The Inspector-General of Emergency Management recommends Queensland Fire and Emergency Services lead an urgent multi-agency (including but not limited to the Queensland Police Service and Brisbane City Council) review of the workflow, of the current Emergency Alert system, including requesting, composing, authorising and issuing of Emergency Alerts by 1 November 2022.  

The Inspector-General of Emergency Management recommends Queensland Fire and Emergency Services implement the Australian Warning System for all nationally agreed hazards by 1 November 2023. Implementation should include guidance and training to all local governments and agencies operationally involved in disaster management, with emphasis on those agencies with hazard specific responsibility.

The Inspector-General of Emergency Management recommends that all local governments that do not have pre-formatted messages and polygons engage with Queensland Fire and Emergency Services and determine whether their local disaster management group capability could be improved through the development of pre-formatted polygons and messages.

The Inspector-General of Emergency Management recommends that all local governments that currently use pre-formatted messages within the Emergency Alert system review and, where necessary, redraft messages using the principles of Clear Explicit Translatable Language (CETL).  

The Inspector-General of Emergency Management recommends Queensland Fire and Emergency Services, in consultation with the Queensland Police Service, incorporate into the workflow of the current Emergency Alert system a process that ensures the inclusion of an ‘urgent approval and distribution without delay’ process for Emergency Alert messages by 1 November 2022.

The Inspector-General of Emergency Management recommends Queensland Fire and Emergency Services adopt measures to achieve a common operating picture between deployed Queensland Fire and Emergency Services assets in disaster management operations by 1 November 2023.

Environment: That, to maximise protection for the environment in and around floodplains, Government, working with local communities especially Indigenous communities, the NSWRA, other agencies and local councils ensure Indigenous voices are well heard in land use planning and natural resource management by:
• developing an Indigenous led cultural landscape restoration strategy for the Northern Rivers for nature-based flood mitigation and adaptation which would see large-scale native revegetation and wetland restoration across the Richmond River catchment, including the Tuckean swamp • supporting Indigenous people to engage in cultural stewardship practices to build the resilience of people and Country, including the Jagun Alliance “Healing our River Country for Community and Landscape Resilience” proposal
• establishing a NSW Indigenous Natural Hazards Trust for research into and development of Aboriginal caring for Country and ‘green’ infrastructure to build back resilience in nature and community
• embedding Indigenous voices and representation in governance structures for the NSW Reconstruction Authority.

Roads: That, to improve the planning and protection of road infrastructure and to ensure communities, freight movers, combat agencies and emergency services have appropriate access and egress during and following a flood event, Government, through TfNSW and NSWRA and working with combat agencies and local and federal governments as needed, should:
• develop a state-wide road evacuation plan to establish a coordinated view of evacuation routes to ensure they are well-maintained and, particularly working with the Commonwealth Government, ensure that funding is coordinated and prioritised to target upgrades where it is most needed to increase flood resilience. This plan should be informed by catchment-wide flood risk modelling
• identify and prioritise communities at high risk of flooding where access and egress will be affected (for example rural communities connected by a single road affected by landslips) to coordinate logistics options to sustain communities isolated as a result of flooding.

NSW disaster app: That, to improve community confidence in government messaging and warnings, the SEOCON and DCS develop a single ‘NSW disaster app’. This:
• will consolidate individual agencies warning apps
• have a simple interface that is accessible via mobile devices
• provide real time flood warnings and information, both raw information from gauges and processed information from publicly available models
• allow citizens to provide information during a flood to help authorities and community, including flood imagery and local knowledge observations in the lead into, during and immediately after flood events. Further, the SEOCON and DCS develop a single impact assessment tool accessible by DCS/Service NSW to expediate grants for and insurance claims on homes and businesses.

PIFAC function: That, to ensure the community can better understand the threat of flood, storm and tsunami activity, the Department of Customer Service (DCS) be made accountable for PIFAC in all emergencies. This will improve access to clear, reliable and consistent messaging prior to and during emergencies. This transfers the PIFAC role from NSW Police Force to Service NSW. Under this PIFAC function, DCS would be responsible for:
• proactively assessing community sentiment and working with agencies to effectively disseminate key disaster information to all communities including vulnerable, culturally, linguistically, and religiously diverse communities
• coordinating clear, consistent, reliable messaging from all government agencies, especially during a disaster
• working with the SEMC, the Bureau of Meteorology, the new NSWRA and SEOCON to provide public statements evaluating the likely risk of flooding and the effectiveness of planning and preparation for the upcoming season. This should be based on sophisticated monitoring of key risk factors and signals for extreme flood events. It should form the basis for clear public communication about these risks on a regional basis and the actions that the Government proposes in preparation.
• working with the NSWRA and SEOCON to deliver a single communication tool for riverine floods, flash floods and dam warnings which uses all available inputs (such as information from the Bureau, real-time river and rain observations data and citizen science data) and provides an assessment of antecedent conditions (such as saturated catchments, soil moisture and water storage capacity). This information should be available to communities and individuals in real-time, on live warning signs in town centres (using satellite connections so they are not reliant on local telecommunications infrastructure)
• recognising that community will revert to social media platforms to self organise when government is unable to respond, the NSW Government should also consider how to work with social media companies and online communities to ensure consistent messaging during an emergency. This may include directing individual users to Government platforms for updated information.

That the NSW Government embed into its emergency plans the appointment of a senior police officer with combat experience to lead recovery efforts following natural disasters.

That the NSW Government accelerate its caravan program and ensure it is made available as an option to all displaced residents from the February-March 2022 floods. 

That the NSW Government work with the community broadcasting sector to identify ways in which community broadcasters could be better supported to provide critical services during natural disasters, with a view to providing them adequate long term funding.

That the NSW Government establish a standing workforce from within the public service to staff evacuation and recovery centres, with this workforce to be trained ahead of time and mobilised as soon as a natural disaster occurs. 

That the NSW Government review its public awareness and communication strategies in relation to natural disasters.

That the NSW Government, in partnership with community groups, including First Nations groups, develop initiatives to build community resilience, particularly in regions at high risk of future natural disaster events. 

That the NSW State Emergency Service, in partnership with the Bureau of Meteorology, investigate ways in which local communities and local media with local knowledge can play a stronger role in flood predictions and warnings.

That the NSW Government ensure that community groups, both existing and emerging, including First Nations groups, are well integrated into disaster recovery, by incorporating them into state recovery plans and engaging with them in between and in the lead up to natural disasters.

That the NSW Government work in partnership with key Aboriginal stakeholders, including the Jali Local Aboriginal Land Council, to prioritise the rebuild of Cabbage Tree Island, and ensure a safe and resourced evacuation plan is in place. 

That the NSW Government ensure that the current review of evacuation centres considers the role, accreditation and support of community evacuation centres, with the outcomes of this review to be made public and incorporated into the update of state emergency plans.

That the NSW Government work with the Commonwealth to develop a national cross-agency app to integrate all community services and agencies into a single platform so that everyone can receive accurate and timely information from one source during emergencies.

That the NSW Government work with First Nations peoples to support Aboriginal organisations in their capacity to operate and respond in times of natural disasters. 

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends the Maryborough District Disaster Management Group works with the Fraser Coast Local Disaster Management Group to prepare and exercise a communications sub-plan with all responsible agencies, to clarify the roles, responsibilities and communication channels used for restricting access to K’gari.

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends the Department of Environment and Science review the resourcing model to ensure surge capacity is available to support incident management functions during response operations. This includes processes to request assistance from other departments and entities with responsibilities for fire and incident management.

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends the membership of the K’gari Locality Specific Fire Management Group be expanded to include representatives of the Butchulla people, community associations from each township and tourism and business operators with interests on the island.

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends the Department of Environment and Science identify opportunities to increase Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service’s capability in incident management and multi-agency fire response, through exercising plans and procedures in collaboration with other stakeholders, including disaster and fire management groups at all levels.

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends the Department of Environment and Science implements the proposed treatments for fire identified in the Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service K’gari Compliance Strategy.

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends a public information resource be developed by Queensland Fire and Emergency Services to inform the community and stakeholders about aerial assets utilised in bushfire response.

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends the Department of Environment and Science establish pre-determined financial delegations and authority for Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service Incident Controllers.

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends the prescribed burn program for K’gari be developed by the Department of Environment and Science, in collaboration with the Locality Specific Fire Management Group and the Butchulla people, based on the principles of the National Position on Prescribed Burning. This program should incorporate a process for monitoring and evaluation of outcomes and integration of evolving fire management practices.

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends Queensland Fire and Emergency Services engages with land managers and other stakeholders on K’gari to source data to inform Predictive Services products.

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends the Locality Specific Fire Management Group for K’gari meet at least twice per year, in person or virtually.

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends Queensland Fire and Emergency Services examines the use of predictive service capability to inform prevention and preparedness in addition to response activities.

The Inspector-General Emergency Management recommends the Maryborough District Disaster Management Group works with the Fraser Coast Local Disaster Management Group to plan for the evacuation of K’gari due to bushfire. Once developed, the plan should be exercised and regularly reviewed.

We recommend that DELWP improves the Powerline Bushfire Safety Program's transparency by publicly reporting on activities, costs and risk-reduction outcomes.

We recommend that DELWP increases its collaboration with Victorian Traditional Owner groups to facilitate the reintroduction of cultural burning and ensure effective support for these practices across all of its regions.

We recommend that DELWP in partnership with Country Fire Authority and Fire Rescue Victoria develops, implements and publicly reports on a holistic suite of performance metrics to demonstrate: - the impact that planned burning has on public and private land on bushfire risk - the impact that planned burning has on public and private land on ecosystem resilience - the impact that non-burn fuel management activities have on public and private land on bushfire risk - the impact that its activities at local and regional levels have on bushfire risk - the cost-effectiveness of its fuel management activities on public and private land.

We recommend that DELWP investigates incentives and advises government on options to accelerate burying and insulating the remaining high-voltage bare-wire powerlines in the 33 highest risk areas.

Supporting local recovery: The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that the entity referred to in Recommendation 13, or otherwise responsible government department work with councils and communities before, during and after emergencies to strengthen:
(a) a common understanding of community-led recovery
(b) the role of communities in recovery planning
(c) the support, training and resources required to enable community-led recovery.

Humanitarian relief: The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that the Department of Jobs, Precincts and Regions work with the Municipal Association of Victoria and councils to build contingencies into emergency relief centre planning to ensure places of shelter are inclusive, recognise diversity and are better placed to support all displaced people in circumstances of: 
(a) community isolation 
(b) prolonged emergencies 
(c) community-led activation of centres.

Public communications: The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that Emergency Management Victoria and / or the entity referred to in Recommendation 13, or otherwise responsible government department, work with councils and government to refine an operational relief and recovery public communications strategy that:
(a) ensures time-critical response and safety information is clear and concise
(b) provides a centralised information point for time-critical relief and early recovery information.

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that Emergency Management Victoria works with the emergency management sector and relevant emergency management entities in New South Wales and South Australia to identify and address key cross border operational and resource management issues. This engagement should aim to enhance interoperability and maximise the capability and capacity of agencies to work together during emergencies along Victoria’s borders. 

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that Emergency Management Victoria collaborate with the emergency management sector to develop a capacity model that considers current and future:
a) career and volunteer emergency management personnel requirements
b) identified and trained personnel for surge requirements
c) emergency risks and climate scenarios. 

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that Victoria Police – in collaboration with the community and the emergency management sector – reflect on events of the 2019–20 fire season to review and enhance evacuation plans and processes with consideration of:
a) high risk areas (including remote locations)
b) early evacuation triggers
c) the potential for isolated communities
d) the presence of tourists and non-residents
e) individual decisions to not evacuate
f) the inability to evacuate
g) consequence management and compounding events such as the loss of essential services or health impacts. 

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management recommends that Emergency Management Victoria – in accepting that emergency management is a ‘shared responsibility’ - collaborate with the emergency management sector and community to:
a) establish clear guidance that clarifies the roles and responsibilities of individuals, communities, the private sector, responder agencies and government before, during and after emergencies
b) develop, implement and evaluate an ongoing communications strategy that ensures these roles and responsibilities are well-understood and reiterated throughout the year. 

State and territory governments should include road closure and opening information on all roads within their borders on public apps. 

State and territory governments should, as a priority, adopt nationally consistent terminology and functions for the different sheltering facilities, including evacuation centres, Neighbourhood Safer Places, places of last resort and natural disaster shelters. 

The Australian Government, working with state and territory governments and critical infrastructure operators, should lead a process to:
(1) identify critical infrastructure
(2) assess key risks to identified critical infrastructure from natural disasters
of national scale or consequence
(3) identify steps needed to mitigate these risks
(4) identify steps to make the critical infrastructure more resilient, and
(5) track achievement against an agreed plan. 

State and territory governments should urgently deliver and implement thevall-hazard Australian Warning System. 

The Australian Government should make provision, in legislation, for a declaration of a state of national emergency. The declaration should include the following components:
(1) the ability for the Australian Government to make a public declaration to communicate the seriousness of a natural disaster
(2) processes to mobilise and activate Australian Government agencies quickly to support states and territories to respond to and recover from a natural disaster, and
(3) the power to take action without a state or territory request for assistance in clearly defined and limited circumstances. 

Australian, state and territory governments should expedite the delivery of a Public Safety Mobile Broadband capability. 

State and territory governments should expedite the development and implementation of the Australian Fire Danger Rating System. It should ensure that there is national consistency in the visual display of the AFDRS and action to be taken in response to each rating. 

State and territory governments should ensure that those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review those plans, and update them where appropriate, including in relation to:
(1) key risks that essential service outages have on communities during a severe or catastrophic natural disaster (particularly communications an
power)
(2) availability of essential supplies, including food and water, and
(3) consequence management and compounding events such as the loss of essential services or health impacts. 

State and territory governments should ensure those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review those plans, and update where appropriate, to provide for coordination between states and territories in cross border areas and to provide cross-border access to evacuation centres. 

State and territory governments should ensure that those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review those plans, and update them where appropriate, including in relation to:
(1) roles and responsibilities of state and territory governments, local governments and local communities
(2) education and signage about evacuations and evacuation routes, including education of seasonal populations
(3) the adequacy of evacuation routes; including contingencies if evacuation routes or centres are assessed as not being able to cope, and
(4) the potential inability to evacuate, either by reason of circumstances or personal characteristics. 

State and territory governments should ensure those responsible for evacuation planning periodically review these plans, and update them where appropriate, to account for the existence and standard of any evacuation centres and safer places (however described) in the community, including:
(1) the capacity of a centre to handle seasonal population variation
(2) the suitability of facilities to cater for diverse groups, including vulnerable people, and those evacuating with animals, and
(3) the existence of communications facilities and alternate power sources.

Australian, state and territory governments should continue to explore the feasibility of a national, all-hazard emergency warning app. 

State and territory governments should provide information to the public on the closure and opening of roads. Information should be provided in real-time, or in advance based on predictions, where possible. 

State and territory governments should provide further community education on the function and limitations of different sheltering facilities, including evacuation centres, Neighbourhood Safer Places, places of last resort and natural disaster shelters. This education should be nationally consistent. 

The Australian Government should work with state and territory governments and critical infrastructure operators to improve information flows during and in response to natural disasters:
(1) between critical infrastructure operators, and
(2) between critical infrastructure operators and government. 

The Australian Government should facilitate state and territory governments working together to develop minimum national standards of information to be included in bushfire warnings apps. 

In collaboration with other jurisdictions the ACT share the learnings for this bushfire event and work to officially embedded values officers and RRATs as key elements of bushfire response.

The working group (Rec 1) should include relevant stakeholders deciding collectively what the declaration might mean for such things as sub and supporting plans and the relevant community messages and calls to action.

A Relocation and Evacuation working group be established from stakeholder organisations to consider and develop an Evacuation and Relocations Sub- Plan. The Sub-Plan should consider the lessons learned this year and address principles, lead agency, WHoG coordination, trigger points etc. This could be the same working group formed for reviewing the Emergencies Act, Plan and sub-plans.

NDIA be engaged in regard to information sharing in emergencies as part of the above actions.

Efforts be increased to build trust, confidence and a common operating picture across PCS and RFS and seek mechanisms that identifies RFS and PCS as equitable partners in delivery of fire management across the territory.

That in order to provide greater consistency in public information and warnings, especially in border areas:
a) the finalisation of the Australian Warning System be prioritised to provide greater consistency in public information and warnings
b) the NSW State Emergency Management Committee, including the Public Information and Warnings Sub-Committee, prioritise the implementation of the Australian Warning System and data standards for relevant hazards within NSW.

That, in order to ensure equitable access to evacuation centres and associated support services for people in border communities, Resilience NSW ensure cross-border access arrangements are reflected in evacuation centre management guidelines.

That, to ensure mobile generators are sourced and distributed on a priority basis during natural disasters, the EUSFAC work with the NSW Telco Authority, relevant NSW government agencies and commercial stakeholders to develop a mobile asset deployment strategy. The strategy should reduce duplication in purchasing, maintaining and housing mobile generators and improve agility in deployment.

That Government, noting that hazard reduction targeted in proximity to assets is on balance more likely to provide help than hinder, should:
a) support local councils and partner agencies to implement more comprehensive hazard
reduction at a local level around towns/cities, communities and local infrastructure assets, and provide incentives for communities to organise themselves to prioritise and implement local hazard reduction initiatives. This will involve a suite of hazard reduction techniques depending on the landscape including prescribed burning, clearing, mowing, and mechanical treatments, and easy disposal of green waste into processors turning it into bioenergy or biofuels
b) beyond the local level priorities for hazard reduction, prioritise prescribed burning in parts of the landscape where fuel treatment may help reduce probability of fires escalating quickly and where terrain and potential atmospheric interactions are likely to escalate fires into fire-generated thunderstorms. This will likely involve a proactive program of treating ridge tops that are prone to dry lightning where reduced fuels may help reduce speed of spread when the fire first starts, or particular windward or lee-slopes that are susceptible to generating extreme fire behaviour and drive fire towards towns.

That, in order to improve fireground communications between NSW agencies and interstate personnel:                                      a) Government ensure all NSW fire authority personnel and vehicles can access and utilise the Public Safety Network (PSN). This should include access to NSW RFS Private Mobile Radio networks where PSN coverage is not yet available.
b) the NSW Telco Authority review cross-border communications availability and planning and advise NSW fire authorities on next steps to enable multi-state interoperability for wide area communications.

That, in order to provide real-time information on evacuation doorknocking during emergency events, Government explore a shared data gateway for NSW agencies based on the NSW State Emergency Service Collector app and a common mapping and analytics platform.

That, in order to ensure the safety and wellbeing of vulnerable people during an evacuation, Resilience NSW:
a) identify aged care facilities in fire and flood prone areas, and ensure that emergency plans are in place and comply with the Evacuation Decision Guidelines for Private Health and Residential Care Facilities
b) develop/refresh evacuation centre protocols to specifically address the needs of vulnerable people.

That, in order to minimise communication outages and extend basic communication coverage during bush fires, the NSW Government work directly, or together with other Australian governments and/or their relevant power and telecommunications regulatory, policy and market bodies, to:
- ensure there are sufficient redundancy options available (e.g. backup diesel generators, deployed temporary telecommunications facilities, etc.) to supply power to essential telecommunication infrastructure or alternative telecommunications infrastructure
- ensure that the telecommunication entities’ and electricity network providers’ Bush Fire Risk Management Plans are updated annually and reported on in the NSW RFS Commissioner’s annual statement to Parliament on the upcoming bush fire season and include details of all actions taken to mitigate those risks including maintenance of APZs and access roads
- ensure there is appropriate auditing of distributors’ preparedness for risks arising from network assets being affected by bush fire, as well as the risk of networks initiating a bush fire
- facilitate cross-carrier roaming arrangements between carriers and the public for basic text, voice and data during the period of emergency in areas directly affected by fire
- enable NSW RFS to require carriers to provide regular information on the status of outages and areas affected by fire.

That Government re-commit to the current, regionally based approach to planning and coordinating hazard reduction activities across all tenures through Bush Fire Management Committees but ensure that it is actually being implemented at a high-level of quality across NSW. Getting it to a high-level of quality requires:
a) implementing the Inquiry’s recommendation about performance auditing of Bush Fire Risk Management Plans
b) prioritising implementation of revised processes for bush fire risk management planning that incorporate new modelling and methods for quantifying risk and the residual risk profile as a result of proposed hazard reduction works
c) ensuring regional priorities for hazard reduction, and how they are determined, are communicated clearly to the community, and their implementation is reported on transparently. This will include being very clear about the objectives of hazard reduction activities and communicating that hazard reduction does not eliminate the risk of fire affecting properties
d) the methodology for assessing and planning for risk reduction becomes an ongoing area of research and the frameworks are formally reviewed every three years.

That, in order to improve information flows and increase public awareness of ABC emergency broadcasts, Government:
a) include an ABC Manager in the Public Information Functional Area Coordinator (PIFAC) team within the State Operations Centre
b) strategically place roadside signage with local/regional ABC station frequency band throughout the State.

That the NSW RFS work with AFAC to analyse the impact of changing fire seasons on inter- jurisdictional resource sharing agreements, both domestic and international, and determine any flow-on effects for NSW fire fighting personnel capacity.

That, in order to maximise the protection of critical infrastructure in a bush fire, Australian governments revise the regulatory framework for the provision to government authorities of information about all critical infrastructure (public and private) including a possible change to compel the owners of critical assets to provide all needed metadata, updated annually, for appropriate planning, preparation and response for bush fire. This would include information about location, ownership, access, details of service the infrastructure supports, and fire treatments of building and surrounding zones.

That, in order to ensure the safety of local landholders on firegrounds, the NSW RFS emphasises the importance of local landholders using protective clothing while fire fighting as part of the RFS’ ‘Farm Fire Unit Integration’ priority for 2020-21.

That, in order to ensure all agencies have a clear understanding of cross-border communication channels during bush fires, all MoUs between state or territory agencies include an agreed protocol about how agencies will communicate across borders and that these are reflected in Incident Action Plans.

That, in order to ensure evacuation centres are fit-for-purpose, Resilience NSW work with Local Emergency Management Committees (LEMCs) to:                                                                                                                                       a) update the guidelines for LEMCs identifying evacuation centres to require a risk assessment of potential locations, which should include identifying alternate sources of power for use by evacuation centres and recording these appropriately
b) review existing evacuation centre locations to assess compliance with updated LEMC guidelines and report to the State Emergency Management Committee on their suitability.

That, in order to improve the provision of evidence-based public health messaging about air quality during bush fire events, Government develop a public education campaign and supporting systems before the next bush fire season. This should include:
- a public education campaign (like sun exposure), to help people make their own decisions about exposure to bush fire smoke
- tailored messaging to target:
* smoke-vulnerable cohorts of the community
* general practitioners, particularly in rural and regional areas, so they can advise patients with relevant, susceptible comorbidities
* employers, to support development of appropriate workplace health and safety guidance for outdoor workers
* an improved air quality alert system such as an enhanced Air Rater app.

That, in order to ensure emergency response agencies can communicate across state and territory borders, the Commonwealth Government allocate 10 + 10 MHz as a dedicated spectrum for Public Safety Mobile Broadband (PSMB) at no cost to states and territories.

That, in order to ensure evacuation arrangements can be scaled up when needed, Resilience NSW:
a) ensure staff who are willing to be deployed to evacuation centres are trained as soon as possible to bolster evacuation centre staff surge capacity
b) train council and NSW government regional staff in evacuation centre establishment and management, supported by a one-page ‘start up sheet’ for opening an evacuation centre
c) enable interested community members to be trained to assist in evacuation centre establishment and management and provide an avenue for skilled volunteers to register their interest
d) develop an exercise for the management of multiple evacuation centres dealing with large numbers of people for a protracted period over a widespread area.

That the NSW RFS identifies remote bush fire prone areas that do not already have an indoor Neighbourhood Safer Place (NSP) and upgrades the relevant NSW RFS Stations to meet NSP guidelines. These stations would require adequate Asset Protection Zones and active/passive protection systems to provide short-term protection.

That, in order to improve support for people evacuating with animals, the Department of Primary Industries:
a) work with Resilience NSW to develop evacuation protocols and procedures to ensure appropriate supports are provided for both people and animals (informed by the findings from Project Ohana), including a process for animal registration at evacuation centres and mutually agreed naming conventions, and provide this information to Local Emergency Management Committees (LEMCs)
b) work with LEMCs to identify overflow sites that can be used for evacuated animals when preferred sites are full
c) further develop the domestic pets evacuation protocol.

That, in order to improve response times to Triple Zero calls, the NSW RFS implements the integrated dispatch system before the 2020-21 fire season commences.

That, in order to ensure the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC) can maintain communications during emergencies, the Government provide the SEOC with independent Public Safety Network functionality.

That the NSW RFS include the following priorities in the Fires Near Me improvements roadmap:
a) text enlargement functionality
b) a clear statement about the app’s limitations and the importance of heeding public warnings and relying on personal observations
c) fire spread prediction maps on extreme/catastrophic days d) update fire map information as technology improves.

Clarify business continuity and restoration of critical infrastructure in the planning and response phases to facilitate water replenishment, fireground remediation and access to businesses (including farming properties).

Invest in upgrading and integrating ICT platforms to eliminate manual data transfers, and ensure IT and radio communication interoperability across the agencies, together with a dedicated focus on the development of a coordinated risk intelligence capability to provide all stakeholders with a common operating picture and rapid damage assessments.

Better coordinate public information and warnings including evacuation plans and provide a single source of information about, the location and direction of fires, how and when to use Safer Places, Places of Last Resort, relief and recovery centres and directed evacuations.

Engage with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) once or twice a year to understand the capabilities that could potentially be deployed. Educate IMTs about how to deploy ADF assistance effectively and develop a streamlined ‘call out’ procedure.

Prepare to ‘scale up’ capability during major bushfire events with senior representatives (including BoM staff) in the SEC 24/7, ensure adequate facilities for IMTs, base camps (e.g. Humanihuts) and recovery centres. Consider the resource implications of providing firefighters to interstate operations.

To enhance shared capacity and collaboratively manage risk, the Chair of the Bundaberg LDMG use the Queensland Emergency Risk Management Framework (QERMF) process to determine if dam failure for Paradise Dam should be reported as a residual risk to the Bundaberg DDMG in this instance due to known changes in the risk profile. 

To increase understanding of hazards and manage risks, dam failure for Paradise Dam be included as a separate risk within the Bundaberg LDMP. 

To enable a shared understanding of the risk, changes in the risk profile of referable dams be clearly communicated by entities that own dams to stakeholders and the community likely to be affected. The communication process starts immediately after the change is identified, is tailored to its audience, makes clear the scale of the change, and is documented so that stakeholders and the community can make informed decisions for managing risks. 

Energy Queensland and local groups consider establishing formal arrangements that embed measures that assist evacuation plans to increase levels of safety. 

Greater emphasis be placed on pre-planned and pre-determined arrangements between the Australian Defence Force and State and local agencies.

Evacuation centre plans be revised to better manage vulnerable persons, including the safe storage of medications and providing alternate arrangements for evacuees with additional needs. (e.g. evacuation centre for aged persons). 

Local groups should plan for and establish clear arrangements to effectively manage offers of assistance including the management of goods, services and volunteers. 

Significant effort should be invested to provide disaster decision-makers at every level with a shared understanding of risks, the situation, and capability, so that they can agree on the best decisions for the communities they serve. 

Efforts are made to improve the timeliness, accuracy and targeting of Emergency Alert messaging by:
 • educating the sector about how Emergency Alert works in detail, and involving them in its testing.
 • ensuring the preparation and authorisation of Emergency Alert campaigns consider those to be warned, and are not limited by disaster management boundaries.
 • allowing the operation of Emergency Alert and the authorisation of its campaigns by disaster management practitioners at a district and local level.

Local disaster management groups should focus on the business continuity of local critical infrastructure and its integration with other plans.

Relevant authorities should work with the tourism sector to clarify future arrangements for evacuation. In particular they should look closely at differentiating voluntary and directed evacuations in their messaging,
ensure the differences are explained to the community in pre-season campaigns, and that necessary information is passed on to tourists. 

The Queensland Chief Health Officer should work with the Office of the Inspector-General Emergency Management to raise, with the Commonwealth, the need for all aged care providers to plan and exercise for evacuation to a similar safe establishment.

Coordinated arrangements for liaison officer deployment should be considered and documented by disaster management groups across the full spectrum of risk identified for their area of responsibility, and not rely on a singular inflexible approach.

Communications protocols about hazard-specific events should be developed to clarify responsibilities and the principles for the release of information and warnings. They should be included in all related hazard-specific plans and published on relevant websites, and used during events.

The national messages for catastrophic fire danger ratings should be integrated with all existing and new community bushfire safety information. 

Until a single call centre is developed, continue deployments of a senior RFS officer to Fire and Rescue NSW ComCen on a 24/7 day basis. This arrangement should determine the quickest most suitable resource and who is ‘in charge’ of an incident

The Commissioners of Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW) and the RFS issue an instruction to FRNSW ComCen that while AVL capability is being made available to the RFS vehicle fleet, no offers of assistance by one agency to the other in combatting a fire is rejected or delayed if what is being offered is appropriate

Take immediate steps to eliminate fire boundaries for call and dispatch purposes to create an agnostic approach to the threat of fires from both a departmental and organisational perspective

In recognising the success of the work of both the volunteer based Rural Fire Service and the full time Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW) members in joint operations – both agencies should be represented at major briefings or press conferences to reinforce successful integrated collaborative efforts rather than individual agency achievements

Review the effectiveness of emergency public information arrangements, and give consideration to embedding an ABC Manager (not a journalist) into the RFS headquarters during emergencies to broadcast warnings to the community that can be pooled to commercial media outlets

TFS, PWS and STT should work with government and each other to continue to pursue a whole-of-state fuel management and burning program that encompasses all land tenures, meets the range of outcomes required by the state (township protection, risk reduction and landscape-scale burns) and is inclusive of private landholders and local communities as well as all fire agencies.

Tasmanian Fire Service (TFS), Tasmanian Parks and Wildlife Service (PWS) and Sustainable Timber Tasmania (STT) initiate a discussion among their Australasian peers about good practice around managing new fire starts in remote terrain, to include issues around identification, predictive analysis, risk management and suppression activities. The outcome should be a document which allows for benchmarking to accepted good practice across Australasia, from which Tasmanian fire agencies can develop protocols against which the management of future events can be tested.

TFS, PWS and STT should establish a State Air Desk, to be staffed by specialist staff year-round, with responsibility for managing both preparatory and contractual issues out of season as well as aircraft management when fires or other emergency events are occurring.

In order to manage a reduced time window available to undertake the current types of planned burns, alternative methods, including the indigenous mosaic ‘cool’ burns, should be examined and trialled as they may extend the period in which planned burns can be undertaken while reducing overall risk and fuel loads.

That in conjunction with a risk‑based approach, a minimum hectare target is also maintained that can be measured and compared. This minimum target should not be below the 5% target established by the Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission.

That emergency management authorities react with heightened awareness and action when BoM issues flood watches and related warnings.

That Government supports the anticipated SES State Flood Warning proposals aimed at improving public warnings and communication, and that the proposed warning system is consistent with the National Frameworks.

Monthly test results need to be accurately recorded.

Carry out a detailed audit of the current Hospital essential loads to determine the current load requirements of the Hospital.

From the above assessment determine the existing generator load requirements and provide a new generator to meet those loads.

Accurate records need to be provided as to what is done for each service.

Prepare and carry out a testing regime and testing strategy and ensure testing of the generator is done every month for 4 hours over that month and under full Hospital load with test result recorded every 15 minutes.

Remove any loads that do not need to be on essential power.

Replacement of all original pipes and hoses not yet done.

Carry out regular load bank testing on the generator with a load bank large enough to fully load the generator to 110% which will clean out the engine and also identify whether the generator is capable of providing full load for a sustained length of time.

Conduct an assessment of the current essential loads and determine if there are loads that should not be on essential power.

Monthly and annual maintenance servicing needs to be scheduled for the generator to DPTI or CHSA schedule requirements.

Renegotiate the maintenance contract at the end of the current contract and have DPTI through AGFMA take on the maintenance contract.

Regular annual testing at 100% on a load bank needs to be scheduled into a maintenance schedule.

If the existing generator is capable of providing the current essential power requirements then the generator needs a major inspection and overhaul all items that may need to be replaced due to age and condition. This includes checking compression, oil pressure, coolant pumping and all other critical components and may actually require providing a temporary generator while the Hospital generator receives a major inspection and possible re build. A ball park figure to do this would be $50,000.00 plus cranage and transport to Detroit workshop probably another $10,000.00 then a temporary generator would need to be hired and installed which could run into $10’s of thousands of dollars depending on how long the engine was out of service. For the money that would be spent checking and rebuilding the existing engine it would be recommended to replace the generator with a new generator.

Due to the age of the generator, reliability and reparability risk due to age and the apparent under capacity of the generator it is recommend to replace the generator with a new generator and associated control system designed for the current load requirements and allowance for some future expansion.

A monthly testing regime needs to be developed that will allow the generator to be tested at full essential load capacity and to ensure that 4 hour monthly testing can be done every month.

That the annexure to the State Emergency Management Plan, ‘Traffic management during emergencies’, be updated to include: responsibilities and processes for road closures; and, Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure requirements in regards to provision of road closure information, notification of changes in road closure status and publishing of that information.

That SA Police, as the control agency for search and rescue, and State Emergency Service who have the responsibility for providing search and rescue services under the State Emergency Management Plan, develop a swiftwater rescue capability plan that describes key swiftwater risk locations, roles and responsibilities of emergency services, State swiftwater resources and dispatch arrangements.

That the SES in collaboration with MFS Communications Centre (Comcen) investigate and implement options to reduce the number of calls coming into the Comcen, (particularly on 132500). Options could include better utilisation of the available options on the Interactive Voice Recording and community education to increase community resilience.

Review and update Part 3, Annex C, of the SEMP ‘Public Information and Warnings’ to: a) clarify the role and responsibilities of the Public Information Functional Support Group and control agencies in relation to public information b) define requirements and processes for liaising with the community, including holding community meetings

Identify, document and communicate contingency arrangements and procedures for emergency services in the event SA Government Radio Network paging is turned off to conserve power, or other loss of paging capacity.

Establish a State-wide resourcing capability to support incident management teams, regional coordination centres, zone emergency centres, relief centres, recovery centres and State control centres. some of the features of such a capability should include: a) multi-agency, cross-government, State-wide pool of incident management and emergency management personnel building on the State incident management team concept currently facilitated by the Country Fire Service, and expanded to include all hazards, multiagency teams with a roster that provides year-round coverage b) a system that enables staff and volunteers from any agency to identify their availability for upcoming shifts c) a rostering system that enables one or more incident management teams, staging areas, regional coordination centres, State control centres and relief centres to develop, maintain and distribute rosters and structure charts in a more coordinated manner d) identifying areas of expertise for key incident and emergency management functions (e.g. public information, alerts and warning, media liaison, logistics and resource management) that would benefit from a coordinated and resource pooling approach and take steps to implement (consider the Mapping Functional Support Group model as a potential service delivery model).

That the Attorney General’s Department consult with local government regarding potential for them to provide logistical support associated with backup power supply to SA Government Radio Network towers in the event of an emergency.

Consider bringing other agencies onto the SA Government Radio Network, in particular, Department of Education and Child Development and local government, to support more effective coordination and provide a reliable communications contingency during emergencies.

That, as with earthquake, SA Police be designated the Control Agency under the State Emergency Management Plan for black system events or other major power outages.

Install UPS on traffic lights on main Central Business District (CBD) and arterial roads to allow an effective movement of traffic during a loss of power.

That SA Police develop an evacuation plan for the Adelaide Central Business District (CBD) which includes:
a) a Traffic Management Plan to assist in the movement of persons and vehicles away from the CBD
b) protocols for the early placement of a SA Police liaison officer within the Traffic Management Centre.

I recommend that the Commissioner of Police consider seeking an agreement with news media outlets whereby the New South Wales Police Force will establish a way for such outlets to rapidly and confidentially determine whether publishing specific material could compromise the response to an ongoing high-risk incident and the media in turn will agree not to publish such material without first alerting a nominated senior police officer of their intention to do so.

The Department of Fire and Emergency Services to investigate and adopt a system that will allow the public to opt in, monitor and receive, through a ‘push mechanism’, bushfire and other emergency warnings, maps and information using a wide variety of devices including personal hand held smart devices.

The Department of Parks and Wildlife to continue emphasis on landscape hazard reduction burning with the annual objective of treating 140,000 hectares per annum in Land Management Zone C. In combination with Recommendation 2 (above) the strategic objective will be that a fuel age of less than six years will be maintained across 45% of the landscape on State Forest, National Parks and other Parks and Wildlife managed lands in the South West and Perth Hills. This will address the current backlog (created from under achievements of the recent two decades of burn programs) by the end of the 2020-2021 burning season (i.e. within the next 5 years).

The Departments of Fire and Emergency Services and Parks and Wildlife to investigate and adopt an emergency services resource management system that will enable the registration, tasking, tracking, management and coordination of emergency management personnel, vehicles, plant and aircraft.

The Department of Parks and Wildlife to plan for the highest priority hazard reduction burning effort around settlements and critical assets in the South West and Perth Hills. The annual objective is to treat a total of 60,000 hectares of priority hazard reduction per annum, comprising 20,000 hectares per annum of Land Management Zone A and 40,000 hectares per year of Land Management Zone B.

The Departments of Parks and Wildlife and Fire and Emergency Services to adopt the policy that all bushfire Level 3 Incident Management Teams in the Perth Hills and the South West will be integrated and pre-formed from the start of the 2016/17 fire season with substantial involvement of both the Departments of Parks and Wildlife and Fire and Emergency Services personnel on all teams.

The State Emergency Management Committee to review the policy for traffic management at emergency incidents so it reflects national ‘best practice’. This includes the production and issuing of an aide-memoire to guide traffic management, emergency and incident management personnel.

The State Government to establish an arrangement to develop a ‘network’ of Western Australian State Government agency personnel who can be called upon for bushfire and emergency incident management capability within Western Australia. The arrangement will be led by the State Emergency Management Committee and modelled on systems used by the Department of Parks and Wildlife.

The Department of Fire and Emergency Services to issue a photo identification card to DFES members, members of Bush Fire Brigades, volunteer emergency services, Incident Management Teams, forestry industry brigade members and Networked Government Emergency Agency members. DFES also to consider temporary windscreen signage to identify vehicles carrying such personnel.

The Department of Fire and Emergency Services to work with the Department of Planning and Local Governments to adopt a policy which enables Local Governments to identify, register and communicate, ‘Places of Bushfire Last Resort’ in settlements and townsites where the life risk from bushfire is very high or greater.

The Department of Fire and Emergency Services, utilising the Office of Bushfire Risk Management, to develop a simplified and fast track hazard reduction burn (and other fuel mitigation techniques) planning and approval process to ensure the timely conduct of township and asset protection burns by Bush Fire Brigades and individual property owners. The process is to be agile and adaptable for the range of stakeholders which may participate in low risk, small scale, low complexity burn planning and approvals.

Flexible pre‐formed multi‐ agency IMTs

Structures to incorporate local knowledge and situational awareness into the fire response

Co‐designed arrangements that support a unified response to fire

Coordinated and targeted mitigation of fire risk

Cross-agency resource management system

The Committee finds that on the evidence presented, that the Fuel Reduction Burn Program should be maintained and have its budget directly funded to ensure that the program continues and does not hinder other services or programs.

The Tasmanian fire agencies consider the development of fire operational guidelines to avoid long-term environmental impacts such as: • • • strategies and tactics that will minimise the impact of fire management activities conditions under which earthmoving equipment and fire chemicals may be used information on seasonal conditions and the times of year when various strategies and tactics should be applied, and fuel management strategies.

The Tasmanian fire agencies develop a joint multi-agency Fire Preparedness Matrix to guide decision-making in response to severe fire weather conditions or capacity issues.

Integrate existing capabilities into a Total Flood Warning System.

Review the allocation of responsibilities for earthquake risk management.

Identify facilities that can be used as cool spaces during heatwaves and establish linkages between operators and emergency management organisations

Improve the coordination and delivery of the National seismic monitoring program.

Integrate non-government entities into emergency response and recovery arrangements.

Review interagency information sharing arrangements.

Review coastal inundation evacuation and response plans.

Continue the enhancement of forecast and warning services.

Build capacity to enable Incident Management Teams to manage the likely increased frequency and intensity of major fire events.

Continue the Fuel Reduction Program.

Establish emergency services ICT redundancy arrangements for damage loss of communications infrastructure.

Review community information and warning systems to ensure they cater for heatwave messages

Develop flood evacuation plans for at risk communities.

Improve information about electricity demand during heatwaves.

Develop arrangements to identify and communicate with people vulnerable to heat stress

Provide walls around critical electrical infrastructure within the main plant area to provide security and protection from catastrophic water system failures.

Improvements to installation to be implemented as follows: - Lighting within the generator enclosure and immediately adjacent to be emergency battery-backed type. - Improvements to the spatial layout within the main generator enclosure should be investigated, including allowance for the control panel door to open 180o (only 90o currently); moving the fuel pumps to a more accessible location, and ensuring clear access to the day tank for manual filling if required. - Improvements to communications facilities between critical areas, including fixed phone line connections between the main control room, main generator control panel in the P (energy) Building, and the generator enclosure, and allowing link to offsite specialist advice. - Where generator maintenance requires operations outdoors (not applicable to main generator, but applicable to others), a shelter over the relevant area should be provided to allow safe work during wet or hot weather. - Written emergency procedures to be prepared covering credible failure scenarios with step by step checklists and recommended actions.

Review generator installations details as noted in report and implement physical improvements where possible.

Add to generator test procedure a checklist at the end of testing which includes checking that all systems are back to normal positions and includes a requirement to leave the day tank full where there is a bulk tank/day tank arrangement.

As part of the electrical master plan update recommended above, a complete and consistent set of single line diagrams describing the electrical distribution network be prepared. Relevant diagrams to be laminated and displayed in the main substations. Labelling to all main electrical equipment be reviewed and updated in accordance with the final documents. 

A detailed review of the fuel control and BMS systems (for all generators) be carried out and actions taken to: 1) Ensure that the fuel alarm system is operational and properly calibrated, and ensure that the alarms are connected to the BMS. 2) Ensure that the BMS transmits these alarms effectively to the maintenance staff. 3) If this review demonstrates risk of fuel control systems not adequately reporting alarms, consider an independent day tank level switch to be installed in each generator fuel tank, directly connected to the BMS. 4) Consider the feasibility of adding a “fuel system not in auto” or “fuel system fault/fail safe watchdog” or “pre-alarm identifying that the generator is about to shut down without intervention” feature to current systems – subject to details of each individual generator system.

Generator dual redundant starter systems should be considered.

The electrical master plan for the site should be updated to include planning for the scheduled replacement or refurbishment of those parts of the infrastructure that have not been renewed in the last 10 years. This planning to consider other upgrades or plans for the FMC overall.

Review control system for the main generator normal/essential changeover system and ensure that it has effective backup/manual or redundant operations, and suitable testing facilities. The Essential board that supplies the main generator power to Blocks A, B, C (except theatres), D, E (except certain critical engineering plant) (MD-1-4P-10E), is a potential single point of failure of a significant portion of the emergency power system and as part of the Master Plan update should be considered as a priority.

Review all generator locations for arrangements for temporary generator installation, including design of modifications as required for electrical connections and spatial requirements at installation locations, to be documented in an emergency procedure.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service, in collaboration with the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service, review and improve the system of bush fire management zones to ensure that greater priority is given to hazard reduction on land classified within land management zones.

That the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service establish a regime of frequent mosaic burning within the Warrumbungle National Park, where conditions permit, to be monitored and evaluated via a formal fully funded research program. This program should then inform the Service’s approach to the wider national park estate.

That the NSW Government commit to and fund a long term program of prescribed burning based on the recommendation of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission of an annual rolling target of a minimum of five per cent of public land per year, and that the NSW Government commit to extending the funding for the National Parks and Wildlife Service five year hazard reduction program past 2016.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service:
-streamline the regulatory system for hazard reduction burns, including the permit system, in order to identify and remove any unnecessary impediments to timely, planned hazard reduction burning

-improve accountability in relation to the implementation of bush fire risk management plans as a means of delivering more hazard reduction.

Develop an integrated inter-agency resource management system: Large and complex fire incidents require resources from multiple agencies. Developing an integrated inter-agency resource management system will have three main benefits: identifying potential resources will be more straightforward • the status and location of resource deployments can be tracked • planning of deployments can take into account all relevant information

Establish multi-agency preformed IMTs: An effective IMT for large and complex fire incidents requires the capacity and expertise of multiple agencies. Establishing multi-agency preformed IMTs will have three main benefits: adequate IMT resources can be deployed with ease • strong working relationships will be built between IMT members • common approaches to incident management and fire response can be embedded.

That the Department of Health & Human Services uses Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority Computer Aided Dispatch data to report ambulance emergency response time performance. 

That the Department of Health & Human Services and the Department of Justice & Regulation, in consultation with their portfolio emergency service agencies that have response time measures, determine relevant targets for these.

That Victoria Police assesses and where practical addresses limitations to available data and trials the use of response times for internal performance measurement.

Noting the implementation of Common Incident Command and Control System (CICCS) in SA that fire and emergency services together with police (including through AFAC and ANZPAA), continue to liaise regarding the development of a national incident management.

Review the current practise of issuing an ‘emergency alert’ telephone message or an emergency warning and/or watch and act alert to ensure that it is consistent, relevant and necessary. Prior to issuing an emergency alert message, consider state level involvement so that other agencies are made aware of message and intent.

That the Emergency Management Australia’s ‘Arrangements for Interstate Assistance (Fire and Emergency Services)’ be applied to all future requests for assistance by the SACFS, SAMFS and SASES.

SACFS appoint the Regional Controller and/or Coordinator as the IC for any Level 3 incident occurring within their Region to provide better continuity and improved coordination. The position of the regional controller and/or coordinator could then be backfilled by a suitably qualified individual as required.

Review the communication and request procedures within SACFS to ensure that the most effective chain of command and line of communications are established between the Incident Management Team, region and state.

That SACFS conduct a review of SIMT with a view to increasing the number of teams from four to six, aligning them with each of the six regions within SA.

That SACFS consider a review to develop an effective interagency messaging system and agency resource management system.

That future declarations be undertaken to ensure that the areas affected by the declaration are clear and concise.

That SACFS consider the Traffic Management Procedures and guiding principles adopted in Tasmania as a model that could be implemented within SA.

Prior to September 2015, the Banana Shire Council develops a multi-channel warning strategy and associated public information campaign, including common language and consistent messaging, for the Banana Shire.

State Disaster Coordination Centre considers requesting a representative from critical infrastructure owners be present as a liaison officer in the State Disaster Coordination Centre during activations for events that may impact on their assets.

As part of the above, both the Banana Shire Council and SunWater ensure Emergency Alert messages are pre-formatted, consistent, polygons are identified according to risk, and that they are tested and practiced with the State Disaster Coordination Centre.

Prior to September 2015, SunWater and the Banana Shire Council jointly develop a multi-channel, common warning strategy, including common language and consistent messaging, for residents downstream of
SunWater assets within the Banana Shire Council, and clearly articulate procedures for dissemination.

A dynamic online list of positions and contact details is published for those able to authorise Emergency Alert, and made accessible to local government.

The Warning and Alert Systems training package is updated to align the content to the Standard for Disaster Management in Queensland and to include advice and scenarios from the Information Commissioner.

A qualitative assessment of public information and warnings arrangements is undertaken as part of the 2016 disaster management plan assessment process.

The Public Information and Warnings Sub-plan Guide is reviewed to include:
- good practice examples
- a broader range of considerations for barriers to effective communication
- guidance to ensure warnings and public information is linked with state agency arrangements, when the event is led by a hazard-specific primary agency.

Queensland Fire and Emergency Services should consider supporting local government in the annual development of at least one pre-formatted Emergency Alert message and polygon map based on a risk assessment and hazard modelling.

Queensland Fire and Emergency Services should consider new and emerging technologies for issuing warnings (including opportunities for Emergency Alert to be distributed in other languages or to people with vision or hearing impairment).

Telecommunications and Power Infrastructure
Noting the high reliance within the community on power and telecommunications
infrastructure, there would be benefit for Governments at both State and Federal level to
work with power providers and telecommunications companies to better define disaster
response and recovery responsibilities, and to identify options for increasing redundancies in
networks in order to improve surety of service

PES External Surge Program The success of the PES External Surge Program and the willingness of participants to deploy at short notice to support the recovery effort is commendable, as is the readiness of their supervisors to release them from their duties to enable deployment. The Program, supported by an appropriate training program, is one that should be sustained as part of the whole of Government recovery readiness effort.

Future appointments to the role of Incident Controller should be limited to one for the entire duration of the incident, with nominated Deputy Incident Controllers to assist or ‘take charge’ in the Incident Controller’s absence. This measure will provide for a single point of responsibility and control for the incident and assist with any subsequent review or enquiry. If it is not possible to implement this proposal for liability reasons, the number of Incident Controllers should nevertheless be reduced to the minimum.

In addition to regular meetings of the DFES/DPaW Interagency Bushfire Management Committee, the two organisations should use joint exercises to identify agreed firefighting approaches for common or likely scenarios.

DFES, in consultation with bushfire volunteers should develop a procedure for the controlled entry and exit of volunteers to the fire ground

The Executive Teams of both DFES and DPaW should meet quarterly to review and agree joint improvements relating to issues of interoperability, complementarity and the alignment of firefighting doctrine. The establishment of a unified command in joint State Operations Centre, Regional Operations Centre and Incident Management Teams should be pursued as an overarching goal.

A Restricted Access Permit system for the entry/ re-entry of residents, based on the one developed for the Parkerville Stoneville Mt Helena Bushfire should be finalised.

Consideration should be given to an automatic ‘Advice’ notice being issued as soon as a fire is reported in a pre- determined high risk area such as the Darling Scarp on days when adverse fire weather conditions are forecast.

All agencies engaged in bushfire response should develop expeditious procedures for the mobilisation of resources in support of other agencies. See discussion in Section 7.1.

The State review and revise its communication strategy, to: • needed for effective and rapid public communications during an emergency; and ensure all emergency response agencies have, or have access to, the capability and resources • ensure, where appropriate, that private operators of essential infrastructure are included in the coordination of public communications during an emergency concerning that infrastructure.

The State establish, for any future incident, integrated incident management teams with GDF Suez and other Victorian essential industry providers, to: • essential industry providers; and require that emergency services personnel work with GDF Suez and other appropriate • implement the Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System.

GDF Suez establish enhanced back-up power supply arrangements that do not depend wholly on mains power, to: • ensure that the Emergency Command Centre can continue to operate if mains power is lost; and • ensure that the reticulated fre services water system can operate with minimal disruption if mains power is lost.

GDF Suez improve its crisis management communication strategy for the Hazelwood mine in line with international best practice.

CFA and VICSES should: explore further opportunities to collaborate with each other.

That Emergency Management Victoria novates the head contract for the StateNet Mobile Radio network to the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority.

That Victoria Police implements the recommendations relating to protective services officers in the Service Demand and Dispatcher Capacity Analysis dated September 2013 and:
- works with the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority to implement revised Metropolitan Mobile Radio channel arrangements to reduce the impact of protective services officer usage on other police users 
- investigates the use of smart devices and applications for protective services officers to minimise their use of the Metropolitan Mobile Radio network for routine enquiries.

That Ambulance Victoria:
- reassesses the current structured call-taking script
- develops a single structured call-taking script for Triple Zero calls.

That the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority critically reviews:
- the current Computer Aided Dispatch 9.1 upgrade project against business case objectives, including system and network reliability and system redundancy, once the project is completed
- the ESTA Triple Zero telephony platform telecommunications upgrade project against business case objectives, including system and network reliability once the project is completed.

That the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority includes Victoria State Emergency Service vehicle capability details in the Computer Aided Dispatch database.

That Emergency Management Victoria expedites the expansion of the Rural Mobile Radio network to all emergency services organisations.

That the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority reclassifies its State Emergency Communications Centres as critical national infrastructure.

That Emergency Management Victoria be responsible for facilitating the interoperability of all organisations involved in emergency response, including the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority and Ambulance Victoria.

That the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority, assisted by the Inspector-General for Emergency Management and responder agencies, improves the process for changing call-taking and dispatch procedures by comprehensively appraising the costs, benefits and operational impacts of these changes and agreeing a plan for their implementation with all affected agencies.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service:
- streamline the regulatory system for hazard reduction burns, including the permit system, in order to identify and remove any unnecessary impediments to timely, planned hazard reduction burning
- improve accountability in relation to the implementation of bush fire risk management plans as a means of delivering more hazard reduction.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service, in order to ensure greater respect for volunteer fire fighters’ knowledge and experience in the management of fires:
- examine its plans of operations to provide for the use of local knowledge at every level of decision making down the chain of command
- require a local fire fighter to be stationed in every command vehicle, where possible 
- ensure that every out of area crew includes at least one local fire fighter
- require officers to engage more effectively and regularly with volunteers during the periods between fires
- consider any further strategies to address the entrenched conflict between officers and volunteers, including additional ways to empower volunteers and utilise them more effectively.

That the NSW Government improve the protection of media and telecommunications towers around New South Wales by:
- increasing the asset protection zone around the towers on Mt Cenn Cruaich and other comparable sites to a radius of at least 100 metres
- conducting an audit of all New South Wales media and telecommunications sites to examine their fire safety in respect of land clearance, fire trails and fuel loads
- implementing a strategy to ensure that licensees of these sites fulfil all their hazard reduction obligations.

That the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service establish a regime of frequent mosaic burning within the Warrumbungle National Park, where conditions permit, to be monitored and evaluated via a formal fully funded research program. This program should then inform the Service’s approach to the wider national park estate.

That the NSW Rural Fire Service investigate mechanisms to enhance the predictability of megafires and how this information is communicated easily to the public.

That the Rural Fire Service and National Parks and Wildlife Service review the procedures for requesting aerial support in ‘severe’ or worse fire conditions to ensure that delays in providing it are reduced to the minimum time possible.

That the Rural Fire Service consider redrafting the disclaimer in its fire predictions to make abundantly clear where the potential errors or omissions may affect the prediction and how to detect them if they are there (for example, by comparing them with linescans) and what other factors (such as VLS) may affect the predictions and in what way.

That the Rural Fire Service and National Parks and Wildlife Service consider amending their protocols for upgrading advices to higher levels to emphasise the significance and urgency of raising warning levels as soon as the potential dangers of fire to lives or property materially increase.

That the Rural Fire Service together with other land managers develop a program whereby local stakeholders come together regularly (every 2 months during non-fire season and monthly during the fire season) to share intelligence and to consider hazard and incident management measures for implementation.

That as part of the adoption of such a posture in ‘severe’ or worse fire conditions, the National Parks and Wildlife Service consider alerting, at an early stage, all relevant persons and organisations, such as shire councils, heavy plant operators, the local RFS captains, Fire & Rescue NSW and other emergency services, that it is doing so, and that their assistance may be required at short notice.

That the Rural Fire Service consider extending pre-emptive section 44 to whole of Castlereagh RFS/Warrumbungle Shire area.

That during periods of ‘severe’ or worse fire conditions, that the National Parks and Wildlife Service consider adopting a posture of pre-emptive planning and deployment of incident management teams in national parks similar to the manner in which the Rural Fire Service does.

The NPWS conduct a review of its prescribed burns program to ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, that all necessary managerial approvals for a prescribed burn are provided as promptly as possible.

That in Class 3 fire-fighting operations, the Rural Fire Service consider including a fire behaviour analyst in the incident management team if feasible.

That the National Parks and Wildlife Service, in consultation with the relevant local Council(s), devise a policy that enables the John Renshaw Parkway to be closed at either end of the Warrumbungle National Park during a bush fire in such a way that its closure would not impede access by emergency services vehicles into the park.

That the National Parks and Wildlife Service consider reviewing its guidelines and protocols in respect of hazard reduction planning and burning-off operations in the light of the evidence from experts witnesses in these proceedings that the incidence of, and intensity of, major fires is increasing and in the light of expert evidence given in these proceedings concerning the dangers of vorticity-driven lateral spread.

That the Rural Fire Service consider amending its fire prediction reports to include a checklist of significant factors that have not been able to be considered in the prediction model and a warning to be alert for them and seek intelligence on them from fire ground managers.

That State and Local Government agencies maximise communication to the residents owning bushfire prone properties to be aware of their level of exposure by having access to the BAL relevant to their property.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s Director of Aviation Safety meet with industry sector leaders to jointly develop a plan for renewing a collaborative and effective Standards Consultative Committee.

The lines of responsibility be made clearer and some individual, perhaps the Regional Environmental Officer, or agency be given overarching responsibility to ensure recommended works related to bushfire mitigation on Defence Estate are carried out in accordance with the Bushfire Management Plan which the Manual for Fire Protection Engineering directs be prepared.

The Marrangaroo Training Area Regional Environmental Officer confer with the local Rural Fire Service at least annually and determine a hazard reduction regime capable of implementation. It is furter recommended all ranges be reviewed in relation to the same issue, that is, that personnel involved in the management of each range under Defence control be directed to confer with local firefighting authorities on at least an annual basis to assess hazard reduction responses to be pursued for that range in subsequent years. 

Range Control Officer Marrangaroo Training Area liase with the local Rural Fire Service units to develop a map indicating the areas of the range likely to contain unexploded ordnance. 

WA adopts a culture of joint IMTs in future. At Regional and State levels, DFES and DEC maintain standing contributions.

Future coordination/support/control of integrated emergency management across all agencies in Albany needs to be merged and located in a single joint facility. This issue needs to be reviewed statewide.

DFES and Local Government Bushfire Brigades ensure that only those with the required AIIMS competence have the authority to manage Level 1 incidents, noting they may not be Fire Control Officers.

The Department of Human Services should develop an improved model for communication for future disasters that provides a single point of information and contact for disaster affected communities

That Tasmania Fire Service or another suitable agency provides information to the community which shows, in simple form, the legislation applicable to approvals for lighting fires on private property and the various relationships between that legislation.

That arrangements are made for and appropriate pre-planning occurs to effectively implement the policy on road closures and traffic management.

That the State Emergency Management Committee makes arrangements to actively manage the use of social media in the community during an emergency, to avoid negative consequences for emergency operations.

That the Government reconsider the current position on emergency declarations in the Emergency Management Act 2006 and the Act is amended to provide: • a graduated scale of emergency declarations; • the ability to make a declaration when an emergency has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur; • the ability for the State Controller (or whatever the person in overall control of response and recovery operations is called) to make one or more declarations; • a declaration to enable access to all emergency powers.

That decisions to open Community Fire Refuges and evacuation centres be coordinated with Tasmania Police.

That Tasmania Police establishes a section within its structure with responsibility for developing and maintaining contemporary expertise in emergency management, progressing innovation, assisting organisational change initiatives and supporting its responsibilities in state emergency management arrangements.

That Tasmania Fire Service and its partner agencies establish a means of monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of centralising the location of Incident Management Teams.

That the Government consider whether it should discuss options for greater mobile phone coverage and redundancy in areas of high risk in emergency situations where there are presently telecommunications limits.

That Tasmania Police reviews its Emergency Traffic Management Points policy; and develops a multi-agency policy in the emergency management plans for road closures and traffic management, including clarity in decision making, coordination and sufficient operational flexibility.

That the State Emergency Management Committee makes timely decisions and resource commitments on the appropriate use of social media in emergency management.

That in multi-agency response and recovery operations, arrangements be made so it is unambiguous who is in charge of these operations.

That Tasmania Police be identified as the lead agency on evacuations.

That Tasmania Police conducts a review to ensure emergency management is treated as a priority and a core function throughout the organisation, including the development of contemporary capabilities, and is supported by an appropriate culture.

That Tasmania Fire Service examines options for developing and issuing fire management objectives and tactics from Incident Management Teams in a more timely way, including ‘quick’ plans.

That evacuation centres and other centres have a standard operating procedure for communications.

That Tasmania Fire Service reviews its integration of rural local knowledge and volunteer brigades into fire operations, develops and maintains appropriate strategies, and aims to be a best-practice fire service in this regard.

That Tasmania Fire Service ensures that the priority on warning communities at risk of active bushfires is not confined to when bushfires are burning out of control.

That the State Controller (or an alternate if they are not available) be expected to personally take an active role in controlling and coordinating response and recovery operations, depending on the nature and scale of the emergency, and until other identified arrangements for ongoing operations are established.

That arrangements are made and appropriate pre-planning occurs to effectively implement the policy on evacuation.

That Tasmania Fire Service develops a research base from which to inform the design of communication campaigns for communities threatened by bushfire.

That the Department of Infrastructure Energy and Resources consult Aurora Energy on the use of wooden poles for overhead infrastructure with a view to mitigating the risk in bushfires.

That police and other emergency services examine options for achieving radio interoperability between them in the absence of an integrated radio system.

That evacuation centres and other centres have plans and arrangements for electrical power redundancy.

That Tasmania Fire Service reviews the communication systems used for all emergency management operations, ensures operators are qualified, and ensures there is appropriate accountability.

That Tasmania Fire Service actively uses predictive modelling to design emergency communications for communities threatened by bushfire, unless there is a compelling reason for not doing so.

That qualifying the evacuation authority in section 47 of the Fire Service Act 1979 be considered — by exempting those people with a pecuniary interest in a property from a directed evacuation where it is reasonable for them to remain.

That Tasmania Fire Service reviews its approach to communicating with communities threatened by bushfire and consider the matters referred to in this Report.

That all agencies and the Government support moving to an integrated communications technology for police and the emergency services.

That a public information plan be developed as a part of the State Special Emergency Plan–Recovery, for implementation in the immediate recovery phase.

That the Department of Justice conduct an independent review to develop a suitable model for integrated and interoperable emergency management arrangements in Tasmania.

That Tasmania Fire Service reviews its position on using local experienced officers on the fire ground in the command model in a structured and systemic way.

That emergency management plans specifically include processes and resources for effectively engaging with and using local communities, including volunteers

That Tasmania Fire Service conducts a review of the fire permit system in the Fire Service Act 1979, and implements change to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the system by: • considering whether it is appropriate to authorise persons or organisations to conduct fuel reduction burning during a permit period • providing a better match between the period, area and fire risk • maintaining a timely and efficient process for issuing permits • naming the period in a way that draws attention to bushfire risk • establishing a reporting and accountability process.

That a state-level policy on evacuations be developed in the emergency management plans, including specific requirements for vulnerable people and guidelines for its implementation.

That Tasmania Fire Service and Tasmania Police review their use of modern forms of communication with the community, including social media, and commit resources to fully use this capability where appropriate.

That the Tasmania Emergency Management Plan enable, and all organisations with a role in emergency management activate, emergency plans at lower threshold events to practice their arrangements and achieve a ‘hot start’ in escalating events.

That appropriate plans are made to mobilise resources quickly to re-open roads affected by emergencies.

That Tasmania Police develops and implements a program for examining emergency management arrangements and facilities in Australia.

That Tasmania Fire Service considers measures to bring local knowledge into Incident Management Team operations.

That emergency management plans recognise the need to provide priority access to areas of emergency operations for critical infrastructure providers.

TFS develop written guidelines for the use of IMTs about the use of evacuation in a bushfire context, and triggers for decision-making.

That TFS and Ambulance Tasmania work together to resolve problems around congestion, particularly during the fire season.

That Tasmania Police, Tasmania Fire Service (TFS), Ambulance Tasmania and State Emergency Services (SES) investigate ways of providing secure and confidential radio communications.

Notification of a total fire ban should be broadcast to the public via any means reasonably available. Section 80, parts (2), (5) and (6) be amended so that broadcast fire ban warnings include, but not be limited to, radio stations, internet sites, social media outlets etc.

That Government agencies work closely with the Bureau of Meteorology and radio stations that broadcast emergency service announcements, to ensure the earliest possible determination of, and communications about, dangerous bushfire conditions.

That the electronic fire permit system used in the Mackay District be made available across the state for Fire Wardens who wish to use it.

That Section 66 (2) of the Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 relating to the exemption for issuing of permits to burn in State Forests, National Parks and Reserves is withdrawn and Departments must work within the District Fire Management Plan.

At the next reprint of the ‘Permit to Light Fire’ book, the requirement to notify neighbours when applying for a permit is reinstated to properly reflect the requirement under the Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990.

That a memorandum of understanding be developed between RFSQ and other organisations with fire fighting capacity at state level, to establish operational procedures when these organisations may be required for a joint response roles. Specifically, the intent will be: Vegetation Fire in a Rural Area: The Rural Fire Brigade in that area (boundary) is in charge and is the first Brigade called by Firecom. Structural Fire in a Rural Area: Firecom calls the Urban Brigade first and they control the incident. Local Rural Fire Brigade must also be notified by Firecom at the same time. Vegetation Fire in an Urban Levy Area: Firecom call the local Urban Brigade first and they control the incident. At their discretion they may call Rural Fire Brigades for assistance. Structural Fire in an Urban Levy Area: Firecom call the local Urban Brigade first and they control the incident.

That the Rural Fire Service Queensland needs to provide greater emphasis and acknowledgement of the use of fire as a tool in sustainable land management.

That as the Queensland Police Service moves to a digital platform the strategy around effective targeting and alternative automated number plate recognition models should form part of the design architecture.

That systems development in the Queensland Police Service capitalises on the advances made by the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service in recent years.

That the Queensland Police Service executive team reassesses its preparedness to collaborate with other agencies to deliver a whole of Government approach to delivering community safety.

That Queensland enters into a similar arrangement with Bureau of Meteorology to have an experienced forecaster seconded to Kedron State Disaster Coordination Centre for at least the duration of fire and storm seasons.

That the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service enters into discussion with the Queensland Police Service regarding the possibility for the Queensland Police Service to assist with prosecutions that may arise out of fire safety matters.

That Queensland Corrective Service, the Queensland Police Service and Queensland Health should work together to develop a position that enables prisoners to have timely access to their prescribed medication despite travel between facilities and without the need for costly re-prescription.

That the roll-out of the Queensland Police Service digital technology should take into consideration adopting and facilitating new processes including the police response to domestic violence.

That the Queensland Police Service:
- identify policing matters that only a sworn officer can manage, or
- identify matters that can be handled more efficiently through the use of emerging technologies such as biometrics and scanners.

That the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business and Commissioners establish a high level working group with the ABC and commercial media to identify and implement an improved information flow to the community on disasters.

That the current provisions enabling there to be a Ministerial Direction be maintained and actioned as the Minister sees fit.

That the Queensland Police Service considers adopting the broader use of ANPR in line with other Australian jurisdictions in consultation with the Privacy Commissioner.

That, where appropriate, the Commissioner of Police appoints appropriately trained and experienced public service officers to appropriate roles in the disaster management system to support District Disaster Coordinators in their vital roles.

That the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business in consultation with the Police Commissioner and the Commissioner Fire & Emergency Services should provide the direction for future information and communication technology strategies and acquisitions.

That the protocols developed by the Queensland Police Service and SES for operations define the respective roles and responsibilities as well as recognise the varying capabilities of SES units across the State.

Develop and implement a program of cost-effective road improvement works that can enhance flood evacuation capacity in the short-medium term.

The committee recommends that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau retrieve VH-NGA flight data recorders without further delay.

Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE) to work with the Triple Zero Awareness Work Group through Australian Communications and Media Authority's (ACMA) Emergency Service Advisory Committee to review Triple Zero awareness messages with regard to telecommunications outages.

Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy will work with the Communications Sector Group within the Trusted Information Sharing Network to develop best practice guidance for owners of critical communications infrastructure regarding public messaging during a prolonged telecommunications outage covering:
- the provision of early and accurate advice to the community;
- the dissemination of information to business, government, community service providers and critical industry sectors such as banks;
- engagement with emergency service providers and the appointed local incident manager;
- public communications over radio, by personal contact etc. - avoiding a reliance on phone and internet;
- communications with other wholesale providers including on matters dealing with compensation;
- public notices, such as the use of prominent notices on websites, explaining the outage to customers and clients outside the affected area; and
- the use of recorded voice announcements to inform incoming callers of the outage.

Governments and other stakeholders consider reviewing their existing emergency management arrangements to ensure public communications are clear and the public is kept informed of the incident response.

The Australian Government, in consultation with consumers and other relevant federal, state and territory agencies, develop a national communication strategy for consumers to be used in the event of an infectious disease outbreak.

If recommendation 1 is not supported by the Australian Government, the committee recommends that the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy issue a Ministerial Direction to the Australian Communications and Media Authority to allocate as a minimum requirement, 20 MHz in the 800 MHz band for the purposes of a public safety mobile broadband network.

The committee recommends that the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy take appropriate measures to secure, for public service agencies, priority access to an additional 10 MHz of spectrum in the 700 MHz band for public safety purposes.

The committee recommends that the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy issue a Ministerial Direction to the Australian Communications and Media Authority to allocate 20 MHz of contiguous spectrum in the 700 MHz band for the purposes of a public safety mobile broadband network.

The committee recommends that Australian governments specifically address issues of compatibility and capacity to facilitate the most effective interoperability of emergency service organisations and their key personnel, especially for fire services.

The Emergency Services Agency should develop and test administrative procedures for the communications systems used for the distribution of public warning and emergency alerts.

The Emergency Services Agency and the Territory and Municipal Services Directorate should develop and routinely review a strategic bushfire capability for the ACT. The contribution of ACT Fire and Rescue (including the Community Fire Units) and the ACT Rural Fire Service (including Parks Brigade) should be explicitly stated.

The Emergency Services Agency and the Territory and Municipal Services Directorate should continue to improve working arrangements between the ACT Rural Fire Service Parks Brigade and the ACT Rural Fire Service headquarters, by:
a) documenting the responsibilities of the Parks and Conservation Service Branch in its land management role versus Parks Brigade role and conveying this to all brigades; and
b) updating or replacing the Emergency Services Agency and the Territory and Municipal Services Directorate 2007 Memorandum of Understanding to guide working arrangements for bushfire preparedness and suppression.

I recommend that the AFP takes steps to ensure that there are on Christmas Island at all times appropriately trained AFP officers who have completed the National Police Search and Rescue Manager’s Course and that upskilling should be ongoing to establish a cadre of trained search and rescue personnel. 

I recommend that Border Protection Command implement a surveillance strategy, possibly with the assistance of other Commonwealth authorities and organisations on the island such as the AFP, which heightens its coverage at times when the weather and sea conditions are rough.

Predetermined locations for Level 3 IMTs should be reviewed and adequately resourced with necessary communications and IT capacity.

Reporting and control should be through the incident chain of command and not through agency chains of command

Prescribed burns which meet the ‘red flag’ criteria should have mandated risk Establish risk management criteria for management criteria imposed.

The expected scenario, with a view to the worst-case scenario should provide the basis for an IAP.

The process for initiating and releasing State Alert messages requires review.

As presently implemented, the AIIMS planning role is under-developed and provides insufficient support to the Incident Controller.

Contingency planning before the fire may have supported the IMT in recognising and seizing strategic opportunities earlier.

An intensive exercise/training program should be developed and maintained across agencies to identify and establish a pool of current Incident Controllers who are capable of managing a Level 3 incident.

There would be benefit in progressively aligning the geographic boundaries of each of the agencies and seeking to co-locate their headquarters within those boundaries.

There should be clearly established criteria for burns which are specially challenging, and these criteria need to extend beyond the intended boundaries of the prescribed burn.

Procedures to relocate IMTs need to be established in doctrine and exercised to ensure continuity of control.

Timely alerts and updates to the community are essential.

Greater investment in training on specific functions within the AIIMS structure will improve the support provided to the Incident Controller.

Logistics and resource officers in IMTs need to collaborate and establish full awareness and control over the available resources.

Within the AIIMS IMT doctrine the roles of the Incident Controller and Deputy Incident Controllers should be defined and well-practiced.

A system of vehicle tracking should be fitted to all fire appliances and linked to the common operating picture. Good communications planning is essential for good command and control.

A risk management approach is needed which considers risks both inside the prescribed burn and the risks that will need to be managed if the fire escapes. This risk assessment should be dynamic in line with the four day and seven day weather forecast.

Opportunities be sought to utilise local government representatives in other areas of the IMT particularly in public information or other community related functions.

To be effective, multi-agency IMTs will need to be exercised regularly and supported by sound and comprehensive doctrine.

Inter-agency cooperation to manage fire precincts in a tenure-blind fashion is necessary for effective fire suppression.

IMTs need to establish early and effective liaison with Local Governments.

Decisions on evacuations need to be made early enough for people to be fully informed, prepared and to move to a place of greater safety. Failure to conduct good planning can create situations where loss of life can occur

The state should identify the number of fully trained, experienced and accredited Level 3 Incident Controllers required to be available at any time and establish a process for identification of suitable personnel, ongoing training and accreditation.

In multi-agency responses the culture, training and equipment characteristics of each of the agencies should be considered in their employment.

Suitably experienced local representatives should be engaged to provide advice to the IMT in all Level 2 and Level 3 incidents at the earliest opportunity.

At Level 3, the available fire management expertise should be applied overwhelmingly to the fire management aspects of emergency management, possibly in incident control, and certainly in situations planning and operations roles.

Incident Controllers should be supported by a planning function that combines experienced weather forecasters, fire behaviour experts and local knowledge.

Radio bulletins need to be up to date and time stamped. Where social media is used the messages need to be up to date and accurate. Websites need to be up to date and accurate.

For incidents of this complexity, effective control in the critical phase (first 24-36 hours of the fire) requires an appropriately resourced IMT.

Clear direction to divisional and sector commanders and a common communications platform enables maximum return to be gained from the application of tactical resources and this rests on good incident action planning, and good command and control.

There would be value in progressively aligning the geographical boundaries of emergency management agencies and co-locating where possible within regions and districts.

DEC’s fire management expertise should be augmented by multi-agency IMTs that incorporate the expertise of other agencies and in fast developing situations the appropriate decisions will need to be made early.

Rolling risk assessment conducted during ignition of prescribed burns should identify whether an escape is likely to develop into a Level 3 incident. As soon as possible after it has been identified that the escape cannot be contained, the incident should be declared a Level 3.

Contingency planning is a critical function in the early stages of an escalating incident, and should provide the foundation of an IAP.

Expand the exploitation of social media, including graphical content for state alerts and warnings. Consider increasing the graphical content of web-based warnings.

Communications planning for geographic regions with recognised black spots and specific communications challenges should be prepared in advance of an emergency in order to support the IMT Communications Planning Officer

Strategic direction seeks to identify and resource those areas of tactical action that offer the greatest advantage.

DFES or DEC (depending on land tenure) is mandated to take over control of emergency incidents from Local Government once they have been declared Level 2 incidents. WESTPLAN BUSHFIRE and legislation to be amended accordingly.

WA adopts a culture of joint IMTs in future. At Regional and State levels, DFES and DEC maintain standing contributions.

Future coordination/support/control of integrated emergency management across all agencies in Albany needs to be merged and located in a single joint facility. This issue needs to be reviewed statewide.

The Minister for Emergency Services should urgently review the technical issues with the Western Australia Emergency Radio Network  program that is forcing the State’s firefighters to revert to their older radio networks.

The Department of Environment and Conservation urgently undertake a review of its risk management practices as they relate to prescribed burns including but not limited to: *reviewing risk management practices to ensure that they are in accordance with AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009; * finalising and implementing the new complexity model developed in house by the DEC; * considering a broader set of parameters of risk by conducting an environmental scan or similar tool for areas under consideration for a prescribed burn; *updating the prescribed fire plans to reflect the broader risk considerations discovered through environmental scanning; *better informing the risk considerations by updating the ‘Red Book’ to reflect current research on burning in coastal heath; and * reconsidering the utility of the ‘Red Flag Burn’ notification on files and either adopting it as a policy across the State or removing it as a consideration.

The Department of Environment and Conservation review its practices and procedures in the undertaking of prescribed burns so as to fully utilise the skills available to it in a seamless way including but not limited to: · volunteer bushfire brigades, especially in regard to use as a source of local advice; and · staff of the Fire and Emergency Services Authority of Western Australia.

The Department of Environment and Conservation review its current policies and operational guidelines in particular by: * strengthening the governance of operations by ensuring the Guidelines are relevant and practical; * ensuring the processes that are implemented for prescribed burns are: (a) value adding to the decisions and approvals required (b) informed by substantive input (c) focussed on outcome rather than process; *completing the draft management plan for the Leeuwin-Naturaliste Capes Area Parks and Reserves in accordance with the provisions of the Conservation and Land Management Act 1989; * exploring the possibility of automating and streamlining the various processes for formulating a prescription for prescribed burns for ease of access and updating; and * clarifying the guidance provided to decision makers as to the ‘edging’ and security of prescribed burns.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority should expand their use of social media to better inform the Western Australian community.

The Ministers for Health, Police, and Emergency Services ensure that the Western Australia Police, the Fire and Emergency Services Authority and St John Ambulance establish a formal platform to share their knowledge and experience in delivering programs to their staff and volunteers to address issues of stress from disasters and critical incidents, as is done in other Australian jurisdictions.

Public authorities such as councils and CMAs should continue to seek local knowledge in relation to flood management issues. In particular, councils will collaborate with VICSES and other key stakeholders in reviewing the system of flood wardens. Roles and responsibilities of flood wardens, and the process for their recruitment, should be formalised and clearly articulated in relevant flood management plans.

The state government establish a well coordinated and formalised system for the reading of river gauges by local people, including flood wardens. Furthermore, the knowledge of local people in predicting flood heights and impacts should be considered by emergency management agencies when predicting floods.

Local knowledge on the management and ongoing maintenance of waterways, including vegetation clearing and debris removal, needs to be incorporated in the development of regional flood mitigation strategies and local flood plans. Specifically:
• the process of flood risk assessment must include community consultation, and these views will inform development of both floodplain management studies, and floodplain implementation plans;
• in the absence of a formal planning process, councils and authorities undertaking significant ad hoc works on waterways for flood mitigation and protection must involve the local community; and
• the revised Victoria Flood Management Strategy and Victorian River Health Strategy will clearly articulate this process.

Agency incident management preparedness: a more comprehensive approach to planning, including the number of personnel, their training and better use of on-the-ground intelligence in the affected areas that enables immediate and strategic decision-making to be concurrent processes.

Agency incident management preparedness: refining IT tools to process the intelligence.

Agency incident management preparedness: provide clarity and certainty in specific roles and responsibilities for each agency.

Efficient and effective supporting tools and processes: streamlining the authorisation processes for urgent warnings.

Efficient and effective supporting tools and processes: developing tools and workflows to quickly and reliably transform technical data into intelligence that can be used to construct messages for community information that are timely, relevant, tailored and effective.

Fire services can improve outcomes by working with EPA as the regulator and licensing authority to achieve improved compliance with the required outcomes specified in the BPEM guidelines

Fire services can improve outcomes by implementing standard procedures that ensure the welfare and safety of crews and the public are not compromised

Fire services can improve outcomes by developing a checklist for use by incident controllers

The Queensland Government should consider implementing mandatory requirements to ensure that all conduits for the purpose of providing electrical supply below the applicable defined flood level are sealed to prevent floodwaters from entering them or flowing into them.

The Queensland Government should consider whether to empower Seqwater, through the flood operations centre, to direct CS Energy to stop or delay releases from Splityard Creek Dam where a flood event is declared under the Manual of Operational Procedures for Flood Mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam.

Electricity distributors should consider installing connection points for generators to provide electricity supply to non-flooded areas that have had their supply cut during floods.

The protocol should make provision for the use of telephone and/or radio where communication by email is not possible. Where necessary, CS Energy and Seqwater should make additional radio equipment available to relevant personnel.

The Queensland Government should consider measures to ensure that requirements are included in the designation of land for community infrastructure under the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 to ensure that critical infrastructure for operating works under the Electricity Act is built to remain operational during and immediately after a flood of a particular magnitude. That magnitude should be determined by an appropriate risk assessment.

CS Energy and Seqwater should agree upon and adhere to a formal communication protocol that requires CS Energy personnel to advise Seqwater, through the Flood Operations Centre, of water movements between Splityard Creek Dam and Wivenhoe Dam or Pryde Creek once a flood event is declared under the Manual of Operational Procedures for Flood Mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam. The protocol should ensure that a direct line of communication is established between CS Energy personnel physically located at the power station and the Flood Operations Centre.

CS Energy should put in place contingency measures to ensure email and telephone communications at Wivenhoe Power Station are not entirely dependent on a network located off-site.

As part of the longer term review of the Manual of Operational Procedures for Flood Mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam the Queensland Government should consider whether the dam operators should be able to extend the drawdown of the lake beyond seven days in order to reduce downstream bank slumping

The Disaster Management Act 2003 should be amended to give the chief executive of the department administering the Act (or his or her delegate) the authority to appoint an officer of Emergency Management Queensland to direct SES operations in extraordinary circumstances

Ensure that adequate administrative personnel are available within the incident control structure to provide administrative and knowledge management support for incident management.

That Bushfires NT, NTFRS, DLP, Weeds Branch, Parks and Wildlife, the Natural Resources Management Board, Biodiversity staff and representatives of the Volunteer Fire Brigades get together, at least annually, to coordinate planning efforts for peri-urban areas.

Conduct an information sharing and planning exercise between Bushfires NT and NTFRS to explore the current boundaries and the overlaps in the peri-urban areas between the NTFRS ERA and the Bushfires NT areas of responsibility for all major centres in the NT.

Continue the use of Warnings and Alerts, in various languages, and through multiple broadcast media, including Indigenous language versions to engage with all people as to the risks of bushfire.

Review the membership of the Bushfires Council, and the composition of Regional Committees to ensure that the Council and Committees have representational stakeholders.

That the Office of Environment and Heritage amend its operating procedures for the Environment Line to ensure that there are clear obligations to pass on information relevant to other agencies, to those agencies in a timely manner.

That the Premier issue clear and unambiguous guidelines to all Government Ministers specifying the timing of notifications to the public of any matters that may affect public health or safety.

FESA, WA Police and St John Ambulance establish a uniform protocol for handling multiple agency emergency responses that does not involve callers having to make multiple calls to 000.

There is a need for community education on how road-blocks and VCPs operate in the event of an emergency.

Prescriptions should mandate consideration of measures to retire risk.

Reporting and control should be through the incident chain of command, and not through agency chain of command.

Core ignition, particularly of red flag burns, should be informed by the 4 & 7 day forecasts (including a longer term perspective over 3 to 4 months)

The agencies need to develop techniques to ensure accuracy of information across all media.

Local knowledge should be accessed to inform the placement and operation of VCPs.

A risk-management approach is needed which considers risks both inside the prescribed burn and the risks that will need to be managed if the fire escapes. The risk assessment should be organised and in line with the four and seven day weather.

The state should converge on a single communications platform for all emergency management and support agencies.

The burn prescription should capture the fuel characteristics and potential rate of spread for those areas outside the burn that will likely be critical during the initial attack on any escaping fire.

Further community education may be needed on how to interpret messages.

VCPs are one of the instruments by which the Incident Controller manages the emergency. VCPs without communications cannot be fully effective in their role. Determine and implement an appropriate communications platform for emergency management

There should be clearly established criteria for burns which are specially challenging, and these criteria need to extend beyond the intended boundaries of the prescribed burn. The criteria should be clarified and adopted as agency S OPs.

The state should progressively align on a shared platform, such as WebEO C , to establish a Common Operating Picture (COP).

Prescriptions need to be interpreted by experienced and knowledgeable personnel to ensure risk is fully understood. It is important that the background and justification for these decisions are captured at each stage and are visible to all levels in WA fire management hierarchy.

A high level review of alerts, warnings and messaging is needed to match community expectations with what is practical and achievable.

Decisions taken on the basis of this risk assessment need to be captured and distributed across district and state.

There needs to be a better appreciation of the role of Vehicle Control Points (VCPs) and how they are managed in bushfire emergencies by all key agencies and the community

Opportunities should be sought to embed other local government representatives in other areas of the IMT particularly in public information.

Contingency plans for escaping burns should be prepared in advance.

Web sites need to be kept updated.

A rolling risk assessment is required which captures the risks of the burn escaping and provides adequate resources.

The State Duty Officer from DEC and the State Duty Director, FES A need to confer whenever a Level 2 or 3 incident is declared to satisfy themselves that they have appropriate incident management structures and resources across the state are at an appropriate level of preparedness.

When people are being moved away from their homes it’s important that they move to a place of greater safety and that their movement is relatively assured.

Suitably experienced personnel with local knowledge should be connected to the Operations and Planning section in all Level 3 incidents in the vicinity of substantial settlements.

Once a burn is ignited, it needs to be the subject of continuing risk assessment and appropriate mitigation.

Early in an incident, close and effective liaison needs to be established with local government agencies.

DEC should investigate embedding an experienced forecaster in the state operations centre.

On a regional basis there would be value in closer working relationship between DEC crews and VBFBs to build mutual trust and confidence. This could be done by opportunity engagement of VBFBs in DEC fire management or through exercises.

Local emergency management committees and planning should identify modes of community contact

The Minister for Emergency Services makes it a priority that the annual budgets of FESA and WA Police are sufficient to bring forward the completion dates of the current radio projects now underway.

The Minister for Emergency Services ensure that the annual budget of FESA contains the funds it requires to coordinate an annual multi-agency bushfire field exercise, alongside other desktop exercises, to be held in different regions of the State each year. The outcomes of this field exercise should be included in the proposed annual Ministerial statement to Parliament on bushfire readiness before each season.

The Minister for Emergency Services amend section 50 of the Emergency Management Act 2005 by June 2012 to allow the State Emergency Coordinator, as well as a hazard management agency, to make an emergency situation declaration.

The Minister for Emergency Services report to Parliament by May 2012 on the resources required to ensure a ‘One Source One Message’ multi-layered information system, as recommended by the Keelty Report, including any upgrades required for FESA’s current State Alert system.

Review the command function of the MROC for Level 3 incidents when the SOC is activated.

There are a range of opportunities identified from reviewing the three fires that will improve coordination between FESA and DEC, requiring limited resources, potentially generating some efficiencies and reflecting a joint, tenure blind approach to fire management in WA. The MIR acknowledges the progress made through the IBMC in these matters and notes these measures will require ongoing strong leadership. These include: · Clarification and consistent application of the Zone 2 and 2A mobilisation protocols; · Duplicating available information on websites; · Establishing a single State air desk and cross-utilising Air Attack Supervisors; · Completing common training for the conduct of public meetings;· Coordinating IMT training and exercises; · Operating joint IMT‘s during interface fires; FESA utilising the DEC mobile ICC when suitable ICPs are not available; · FESA engaging in daily weather teleconferences with DEC; Engaging a permanent BoM officer to support a common FESA and DEC SOC; · Developing a common ‗Tool Box‘ of forms and operational procedures for fire response; · Developing common jurisdictional arrangements to accommodate interstate support; · Developing a joint FESA/DEC SOC at the new (FESA) Emergency Services facility at Cockburn; · Adopting common and transparent Level 3 IC accreditation · Using a single mapping capability across both agencies and · Using common naming conventions for fires.

FESA must actively manage the transition to WAERN and provide alternative means for regional crews to communicate when in areas where WAERN is not operated.

FESA seek legal and policing advice regarding the policy to leave residents who chose not to evacuate in a declared ‗dangerous area‘ after a bushfire.

All responding crews and the incident command appointments should adopt a ‘Size Up‘ reporting format.

FESA should review the size of the existing pre-formed IMT to include additional Information and Planning officers and increased resourcing of scribes and management support for all Level 3 incidents.

Initial StateAlert messages should provide timely broad advice to a wide audience authorised by the SDD, while subsequent messages may provide more detail.

FESA and DEC need to appoint accredited Level 3 IC‘s based on experience, competency and currency.

To provide Level 3 IC‘s (and FESA) with a level of confidence and to maintain currency across the pool of accredited IC‘s, regular exercising of IC‘s and Level 3 IMT‘s is required.

FESA should continue to develop with DEC and Local Government a number of rostered pre-formed IMT‘s available throughout the fire season, regardless of predicted weather.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority and the ABC commence a thorough review of emergency warning messages. This review should give consideration to: The content, structure and presentation of emergency warning messages Media access to the Incident Management Team and State Operations Centre. This review should be expanded to include other media organisations should they demonstrate a willingness and capacity to contribute. 20

Emergency Management Western Australia establish an inter-agency working group to continue the development of the new single emergency services Act.

FESA and local governments jointly review radio communications capability prior to the 2011/12 bushfire season with a view to improving the current delivery of service to firefighters.

Emergency service agencies undertake more consultation and joint exercising involving the Fire and Emergency Services Authority, the Department of Environment, the Western Australian Police, the Department for Child Protection, local governments and volunteers – including Volunteer Bush Fire Brigades. This should include field exercises which test: Evacuation centres Critical infrastructure (including at the local level) Traffic management, including road blocks. Consideration should also be given to involving the community in exercising (see Recommendation 7) and using prescribed burns as exercises (see Recommendation 14) More detailed planning for exercises should be included in a revised WESTPLANBUSHFIRE to be endorsed by the State Emergency Management Committee.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority and the ABC commence a thorough review of emergency warning messages. This review should give consideration to: 
- The content, structure and presentation of emergency warning messages
- Media access to the Incident Management Team and State Operations Centre.
This review should be expanded to include other media organisations should they demonstrate a willingness and capacity to contribute.

The State Government consider resourcing the Department of Environment and Conservation and local governments to develop and administer a comprehensive prescribed burning program in Perth‟s urban/rural interface to compliment DEC's existing landscape-scale program.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority, the Department of Environment and Conservation and local governments take proactive steps to conduct their prescribed burning programs as joint exercises. This will give effect to: Reducing fuel load Improving inter-operability A mutual understanding of the fire fighting techniques of each agency.

The Western Australian Police and the Fire and Emergency Services Authority jointly examine the Traffic Management System developed in response to the 2009 Victorian bushfires and seek its adaptation to use in WA with additional attention to the access and egress by bona fide residents to areas that are evacuated.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority and the Department of Environment and Conservation develop and finalise their Memorandum of Understanding and commit to working in partnership.

The State Government amend section 50 of the Emergency Management Act 2005 to allow the Chair of the State Emergency Coordination Group to declare an emergency situation.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority and the Western Australian Police ensure they receive all necessary legal clarification in relation to Bushfire Responsibilities of Police Officers – Powers Used in Assisting Fire Authorities in Responding to Bushfires, to be promulgated across FESA and WAPOL.

The State Government consider resourcing the Department of Environment and Conservation and local governments to develop and administer a comprehensive prescribed burning program in Perth’s urban/rural interface to compliment DEC’s existing landscape-scale program.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority and the Western Australian Police ensure they receive all necessary legal clarification in relation to Bushfire Responsibilities of Police Officers – Powers Used in Assisting Fire Authorities in Responding to Bushfires, to be promulgated across FESA and WAPOL.

Hazard Management Agencies overseeing the response to incidents on the urban fringe select evacuation centres that are well within the urban environment and unlikely to be impacted by the incident.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority and the Department of Environment and Conservation ensure that their Incident Controllers identify critical infrastructure as part of their initial assessment and preparation of Incident Action Plans when attending major incidents.

Hazard Management Agencies overseeing the response to incidents on the urban fringe select evacuation centres that are well within the urban environment and unlikely to be impacted by the incident.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority and the Department of Environment and Conservation ensure that their Incident Controllers identify critical infrastructure as part of their initial assessment and preparation of Incident Action Plans when attending major incidents.

FESA and local governments jointly review radio communications capability prior to the 2011/12 bushfire season with a view to improving the current delivery of service to firefighters.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority work in partnership with Main Roads Western Australia and local governments to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy for the use of mobile variable message boards to alert the community to the declaration of a total fire ban and what it means.

The Department for Child Protection, the Western Australian Police and the Fire and Emergency Services Authority develop improved arrangements for communicating the loss of home and possessions to persons gathered at evacuation centres with a view to increasing privacy.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority and the Department of Environment and Conservation develop and finalise their Memorandum of Understanding and commit to working in partnership.

FESA develop in partnership with other emergency service agencies a ‘one source: one message’ multi layered system similar to that recommended by the Victoria Bushfire royal Commission.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority consider alternative wording to Total Fire Ban that ensures people gain a more complete understanding of what actions are prohibited.

The Interagency Bushfire Management Committee develop a consistent program of education, training (including media), testing and review of Level 3 Incident Controllers. This should include provision for a formal review of the performance of individual Level 3 Incident Controllers after every incident.

FESA develop in partnership with other emergency service agencies develop a 'one source: one message' multi layered system similar to that recommended by the Victoria Bushfire royal Commission.

The Fire and Emergency Services Authority, the Department of Environment and Conservation and local governments take proactive steps to conduct their prescribed burning programs as joint exercises. This will give effect to:
- Reducing fuel load
- Improving inter-operability
- A mutual understanding of the fire fighting techniques of each agency.

The State Government reaffirm its 2009 decision to approve DEC exercising greater flexibility in managing smoke within national guidelines, in order to achieve its prescribed burn program.

the state develop a standard approach to the provision of emergency warnings and information in formats – spoken and written – that recognise diverse community needs, including language and disability

the state, as a matter of urgency, develop a multi-agency Incident Control Team capability to be readily available for statewide deployment to establish incident control or to relieve functioning control structures.

the state develop an efficient process to ensure that, during flood events, temporary construction of flood mitigation works, such as levees, is controlled so as not to unacceptably impact on flood intelligence.

Victoria Police revise coordinator arrangements to ensure: • a coordinator presence is maintained at the place where incident control is being exercised • effective control is established and is maintained until the response phase has concluded • key control roles may be performed by personnel from agencies other than the designated control agency • that the timely compilation and distribution of an appropriate Incident Action Plan is recognised as a fundamental component of establishing effective control • those performing the coordinator role at an Incident Control Centre be suitably trained, skilled and experienced in emergency management and where possible possess a degree of local knowledge of the relevant area; and • that the revised coordinator arrangements are reflected within the State Emergency Response Plan

the state put in place appropriate measures to inform the community of the intended purpose of the Emergency Alert warning system.

the state actively pursue the use of social media as part of its emergency warning and public information system.

the state clarify the role of intelligence cell staff (for example, hydrologists and/or Catchment Management Authority) who are utilised in Incident Control Centres during flood events

the state ensure, as a matter of priority, that the State Control Centre is able to function as a fit for purpose, multi-agency emergency management centre. Necessary works to achieve this outcome should have an overarching focus on the implementation of common agency systems and processes to the fullest extent possible.

the state require that agencies operate in compliance with the guidelines of the Victorian Warning Protocol to ensure efficacy of warning messages.

the state review its Memoranda of Understanding with official emergency broadcasters to take account of increased usage of internet based information, including social media and the ability to broadcast community meetings

the state develop a flood warning system for each basin and location with community input and make relevant documents publicly available. Each warning system should include key performance indicators.

the state ensure that interoperable information management practices are developed and implemented by emergency management agencies. Common systems should be utilised to the fullest extent possible.

the state develop and implement standards for Emergency Alert to ensure consistent use, training and application by accredited operators within agencies across ‘all hazards’.

the state comprehensively pursue the objective of achieving (where possible) the priority outcomes of the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience and the imperative of shared responsibility, in particular by: • requiring that local knowledge is considered as a critical component of all phases of emergency management • involving local communities in the development and ownership of community resilience plans based on an ‘all hazards’ approach and tailored for the specific needs of each community • encouraging local communities to form resilience committees to develop and administer community resilience plans • nominating Victoria Police as the lead agency in initiating the strategy to develop community resilience committees; and • requiring emergency service agencies to consult and engage with local community resilience committees in the preparation, planning, response and recovery phases of emergency management.

the state investigate the ability to refine the Flood and Storm Information Line to enable it to receive as well as provide information.

the state ensure that common and interoperable resource management systems are developed and implemented by emergency management agencies. Common systems should be utilised to the fullest extent possible.

the state develop and implement a single web portal as a means of providing emergency information to communities and local government on an ‘all hazards’ basis, including the information referred to in recommendations 74, 89 and 92.

the state and the commonwealth, during a flood event, make information available on providers who have capacity to accommodate patients and residents who require evacuation.

the state engage with local government to ensure emergency services’ public information and warnings reflect the community demographic.

the state commit to securing effective multi-agency interoperable communications as a high level priority and that all future communications projects and upgrades incorporate compliance provisions mandating interoperability requirements.

the state take the necessary measures to require that local knowledge is considered in flood risk planning, including verification of flood maps and flood response plans.

the state ensure: • a common, functional and accessible system be introduced to enable effective Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre and Incident Control Centre communications • a regime of regular Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre exercising is introduced with oversight by an appropriate independent body. Such exercising should include testing of systems utilised for Incident Control Centre and Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre communications • those required to perform Emergency Management Liaison Officer roles have undertaken appropriate training; and • resource requesting arrangements are clarified and documented so that control and coordination functions do not overlap.

The Fire Services Commissioner ensures that there is a single standard for the tabards worn by the IMT on the fireground and in control centres to ensure consistency and aid interoperability.

The CFA works with MFB to ensure that the MFB control unit is available for responding to large fires and multi-agency incidents in fringe CFA areas

The Fire Services Commissioner clarifies the role of regional controller for major fires and incidents other than bushfire.

Review the suite of community bushfire warning systems available to tourists across the State.

Ensure that local knowledge, local flavour and local language is used where possible in the development of all community bushfire warnings.

Improve links and interactions between the communication systems e.g. customise OSOM messages to each of the communication mechanisms, link OSOM with Emergency Alert.

Develop a robust evaluation framework to review community bushfire warning policies, processes, systems and procedures both internally and with communities at regular intervals and immediately after a major bushfire event.

Allow the MFB and SES access to using OSOM.

Review Emergency Alert and OSOM systems to improve ease of use.

Educate and engage with fire-affected landholders about the types of warnings, what they might expect from the warnings and their responsibility for response to prevent loss of life.

Amend SOP J4.01and other strategic and procedural documents to reflect the goal of ‘timely, relevant and tailored’ for community bushfire warnings.

Encourage ICCs to use local knowledge to review templates prior to release.

Review the potential use of ‘crowdsourcing’ sites such as Bushfire Connect in community bushfire warnings.

Ensure that warning terminology used in the templates and FireWeb is consistent.

Integrate social media into the OSOM system.

Review the use of the terms in the templates e.g. ‘out of control’ so that community misconceptions are minimised.

Review OSOM to enable monitoring or tracking of where messages were sent, who they were sent to and when they are due for review.

The Fire Services ensure that an incident action plan (summary) is developed in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedure J3.03.

Incident Controllers ensure that Emergency Management Teams consider, provide advice, and manage the broader consequences of actions, such as reopening roads, the resumption of public transport and school buses, and the welfare of those impacted by traffic management points.

The Fire Services ensure information and warning projects are able to be integrated with a common operating platform.

The Fire Services continue to develop fire behaviour analysis and predictive science capability by ensuring the Fire Behaviour Analysis Team is appropriately resourced with accredited staff and available to provide services to the IMT.

The Fire Services investigate the reported technical communication issues for this fire

The Fire Services ensure that information and warnings are developed in accordance with the Victorian Warning Protocol

The Fire Services, as part of the regular review of Incident Management Teams – Readiness Arrangements, reassess current resource sustainability and identify opportunities for a more flexible application.

The Fire Services move towards a common and more disciplined approach to fireground communications.

The Fire Services Commissioner ensures that the inter-relationship between Information Sections at all levels is understood.

The Fire Services, and other emergency management agencies, use the Tostaree fire as a scenario exercise to improve understanding of fast-running fires and enhance interoperability and control strategies

The Fire Services introduce systems, procedures and operational training that promote information sharing and consistent situational awareness at every level, including to and from the fireground. This should include agencies such as police members on duty at roadblocks

The Fire Services evaluate the new information and warning systems to identify ways to integrate them and improve their capacity to issue timely, relevant and tailored messages. This should include the use of social media.

Energy Safe Victoria ensures that the standards for vegetation clearance around power lines consider the impact of fire on electrical infrastructure and the risk of loss of electricity supply to the community.

The Fire Services develop a joint protocol for each Fire Service to notify the other of fires reported from fire towers

The Fire Services, in consultation with media outlets, develop a more effective strategy for informing the community of Total Fire Ban days.

Victoria Police, under the auspice of the Regional Emergency Response Plan, lead a task force to ensure that the Princes Highway is treated as an asset of significance and an appropriate risk-based approach is adopted to minimise the impact of fire. This approach is to be integrated into regional and municipal fire management plan

Local government councils implement a zoning approach to fuel management as recommended by COAG 2004.

Tasmanian entities with responsibilities for bushfire management actively pursue national consistency of warning systems and emergency warning signals through national bodies such as the National Emergency Management Committee.

The committee recommends the government consider granting public broadcasters priority access to fuel during times of emergency for the purpose of broadcasting emergency warnings and information, and in a way that does not impede the ability of emergency service organisations to access fuel.

The Interagency Bushfire Management Committee and its sub-committees are the logical central platform for developing and strengthening future joint bushfire strategies and common systems of work between bushfire management agencies in Western Australia.

Conducting a pre-fire season exercise for each Pre-Formed Incident Management Team could be used to “re-accrediting” each team on an annual basis.

Triggers and a process for transfer of command and control from DEC to FESA should be developed and documented.

Higher level DEC guidance to Level 3 Incident Controllers could be improved by introducing a more explicit and robust process of questioning, engagement, monitoring and oversight of Level 3 Incident Controllers.

A summary Incident Action Plan could allow the Incident Controller to more quickly appreciate the situation and articulate a plan early in an incident.

DEC’s incident management capability could be enhanced by: – Appointing a Deputy Incident Controller for every Level 3 IMT. – Establishing a fast response “short” IMT capability for each Level 3 IMT. – Establish clear triggers to initiate sending in a “short” IMT to a fire. – Including FESA officers in pre-formed Level 3 IMT’s. – Establishing additional pre-formed Level 3 IMT’s with FESA. – Where appropriate, appointing a local Bush Fire Brigade officer as Deputy Operations Officer.

A Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Chief Executives of DEC and FESA would be a valuable statement of joint commitment between the two agencies.

FESA, in partnership with other agencies and the community, develops Western Australia’s urban interface fire fighting capability and capacity.

FESA maintains inter-agency relationships and arrangements, and develops formalised arrangements across the entire emergency management cycle for joint activities such as training, exercises and procedure development.

FESA establishes a dedicated intelligence function in Incident Management Teams for major bushfires and ensure this function is appropriately supported with threat based tools and systems.

FESA and DEC take a whole of capability approach to joint operations, including developing joint doctrine that provides a common and articulated understanding of roles and responsibilities, resources and capabilities

The State (through Energy Safe Victoria) require distribution businesses to review and modify their current practices, standards and procedures for the training and auditing of asset inspectors to ensure that registered training organisations provide adequate theoretical and practical training for asset inspectors.

The State clarify whether, during major fires, Victoria Police should discharge its coordination functions from the State Emergency Response Coordination Centre or from the State Control Centre.

The State (through Energy Safe Victoria) require distribution businesses to change their asset inspection standards and procedures to require that all SWER lines and all 22-kilovolt feeders in areas of high bushfire risk are inspected at least every three years.

The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment prescribe and audit the minimum number and nature of level 3 joint training exercises in which incident management team staff (including volunteers) are required to participate.

The State introduce a comprehensive approach to shelter options that includes the following: ■ developing standards for community refuges as a matter of priority and replacing the 2005 Fire Refuges in Victoria: Policy and Practice; ■ designating community refuges—particularly in areas of very high risk—where other bushfire safety options are limited; ■ working with municipal councils to ensure that appropriate criteria are used for bushfire shelters, so that people are not discouraged from using a bushfire shelter if there is no better option available; ■ acknowledging personal shelters around their homes as a fallback option for individuals.

The State (through Energy Safe Victoria) require distribution businesses to do the following: ■ fit spreaders to any lines with a history of clashing or the potential to do so; ■ fit or retrofit all spans that are more than 300 metres long with vibration dampers as soon as is reasonably practicable.

The Country Fire Authority provide to all CFA volunteers an identification card or similar to facilitate their passage through roadblocks established in accordance with the 2009 Guidelines for the Operation of Traffic Management Points during Wildfires.

The State revise its bushfire safety policy. While adopting the national Prepare. Act. Survive. framework in Victoria, the policy should do the following: ■ enhance the role of warnings—including providing for timely and informative advice about the predicted passage of a fire and the actions to be taken by people in areas potentially in its path; ■ emphasise that all fires are different in ways that require an awareness of fire conditions, local circumstances and personal capacity; ■ recognise that the heightened risk on the worst days demands a different response; ■ retain those elements of the existing bushfire policy that have proved effective; ■ strengthen the range of options available in the face of fire, including community refuges, bushfire shelters and evacuation; ■ ensure that local solutions are tailored and known to communities through local bushfire planning; ■ improve advice on the nature of fire and house defendability, taking account of broader landscape risks.

The State amend the Regulations under Victoria’s Electricity Safety Act 1998 and otherwise take such steps as may be required to give effect to the following: ■ the progressive replacement of all SWER (single-wire earth return) power lines in Victoria with aerial bundled cable, underground cabling or other technology that delivers greatly reduced bushfire risk. The replacement program should be completed in the areas of highest bushfire risk within 10 years and should continue in areas of lower bushfire risk as the lines reach the end of their engineering lives; ■ the progressive replacement of all 22-kilovolt distribution feeders with aerial bundled cable, underground cabling or other technology that delivers greatly reduced bushfire risk as the feeders reach the end of their engineering lives. Priority should be given to distribution feeders in the areas of highest bushfire risk.

The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment amend their procedures to require that a suitably experienced, qualified and competent person be appointed as Incident Controller, regardless of the control agency for the fire.

The State introduce a comprehensive approach to evacuation, so that this option is planned, considered and implemented when it is likely to offer a higher level of protection than other contingency options. The approach should: ■ encourage individuals—especially vulnerable people—to relocate early; ■ include consideration of plans for assisted evacuation of vulnerable people; ■ include consideration of plans for assisted evacuation of vulnerable people.

Victoria Police continue to pursue a coordinated statewide approach to arson prevention and regularly review its approach to ensure that it contains the following elements: ■ high-level commitment from senior police; ■ a research program aimed at refining arson prevention and detection strategies; ■ centralised coordination that includes comprehensive training, periodic evaluation of arson prevention strategies and programs, and promotion of best-practice prevention approaches; ■ a requirement that all fire-prone police service areas have arson prevention plans and programs, according to their level of risk.

The State (through Energy Safe Victoria) require distribution businesses to do the following: ■ disable the reclose function on the automatic circuit reclosers on all SWER lines for the six weeks of greatest risk in every fire season; ■ adjust the reclose function on the automatic circuit reclosers on all 22-kilovolt feeders on all total fire ban days to permit only one reclose attempt before lockout.

The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment establish before the 2010–11 fire season: ■ a uniform, objective and transparent process based on the current DSE approach for the accreditation of level 3 Incident Controllers; ■ a performance review system for level 3 Incident Controllers; ■ a traineeship program for progression from level 2 to level 3 incident management team positions.

The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment standardise their operating systems and information and communications technologies with the aim of achieving greater efficiency and interoperability between agencies.

The Department of Sustainability and Environment report annually on prescribed burning outcomes in a manner that meets public accountability objectives, including publishing details of targets, area burnt, funds expended on the program, and impacts on biodiversity.

The State amend the regulatory framework for electricity safety to require that distribution businesses adopt, as part of their management plans, measures to reduce the risks posed by hazard trees—that is, trees that are outside the clearance zone but that could come into contact with an electric power line having regard to foreseeable local conditions.

The Country Fire Authority review and improve its communications strategy as a matter of priority and develop a program for identifying and responding to black spots in radio coverage.

The State amend the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 to enable the Chief Officer to delegate the power to issue fire prevention notices.

The State amend the regulatory framework for electricity safety to strengthen Energy Safe Victoria’s mandate in relation to the prevention and mitigation of electricity-caused bushfires and to require it to fulfil that mandate.

The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment: ■ amend their procedures to require that an incident action plan summary be completed within the first four hours of an incident being reported and be provided to the State Control Centre and, where established, to the relevant Area of Operations Control Centre; ■ adopt DSE’s incident action plan summary as the template to be used by all incident management teams and ensure that the template is included in the online IMT Tool Box; ■ provide regular training to IMT staff, highlighting the importance of information and reinforcing the support available from specialists within the State Control Centre.

The State fund and commit to implementing a long-term program of prescribed burning based on an annual rolling target of 5 per cent minimum of public land.

The Department of Human Services should complete work on emergency communication and information management issues. 

NOPSA’s prohibition powers should be extended such that a prohibition notice can be issued where a NOPSA Occupational Health and Safety Inspector believes, on reasonable grounds, that an activity is occurring or may occur at a facility involving an immediate threat to the health or safety of a person.

The Commonwealth encourages further research into prescribed burning and its effectiveness and into alternative bushfire mitigation approaches through improved bushfire risk understanding at the asset level.

The Productivity Commission undertake an examination of bushfire risk from ageing power infrastructure, including an assessment of replacement costs and likely suppression costs from bushfires caused by defective infrastructure.

The Commonwealth Government work with the states and their agencies to ensure consistent terminology is used when communicating with the public.

Subject to the findings of the Productivity Commission, the Commonwealth examine options for the funding of replacement of power infrastructure that presents an unacceptable bushfire risk.

Portable, reliable mobile repeaters are required to provide radio communications into areas not covered by existing repeater networks. These repeaters need the capacity to be linked.

Main Roads Western Australia, Police and LGA’s be encouraged via State emergency arrangements to establish a distributed cache of “hard” road barriers for deployment to major incidents

A centralised emergency services website should be established that the public can access for reliable and up to date information on any incident. The website must be capable of reliably servicing a very high traffic load and be easily updated by HMA’s.

A formal IMG meeting should be convened as early as possible at initiating incidents with potential. At the very least early advice to potential IMG members should be made that a meeting is likely to be convened. The initial IMG should include all IMG representatives to ensure comprehensive briefing, agency specific situational awareness and issue identification.

The Interagency Guidelines for Road closure needs to be reviewed to incorporate a mechanism to identify bone-fide local landholders to facilitate their movement in and out of cordoned areas in sympathy with the Stay and Defend requirements.

Wherever possible the ISU should be co-located with Operations and Logistics Sections to ensure effective communications and the ICC in which they operate should be located in the affected community.

Potential OAMG membership should be identified in DEMC protocols and local hazard management plans. The information needs to be kept current. The contact details for each member should be recorded. These plans and contact details need to be available to any IMT mobilised to deal with an incident within the jurisdiction. This means access to this information via internet and storage and maintenance at a centralised facility managed by FESA.]

Information packs to be provided to road traffic personnel to assist with enquiries by public or provision to members of public and landholders who are defending homes/stock etc

At Level 3 incidents the position of ‘Traffic Operations Officer’ –be established and filled by a WAPOL officer. A role description for this position is required and should be included in the “Guidelines for the Operations of Road Closures During Bushfires 2008”. This officer is to be supported by a suitably qualified officer from MRWA that is capable of developing Traffic Management Plans that address risk and are cognisant of considerations associated with road type, appropriate speed limitations, signage requirements, traffic volumes, detours for local traffic and heavy haulage etc. This role should report to the IC and have strong links to the Operations Section, Planning Section (particularly the Situation Unit) and the Information Unit.

Public meetings are to be encouraged for all Level 3 incidents that affect, or have the potential to affect communities.

At Level 3 incidents the Information Services Unit should be adequately resourced with information technology and at least 6 persons, all of whom are very experienced and capable in dealing with the information demands of a Level 3 incident.

A formal OAMG meeting should be convened as early as possible for incidents with the potential to be Level 3 incidents. At the very least early advice to potential OAMG members should be made on days that exhibit extreme fire weather and other high ignition risk factors that a meeting is likely to be convened. The initial OAMG should include all OAMG representatives identified by LEMAC and DEMAC for each area to ensure comprehensive briefing, agency specific situational awareness and issue identification.

The information templates used by the ISU in developing public information boards need to be standardised and posted on the DEC Fire Management Services webpage to allow access and use by the ISU. A standard across government would add significantly to their acceptance and use by the public as a reliable source of information.

A review of community messages, their construction and component parts, the process to activate them and the technology required to deliver the messages by digital and non-digital media should be undertaken. The desired outcome is to define standard messages, procedures, tools and technologies that can be utilised by all HMA’s in Western Australia.

In preparing traffic management plans consideration should be given to which VCP’s are critical and need to be resourced with uniformed Police Officers and which VCP’s can be manned with civilian contractors.

The declaration of a potential Level 3 incident should be notified to FESA who can facilitate an early warning to CFCO’s in the Shire and surrounding LGA’s.

Prior to the bushfire season, potential IMG members, many of whom are members of the Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC) should be made aware of, and possibly exercise, their role as an IMG member.

Full briefings of traffic management personnel should be provided prior to dispatch to work areas – why road closed, what their authority level is, level of current risk etc

Dedicated information packages should be made available to personnel operating Vehicle Control Points at the shift briefing.

The responsibilities and obligations for an OAM and OAMG (when established) needs to clarified and codified in Westplan Bushfire with regard to • Provision of information to participating organisations about the progress and potential of an incident; • Dealing with information disseminated to the public; and • Sourcing, coordinating and prioritising resources required by incidents within the Operations Area. There is lack of clarity in current arrangements concerning the role of the agency undertaking control operations e.g. DEC or a local govt and the transfer of these responsibilities to an OAMG when established.

Potential IMG membership should be identified in local hazard management plans. The information needs to be kept current. The contact details for each member should be recorded. These plans and contact details need to be available to any IMT mobilised to deal with an incident within the jurisdiction. This means access to this information via internet and storage and maintenance at a centralised facility managed by FESA.

Provision of timely, accurate and regular information to the community via electronic media (radio and internet) is a recognised function of the Information Unit in liaison with the Traffic Operations Officer. The aim of this arrangement is to facilitate appropriate behaviour in the travelling public and local community concerning access limitations and disruptions to the fire ground and surrounding areas.

The ISU should be provided with a person with local knowledge at Level 3 incidents.

When an OAMG is established, a formal declaration of its establishment needs to be transmitted to all organisation/agencies involved. The declaration should clearly establish the reporting arrangements for Incident Controllers to the OAM as described in Westplan Bushfire.

There needs to be a system that allows laptop computers brought to an incident to be configured at the start of the season and allow them to be easily activated to the correct configuration when they arrive at the incident.

ABC Radio should be a participant in IMG and/or OAMG. LEMC and DEMC should plan for this involvement in Local and District Emergency Management Plans.

That to the extent it has not already done so, DEC take action to ensure that in future cases relevant weather forecast information, particularly information as to significant wind changes, is promptly transmitted through the Incident Management Team and made available to persons with field operation responsibility.

That arrangements be put in place for signage to be retained at Norseman and available at short notice to enable motorists to be warned of potential problems existing on the Great Eastern Highway west of Coolgardie.

SEMC and EM WA should: ensure all agencies use the same approach to managing incidents.

SEMC and EM WA should: ensure that all agencies can access other agencies’ operations centres when needed and that the procedures to do so are documented

SEMC and EM WA should: ensure that agencies have a common or compatible crisis information management system in place

That Tasmania Fire Service implement Recommendation 5 above; and that Aurora continue to co-operate with that Service.

That the recommendations contained in the Police Operational Debrief Report of 22 October 2007 to 7 November 2007, submitted to the Coroner, be further considered by the Tasmania Police for adoption where considered appropriate by Tasmania Police.

District and State levels utilise the current Act to make pre-emptive declarations of a disaster event (likely disasters) so as to be proactive in leading and controlling disaster events. All levels of the system should immediately notify other levels if they activate the Disaster Management arrangements. ƒ The Public Safety Preservation Act 1986 be amended to provide powers for Police Officers to provide an immediate response in the event of a rapid onset disaster event such as a landslide.

Suggested escalation trigger points be discussed with District Disaster Coordinators and Local Disaster Coordinators, and if considered practical and useful, be incorporated in Local, District and State Disaster Management Plans.

The Department of Community Safety and Councils develop MOUs to reflect the genuine partnership that exists in present arrangements including an emphasis on the use of the agreed State disaster arrangements to task and deploy SES units following State/Local consultation.

The Commissioner of Police, through a dedicated Assistant Commissioner (supported by a cohort of Assistant Commissioners to ensure adequate coverage), be assigned responsibility for overall control of each natural Disaster Management event in Queensland as the preferred arrangement.

Planning and consultation be undertaken by EMQ with all levels of the Disaster Management system to ensure that necessary risk-based disaster evacuation plans are prepared at Local, District and State levels, supported by necessary community education and preparedness programs.

The SDMG commission the Department of Community Safety and seek the necessary funding to develop and enhance the Statewide Disaster Management information and communications system building on alternatives already in place and in consultation with all levels of Government.

The SDMG lead an initiative to integrate and/or inter-connect all of the control centres involved at all levels of the Disaster Management system in Queensland as part of the project to integrate State communications.

That the Rural Fires Act 1997 be amended to provide to designated Fire Investigation Officers of the Rural Fire Service the power to enter any land upon which a bushfire has occurred for the purposes of investigation for a period of up to 24 hours after a fire has been declared out.

That emergency services are required to work directly with port/channel managers and the nominated marine safety authority to ensure that a training and exercise regime is established to enable emergency services personnel to develop and maintain the skills and knowledge relevant to marine emergency management.

That emergency services are required to work directly with port/channel managers and the nominated marine safety authority to identify and ensure availability of marine resources necessary for emergency services to meet their statutory obligations in responding to marine emergencies (this recommendation should be read in conjunction with recommendation 26 & 27).

That emergency services are required to work directly with ports and the nominated marine safety authority when ports are preparing marine emergency response arrangements.

That the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner ensures that an emergency services multi-agency working group is established to develop a specialist marine emergency response capability for Victoria based on the multi-agency Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) model. The specialist personnel should be required to have:
• detailed knowledge of ship safety systems and ship command/control arrangements;
• detailed understanding of State, national and international marine emergency management
arrangements;
• the ability to safely board and undertake a detailed assessment of a maritime emergency
• the ability to support the ships crew during a maritime emergency;
• the ability to effectively relay information back to the Marine Emergency Management Team.

Victoria progress, as a matter of priority, a telephony based public emergency notification system to reduce demand on Triple Zero and other emergency telephone lines during a major emergency.

Emergency Service Organisations review their use of Emergency Alerting System paging message categories to ensure that priority messages are not compromised by inappropriate use. An education program may be required to ensure that all users understand message categories, their intended use and ramifications of each category on network and message delivery sequence.

Emergency Service Organisations work with government departments, local governments and private industry to identify and implement a model for communication flow during an emergency incident.

The electricity distribution businesses enhance power outage information on their websites which are accessible to electricity retail businesses, the media and the public and also consider improving their capacity to communicate with customers.

The Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority, in partnership with Telstra, consider technological solutions to streamline the handover process for Triple Zero calls.

The Victoria State Emergency Service improve its communication with local governments, especially in relation to severe weather and storm warning information.

The Victoria State Emergency Service, Department of Primary Industries, Energy Safe Victoria and the energy sector develop a coordinated set of safety messaging about preparedness for storm events and clearly outline the responsibilities for delivering these messages before during and after an emergency.

Energy Safe Victoria finalise the development of the passport system to improve interstate mutual aid arrangements allowing operator access to qualified interstate power restoration personnel.

The integrated Emergency Coordination Centre be utilised during all significant multi-agency or multi-incident events with effective liaison with the State Emergency Response Coordinator.

Electricity distribution businesses develop and implement alternative arrangements for monitoring fallen powerlines.

That in order to enhance the protection of community and ecological assets, the Department of Sustainability and Environment increase its annual prescribed burning target from 130,000 hectares to 385,000 hectares. This should be treated as a rolling target, with any shortfalls to be made up in subsequent years.

That the Department of Sustainability and Environment implement remote sensing imagery as a routine part of its pre-burn and post-burn assessment process for prescribed burning. Maps of every prescribed burn should be produced in a similar format to those used in Western Australia, indicating the boundary of each burn and the varying fire intensities achieved within the burn area. The boundaries of all Fuel Management Zones within each burn should also be indicated.
Each prescribed burn map should be made publicly available on the Department of Sustainability and Environment’s website, together with a map of the same burn area which shows the pre-burn fuel hazard levels and a statement of the total area treated within each Fuel Management Zone by each prescribed burn.

That the Minister for Emergency Services, the Chief Officer of the South Australian Country Fire Service, the Chief Officer of the South Australian State Emergency Services and the Commissioner of Police establish a panel to develop policies and practices to ensure that at the time bushfire warnings are created and delivered, all such warnings are made known to all emergency service entities, and to ensure that warnings of an approaching fire are delivered in a timely manner with detailed and specific information relevant to the circumstances of the section of the public to whom they are directed. 

That the Minister for Emergency Services in conjunction with the Chief Officer of the South Australian Country Fire Service, the Chief Officer of the South Australian State Emergency Services and the Commissioner of South Australia Police develop policies and practices regarding the issuing of public warnings that address the risk posed to the public by an existing fire incident with a view to disseminating such warnings to the public at a time before the escalation of an existing fire incident occurs.

That the South Australian Country Fire Service establish preplanned Level 2 Incident Management Teams in each Region for deployment to Level 2 incidents.

That the Minister for Emergency Services and the Minister for Local Government consider the enactment of legislation that would empower Local Government to require the owners or occupiers of rural land to create fire breaks on the land of a kind that Local Government may determine and/or to require the removal of flammable materials from the land, as measures for preventing the outbreak of a bushfire, or for preventing the spread or extension of a bushfire.

That the Minister for Emergency Services and the Chief Officer of the South Australian Country Fire Service consider the creation of a position within an Incident Management Team of a Landowner Liaison Officer the duties and responsibilities of whom is to establish contact with and liaise with the owner and/or occupiers of rural land on which a fire is situated.

That the South Australian Country Fire Service empower the Regional Public Warnings Officer to create and deliver public warnings on that Officer’s initiative without the necessity of seeking the approval of personnel at State Headquarters.

The streamlining correspondence to Emergency Service Agencies

Immunity be prescribed for persons (including volunteers) using force in the exercise of a power or function under the FES Act or carrying out any direction or requirement given or imposed at the scene of a fire or other emergency.

Crown Law opinion be obtained to determine whether the FES Act gives the Minister power to direct and control individual Chief Officers and if that provision does not exist then the FES Act be amended to include that power. 

The Committee recommends that the ACT Emergency Services and the Rural Fire Service in particular institute regular meetings with the NSW Rural Fire Service and other appropriate authorities, such as environment
and national parks for the purposes of land management and fuel load assessment and control.

That following the declaration of a natural disaster, complete and accurate information on Western Australian Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements assistance measures and application processes is disseminated through public communications channels, including the media.

That consideration be given to additional ways and means to improve broadcast capability into disaster-affected regions, particularly for the early aftermath of any disaster when a loss of power characterises the event.

An early and high priority task in recovery from a natural disaster should be the development of a coordinated, succinct, practical and flexible public communications plan.

In any future large-scale disaster or event, consideration be given to a centrally located Media Operations Centre.

Need for scripting of messages by fire agency representatives when promoting VBIL services via radio, TV and newspapers.

Investigate procedures for updating the Victoria Bushfire Information Line (VBIL) Integrated Voice Response recorded message system to allow recording of permanent bushfire safety, and incident-specific, messages, accessible when the VBIL is experiencing high call volumes during large and/or numerous significant incidents

Investigate engaging with other agencies involved in emergency management including SES, VicRoads, VicPolice, OESC and DHS to establish a single united emergency information line for Victoria that can be used to provide information to the public from all agencies involved.

We recommend that NSW Health continue with its good work and continue to improve communication mechanisms with those, such as GPs, likely to be affected in major infectious disease outbreaks.

The Department of Primary Industries continue to consult local community about emergency planning and sites for disposal to retain confidence in the event of a genuine emergency.

That the Emergency Services Agency conduct investigations - and liase with emergency services agencies in other jurisdicions - in order to ascertain what technologies exist and are effective for use in disseminating warnings and associated information to the community of the ACT

That courses and programs be conducted to increase the level of Incident Control System training and augment the expertise of people who are likely to perform functions in an incident management team

If it is not part of the proposed version 2 of the Strategic Bushfire Management Plan, that the plan be revised to provide for a fuel-reduction burning regime in the ‘Land Management Zone’ that is equivalent to that contemplated for the corridors designated as the ‘Landscape Division Zone’ and that the regime involve burning areas in rotation to achieve an appropriately varying fire age spectrum across the entire landscape

That the Emergnecy Services Agency publicise and demonstrate the use of the Standard Emergency Warning Signal and provide to the community adequate explanation of the application of the signal. This should occur at least annually, in conjunction with any pre-summer fire awareness initiatives

That senior officers of the Emergency Services Agency give greater recognition to the skills, knowledge and experience of people from other agencies – particularly the land management agencies – as well as rural residents and private individuals and use these people in roles commensurate with their skills and experience

That clarification be provided and information be made public in connection with the hazard reduction proposed under the Strategic Bushfire Management Plan for the area designated ‘Land Management Zone’, which appears to cover about 70 per cent of the ACT landscape and might be excluded from fuel-reduction burning

That measures be taken to ensure that ACT and NSW Rural Fire Service radio communications systems are integrated, so that ACT and NSW firefighting units can communicate with each other

That, if he is willing to participate, Mr John Lowe be made a member of the implementation taskforce to which I refer in recommendation 70

That appointments of personnel to functional positions within the incident management team be based solely on competence and experience and be made by the Chief of the ACT Rural Fire Service or, in the absence of that officer, the Deputy Chief of the ACT Rural Fire Service

That a hazard-reduction program be introduced, involving regular and strategic burning in all areas of the ACT – including the catchment areas – with a view to having fuel-reduced areas in a pattern across the landscape, excluding only small areas of particular ecological or conservation importance

That the Australian Federal Police and the Emergency Services Agency agree on a policy on community safety and evacuation during bushfires, based on the Australasian Fire Authorities Council position outlined in its paper Community Safety and Evacuation during Bushfires. Community education programs should incorporate advice on this, including the ‘stay or go’ policy

That the views and concerns expressed by the ACT Sustainable Rural Lands Group be taken into account when implementing the recommendations in this report

That senior officers in the Australian Federal Police and the Emergency Services Agency maintain regular and meaningful contact during fire emergencies, to ensure full dissemination of information and thus facilitate the making of good operational decisions

That a system of public warnings that uses grid references shown on the maps in the Canberra telephone directory be adopted

That the Emergency Services Agency review the communications systems used by the four services (the ACT Ambulance Service, the ACT Rural Fire Service, the ACT State Emergency Service and the ACT Fire Brigade), by the Australian Federal Police, by NSW emergency services and by aircraft and ensure the systems are compatible

That prescribed burning operations be conducted according to agreed standard burning prescriptions

That Melbourne Water and councils explore opportunities for working collaboratively to address the management of flooding risks with a view to optimising the efficient and effective use of their flood mitigation resources.

Develop a component of the DSE Workforce Strategy to build organisational capacity and sustainability of the prescribed burning program across the networked emergency organisation: 
• formalise fire management accountabilities including prescribed burning in executive and non executive performance management systems and related plans
• include annual resource commitments in schedules to cooperative agreements across the networked emergency organisation • undertake continuing research to address volunteer motivation and involvement in the prescribed burning program across the networked emergency organisation
• identify opportunities to recognise fire related training that are transferable to non fire related employment

Strengthen internal and external communications to ensure adequate stakeholder involvement throughout the prescribed burning program: 
• coordinate public information and media about prescribed burns in the DSE corporate communications policy
• explore opportunities to secure appropriate stakeholder engagement at all stages of the prescribed burning program
• extend burn OIC update program concept to all personnel engaged in the prescribed burning program
• establish links between the prescribed burning program and the Integrated Municipal Fire Management Planning project

Integrate information management systems relating to the prescribed burning program to provide consistency across the networked emergency organisation:
• upgrade FireWeb as a map based application
• include risk management tools on FireWeb
• develop an integrated information management standard across the networked emergency organisation

Align policies and processes, within the year round 365 day focus on fire management, to provide consistency in the approach to fire regardless of its origins,- that is fuel reduction burning, regeneration and ecological burning or unplanned fire;
• extend contracted fire season services to increase resources available in high risk periods during the prescribed burning program
• revise documentation to remove distinctions between planned and unplanned fire
• extend Emergency Coordination Centre operations to include the prescribed burning program
• apply Australasian Interagency Incident Management System-Incident Control System rules to the prescribed burning program as a priority element of improving risk management processes

Develop new prescriptions for prescribed burning to accommodate local conditions in those areas where standard prescriptions are assessed to be inappropriate: 
• develop prescriptions for heathland/peat at Wilsons Promontory
• finalise development of prescriptions for the Mallee
• disseminate the fuel hazard guide to all burn personnel
• develop a training program to interpret prescriptions

Metropolitan Fire Brigade and Aviation Rescue Fire Fighting service review and enhance the existing mutual response Memorandum of Agreement to provide more timely notification and therefore immediate access to appropriate resources to respond to emergencies.

Melbourne Airport Emergency Planning Committee review the Airport Emergency Plan to ensure the capabilities of agencies are adequately documented and understood by all stakeholders, and that all agencies including airlines are represented at the appropriate organisational level on the Airport Emergency Planning Committee.

The Committee recommends that the government provide authority to a single community representative body to authorise clearing of native vegetation for fire management. (The community representative body must incorporate the CFS, DEH, Native Vegetation Council and local council)

The incident command system should clearly identify the roles of the rail commander, site controller, police commander and commanders of the other emergency services, and the way in which each is to work together during the recovery phase of any rail accident.

A direct line of communication should be established between the RMC and Emergency Services Operations Control Centre by a “tie line” or otherwise, so as to ensure that in the case of a serious rail accident there is an open line of communication between the officer in charge of the management of the incident at the RMC and the various emergency response services.

The RMC should be equipped by RailCorp with a transcriber system, or mimic board, or such other system as is necessary to enable identification of the precise location at any time of any train on the RailCorp network.

A designated staff member at the RMC should act as the rail emergency management co-ordinator. He or she should be the sole point of contact at the RMC with other rail personnel involved in the rail accident and emergency services personnel during the rescue phase of the emergency response.

A dedicated telephone line should be established by RailCorp between the RMC and any Emergency Services Control Centre for use during any emergency.

The rail commander should have complete authority to direct and control any rail employees attending the site of a rail accident, in accordance with directions given or arrangements put in place by the site controller, until the rescue phase of the emergency response to the rail accident has been completed.

There should be interoperability of communications equipment between all trains operating on the New South Wales rail network.

The role of the rail commander should be to provide support and assistance to the site controller and emergency services personnel until the rescue phase of the emergency response to any rail accident is completed.

There must be compatibility of communications systems throughout the rail network. It is essential that all train drivers, train controllers, signallers, train guards and supervisors of trackside work gangs in New South Wales be able to communicate using the same technology.

The location of the command post for site control at the scene of any rail accident should be identified by NSW Police by a distinctive flashing light.

All signal telephones must be maintained by RailCorp in proper working order.

The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, seek to create systematic mechanisms for better targeting and evaluating inter- agency coordination within the National Capability Development Exercise Programme and continuous improvement cycle.