine before or during the term of appointment for the purpose of assessing his or her suitability for the position
(g) shall not be, or have been within the two years immediately preceding the appointment, employed or engaged by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.

That there be similar facilities for the unloading and transfer of horses at any other airport in Australia that might receive horses imported from places other than New Zealand.

That the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry designate, without delay, a Senior Executive Service officer to be primarily responsible and accountable for the importation of horses into Australia and to that end to have the power to exercise all necessary authority.

That there be provided without delay at Sydney (Kingsford Smith) and Tullamarine Airports facilities to enable people who might have had contact with imported horses to shower and change their clothes, under supervision, before leaving the airport.

The committee recommends the Australian Government strengthen CASA's governance framework and administrative capability by:
• introducing a small board of up to five members to provide enhanced oversight and strategic direction for CASA; and
• undertaking a review of CASA's funding arrangements to ensure CASA is equipped to deal with new regulatory challenges.

The Committee notes the importance of mitigation measures in addressing climate change impacts and accordingly recommends that the Australian Government continue to take urgent action to ensure that Australia can best contribute to a reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions.

The Committee recommends that the ESA hold discussions with NSW with a view to developing a joint exercise program with the NSW Rural Fire Service on an ongoing basis.

The Committee recommends that the ESA develop a schedule of proposed exercises as a five year rolling plan, in order that all the elements of emergency services are able to be tested over that time and in differing
situations.

Accordingly I recommend that the Federal Minister for Transport, consider engaging an external consultant to assess whether high level intervention is warranted. 

To improve the management of the National Medical Stockpile, the ANAO recommends that the Department of Health and Ageing incorporate into its governance framework:
(a) an assessment of the risks associated with the Stockpile in a risk management plan that is periodically reviewed; and
(b) a performance management and reporting framework for the Stockpile.

We recommend that NSW Health continue with its good work and continue to develop and test the capability of its contact tracing system to deal with a public health emergency.

We recommend that NSW Health continue with its good work and continue to develop and test its surveillance systems for early detection of infectious diseases.

We recommend that NSW Health continue with its good work and formally establish and oversight a comprehensive program of training, testing and evaluation of plans at the state, area and facility level.

We recommend that NSW Health continue with its good work and apply the lessons learnt from Exercise Cumpston to further improve preparedness for major infectious disease emergencies.

The Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner convene a working group of key emergency services and emergency management agencies to develop a flow chart based on scenario testing, to support decision making and the assessment of response requirements to medical, hazardous materials and CBR emergencies including their transition from one type to another.

Regular field training exercises should be conducted by RailCorp with the emergency services to ensure that the incident command system and rail displan are able to be fully implemented as quickly as possible and are reviewed and improved.

That the Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council requests that the Australian Government, through the Australian Emergency Management Committee, develops an effective pathway to incorporate hazard science into emergency management policy.

Consolidate the Australian Government decision to establish an Australian Tsunami Warning System through a long-term government commitment to ensure a sustainable and effective national tsunami warning system beyond the current four-year initiative.

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, strengthens the reporting on the National Capability Development Exercise Programme through:
a) the provision of clearer guidance on, and monitoring of, the quality of reporting required for the exercises; and
b) a review of the exercise umpiring process to maximise the contribution umpires make to effective performance measurement and reporting and hence to continuous improvement.

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee:
a) clearly distinguish between the testing/evaluation components and the training components for the exercises conducted under the National Capability Development Exercise Programme; and
b) ensure that the National Capability Development Exercise Programme, and each of the exercises conducted, places sufficient emphasis on evaluation.

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, pursue a more strategic and systematic approach to the measurement of performance via the National Capability Development Exercise Programme by:
a) the setting of broad exercise objectives and supporting performance indicators that are aligned with the priority areas of the national arrangements to be tested;
b) the consistent setting of objectives and performance indicators that allow for the measurement and reporting of performance over time; and
c) encouraging agencies to set objectives and performance indicators that are more aligned with those of the broad exercise and those of other relevant participating agencies.

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in conjunction with the National Counter-Terrorism Committee’s exercise management advisers, explore options for the incorporation of more contemporary and varied testing and training aids in the National Capability Development Exercise Programme.

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter- Terrorism Committee, pursue the adoption of a more strategic approach to determining the National Capability Development Exercise Programme so that:
a) the exercises conducted better address the areas of greatest priority and maximise their contribution to the enhancement of a basic, viable nation-wide capability;
b) synergies with other exercises and reviews can be better taken into account; and
c) the rationale for the setting of the programme, including the individual components, is clearly documented.

The Working Group recommends that Emergency Management Australia and the jurisdictions through the AEMC develop a three year rolling national exercise strategy aimed at testing the response and recovery aspects of large scale disasters. 

The Working Group recommends that the results of the scenario modeling be presented to the Australian Emergency Management Committee (AEMC) upon completion, and that AEMC form Sub Working Groups of State/Territory emergency management representatives as appropriate to be tasked with considering response and recovery capability (both state/territory and national) against the identified consequences. 

Related to recommendation 16, the Working Group recommends that the likelihood and consequences be systematically assessed by appropriate agencies that would include Geoscience Australia, the Bureau of Meteorology, CSIRO and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry among others. The range of hazards to be considered should include but not be limited to;
• Tsunami
• Bushfire (working with the Bushfire CRC)
• Severe storm
• Flood
• Cyclonic wind and storm surge
• Earthquake
• Temperature extremes and the impact of climatic change
• Disease threat – human, animal and flora/fauna 

That Victoria Police ensure all police members understand the Victorian legislation in relation to evacuation, and that any decision to recommend evacuation remains with the Incident Controller.

That the fire agencies develop a program to significantly increase the amount of joint training and exercises undertaken.

That CFA further develops the information supporting the decision to stay or go, to incorporate a better understanding of both the likely consequences of leaving home at inappropriate times, and the conditions and
emotional impacts likely to be experienced during the passage of the fire front.

That DSE and CFA work in cooperation with the Municipal Emergency Response Coordinators to develop and conduct joint exercises that practise the skills and test procedures for operations of the Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre, Municipal Recovery Centre and Incident Control Centres. 

The Committee recommends in acknowledgement of the expertise that the Commonwealth can bring to the Australasian Fire Authorities Council and of funding already supplied to the Council for the development of a National Aerial Firefighting Strategy, that the current status of Emergency Management Australia on AFAC as an associate member be upgraded to full membership and that full membership also be extended to the Department of Defence.

The Committee recommends that the functions and administration of Emergency Management Australia be reviewed to develop an organisation that is proactive and involved in the development and implementation of national policy on emergency response.

The Committee recommends that the Australasian Fire Authorities Council’s suggested evacuation protocol be adopted by all of the Australian States and Territories.